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3 September 1981

China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 14/81)

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CONTENTS

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

China's Vietnam Vets Attend Nanjing Advanced Infantry School
(Yang Genrong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1 May 79)..... 1

Wuhan Tank Battalion Experiments in Multigrade Training
(Kuang Zhaojian, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 May 79)..... 2

Relationship Between Commanders, Subordinates Discussed
(Pei Dingsan; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 25 May 79)..... 7

Agitation, Propaganda Help Maintain Fighting Spirit
(Zhao Gengqun; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 27 May 79)..... 10

Shenyang Army Hospital Adopts New Clinical Technology
(Guo Jindong, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 27 May 79)..... 14

Beijing Unit Carries Out Combined-Arms Training
(Zhang Meirong, Huang Yusheng; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 27 May 79)..... 16

Study of New Weapon Technology, Combat Methods Urged
(Bing Yan; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Apr 79)..... 17

Articles Extol Flight Heroes in Border Defense
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Apr 79)..... 22

Heroic Air Defense Commander, by Pan Zongde
Mechanic Ensures Flight Safety, by Jin Shijun, Deng Xudong
Patrol Aircraft Extra Alert, by Cai Shanwu, Liu Changdong
Cargo Plane Crew Alert

Saga of Young Soldier's Sacrifice for Motherland
(Liu Liangkai, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Apr 79)..... 25

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

Youth Exhorted To Be Model Defenders of Motherland
(Wu Zhang; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Apr 79) 27

Soldier Suggests Improvements in Tactics, Equipment
(Lo; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Apr 79) 29

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CHINA'S VIETNAM VETS ATTEND NANJING ADVANCED INFANTRY SCHOOL

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 May 79 p 1

[Article by Yang Genrong [2799 2704 2837]: "Nearly 100 Outstanding Cadres Enter the Nanjing Advanced Infantry School"]

[Text] Beginning on 15 April, 93 cadres from the Guangxi Border Troops have arrived one after another at the Nanjing Advanced Infantry School for study. Among these outstanding commanders tempered in the self-defensive counterattack are some military cadres who led "dagger" companies in bravely penetrating the enemy lines and who directed one decisive victory after another in the battles of Tong Deng [Chinese pronunciation: 0681 4098] and Lang Son; some political cadres who always set a personal example in promptly and forcefully carrying out political work during the battle; and some leading logistics cadres who fear neither hardship nor death and who did an outstanding job of completing battle supply tasks. Among the 93 students are 50 who have been cited for battlefield service. The arrival of this batch of students has given the school brave deeds and battle experience for developing in-depth study of the self-defensive counterattack battles. This has raised the quality of instruction and provided extremely beneficial factors.

The CCP committee of the Nanjing Advanced Infantry School has attached great importance to this batch of new students entering the school. They drew up a resolution on studying the brave deeds and experiences in the battle of self-defense and counterattack, calling on the personnel of the school to study seriously the lofty patriotism and revolutionary heroic spirit of the troops who participated in battle, study the valuable experience in doing battle which was paid for with blood, to utilize this experience thoroughly in reforming instruction, to strive to train outstanding commanders and to greatly advance all items of work with instruction at the core.

11723
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

WUHAN TANK BATTALION EXPERIMENTS IN MULTIGRADE TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 May 79 p 1

[Article by Kuang Zhaojian [2568 0664 1017], Liu Jinzhang [0491 6855 4545], Guo Chuangxing [6753 0482 5281] and Han Baoqing [7281 5508 7230], "Reform the Educational System, Raise the Quality of Training"]

[Text] This newspaper received a great deal of response after we published the experiences of a regiment of units under the Nanjing Command with a "promotion grade system" of training in our 26 February issue. Many units feel that this training method is a major reform which solves the long-standing problem of putting rookie and veteran soldiers in the same pot and that it helps raise the quality of training. Some comrades, however, have raised the question of how can we solve the problems of inadequate teaching personnel, equipment and space if we act like that regiment and train each company in separated class grades. The No 1 tank battalion of a certain division of the units under the Wuhan Command has experimented in carried out multigrade education taking the battalion as the educational unit and solved these problems relatively well. Here we introduce how they have done this.

The No 1 tank battalion is this year's pioneer training test-point battalion in a certain division of the armored force of the units under the Wuhan Command. Since the beginning of February, with the assistance of a divisional work team, it has adopted a new teaching system focusing on the battalion and joining the battalion and the companies according to the "promotion grade system" method. The quality of training has improved markedly.

The "Promotion Grade System" Training Method Carries With It a Reform in the Educational System

In January of this year when they were studying the training plan for the training test-point battalion, some comrades put forth the daring proposal to carry out training on a specialized basis by separating higher and lower classes. Of course this would be very good for solving the problem of putting

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novice and veteran personnel in the same pot. But it also bore with it a new problem. Everyone first counted things up: a tank company has four kinds of personnel: tank commander, driver, first gunner and second gunner. If each of these has a higher and lower class, that makes eight classes. Yet one tank company has nine cadres including the quartermaster and in ordinary times at most two-thirds of these are available. The teaching capability is therefore insufficient to use the company as the teaching unit to carry out multigrade training. In addition, some comrades pointed out that so many training vehicles would be required for company-level training. In the past when training was divided into four specialized squads there was a chronic problem in practical operations of contending for vehicles and waiting for them. If they split the four squads into eight classes the contradictions of contending and waiting for vehicles would become more intense and there would definitely be insufficient training grounds and materials as well.

What could be done? The division CCP committee considered the greater interests and after numerous studies and deliberations resolved to search out a way via reforming the educational system, changing from one in the past with the company as its basic unit to a multigrade training system organized in a unified way by the battalion. Moreover Assistant Division Commander Chen and Vice-Commissar Sheng led separate work teams to first go to the No 1 battalion of a certain regiment for a trial run.

Methods of Implementing the Organization of Teaching Using the Battalion as the Basic Unit

How, concretely, can multigrade training be organized in a unified manner by the battalion?

One, the personnel of the entire battalion are grouped into unified classes. Using the method of mass appraisal, review by groups of teaching personnel and examination and approval by the company CCP branch, they grouped the tank commanders, first gunners and drivers each into higher and lower classes according to time of service, technical grade and ability to learn. The second gunners were grouped into one class, making a total of seven classes. Those whose professional techniques were relatively good went to the A classes while those whose technical level was a little lower or who were rookies went to the B classes. The personnel of each company were like schoolmates going to their own classes at unified training times to listen to lectures or to drill. In the course of training personnel were promoted and demoted in grade in keeping with the development of their professional qualities.

Two, the teaching personnel of the entire battalion divided up their work in a unified manner. The battalion organized and assigned the cadres and teaching personnel of each company in a unified manner. Aiming at the technical specialties of each cadre and his level of teaching responsibility and acting in accordance with the principles of putting the capable in command and pairing up the strong and the weak, they put the specialized teaching personnel of the entire battalion into four instructor groups, including

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communications, gunnery and driving, and separately arranged cadres at the levels of battalion and company to assume the responsibility of group leader or assistant group leader. On the eve of the training, the four instructor groups divided up the work for the 85 basic topics and operational topics involved in this year's specialized training. This brought each subject down to the individual so that each instructor understood the topic, contents, time and methods of his own teaching responsibility and there was a primary teacher and a backup teacher for each topic in order to avoid the situation where there is no one to teach when an instructor leaves. Battalion and regiment cadre experts were invited to teach the nine theoretical topics which were relatively difficult.

