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7 May 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 25/81)

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MILITARY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CONTROVERSIAL AID TO THIRD WORLD MILITARY, POLICE

Hamburg STERN in German 19 Mar 81 pp 238, 242

[Article by Mario R. Dederichs: "A Double Moral Standard: Bonn's Controversial Training and Development Aid to Third World Countries' Military and Police Forces"]

[Text] In the course of a Bundestag questions-and-answers session, State Secretary Wilfried Penner of the Ministry of Defense found himself in a quandary. CDU deputy Hans-Juergen Stutzer had wanted to know whether not sending any weapons into areas of tension and to dictators and putsch leaders while at the same time providing Bundeswehr training for soldiers from those very countries does not constitute "a double moral standard." Penner conceded that there are "some difficulties as regards consistency with respect to existing standards." Then he added the following: "A sensibly conceived foreign policy must also let itself be guided by what appears useful for the FRG."

The principle of "whatever serves Bonn's interests will be done" has for years been applied to the rendering of assistance to military and police forces in Africa, Asia, and South America by providing them with equipment and training, in which endeavor the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior are jointly collaborating under the overall control of Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Thus, for instance, the Bundeswehr is presently instructing 219 soldiers from 39 predominantly Third World countries in military command functions and weapons technology. Included are military personnel from such dictatorships as Guinea and Zaire. Two officers of the South Korean potentate Chun Doo Hwan are participating in a course of study at the Hamburg officer academy. Dating back to the time of the shah, 31 Iranian cadets have been getting naval training. In their country, torture and persecution were already prevalent at that time and today Iran, involved in a war with Iraq, is one of the hottest tension areas of the world. According to a confidential government paper, Bonn nonetheless believes that its training assistance is "as suitable as scarcely any other means for conveying our concepts of justice, freedom, and of the democratic form of government and way of life."

The Federal Government is also making a staunchly positive assessment of its equipment aid for the military and police forces which it is presently rendering to 31

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underdeveloped countries. During the past year, this item in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoured DM 9 million. An "informational annotation" states that, "due to its special political effect and, last but not least, its speedy implementation, simplicity, and precision, the equipment aid has proved to be eminently worthwhile as a dependable means for use in our foreign-policy relations with the concerned recipient countries."

To be sure, Bonn would much prefer to enjoy such gratification in silence. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confidentiality has been agreed upon with all recipient countries, and this was allegedly done in accordance with their wishes. Equipment aid made headlines only in this one instance: According to Bonn's version, Somalia would never have given its consent to the GSG-9 liberation action at Mogadishu without this aid. In the 3-year program preceding the freeing of the hostages, Somalia received military and police equipment amounting to DM 8.9 million. Afterwards, the aid was escalated to DM 15 million. Today this East African country is the second biggest recipient country after Tunisia. Additional major recipient countries are the Sudan and Niger, Morocco, Mali, Ruanda, Cameroon and Upper Volta.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that the delivered material--trucks, aircraft, engineering equipment, uniforms and criminal investigation laboratories--are only of a defensive nature and must not "be used for peace-endangering purposes." Rather, it is pointed out, this is "a measure which flanks our development aid." However, Uwe Holtz, the SPD's Third World expert, countered with the following statement: "We must oppose the militarization of the underdeveloped countries." His fellow party member Peter Wuertz, a member of the Bundestag budget committee, vigorously demands that the next 3-year equipment aid program not be permitted to grow as strongly as in 1979. At that time it had been doubled from DM 76 million to DM 153 million.

For in the politically unstable countries of the Third World there is always the risk that German equipment aid may be used for purposes other than originally intended. For instance, in the civil war, the military junta of El Salvador is using 20 Rheinstahl armored police cars. Morocco, which is fighting against the Polisario guerrillas in the western Sahara, supplies its army for the most part with field kitchens, medical equipment, and field rations from the FRG. In Tunisia, where members of the opposition and unionists are rigorously persecuted, German officials are training the police.

The military and police aid activities function as a "bridge" to future arms exports. For conflict research specialist Peter Lock of Hamburg University there exists "no doubt at all that this amounts to an aid for opening up markets." Firms which get involved via official aid projects subsequently keep on doing business such as, for instance, the Dornier aircraft manufacturing firm in Niger, which received the Do 27 and Noratlas aircraft plus military advisers from Bonn. And Malaya in Southeast Asia is no longer satisfied with only the German planning aid rendered to it in connection with the construction of the new Lumut naval base. Now, this country wants to buy 500 "Marder" infantry tanks and special-purpose "Condor" police vehicles from Thyssen-Henschel.

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An armaments study prepared by former tank General Eike Middeldorf for the Ministry of Defense accommodates such ambitions: It recommends that old Bundeswehr weapons not be scrapped, but that airplanes, tanks, guns, and infantry weapons be passed out to underdeveloped countries--but, of course, only for "defensive purposes."

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MILITARY GREECE

REPORTAGE ON AVIATION INDUSTRY, MIRAGE F-1 PLANES PUBLISHED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 14 Mar 81 pp 35-37, 39, 52

[Article by Jean de Galard: "Greek Mirage F-1s Have Flown More Than 40,000 Hours"]

[Text] Situated some 60 km northeast of Athens, near the shore of the Aegean Sea, the Tanagra Base, today under the command of Colonel Plevrakis, houses the 114th Combat Wing of the Hellenic Air Force, whose two squadrons Nos 334 and 342 are equipped with Mirage F1CGs which have SNECMA Atar 9K50 engines and Thomson-CSF Cyrano 4 radar.

The 114th All-Weather Fighter Wing is a unit of the Greek Tactical Air Force whose principal mission is air defense and whose secondary mission is ground attack.

The Hellenic Air Force was one of the first foreign air forces (after South Africa, Spain and Kuwait) to place an order with the French Government for Mirage F-1s--the Greek designation is Mirage F1CG--and it received delivery of the first 40 of this type of aircraft ordered in June 1974 at about the same time that the Fourth Air Defense Squadron of the French Air Force, equipped with Mirage F-1s, was becoming operational.

Let us mention again in fact that the first F-1s of the 30th Fighter Wing arrived in Reims in December 1973-January 1974 (cf AIR ET COSMOS No 515 of 2 February 1974). The two Mirage F1CGs flown from France by Greek pilots--from Mont-de-Marsan to Tanagra via Orange, with reserve fuel tanks--landed at the Tanagra Base on 5 August 1975. Only several months time, therefore, separated the entry into service of the Mirage F-1s in the air forces of the two countries. And as the equipping of the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) was carried out at an accelerated rate--the two squadrons of 20 planes each were constituted in 1976 and 1977 respectively--and as the increase in strength, on the operational level, of the two Greek squadrons was carried out just as rapidly, it can be said that the French Air Force and the Hellenic Air Force encountered and lived through the same problems together, those which await every air force which places in service a new combat plane, especially when the technology, operation and maintenance of this aircraft incorporate new concepts--which was the case with the Mirage 1.

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The pilots and mechanics of the French Air Force certainly still remember, even if the situation has radically changed, the growing pains the F-1 experienced in the early part of its entry into service and the modification--not to mention the supply problems--which had to be effected on its frame, its engine, its equipment.

The Greeks also experienced this difficult period, doubtless rendered more difficult yet for three reasons:

--the distance separating the place of use from the supply source;

--the language, even comprehension, problems of a technical documentation preliminarily translated into a second foreign language;

--the novelty and shortcomings of French logistic support in the process of being created, compared to the experience and amplitude of the NATO logistic system to which the HAF had long been accustomed.

The initial weakness of logistic support was also felt at the same time in the French Air Force. It usually accompanies the placing in service of a new airplane because experience is lacking to order in time the spare parts which will be necessary on a priority basis. It was felt all the more strongly in Greece in that it occurred at the same time that a national aeronautical industry, called the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, was being created, entrusted both with building up the first stock of spare parts earmarked for maintaining a good operational level of the two squadrons equipped with F1CGs, and progressively, without exterior aid, assuring the complete maintenance of the plane: frame, engine, mechanical and electronic equipment.

It was also important, as the increase in strength of the Mirage F-1s in the air defense squadrons of the French Air Force made apparent the necessity of certain technical modifications, to have the same modifications also applied to the Greek Mirage F-1s. The politico-military situation in Greece required in fact of the Hellenic Air Force that its operational availability be very high.

The undertaking, as might be expected, was not simple. Five years after the arrival at Tanagra of the first F1CGs flown by Greek pilots trained in France, a little over 3 years after delivery of the last of the 40 Mirage F-1s ordered by Greece, difficulties still remain. These concern essentially today, as we shall show in the following lines and in an article we will devote later to the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, spare parts and supplies, the difficulties relative to maintenance having been almost completely overcome. The customer, in this case the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, is inclined to judge severely its suppliers' delays, while the latter, for their part, consider that the spare parts orders from the aforementioned customer are often received much too close to the desired delivery date.

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The problem is obviously all the more serious for the Hellenic Aerospace Industry in that they must both be able to demonstrate their aptitude at carrying out their twofold mission of supply and maintenance center and give instantaneous satisfaction to an exacting customer, the Hellenic Air Force.

A Well Protected Base

The Tanagra Base has a NATO regulation-size, that is to say 2,400 m, runway. It is flanked on either side by two taxi runways which can if need arises be used for take-off. At the alert, the Mirage F1CGs can take off simultaneously in groups of three.

It is equipped with an ILS, and an approach radar constitutes for pilots a second aid in landing.

The base includes, like all NATO bases, many shelter hangars (let us recall that this will soon be the case with all French Air Force fighter plane bases). These hangars constitute for the Mirage F1CGs excellent protection but also very good camouflage, for to the visitor who walks around the base no parked airships are visible. The only thing he sees are hangars and planes taking off, in flight, or landing.