Three, the entire battalion drew up a unified concrete implementing training plan. They organized the battalion's instructors to act in keeping with the monthly plans of the regiment and collectively draw up a program for implementing the training topics, collectively prepare lessons and examinations. In drawing up this program they treat groups A and B separately according to their aptitudes. For example, they increased the number of relatively deep topics for drivers in class A, including the extended utilization of tanks and basic knowledge for technical appraisal and minor tank repairs.

Four, the battalion made unified arrangements for various kinds of training equipment. While the instruction was being carried out, specialized training equipment was all managed and repaired by the battalion and distributed to each class in a unified manner for its use. This not only brought the existing equipment into full play, it also created conditions for joint specialized training.

Five, the battalion and the companies join with both division and joining. While the battalion organizes specialized basic training and education in a unified manner, the company cadres cooperate on their own initiative and organize the soldiers of their own companies to go to class at the appropriate times, to do their studies well and to do good political and ideological work in the course of training. The battalion makes unified stipulations for the times which should be used for training, taking the company as the basic organizational unit for concrete implementation. Training competitions are also carried out between companies. They also pay attention to joining organically separate training and joint training. That is, after a stretch of separate specialized training they let the four kinds of personnel return to their own tanks and do a stretch of joint specialized training. They then separate the training again in a repeated cycle. This allows the company cadres to grasp promptly the specialized technical conditions of the soldiers in their own companies and facilitates the personnel of each tank in practicing cooperative maneuvers.

Advantages of Reforming the Educational System

Although the No 1 tank battalion has not trial implemented the multigrade instructional system organized in a unified way by the battalion for a very long period of time, its advantages have already begun to become evident.

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"With the new educational system, rookie and veteran personnel both have a keen interest in study." This is the general opinion of the soldiers. Rookie and veteran personnel have separate drills and lectures in keeping with their different natures and there is both promotion and demotion. The veteran personnel do not study "the same old stuff," so they take an intense interest in study. The rookie personnel strive to be promoted to the higher grade and put out a bit more effort to study and drill. The enthusiasm of the battalion's soldiers for training has been throroughly aroused.

"With the new educational system we no longer worry about the instructor problem." This is the impression of the company cadres. The No 3 company is a prominent example. During the first half of last year, the commander entered a training unit and the vice-commander was not qualified. There were no cadres to handle the two main specialties of gunnery and driving. The company ran around in circles in haste and the best it could do was to pick out four soldiers to act as instructors. This affected the quality of the training. At the beginning of training this year, one technical cadre of the No 3 company was in the hospital due to illness, two cadres were transferred and there was no leader for one platoon. Yet because the battalion organized instruction in a unified manner, the training of the No 3 company not only was as bustling with activity as before, its quality was better than in past years.

"With the new educational system the utilization of vehicles, training grounds and equipment has been raised." When the company was the unit of instruction, vehicles and equipment were both guaranteed by the company. A large number of vehicles were utilized and equipment was in short supply. With the battalion as the unit of instruction and classes divided into higher and lower, the battalion has alternated basic specialized and general topics and topics involving basic theory and practical operations. Vehicles are transferred and equipment is guaranteed in a unified way by the battalion, overcoming in an effective way the above maladies, cutting down on the phenomena of idle vehicles, contending for vehicles and waiting for vehicles and increasing the training time of personnel in actual operations.

After more than two months the quality of training has improved markedly. Good results have been obtained in those classes which have already been held. For example, the overall evaluation of the theory test for the specialized A communications group was excellent while on basic drill No 1 the B group, with eight participants, had seven rated excellent and one rated good, with 100 percent passing. The overall daytime evaluation was excellent for the 33 participants in the A and B groups of drivers in basic driving, with 100 percent passing. Basic drill No 3 was rated overall excellent for groups A and B of the first gunners. In practicing initiating and terminating the battle with antiaircraft machine guns, 13 out of 14 second gunners were excellent and one did not pass.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

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Remaining Problems

Some new problems have appeared with the implementation of the new educational system. The main one is that once the rookie and veteran soldiers were separated into different training classes it has not been easy to promote movements for the veterans to lead the rookies. In addition, once the battalion became the unit for instruction the cadres of the companies lacked a very deep understanding of the soldiers of their own company. This has brought with it some problems in company political and ideological work and in company administration. But they feel that these problems may be solved by uncovering new methods in the course of practice. Towards the end of March the division had already held an on-site conference in this battalion and is promoting its experience throughout the division.

11723
CSO: 4005/2095

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMANDERS, SUBORDINATES DISCUSSED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 25 May 79 p 3

[Article by Pei Dingsan [5952 1353 0005]: "'On Horse' and 'On Foot'"]

[Text] During a rapid march to pursue and destroy the enemy during the War of Liberation, the troops marched day and night. The commander of one regiment was anxious to annihilate the enemy and was continually blaming the troops for going too slow. Because he was on horseback it was very difficult for him to comprehend how much tenacious willpower it took for the soldiers who were already completely exhausted to march one step forward. In consequence some of the soldiers said, "Who does not want to lay hold of the enemy as quickly as possible? Those who are on horse must know the difficulties of those on foot!"

"Those on horse must get to know the difficulties of those on foot" is plain speech but there is truth in it which affords food for thought. For example, comparing those "on horse" to the leaders and those "on foot" to the masses, this means that the leaders should attentively experience and observe the hardships and difficulties. When they hand over tasks to the masses or when they supervise and urge the masses to complete tasks, they must take into account the difficulties which the masses encounter and, with earnest solicitude, handle matters in a fair and reasonable way. Numerous facts from the war years prove that when those "on horse" can know the difficulties of those "on foot," the latter can follow the orders of those "on horse." At present we must concentrate the thoughts and energies of the broad masses on socialist modernization and our "horseback" leaders must likewise "know the difficulties of those on foot." Bureaucratic attitudes such as being unconcerned with the vital interests of the masses, not taking the sufferings of the masses to heart and being insensitive to the practical difficulties of the masses must all be resolutely opposed and rectified. If not, the masses will treat you as badly as you treat them, and it will be impossible to genuinely get everyone to concentrate their thoughts and energies on modernization.