Each of the two squadrons has available on the base its own geographic zone and its own runway service. Maintenance service, shared by both squadrons, assures the upkeep of the various elements of the aircraft: mechanical and hydraulic units, radar, engines and accessories. The majority of the testing and monitoring benches in service on the base are identical, as the photos which illustrate these pages show, with those found at French Air Force bases. The arrival at Tanagra of the F1CGs necessitated the construction of several new technical buildings and especially the transformation and modernization of already existing buildings to adapt them, notably in respect to maintenance, to required specifications.

Pilot Instruction and Training

The first 16 Greek Mirage F-1 pilots were instructed and trained in France, principally at Mont-de-Marsan and at Reims. From among them, the most highly qualified were selected as instructors to assure in their turn in Greece the conversion of student-pilots for the F1CGs.

For their part, ground mechanics in charge of upkeep and readying planes have also taken in France a reconversion course in 1974-1975. Today, on the spot, the senior students are instructing the juniors.

Since 1978, the two squadrons 334 and 342 have had available an LMT simulator, whose operation and periodic upkeep have been entirely assured since 1979 by the qualified personnel of the base. It is in operation about 8 hours a

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day (it is doubtless appropriate to point out here that in peacetime on a Greek airbase normal activity begins at 0730 and continues without a break until 1500) and has three uses: to instruct very young pilots; to convert to the F1CG pilots who have experience on other types of planes; to perfect the pilots who are already qualified on the F1CG.

The pilots chosen to fly Mirage F1CGs have a minimum of 150 to 200 flight hours on fighter planes. They take a training course on the ground at Tanagra which lasts about a month; this course is followed by a week of simulator work (10 hours on the average), during which the pilot in training flies about 5 hours on a T-33, especially in order to familiarize himself with procedures and, on the visual level, with the base surroundings.

Next comes, for the future Greek Mirage F-1 pilot, soloing in his plane, the first ground taxiing. Then it is his first real 'solo' flight, in which he is of course accompanied by a patrol leader instructor. The first training flights last all total a little under 10 hours. These are followed by an operations training period which is spread over a little more than 40 hours. The pilot is then qualified as operational if he passes a series of tests. His training is continued under the watchful eye of an experienced pilot who aims to make of him both a patrol leader, capable of bringing a disorientated crew member back to base, and a pilot capable of participating in aerial combat. In this respect and in the opinion of two squadron-leaders, the 2-seat version of the Mirage F-1 would constitute a valuable aid. But the Greek defense budget does not authorize the corresponding expenditure.

In the two squadrons we have visited, experienced pilots who already have a good number of hours to their credit on Mirage F1CGs are mixed in with very young pilots, who graduated just a few years earlier from the Air Academy.

In the squadrons, the pilots fly an average of 15 hours a month (180 hours a year); in this total are included the 3 to 5 hours in the T33 but not, of course, the 3 to 4 hours of simulator training they put in in order to perfect themselves.

A Good Level of Availability

The 114th Fighter Wing (which has, in addition to its Mirage F1CGs, several T33s), has had to deplore, up to now, two F1CG accidents which cost the life of their pilots. The 38 Mirage F1CGs presently in operation have totaled 40,000 flight hours and the one which has the largest number has around 1,300. All upkeep is assured today by Greek mechanicians who had the advantage, until last year, within the framework of contractual agreements, of the presence of French technicians sent by Dassault, SNECMA and Thomson-CSF. For the last year, there has been only one.

The level of operational availability, according to squadron-leaders, is on the order of 80 percent, which appears remarkable if one thinks of the amount of upkeep problems to be solved (those evoked in the beginning of this article).

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The Greek F1CG pilots whom we questioned declared themselves well satisfied with the plane's intrinsic qualities (remarks on its SFENA automatic pilot were always very laudatory), its easy handling at high and low speeds, its manoeuvrability, its performance. The colonel in command of the Tanagra Base, who has flown around 250 hours in Mirage F-1s (out of a total of 6,250 hours), considers it the plane the best adapted to the mission of air defense as this latter is defined by the Greek general staff. Like all fighter pilots, he would unquestionably wish that "the motor would push a little harder and that the radar would work better."

In any event the pilots expect a lot from the improvements which the addition of combat flaps will add to their planes; the transformation of the planes is going to be assured shortly and will be staggered so that the Wing's operational level will never fall beneath a certain fixed threshold.

The F1CGs of the 114th Wing took part several months ago in NATO manoeuvres along with F4s, F-5s and F-15s. The results were judged to be very satisfactory.

For reasons of "national defense," the people we spoke with were keen not to reveal any details on F1CG weaponry; doubtless the interface modifications required by the use of the Sidewinder instead of the Magic missile were not without causing some problems. It is intentional that the planes photographed here have been shown on the ground in linear configuration.

"For air-to-air firing they are armed with 30 milimeter canons and missiles; on tactical support missions, they chiefly carry bombs, of 250 and 450 kilograms among others."

Supply Time Must Be Reduced

If the pilots of the 114th Wing freely admit that the placing in service of the Mirage F-1 has finally set fewer operational problems for them than of the F-104 20 years ago, the Maintenance Squadron's mechanics, on the other hand, lament that supply time of spare parts is practically twice as long as that to which NATO logistics had accustomed them. Fortunately, the breakdown rate of the plane's various components is qualified as rather low.

The setting up of the various testing benches has doubtless required more time than planned; it is practically finished today and the complete upkeep of the F-1s is assured by Greek mechanics. The latter carry out in particular the 200, 400 and 600 hour check up of the Atar 9K50, each check up requiring around 80 working hours. The 800 hour check up and beyond is assured by the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, with resources whose amplitude will be made known in the article we will write soon on the HAI.

Periodically, Greek Mirage F-1 pilots visit with some of their aircraft air defense units of the French Air Force. Last year the 12th Fighter Wing of

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Cambrai received the visit of Greek pilots. Next June, in principle, the 10th Fighter Wing based at Creil will receive the visit of the Greek Mirage F1CG pilots. Let us bet that, meanwhile, the remaining difficulties will have been substantially smoothed over. And, in any event, in the meantime a Greek delegation, composed of high-ranking representatives of official departments, will have been received on official visit in France, while Greek pilots were supposed to come this week to France to complete and terminate in Istres the first evaluation of the Mirage 2000 carried out last year.

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GENERAL FRANCE

COMPUTERIZED DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY OF ELECTORATE

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21-27 Mar 81 pp 140-143, 145-148

[Article by Herve Le Bras (director of studies at l'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales and director of research at l'Institut national d'etudes demographiques) and Emmanuel Todd (author of "La chute finale" and "Fou et le proletaire" and columnist for LE MONDE) based on their book by the same title: "L'Invention de la France"]

[Excerpts] The Computer, the Map and Sociology

The map complex was prepared by a computer. The most recent materials are flexible and accurate enough to make the result favorably comparable to a traditional cartographer's work. The maps appear on a cathode screen the size of a large television screen. They are made up of minuscule luminous dots linked together to form contours or scattered to fill in surfaces. In less than 2 minutes, almost 20,000 of these dots appear on the screen to create a remarkably detailed image. A (hard copy) photocopying machine then sweeps the screen to record the map. This speed of execution has revolutionized cartographic practice, in which the designer had to reflect carefully before choosing his colors, and tracing took several hours. Henceforth one can obtain more than 20 different maps in an hour, choosing that which supplies the best illustration. The convenience of the computer is not limited to speedy drafting, but is also evidenced in the almost infinite possibilities for manupulation. In the present case, instant access to a bank of departmental data comprising almost 1,500 different series makes a wide variety of comparisons, cross references and superpositions of economic, social and anthropological phenomena possible.

In less than a minute, any departmental series whatsoever can be compared to the series under study. To prepare two close phenomena, such as the intensity of religious practice and the frequency of right-wing voting, the computer calculates the existing range between its reading for religious practice and its reading for right-wing voting. The smaller the gap, the greater the agreement between two phenomena. The greater it is, the greater the difference between them. The map of these differences instantly obtained reveals the existence of some regions of difference in France in which the right wing is not very Christian or the left wing is very little dechristianized.

No one to date has been able to explain why certain regions in France seem naturally leftist and others rightist. Economist sociology, whether Marxist and fanatic on the concept of social class, or liberal and supporting the idea of socioprofessional

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categories, has nothing to say on these opposing attitudes. Certain right-wing regions are rich and others poor. Certain left-wing regions are heavily worker populated, but the majority are rural or tertiary. Economics does not guide French political life. However, the left and the right, which divided up the national territory between 1789 and 1889 (between the taking of the Bastille and the building of the Eiffel Tower), did not choose their respective provinces by chance or for the quality of their cheese or their folklore. The political division of France followed very precise anthropological lines of force. The major ideologies--radicalism, conservatism, socialism, Catholicism and communism--are each situated in a system of particular relationships. Political sensitivity is closely linked in fact with the dominant mode of family affectivity.

More generally and basically, a study of French anthropological diversity leads to a new interpretation of a central myth in national history, a myth which is useful and generous: universal man, identical in any place, any culture, the revolutionary dream which did not die with the First Republic.

Could this radical attitude have been born elsewhere than in France, an anthropologically diverse nation, where the citizenry is not the mere juridical reflection of a system of particular mores, but the product of a will on the part of individuals and provinces to "live together," of a desire to dominate, to annihilate anthropological determinism?

The invention of France is this process of fabricating a nation from diverse and contradictory elements.

Nature and Development of the French Political System

Since its origins, the French political system has been only superficially national. The balanced opposition of the left and the right hardly exists except on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies at the Bourbon Palace. The majority of the provinces and the regions have in reality been politically homogeneous and stable since the beginning of the century. The right wing traditionally carries the West, a good part of the East and the southern part of the Massif Central. The left dominates in the Midi, the Center-Limousin and the North. The electoral battle is only uncertain on the fringes of these inert blocs, in which voting, whether it be heavily for the left or the right, is not a subject on which individuals reflect, but an element of local culture.