There is another side to the matter, however. Although that regimental commander grumbled about the soldiers, he also had his difficulties.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

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If they did not pursue and attack the enemy rapidly, they would not strike them and might even affect the completion of the entire battle plan. From this angle, that commander was also correct in saying, "Those who are on foot must know the difficulties of those on horse!" So if we are to consider the problem from all angles, we must advocate "those on foot knowing the difficulties of those on horse" at the same time that we should stress "those on horse knowing the difficulties of those on foot." After the disaster of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," there are some genuine practical difficulties at present among the masses. When the masses present their own difficulties and demand that they be solved, this is understandable, and they should be satisfied to the fullest extent possible. However, those "on horse" have difficulties just in the same way that those "on foot" have theirs. The fact that there are problems which should be solved is not equivalent to having the wherewithal to solve them. We cannot simply look at our own difficulties and present demands to our hearts' content by just looking out for ourselves. We must also consider the difficulties of the state and show understanding and sympathy for straits of the leadership in not having the capability to fulfill all wishes.

Actually, both those "on horse" and those "on foot" are good. Their overall aims are the same and it is not difficult to unite them. At present the fundamental interests of the people of the entire nation lie in carrying out the four socialist modernizations. This is the big picture for the entire nation and it is our common overall goal. In order to realize this goal, both those "on horse" and those "on foot" must focus their thinking and power on the four modernizations. Those problems of livelihood for the masses which have accumulated over a long period of time must be grasped and resolved in order to facilitate whipping up the enthusiasm of the masses. At the same time we must look at the limitations of objective conditions. We cannot solve everything in a short period of time nor can we act with undue haste lest we block the four modernizations. At present, although the course of events has already made a turn for the better, it is only an initial turn and is far from a total turn. Much remains to be tidied up and to be built and we must still rely on leading cadres and the broad masses to exert tremendous common efforts. As for those matters which we do not have conditions to resolve for the time being, we must still promote a spirit of arduous struggle and vanquish the difficulties together. Only if we fix all our hearts and eyes on the great goal of the four modernizations, join present and long-run interests (that is, taking present interests into account while submitting to long-run interests) and join partial interests and those of the whole (that is, taking the interests of the part into account while submitting to those of the whole), then the contradiction between those "on horse" and those "on foot" can entirely be unified.

In order to better unify those "on horse" and those "on foot," both leaders and the masses should adopt a positive attitude, increase their sense of responsibility and do their work with initiative. Leading cadres must have a mass concept, that is they must be concerned about the masses and think of

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

them in every regard. They must also report difficulties accurately to the masses and publicize the Party's policies among them. In addition they must discuss things with the masses and concentrate their wisdom. The masses must have the thinking of protagonists and consider problems from the point of view of the overall situation. They must not only show understanding and sympathy for the difficulties of the leaders but also propose ideas and think of ways of dealing with them on behalf of the leadership so that they may work together to overcome these difficulties. If only those "on horse" and those "on foot" work with one mind and one heart and forge a burst of energy, no difficulty can hinder the forward pace of our socialist modernization.

11723
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

AGITATION, PROPAGANDA HELP MAINTAIN FIGHTING SPIRIT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 May 79 p 1

[Article by Zhao Gengqun [6392 2577 5028] of the political work teaching and research office of the political academy: "Where Does the Fine Fighting Spirit Come From?"]

> [Text] As far as the whole conduct of a war is concerned, proper orders, slogans and written addresses to the troops are of the same important significance as first-rate heavy guns or first-rate fast tanks.
>
> --Stalin

After the victorious conclusion of the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, we went to Yunnan and conducted a study among the frontier guards. We were particularly impressed by the fact that in this battle the work of propaganda and agitation was well done, with clear-cut aims, strong militancy and broad mass support. The simple but effective fighting slogans and propaganda and agitation of every description helped the army units to maintain their fine fighting spirit all along.

We have roughly summarized the contents and features of the wartime propaganda and agitation in a few points as a tentative outline for teaching.

1. Grasping well the education of "looking upon the enemy in three ways," and arousing the troops' fighting spirit. The comrades of army units taking part in the war said that this is the foundation of propaganda and agitation. When this foundation is laid, the fighting spirit will be ignited easily like dried firewood. Before the battle started, all units carried out education in looking upon the Vietnamese aggressors with hatred, looking down upon them, and showing comtempt for them. The troops were organized to read material on the crimes of the Vietnamese authorities in throwing in their lot with the Soviet revisionists, in carrying out aggression against Cambodia. and in pursuing regional hegemonism. The comrades of local foreign affairs departments were asked to explain to the troops the origin and development of fighting in the border areas between China and Vietnam. Those overseas Chinese who had been driven back to this country were asked to expose the crimes of the Vietnamese authorities in opposing and boycotting Chinese. The troops were taken to the sites where the Vietnamese army of aggression murdered our frontier guards and people, and meetings were held to denounce the enemy. These live facts showed the cadres and fighters clearly the reactionary features of the Vietnamese authorities. Shi Yuannan [0670 2266 0589], a fighter in a certain regiment, said: "When I was born, my father was helping Vietnam with reconstruction. To remember the friendship between

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the peoples of China and Vietnam, my mother gave me the name of 'Yuannan' meaning 'Help Vietnam.' But now the Vietnamese authorities have broken faith with us and are using guns to kill Chinese people who have selflessly helped them. We must give these gangsters a heavy blow!"

2. Instilling heroic images in the minds of the fighters. The army units taking part in the war compiled and published "honor rolls" of their own heroic individuals and groups for circulation and study, and set the standards for the fighters to win honor in time of war. All the fighters had these heroic images in their hearts, and became determined to "learn from and emulate the heroes, to become a hero with honor," and "learn from the heroes, translate into action, and make new contributions in defense of the four modernizations." The 9th company party branch of a certain regiment called upon the whole company to imitate Huang Jiguang [7806 4949 0342] and Dong Cunrui [5516 1317 3843] in launching an attack, to imitate hero Wang Cheng [3769 2052] in holding fast to one's position, to imitate Qiu Shaoyun [6726 1421 0061] in carrying out orders and observing discipline, and to imitate Luo Guangxie [5012 0342 3610] in opening up a passageway. The "Luoyang heroic company" of a certain Red Army regiment was unable to advance while attacking Height 171. Political instructor Lan Titang [5695 7555 1016] at once called out: "Carry on the tradition of the 'Luoyang heroic company' and fight for the prestige of the 'Luoyang heroic company'!" All the comrades of the company echoed loudly: "We are the steel-sworded 5th company and we are determined to take Height 171!" They charged forward bravely and took the height very quickly. Then, fighting in coordination with other fraternal companies, they took two more heights in succession, and won new honors for their "Luoyang heroic company."

3. Doing a good job of agitation in the light of specific tasks. A certain regiment was given the task of taking Height 230 by secretly crossing the Red River. They raised the cry: "Let's pull out the nail, make a breakthrough, and open the gate for the entire division!" The troops were inspired to plant the Red Flag on Height 230. After the initial success, the higher command again gave them the order to advance toward Weijin and Gantang and, together with other fraternal units, to encircle and annihilate the enemy 345th division. The regiment party committee also called upon them to "maintain the style of continuous fighting, take Weijin, cut right into Gantang, annihilate the 345th division, and win a big victory." Under the stimulation of this slogan, the comrades defied fatigue and fought continuously. During the advance they encouraged one another: "Let's brace up, wipe out the 345th division; let's exert more effort, hit hard the '316' enemy (the Vietnamese 316A division)." Thus their fighting spirit was high. The comrades of units taking part in the battle learned from practical experience that when propaganda and agitation work was integrated with the concrete fighting task, it exerted a force which was quickly transformed into fighting strength.

4. Shouting war slogans at the right moment. All the fighting units agreed that shouting slogans at the critical moment changed the situation entirely. They paid great attention to every phase of the battle and conducted effective agitation at the proper time. When the 8th company of a certain regiment had taken Height 154 and built their defenses, the enemy carried out a surprise attack in the night and inflicted some casualties on the company. They immediately called out: "Turn our grief into strength and resolutely avenge our comrades-in-arms!" When the enemy artillery bombardment destroyed our heavy guns, they called upon all comrades: "Wipe

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out the enemy with our rifles and handgrenades, don't let the enemy advance a single step!" When the enemy concentrated forces in a mass attack and the fighting became very fierce, they shouted slogans loudly: "Never give in, and vow to live or perish at our posts." "Live up to the trust of the fatherland and the people's expectations, and strike down the enemy even with a bayonet or a rock." Thus, six times they repulsed the counterattack of the enemy. When the supply of ammunition dwindled on the front, the 2d platoon of the 6th company sent over their own supply. More slogans resounded along the front: "Learn from comrades of the 2d platoon, give the enemy a hard blow, and swear to hold our positions." Prompt propaganda and agitation inspired the fighters to become more and more courageous in fighting so that they were able to hold the in position.

5. Raising appropriate slogans according to the nature of the work of each unit. During the fighting period, all army units were guided by the general idea of doing everything to win the war, and raised agitation slogans appropriate to the nature of the work in their units. The artillery units raised the slogan: "Whereever artillery is wanted, we will go to fight." They were not afraid of difficulty or danger, placed their guns at various points in complex terrain, carefully aimed at every target, and made every shell fired explode in the midst of an enemy group. The motor transport corps comrades raised the slogan: "Wherever our troops are fighting, we will deliver them ammunition and supplies." They endured the hardship of an arduous journey, traveled day and night. Some drivers did not leave the driver's cab for 7 days and nights. The medical personnel raised the slogan: "Our heroic comrades win victories on the front; we will spare no effort to treat the wounded." They expressed their love for their class brothers by giving them meticulous medical care and surgery, worked hard day and night, and accomplished miracles in saving lives and tending the wounded.

6. The outstanding commanders are also exemplary agitators. Among the cadres of troops which took part in the fighting, we fould a common characteristic, that is, they were both courageous in leading an attack and good at agitation, and they put agitation and command in perfect harmony. Commander Liu Jianrong [0491 1696 2837] of the 4th company of a certain regiment led an attack to take a certain height. In the fighting he commanded his company and did the work of agitation at the same time. When he was hit twice, in the leg and in the abdomen, comrades tried to give him first aid. He told them: "Don't bother about me, charge forward quickly!" Then, enduring severe pain, he led his fighters in continuing the attack. When they reached a spot some 20 meters from the top of the hill, he was fatally wounded in the head. He was still pointing at the enemy with his finger and with his last breath urged his fighters to charge forward. Company commander Liu's words and gesture gave the fighters tremendous strength. They shouted the slogan, "Avenge our company commander," captured the hill quickly and wiped out the enemy.

7. Through a mass network of propaganda and agitation with Communist Party members as its core, field agitation could become everybody's activity. In the attack on Height 148, communist Jiang Jinzhu [5592 6855 2691], a squad leader of the 2d company of a certain regiment, was seriously wounded in the head. He said hoarsely to his deputy: "We both are communists and must capture this hill to win glory for our party and to avenge our dead comrades. If I die, you must lead the squad to accomplish this task!" He endured severe pain in his wound, destroyed the enemy's last firing point with a handgrenade, and set an example for his comrades-in-arms

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with his own exemplary action. Another comrade was wounded in both legs. When he was carried down the hill on a stretcher, a reinforcement unit was passing by. He called to his comrades-in-arms optimistically: "I have some difficulty with my legs and have to go down and take a rest now. I hope you will fight hard. I will return soon!" The fighters were moved by his words and said tearfully: "Rest assured that we will certainly avenge you." Scenes like these were numerous in the battle. It may be said that everywhere the cadres encouraged the fighters, the fighters encouraged the cadres, the infantry men commended the artillery men, the artillery men praised the infantry men, the office workers encouraged the troops, and the wounded encouraged their comrades-in-arms. The situation was lively.

8. Not sticking to one pattern and using flexible methods. During our tour of study we came to realize that the troops on the front used flexible methods of propaganda and agitation. The brutality of the enemy, the people's support, the heroic deeds of the fighters in the battle, the victorious reports from the battleground, and the letters from families in the motherland were all good material for the work of propaganda and agitation. Fighter Zhang Yuancheng [1728 6678 2052] of the 2d mechanized company of a certain regiment sprained his foot in field training, and it became very swollen. The aged leader of a local production team saw him, opened his wound with a needle, and sucked the extravasated blood out bit by bit by mouth. When the mechanized unit arrived at the front, the aged team leader again tramped over hill and dale for scores of li and brought gifts to comfort Zhang Yuancheng and other fighters. The officers used this event to teach the fighters: "The people give us support to fight the enemy, we must win a victory for the people." The 8th company of a certain unit was holding fast to Height 250 during a battle when the company commander was wounded in the head. Deputy political instructor Deng Guanglu [6772 0342 4389] took the commander's service cap, which was smeared with blood, and wrote the following words: "The hole was made by a bullet fired by the enemy and the blood was shed by our commander. Comrades, we must avenge our commander!" This cap was passed from one fighter to another along the entire position. It aroused the fighters' concern for their commander and hatred against the enemy. They were filled with rage and repulsed the enemy time after time in fighting back. The entire company held the position firmly like a nail being driven into the ground.

The field work of propaganda and agitation is the essential substance of political work in the time of war, and it is a fine tradition of the political work of our army. From the counterattack against Vietnam in self-defense we have again gained some new experience and enriched its substance. Provided we can carefully learn from and apply this valuable experience, we will carry out our political work to better serve the modernization of our army.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SHENYANG ARMY HOSPITAL ADOPTS NEW CLINICAL TECHNOLOGY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 May 79 p 1

[Article by correspondents Guo Jindong [6753 2516 2639] and Tang Wenjun [0781 2429 0193] and staff reporter Yang Xuequan [2799 1331 3123]: "The Successful Use of New Clinical Technology"]

[Text] How do army hospitals carry out modernization: by relying on foreign advanced equipment or by depending on available equipment and using both native and foreign methods? The Shenyang General Army Hospital has carried forward the fine tradition of plain living and hard struggle, refrained from relying on others for help, and carried on its work and achieved "modernization" at the same time. Under the guidance of this concept, it introduced 35 items of new technology in the first quarter of this year, 9 of which reach the advanced level in our country, including the treatment of congenital heart disease by repairing the closing tube of the tricuspid valve, and the making of a portable capacity-discharge grid-controlled x-ray machine.