Statistically, this characteristic of the political system is expressed by the extreme disparity in the results obtained by each party in the various regions of France. In the 1919 elections, for example, just prior to the Tours split, the old Socialist Party, still united, won 42 percent of the votes cast in Allier, but only 2 percent in Vendee; 40 percent in Bouches-du-Rhone, but 7 percent on Orne; 22 percent in Correze, but 5 percent in Meuse. A traditional statistical index with an evocative name, "variance," enables us to synthesize these disparities for the departments as a whole, to measure the average degree of disparity in the results obtained by this or that party in a given election. Variance, which summarizes here the geographic variability of electoral performance, is traditionally very strong for all the French political parties. The more a party tends toward uniform distribution of its voters over the whole of a territory, the smaller the variance. On the contrary, the more its voters are concentrated in certain strongholds, and sparse in other regions, the greater the variance is.

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From this point of view, the PS and the PCF still appeared in 1973 as two parties of the old type. These two brothers, not twins but both the offspring of the old Jaures Socialist Party, produced, like their common ancestor, a strong variance in their electoral results: 46 for the PS, 46 for the PCF. This symmetrical system broke up in 1978: the electoral variance of the PCF did not change, while that of the PS dropped to 23.

This decline shows that the PS is suddenly spreading to the whole of French territory. It is advancing above all in the traditional zones of force of the right wing, the East and the West. It is losing ground in the old regions of leftist influence, the Midi in particular.

The socialist penetration in the East, accounting for a gain of +8 percent of the votes in Alsace, is basically a natural phenomenon. The very conservative direction of this region is recent, the effect of the 20th-century traumas, the constant transfers of sovereignty suffered by Alsace and Lorraine since 1870. In the middle of the 19th century, Alsace was regarded as a republican and leftist region. It was the anticlerical policy of the Third Republic between the two wars which led the recovered province to reject these traditions. Thus the socialist push is not a novelty, but a reconciliation.

It is the conquest of the West by the PS which began in 1978 which is the spectacular and basic phenomenon. Here socialism is penetrating a region which had rejected the left with a certain fanaticism since 1789. Andre Siegfried clearly showed, in his "Political Chart of the West of France" around 1913, to what point Brittany and above all Anjou, Maine and Vendee were still living in the era of the Old Regime, as if they were outside republican France. The 1978 election thus completed an historical cycle. It meant that the French Revolution, with its specific ideological conflicts, its loves and its hates, was ended.

The PS is not alone in profiting from this calming of passions and this national homogenization movement. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, less popular in the country as a whole than General de Gaulle, nonetheless has had greater acceptance in the heart of Languedoc, which extends from Montpellier to Toulouse. In 1974, the liberal right wing penetrated the red Midi at the very moment the liberal left wing was penetrating the reactionary West. A process of fusion is currently in progress and is likely to continue in the years to come. The French political system is in the process of abandoning its old geographic and anthropological segmentation.

As opposed to these movements of national breadth, the French Communist Party is the embodiment of fidelity to regional traditions. It remains solidly established, or solidly reduced, depending on the point of view, in its stronghold in the North, the Center-Limousin and Midi. It has been absolutely unable to expand in the Eastern and Western parts of the country. On the contrary, its most serious provincial setbacks in 1978 occurred in the regions in which it was already traditionally weak. It lost more than 4 percent of the votes cast in Finistere, Calvados and Cantal, all departments belonging to the bloc of old conservative regions. With its three strong points being the North, Center and Midi, the electoral map of the PCF, showing violent contrasts, still somewhat resembled that of French socialism in 1919. The PCF was not able, as the PS was, to reach beyond the framework and the fidelity defined by our very ancient revolution.

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The only region in which it is still advancing in perceptible fashion is, typically, the South-West (Hautes-Pyrenees, Ariege, Tarn-et-Garonne, Haute-Garonne), where it continues to chip away tirelessly at the bastions of the old SFIO [French Section of the Workers International (French Socialist Party)] and the Radical Party. Thus French communism is confirming that it is less a leftist force than a necrosis of the left, plagued with impotence when it comes to forcing the retreat in conservative influence.

There is one region of France, of capital importance one can accurately say, in which the PCF is fainting--the Parisian concentration in the broad sense. In the departments of the "little crown" as a whole (Seine-Saint-Denis, Val d'Oise, Hauts-de Seine), the PCF showed a decline between 1973 and 1978 from 29.5 percent to 24.9 percent of the votes cast--a drop of 4.6 percent in 5 years.

Since its origins, the power of Paris communism has concealed the unequal influence of the party in French territory as a whole. In the great Jacobin tradition, a strong PCF in the capital sufficed for it to be considered as a great national party. This central collapse, if it continues, is likely to bring brutally to the fore the regional ethnographic characteristics of the PCF.