In particular, it has tackled the following three problems:

1. Correct handling of the relationship between importing and copying, and trying its best to copy whatever can be duplicated by relying on our socialist superiority and collective wisdom and displaying a spirit of broad cooperation. In the past, the members of the hospital's radiology department had tried to fill in the gaps in the technology of diagnosing and locating pathological changes in soft tissues and nonmetallic foreign bodies. After seeing pictures of a patented molybdenum-target x-ray machine in foreign medical journals, they worked very hard to design and build their own soft x-ray machine, which won a special prize at the National Science Symposium. Later, they visited a local hospital and saw an imported sample x-ray machine which was more advanced in performance and could take pictures in any position using a common power source in hospital wards. With the assistance of fraternal units, they again worked hard for 7 months, and in January this year they succeeded in turning out a replica of this machine as China's first portable-discharge grid-controlled X-ray machine of the advanced level of the 1970's. The machine has been tested and used in clinical practice and found to perform well with satisfactory results.

2. Trying by all means to save foreign exchange for the state by doing our own repairs of imported equipment and making the necessary spare parts without waiting for and relying on imports. Last July the hospital's number one internal medicine

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department imported a fiber endoscope, which was laid aside due to lack of a conducting wire for a gastroscope for high-frequency electric burning. Some comrades intended to wait for the importation of spare parts before using the instrument in clinical practice. Later, they all realized that it would cost the state's foreign exchange and take some time to import the needed conducting wire, so they decided to make one themselves. With the help of the hospital maintenance team, they successfully made a replacement part and promptly used the endoscope in clinical practice. In the first quarter of this year, by using this instrument in nine cases they successfully carried out electric excision of gastric and colonic polyposis.

3. Setting high aims and lofty goals to catch up with and surpass the advanced level when we have imported equipment and technology, as well as striving to create conditions for catching up with and surpassing the advanced level when we do not have imported equipment and technology. The hispital's number one surgical department last year performed 147 operations involving direct observation inside the heart in external circulation, of which 82 cases were Fallot's tetrad disease, with a successful operation rate of 97.5 percent, thus reaching an international advanced level. To develop in depth and breadth the surgical treatment of cardiac angiopathy, members of the department actively created the necessary conditions and took their own road of development. In the early period when they used valve tubes in the surgical treatment of cardiac angiopathy, they encountered many difficulties. However, they did not ask for assistance from the state and did not wait, but took the initiative to look for means to overcome the difficulties. To make their own valve-frame, they approached a local factory to get some leftover bits and pieces of titanium alloy steel, and they did their own processing by hammering them little by little. They had no biovalve, so every day they went to a slaughterhouse to pick out suitable valves from hundreds, sometimes even nearly a thousand, pig hearts for processing, and then very carefully sewed them stitch by stitch onto the valve-frame. In January this year, for the first time in our country, they successfully performed an operation to repair the closing tube of the tricuspid valve in human bodies.

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CSO: 4005/2088

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BEIJING UNIT CARRIES OUT COMBINED-ARMS TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 May 79 p 1

[Article by Zhang Meirong [1728 2734 2837] and Huang Yusheng [7806 3768 3932]: "Beijing Unit Carries Out Combined-Arms Training for Better Joint Command"]

[Text] One of the Beijing PLA units has carried out combined-arms training at a preselected operations area to help its commanders at all levels become familiar with the various armed service branches and improve their ability for joint command.

Before this combined exercise, the army unit used collective training as a means to have all armed service branches learn from one another, to have the infantry learn how to get into tanks and armored carriers, and so that the commanders at all levels could learn systematically about other armed service branches and the principles of combat. During the exercises at various levels, the infantry was reinforced as much as possible by armed service branches with tanks, artillery, signal corps, engineers and antichemical warfare corps, so that all armed service branches could get practical training. When the regiments carried out exercises, the higher echelon set up a field situation based on the enemy's formation, equipment, firepower distribution and tactics to help commanders at all levels, in conditions close to actual fighting, to study ways of using their troops, disposing of firepower and setting up command posts, to study ways of adjusting the cooperation of various armed service branches at different times, and to become familiar with the organized command at their own levels. The soldiers learned the order of battle, changes in combat formations under different conditions, ways of using topographical and surface features, alternative covering fire, and the advantage of launching an assault after a barrage of artillery fire. They said that they learned a great deal from this practical exercise and greatly improved their technological and tactical level.

At present, in the light of the weakness of its cadres in combat coordination, this army unit organized eight training groups of cadres from among its divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and staff officers, intensified study and training in the organization of command, and made the determination to achieve better results from the training of cadres this year.

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CSO: 4005/2088

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

STUDY OF NEW WEAPON TECHNOLOGY, COMBAT METHODS URGED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 3

[Article by Bing Yan [0393 1484]: "It Is Necessary To Study Seriously New Combat Methods"]

[Text] As China's Army modernizes, the commanders of the army face an urgent question: to strive to study and research advanced combat methods.

As a historical process, the rifle defeated the sword, and new advanced combat methods will ultimately replace out-of-date and backward combat methods. This is an objective law of warfare development and must be the object of the consciousness and generals of any class who must conform to this law and not try to change it. In the history of warfare, battle by mounted troops negated battle by chariots; line formations of musketeers and lancers negated mounted armored troops; skirmish formations under cover of artillery negated line formations; and after the appearance of the tank, armored units took the place of skirmish tactics on the battlefield, etc. These changes in combat methods and means prove the truth that "Soldiers do not have a constant situation and water does not have a constant form." (SUNZI BINGFA, XUSHIPIAN) The thinking of combat commanders must not get into a rut and take steps without regard to the circumstances.

Some comrades ask, "Aren't our proletarian army's combat methods the most complete and most advanced?" No. There are two things wrong with this. The first is to ascribe the "class" label to combat methods. This does not conform to Marxist materialism and can only block our field of vision and bind us hand and foot. The second is using the advance nature of class rather than the advanced nature of combat methods which departs from seeking truth from facts and becomes one of the theoretical bases of parochial arrogance.

Does combat method have a class nature? To answer this question it is necessary first to analyze its objective properties and clarify the fundamental factors which determine combat method.