Communism and the Workers Class: A Sociological Fantasy

The PCF defines itself as the party of the workers class. This claim is widely accepted. It is believed, on the right as on the left, that communism is a proletarian phenomenon. This representation is a veritable sociological fantasy. There is no visible relation in France between the geographic distribution of the workers class and the regional influence of the PCF. The coefficient of correlation between the relative importance of the industrial sector and the percentage of votes won by the PCF in the legislative elections is practically nil, to be exact 0.08 (1978 legislative elections, active population employed in the secondary sector in 1968).

The maps showing the location of industry and the "party of the workers class" are absolutely disparate. Communism and the proletariat coincide only in the Northern part of France (departments of Pas-de-Calais, Nord, Aisne and Ardennes). Of the 21 most heavily industrialized departments, only 4 show a percentage of communist votes equal or superior to 25 percent. Two of the three communist bastions, Center-Limousin and the Mediterranean coast, are in no way regions remarkable for their industrial development.

The East, on the contrary, from Moselle to Isere, which is heavily industrial, has been penetrated by communism to a very weak extent. There is a mystery here and a mystification. How could political science and public opinion in general have accepted the idea that there is a firm and basic relationship between communism and the proletariat?

The illusion is based on an inversion of the mechanism of perception of economic reality. The regions which vote communist are perceived as industrial and workers' regions. It is not widely known in France that Isere, Haute-Savoie, Jura, Doubs, Eure and Aube are heavily industrial departments with concentrations of workers, because these regions do not vote communist. In the collective awareness, economic perception derives from political perception, and not the reverse.

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The economy is a world of social half-awareness. It is regarded as important and even basic by the majority of current sociologists, whether Marxist or not, but these sociologists lack a precise knowledge of the specific economy. Economics is a mythical reference. On the theoretical level, it dominates the field of the humanities. In practice, its image is entirely determined by the political superstructure and the ideological superstitions which prevail today. Only the conservative deputies elected in the heavily proletarian regions know basically that communism is not a byproduct of industrialization.

This lack of coincidence between communism and industry on the level of France can be observed on the international scale. The Russia of 1917 and the China of 1949 were not industrial countries: they are presently communist. England was very much a country of the workers: it is still not communist.

Giscard d'Estaing, de Gaulle and Languedoc

Valery Giscard d'Estaing was regarded at the time of his election to the presidency of the republic as a conservative of a more classic nature than General de Gaulle. There was emphasis then on a popular base of support for Gaullism which the new president lost. Electoral geography brings out another image, a radically different one.

In 1974, as a whole, Giscard rallied a much smaller percentage of votes than did de Gaulle in 1965: 50.7 percent as opposed to 55 percent. But if he lost voters in the greater portion of the country, he surpassed the general's figures in the most traditional leftist regions, in the heart of Languedoc. With Giscard d'Estaing, the so-called classic right wing penetrated the most solid bastions of the socialist and radical left. This movement can be compared with the symmetrical push of the new PS in the conservative East and West. Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the PS are the simultaneous incarnations of a process of geographical homogenization of the French political system. From the point of view of electoral sociology, they are complementary and are contributing to the development of a new political system.

This development also points up the extent to which the purest essence of the Midi rejected de Gaulle. Rarely in the political history of the country has the contrast between the North and South been so striking. With the appearance of national unity and rising above parties, the general pushed the antagonism between North and South, one of the structural elements in the old French political system, to its limit of tolerance. It would be interesting to know why the heart of Languedoc was so resistant to the charms of the personal and plebicite system. One thing is certain: this region does not like the father image in politics. Thus in the subjugated France of the years 1958-1969, Languedoc was a veritable refuge for liberal ideas. This role as a political "redoubt" is not without its similarities to the place occupied by the reactionary West in the republican and secular France of the Third Republic.

The Rocard Phenomenon

A candidate in the 1969 presidential election, Michel Rocard achieved but a limited triumph. The big winner on the left then (that is to say the least defeated) was Jacques Duclos, the representative of the PCF, who won 21 percent of the votes despite predictions to the contrary. Rocard had to content himself with 3.6 percent. These

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are overall results. A detailed geographic analysis reveals the meaning of the Rocard phenomenon, the profound reason for national popularity and fascination unrelated to the minority, not to say insignificant, electoral base of a candidate. Compared with the total number of leftist votes, the strength of Rocard's electorate traces with diabolical precision the map of religious practice around 1960. The deeper one penetrates into a Catholic region, the heavier Michel Rocard's weight on the left was. What he represented was quite simply the breakdown of the old clerical-anticlerical cleavage inherited from the French Revolution. His minuscule electorate then represented a union of the two Frances, or rather a third France, indifferent to the ideological conflicts of the past. But the PCF was not at all wrong in speaking of a "Rocard d'Estaing." The electoral maps of the support of the two graduates of the National School of Administration are strangely similar. Both are dictated heavily by the map of Catholicism, which in itself is a marvelous negative image of the map of communism.

The Right Wing and Religion

The French left wing has a mythical adversary, fascism (it will not succeed) and a real opponent, Catholicism (but it extends a hand to it). One could marvel at the consistency with which our leftist parties wage the battle against an absolutely nonexistent fascist menace. No party of the Mussolini, Nazi or more modestly Franco type has ever had the slightest electoral importance in France, even in 1936. Today, the extreme right wing, all factions merged, commands about one half of one percent of the votes (1978).

The hard and serious nucleus of the French right wing is Catholicism, an ideological system which may under certain circumstances encourage anti-Semitism, but which never favors a generalized xenophobia of the Nazi type. The Roman Catholic church is after all, like communism, a supranational phenomenon.

The map reflecting the voting support for Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 and that showing religious practice around 1960 are remarkably similar.

Paradoxically, the French Revolution, by decapitating Catholicism in Paris and the Paris basin, enabled it to sink deep roots in the peripheral peasant society. In Rouergue, in the Basque country, in Alsace or in Leon (in Finistere-Nord), Catholicism prevails in local communities where the temperament is democratic. It provides the conservative right wing with a veritable mass base.

The Left Wing: A Family Affair

The economic variables are powerless to explain the unwavering leftist inclination of certain regions of France and the reactionary obstinacy of some others. The map showing Mitterrand's voting support in no way resembles that reflecting industry or poverty. Nor does that reflecting Giscard d'Estaing's voting support coincide with that showing wealth or the peasantry.

Family structure, a basic anthropological parameter, does on the other hand, and with remarkable precision, coincide with the map of the leftist vote. The regions in which the traditional family is both extensive (that is to say frequently associating a number of married couples in a single domestic unit) and flexible in its mechanism for the takeover of the generations (reflected in early marriage by young adults) voted

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for Francois Mitterrand in 1974. The typical values of this community type of family organization are close to those of the left. The community family envelops the individual in its warmth and its protection.

When this traditional family structure is solid and intact, it is a true social force, a guarantee against encroachments by state or aristocratic powers. This is the reason for the leftist inclination in the regions where it is found. When this family structure breaks down and is replaced by simple conjugal households, it leaves individuals with a sense of emptiness and yearning for the community. Consequently the individual is predisposed toward an acceptance of the communist ideal, a particularly clear phenomenon in two regions, the Center-Limousin and the Mediterranean coast, while the collapse of the Languedoc family structures in the 19th century created fertile ground for the communist movement.

Authority

A cartographic contour recurs unceasingly in this geography of French mentality. Twenty times, 100 times, like a leitmotiv, a complex has appeared made up of 5 peripheral poles: Brittany, the Basque country, the Southeast frontier--from the Jura to Alsace. A large number of variable factors find their way into this repetitive form, such as the proportion of households including collateral relatives of the head of the family or children over 25 years of age and the frequency of the birth of twins. If we add to these five poles the interior of the West--from Perche to Anjou--we obtain a map of religious practice, or the hard right wing, that is to say the departments which voted most enthusiastically for Valery Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 or for Charles de Gaulle in 1965, and attended mass most assiduously around 1960.

There is a veritable key which organizes this seemingly heterogeneous grouping: average age at marriage. Couples marry more or less young in the various provinces in France: the level of youthful marriage is a good indicator of the type of control exercised over these young adults by their social system, but this social system is not uniform throughout France. Age at marriage, recorded on the departmental level, measures the local strength of the authority principle. Marriage at an older age defines a family structure of the authoritarian type. It produces numerous unmarried men and women who sometimes remain for the whole of their lives in the families of their married brothers or sisters, as aging children or eternal uncles.

Politics and the Birth Rate

Toward the middle of the 6th decade of the 20th century, one could still find in France a rather remarkable coincidence between leftist political votes and a low reproduction rate for couples. The map reflecting the vote for Mitterrand in 1965 and that showing the lowest reproduction indices in 1975 are very similar. The old republican and anti-de Gaulle regions have a conservative attitude toward procreation.

In 1974, however, this clear image became clouded: Mitterrand won back for the left wing, after the departure of General de Gaulle, the old socialist regions in the North, between Amiens and Lille. Now this part of the country has a high birth rate, close to that of the vast conservative zone which surrounds it. The relationship between the left wing and low reproduction is weakening, but it has not disappeared on the level of France overall.

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There is no direct and immutable relationship between the number of births and political attitudes. The coincidences, frequent but intermittent, derive from the fact that politics and the reproduction rate are both determined by an anthropological substratum. But if the community family in the South always produces leftist votes, this does not inevitably lead to a low birth rate.

Political Agnosticism and Life Expectancy

The two main ideologies underlying the traditional national political conflict--the revolutionary concept and Catholicism--are metaphysical systems. Religion believes in paradise after death. The revolutionary ideal involves belief in paradise on earth.

Communism, the current representative of the revolutionary atheism and materialism of the 18th century, affirms moreover that the spirit dies when the body does.