In proving that combat method has a class nature, many comrades cite Engels as proof: "The entire organization and combat methods of an army and the victory or defeat related to it depends on material, i.e., economic, conditions; it depends on the human and weapon materials, that is, it depends on the quality and quantity of the inhabitants and on the technique." ["Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol III, p 210.] Well in "Anti-Duhring" and other essays on military affairs

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Engels expressed this same idea. Under the conditions prevailing at the time, Engels felt that the method of combat was determined by the two factors of men and weapons. However, later, new warfare partice proved that this conclusion had to be corrected. For example, to explain the fact that changes in the soldiers in the army determined the changes in combat methods, Engels used the American War of Independence as an example. He pointed out that the reasons the combat method changed from line tactics to skirmish tactics was partly because the Americans had the rifle which was faster and more accurate than the musket, and partly because the insurrectionists lacked strict infantry training and it was difficult for them to master the line tactic. The insurrectionists fought for their personal interests and unlike the mercenaries who deserted in critical situations, did not need strict line formations to keep them in check. At the same time, the Americans were hunters and marksmanship is suited to skirmish tactics. Thus, Engels came to the conclusion that skirmish tactics were "a new combat technique produced by changes in the soldiers." ["Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol III, p 208]

But based on this conclusion: it is difficult to explain why later on mercenaries who were fully trained to serve the ruling classes and were neither hunters nor insurrectionists all used skirmish tactics. In fact, after Napoleon, all the armies in the world, including proletarian armies, used skirmish tactics. It is clear that changes in the soldiers were not the main reason why combat methods change. Here, the ultimate reason is the deadliness of the rifle. In the face of its shower of bullets, all dense combat formations must disperse, otherwise it would be impossible to achieve the aim of self-defense and to destroy the enemy. During the Franco-Prussion War, the armies on both sides used breech-loading rifles in the first engagement, but because the commanders followed the old ways and still used column formations, suited to the time of the rifled musket, a brief transitional step in the evolution from line formation to skirmish formation, the Prussians attempted to stop at this stage and make it the combat method suited to the new weapon. As a result, they suffered great losses. In less than 2 hours of battle, they lost over one-third of their guard army. From then on the column formation, like the line formation, was completely discarded. Therefore, the idea which Engels emphasized repeatedly that "once technological advances can be used and have been used for military purposes, they immediately become dominant and frequently go against the will of the commanders and give rise to changes and even revolutions in combat method." ["Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol 3, p 211] But Lenin summed up Engels' idea more accurately and succinctly: "Tactics are determined by an army's technological level." ["Selected Works of Lenin, Vol 1, p 669]. That is, the basic factor which determines combat method is the development of weapons and equipment which accompanies the increase in productive forces, and all other factors, including the influence of brilliant commanders and changes in the soldiers, simply provide the external conditions for changes in combat method so that sooner or later the different armies of other countries will master the new combat methods. (This is a general law of combat method change including even the selection and application of tactical techniques in specific battles, based, of course, on the flexible changes in the objective conditions of weather, terrain and intelligence, and the two cannot ever be combined.)

Since the fundamental factor which determines change in combat method is the development of weapons technology and not man's subjective will or changes in the soldiers, we can say straightforwardly that combat method itself has no class

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character and even less can the class properties of an army be used as a norm to measure whether or not combat methods are advanced. Armies made up of different classes but at the same stage of weapons development may use the same combat methods. Armies of all classes may learn from each other in combat methods. Of course we should acknowledge that whether or not combat methods are advanced is determined first of all by whether or not the weapons and equipment are advanced. At the same time, we also should acknowledge that at the same stage of weapons development, those who discover new combat methods are not necessarily those who have created the new weapons technology. Having advanced weapons and equipment is a precondition for having mastery of advanced combat methods but there is also the question of whether or not those with advanced equipment are good at finding the combat methods most suited to the new weapons technology. There is also a question of smashing conservative thinking, getting rid of the force of habit, not rigidly adhering to outdated experience and an obsolete military science outlook, but upholding the practice of proceeding from reality, and seeking truth from facts so that one's thinking will constantly adapt to the objective laws of the development of warfare. It is worth mentioning that when we discuss the fact that weapons determine combat method and that the technological level determines tactics, we are not answering the question of what determines victory and defeat in warfare. Therefore, acknowledging th objective law that changes in combat method are determined by the development of weapons we definitely cannot equate the issue of what determines the outcome of a war with the doctrine that only weapons are important. If one studies the advanced combat methods of foreign countries, even less can one talk of any "bourgeois classification". Today we want to accelerate the modernization of national defense, and not only must we vigorously develop new advanced weapons and equipment, we also must make an effort to study and master advanced combat methods.

Our proletarian army of course has its own unique principles of tactics and strategy. But its "advancement" and "uniqueness" is only in the righteousness and popularity of the wars we fight, i.e., in the human-sea tactics of the people's war, it relies on the support of the masses and on flexible application. All hegemonic armies are divorced from the people and have little support. They can copy the tactical and strategic principles of people's war from our military specialists, but they cannot really learn to apply them. But on the other hand, we can study completely the tactical methods of all the armies in the world from an understanding of the guiding principles of warfare in general, and with modifications use them to enrich and perfect the strategy and tactics of the people's war. In the past, under the influence of the "leftist" line promoted by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," combat method and tactics were branded with a class character and the incorrect styles of parochial arrogance and the notion tht they were the only true revolutionaries were developed. Furthermore, the carrying on of our army's traditional combat method and experience was also cut off at will according to the political needs of periodic "line struggles." Even today some commanders do not dare to use "point formation" and "V formation" in troop training, saying that this is a tactical principle of Lin Biao, so it's better to return to the pre-Napoleonic era and use close-line formation to stop the hail of bullets from enemy machineguns. This sort of old fashioned idea is unsuited to the situation as we modernize our army.

That the development of weapons technology determines the changes in combat methods, should be said to be a basic understanding of Marxist military affairs theory. No

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matter whether we study modern warfare or draw on foreign experiences, or even study battles from our own past, and study the strategy and tactics summarized by Comrade Mao Zedong, it is always necessary to adopt this viewpoint. Otherwise, it is turning things upside down and pursuing the trivial rather than the essential. A few years ago, when Lin Biao and the "gang of four" were peddling their reactionary willfullness, this point of view was overlooked by people and many comrades studying military affairs and researching warfare were satisfied just to memorize everything uncritically and to copy down existing conclusions, and indiscriminately to accept intact the combat means and methods of the past. They did not know that military affairs specialists should not be copiers but should be creators; the study of military theory is not "archaeology" but it is a field which should open up paths to the development of truth. Are not many of our older comrades paying serious attention to helping out and setting a good example for young cadres? This is a commendable spirit. But helping out and setting a good example is not simply mechanically imitating the past, you cannot paint a modern day "ladle" according to the "bottle gourd" of the past, but must proceed from the new historical conditions and combine what is to be passed on and what is created. Therefore, we propose that the basic Marxist idea that the level of technology determines the tactics and the weapons determine the combat method be restudied, with the aim of making our comrades able to overhaul completely their thinking and understand how to explore new laws for directing war according to the cognitive line of materialism.

In studying and researching new combat methods in accordance with the objective law that the development of weapons technology determines changes in combat method, we must start from the beginning--that is, we must study new military science knowledge, understand the capabilities, characteristics and uses of new weapons technologies, get a firm technological foundation and then tactical means can be used flexibly. A far-sighted military scientist also should note the world developmental trends in modernized weapons and equipment and see in them the direction new combat methods and means will take. Those commanders who neglect to study military science and simply copy the existing combat methods of others are not smart commanders. Many combined unit commanders lack the ability to "combine," and an important reason for this is their severe lack of scientific and technical knowledge.