Communism and Catholicism have in common the idea that a relationship must necessarily exist between the view of death and the concept of politics. True happiness, according to both doctrines, can only lie in the future of an individual, on earth or in heaven.

The majority of the regions of France have accepted this coincidence of political ideas and metaphysical concepts. One is leftist and atheist, or rightist and a believer. Only a few provinces have rejected this alignment of faith and the vote. They are then rightist, without being particularly Christian, or leftist, without being entirely dechristianized. Two main and opposing blocs are particularly remarkable.

One extends from the Seine to the Atlantic, and is right wing without excessive belief in god.

The other extends from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean and is viscerally leftist without being hostile to religion.

Curiously, these two compact blocs are seen with equal clarity on the maps of life expectancy.

Death comes particularly late in the regions of political agnosticism, where metaphysics is not concerned with earthly conflicts. Lives are long in the regions in which there is belief neither in paradise on earth nor a paradise after death.

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

Workers--21 departments with the heaviest proportion of workers in 1968.



Communism--21 departments with the heaviest proportion of communist votes in 1978.

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Communism in the Workers Class--departments with both a strong communist vote and many workers (intersection of the two preceding maps).



Gain by Giscard d'Estaing (in 1974) over de Gaulle (in 1965) in the crosshatched areas.

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

Rocard in 1969--percentage won by Rocard out of the leftist votes in 1969.

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

Giscard and Catholicism in 1974--Proportion of votes cast for Giscard d'Estaing in 1974.



Religious Practice Around 1960--Proportion of practicing Christians.



Giscard Without Catholicism: Difference--In the departments with darkest shading, Giscard d'Estaing won votes but attendance at mass is rare.

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

Left: Mitterrand in 1974--38 departments in which the left won the best results (striped areas).

Right: Departments where the average age at marriage was young around 1955 (63 departments).

Departments in which the proportion of large families was the highest in 1975 (44 departments).

Community family--overlap of the two preceding categories.

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AGE AU MARIAGE
Si l'on fait la moyenne de l'âge de la femme et de celui du mari à leur mariage, en 1955, les vingt-sept départements pour lesquels cet âge moyen est le plus élevé sont représentés en hachures.

Age at Marriage--if the ages of the husband and wife at the time of marriage in 1955 are averaged, the 27 departments in which the average age was highest are crosshatched.



GISCARD EN 1974
Les vingt-sept départements qui ont donné les plus fortes majorités à Giscard en 1974 sont hachurés.

Giscard d'Estaing in 1974--the 27 departments which gave Giscard d'Estaing the largest majorities in 1974 are crosshatched.



Religious Practice--Departments in which attendance at mass exceeded 40 percent around 1960 are crosshatched.

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

Politics and Birth Rate: Mitterrand Majority in 1965--departments which cast the majority of their votes for Mitterrand in the 1965 presidential election.

Low Birth Rate in 1975--33 departments in which the birth rate was lowest in 1975.



DENATALITÉ EN 1975
Trente-trois départements où la fécondité est la plus faible en 1975.

Mitterrand Majority in 1974--departments which cast the majority of their votes for Mitterrand in the 1974 presidential election.

MITTERRAND MAJORITAIRE EN 1974
Départements ayant donné la majorité de leurs suffrages à Mitterrand à l'élection présidentielle de 1974.

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

Left: Political Agnosticism--nonreligious right wing; nondechristianized left wing; the departments in which the political and religious attitudes do not coincide are striped.

Right: Life Expectancy in 1975--life expectancy span after the age of 50 in 1975 (individuals 50 years old) in relation to the national average.

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GENERAL NORWAY

BRIEFS

JOINING SPACE AGENCY--An agreement was signed on 2 April 1981 [for Norway to join the European Space Agency (ESA)]. It was signed at the ESA headquarters in Paris by Odd Gothe, chief negotiator for the Ministry of Industry and Erik Quistgaard, director general of ESA. The agreement is subject to ratification by the Norwegian Parliament. This agreement confers upon Norway the status of associate member for a period of 5 years, during which time Norway could commit itself to adhere to the Convention of 30 May 1975, and thus acquire full membership. The status of associate member permits Norway to participate in the space teledetection system, "Earthnet," and in the general studies concerning future projects, which are the fundamental activities of the Agency. Norway likewise will be able to participate in other mandatory and optional activities, including operational ones, conducted by the Agency and concerning space. Norway may be represented on the Council of the Agency by two additional delegates, who can be accompanied by advisors. Norway will have a consultative voice within all the subsidiary organizations of the Agency, and will be represented at the meetings of the Council's directors when programs in which Norway is participating are discussed. It can also request observer status to be represented at the meetings of any subsidiary organ or working group. Norway presently participates in the MARECS maritime satellite communications program, and in ESA's program preparing the European teledetection satellite, the "ERS." [Text] [Paris AIR ET COMOS in French 11 Apr 81 p 63] [COPYRIGHT: A & C. 1981]

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