Our commanders also should look at another side of the question--changes in combat means and method also influence the development of weapons and equipment. This not only appears in the proper use of tactics which can fully employ the existing technology and equipment, but even make up for inadequacies in the techology. Moreover, as soon as new advanced combat means and methods appear and are used, it is necessary urgently to demand improvements in obsolete weapons and equipment and point the way for new technological development. For example, under the conditions of modern warfare, a clear characteristic of combat method is the dispersed arrangement of manpower and the concentrated use and camouflaged movement of firepower, which demands in terms of technique, an increase in the range and accuracy of field artillery and at the same time also presents newer and greater demands with regard to the combat performance of aircraft and varying range antiaircraft weapons, and an improvement in existing communications, reconnaissance and engineering technologies and machinery, pointing out a general direction for the improvement of our weapons and equipment, to increase our self-consciousness and reduce our recklessness. The negative attitude that existing equipment is adequate and that there is no point in studying new combat methods or that limits study of

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combat methods to those suited to existing equipment is the "myopia" of military science research. The dialectical method is such that backward technological levels can lead to backward tactical thinking and backward tactical thinking must limit and constrict technological development.

Studying and researching advanced combat methods also must promote change in our organizational and command methods. Just as technology determines tactics, new combat methods demand new organizational and command methods suited to them. This point we can see clearly in the staff planning in present military command agencies. In ancient warfare weapons and equipment were simple, combat methods were basically close combat and organization and command also were simple. By 1809 when Napoleon met the Austiran Army at Wagram, his command post was only 3 or 4 kilometers from the frontlines and he could still issue verbal orders personally to his troops (his orders could be sent directly to regimental commanders). Later on, with advances in firearms, increases in the kind of soldiers and the use of skirmish tactics, the battlefield expanded and Napoleon could no longer issue verbal orders to command his troops, so a new type of staff officer appeared, i.e., Napoleon's chief of staff, Field Marshal Berthier. And by the Franco-Prussian War, Berthier also created the general staff, then all armies in the world imitated the French Army in the creation of the organizational command. Modern warfare is much more complicated than in the time of the Franco-Prussian War and the use of new military techniques on the battlefield and the production of new combat methods makes it no longer a basic premise to rely on increasing the staff personnel. What is urgently demanded is to develop command tools, improve command methods, reform command organization, borrow from advanced experience abroad and gradually automate organization and command.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARTICLES EXTOL FLIGHT HEROES IN BORDER DEFENSE

Heroic Air Defense Commander

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by Pan Zongde [3382 1350 1795]]

[Text] "Follow me, charge!" This is the code of action of Li Zhonglin [2621 1813 2651], the commander of an air defense regiment on the Yunnan border and it is a true portrait of his revolutionary spirit and soldierly life.

On 17 February, Li Zhonglin's regiment was responsible for security patrol duty in the battle zone in conjunction with a protective counterattack and defensive border battle by the army. When Li Zhonglin laid out the order of battle at the regimental party committee meeting, he bravely put himself in the first echelon and demanded that the higher authorities give him the most arduous mission. At 7:15, four green signal flares rose into the sky and immediately there was the roar of engines on the airfield. "Follow me, charge!" Regimental Commander Li led the first echelon and flew majestically toward the battle zone, ever vigilantly patrolling the skies over the motherland's border.

One time, in coordination with the surface units which were punishing the Vietnamese invaders, the upper echelons ordered Regimental Commander Li's regiment to help spot where our artillery's shells were landing in the battle zone. "Follow me, charge!" Again, Regimental Commander Li took the lead aircraft in the first echelon, and in close coordination with his wingmen vigilantly and nimbly circled and spotted. Suddenly, the radio in their aircraft malfunctioned in the microphone. He quick-wittedly waggled his wings to signal to his wingmen. Wingman number 3 understood immediately and quickly moved to the front to continue spotting and successfully completed the mission.

Patrol missions often set out and return before dawn and at twilight. At such times the fog is very dense and visibility is low. Flying under such conditions is very difficult. So that everything would be perfectly safe, each time they had to fly under such weather conditions, Regimental Commander Li always shouted "Follow me, charge!" and led everyone to battle through the difficulty. Early one morning, Regimental Commander Li was in the first echelon returning from a patrol when unexpectedly the fog began to get thicker and they couldn't see the runways clearly. Relying on mastery gained through many years of training, shortly

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before they reached the airfield, he alerted everyone to use their compass precisely and pay attention to getting a fix on the vertical ground markers on the field so as to determine their position. Under his precise example and careful directions the entire unit landed safely and the pilots all respected Regimental Commander Li for being bold but cautious and commanding well.

Mechanic Ensures Flight Safety

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by Jin Shijun [7246 0013 6511] and Deng Xudong [6772 4872 2639]

[Text] On the morning of 20 February, as the fighting eagles returned from patrol one by one, the ground crew of the 20 Squadron carefully carried out a post-flight inspection. The mechanic Liu Shahong [2692 3097 3163] nimbly finished inspecting aircraft number 73's intake and then inspected the jet. At the time the jet was still over 63° C, so the acting master mechanic had little Liu inspect it again early the next morning. Liu Shahong thought that the fighting eagles had to go into combat at any time and if when he inspected it the next morning he discovered some obstruction that couldn't be eliminated promptly it would keep the aircraft from going into battle. He decided that he definitely could not have a chance for combat bungled because he did not do his job well and so insisted on completing his task. He made his way into the jet and got soaking wet from sweat in the hot interior. Holding a light he conducted a careful inspection of the fuel ring and the flow regulator and discovered a carbon buildup about the size of a fingernail in the precombustion chamber. He determined that this was the damaged part and promptly reported this to the leader. Then along with the rest of the comrades in the crew he worked through the night until 5:20 changing the afterburner. Because they promptly got rid of this serious obstruction, they guaranteed the fighting preparedness of this young eagle. For this reason, the upper echelons awarded Liu Shahong, Merit Citation Class III.

Patrol Aircraft Extra Alert

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by Cai Shanwu [5591 0810 2976] and Liu Changdong [0491 2490 2639]]

[Text] In the air 10,000 meters above China's southern border, from time to time comes a deafening roar: It is a flight from the high-speed fighter group of the Yunnan Front Line Air Force on patrol.

After the self-defense counterattack and defensive border war broke out, each day this group was on the spot for 19 hours. Although the drain on the comrades' strength was great, everyone maintained high fighting morale and continued to fight without fear of fatigue. Deputy Regimental Commander Xia Youcai [1115 0645 2088] and group cadres Hu Da'an [5170 6671 1344] and Tang Qizhong [0781 0120 1813] who flew missions with the group, fought bravely in the vanguard, vied for the difficult tasks and set an example for everyone else.

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One day they were on orders to patrol on China's side of the China-Vietnam border. Their flight suits were soaked with sweat but no one complained. At 13,000 meters Deputy Group Commander Wu Chunfa [0702 2504 4099] and pilot Chen Xiaodong [7115 2556 2639] suddenly discovered something suspicious. Wu Chunfa immediately alerted Chen Xiaodong to keep an eye out. They kept careful watch, ready to fight at any time, until the suspected target disappeared and they victoriously returned. At the same time that they were frequently going into combat, this group also took on training missions with other units. In leading they came up with an idea and sent experienced pilots to four airfields to coordinate training and study tactical techniques for destroying enemy aircraft. Through this training the air combat level of this and the other units was raised a great deal.

In 20-odd days' time they completed all combat missions assigned by the upper echelons and received the praise of the leadership and comrades of the Yunnan Front Line Air Force units.

Cargo Plane Crew Alert

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2

[Text] Female pilot Wang Shuran's [3769 3219 5333] air crew of a regiment of the air force's air arm was cited for meritorious service 3rd class in carrying out an urgent airlift mission in the self-defense counterattack and border defense.

During the 9 days that they were executing the mission, they flew over 6 hours each day and the longest they were on the ground was 20 hours. Sometimes before a mission was completed, and the aircraft was still in the air, orders for another were received over the radio. Sometimes, just as a mission was completed and the air crew comrades had gone to bed to rest they were immediately recalled for a new mission. However complex and difficult the mission, however short the time, however difficult the conditions, they were always filled with pride and enthusiasm, fearlessly, they thought single-mindedly of the needs of the front and did everything to insure victory in combat. One time, they had loaded their cargo at an airfield and were just ready to take off when suddenly they discovered that the braking parachute a fighter had used when landing had not yet been retrieved and at the same time a rear fighter flight was ready to take off for combat. If they took off as usual on time, the braking chute might get wound around the propellor blades but if the plane did not take off promptly it would have an effect on the rear fighter flight taking off. It was a critical situation and there could not be any delay. The air crew comrades bravely, resourcefully and in close coordination took off along the side of the runway in between the fighter takeoffs. They coped with this complex situation successfully and their cargo got to its destination on time.

The good cooperative spirit and strong battle style of Wang Shufeng's air crew is inseparable from their highly developed sense of "liangzhang yiyuan" [0357 7022 0001 0765]. Air crew leader Wang Shufeng, party group leader Feng Gaijin 7458 2395 0603] and safetyman Yang Qinglong [2799 7230 7893], were true to the great trust of the party organization and the confidence of their comrades. They conscientiously did their duty, made strict demands on themselves and served as a model in everything they did. Thus they spurred on all personnel in the air crew to stand fast at their posts, help each other, not fear difficulties, unite and fight, and relying on their collective wisdom and thus strengthen completely their mission in an outstanding way.

8226
CSO: 4005/2097

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SAGA OF YOUNG SOLDIER'S SACRIFICE FOR MOTHERLAND

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by Liu Liangkai [0491 5328 0418], Wu Shunxiang [0702 7311 4382], Liu Bo [0491 3134] and Wang Jianguo [3769 1696 0948]: "Charges Ahead to Heroic Sacrifice for the Motherland and for the People; Cadre's Son Zhen Ping [3914 1627] A Fearless New Generation Hero; Zhen Wenlin [3914 2429 2651] Martyr's Father and Deputy Director of Political Section Says Zhen Ping Lived up to the Fostering of the Party and People and Died a Glorious Death"]

[Text] At 1643 on 27 February, two white signal flares rose over the peak of Kouma Mountain reporting that the gate to Liang Mountain was open. Zhen Wenlin, deputy director of a political section who was just then at the command post in the rear, received a message relayed from the frontlines: His son Zhen Ping had led the first charge of the First Platoon, Company Eight on Kouma Mountain and herocially sacrificed his life. Deputy Director Zhen thought for a moment then said calmly to the comrade beside him: A price must always be paid for revolution, and that's what his death was.

To commend Zhen Ping's meritorious deeds in battle, the league and party committees have petitioned the higher authorities to bestow on him the title of Combat Hero. During his lifetime, Comrade Zhen Ping's behavior was commendable. In 1974, after graduation from senior middle school at the age of 17, with the encouragement of and support of his parents he went to a rural area for labor training and in 1977 he was recruited into the army from the hydroelectric power station where he was working. In the army he was modest and prudent and studied hard to get ahead. He was on good terms with soldiers from worker and peasant backgrounds. In all things he took the lead and served as a model. He was evaluated as a model member, a pacesetter who studied Lei Feng and a training pacesetter. A year after joining the army he entered the party and was called a superior student. In March 1978 he was promoted to squad leader and this January he was made platoon leader.

Zhen Ping was filled with righteous indignation over constant encroachments of Chinese border regions by the Vietnamese reactionary authorities. He wrote many statements of determination to the party branch requesting that he be allowed to participate in the battle to punish severely the Vietnamese invaders. In a letter he wrote to his elder brother he said: "I will charge ahead for the motherland and the people even if it is to my death!" He said to his father, "Please don't worry. I won't embarrass the party and the people. You will hear news of victory."

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

On 26 February, Company Eight took on the mission of the main attack on Kouma Mountain. At the branch committee meeting at the front, three infantry platoon leaders vied for the mission to be the assault platoon. Zhen Ping repeatedly requested the mission and finally was given the task of being the assault platoon. Zhen Ping was very much aware that his responsibility was a heavy one: Kouma Mountain is 800 meters high, the slopes are densely wooded and the terrain is irregular. It is the sort of position that is easy to defend but difficult to attack: It is very strategically located but with difficult access. It is the gateway to Liang Mountain. Whether or not Kouma Mountain could be taken on schedule would affect the general situation of the battle for Liang Mountain. That night, he called the squad leaders and squad cadres together and engaging in military democracy, they studied the various methods of attack and drew up a battle plan.

On 27 February, under cover of our artillery, Company Eight launched an attack on Kouma Mountain which was held by the enemy. At 1535, Company Eight launched the final attack on the Kouma Mountain peak and Zhen Ping led the entire platoon throughout the attack right at the very front of the company. Each time they made a breakthrough he fired off a signal flare to report to the command post that the assault platoon had reached its position. Our support fire crept up toward the top of the mountain and Zhen Ping bravely attacked at a distance of only about 20 meters behind the point where our shells were landing. Sometimes he would crawl forward, other times he would bound, organizing the platoon's fire as they wiped out three enemy gun positions in succession, right up to the peak. Our cannons had barely stopped when Zhen Ping charged to a point only 25 meters from the enemy entrenchment on the mountain top. The enemy hiding in the gun emplacement had not expected that our infantry detachment could move this fast and without looking threw handgrenades. One by one the handgrenades flew smoking over the heads of the platoon comrades. Zhen Ping shouted: "Wipe out the enemy gun position!" The entire platoon opened fire together. Just as Zhen Ping had climbed over the entrenchment and raised the signal gun to fire a flare reporting victory a surviving enemy soldier hidden in the bunker fired a shot and Zhen Ping fell.

With a cry of "Avenge platoon leader Zhen!" the comrades of Company Eight thoroughly destroyed the surviving enemy soldiers and took firm control of the main peak of Kouma Mountain. At this time our infantry, artillery and armored units were struggling up along the winding trail of the lower part of Kouma Mountain.

On 28 February, Deputy Director Zhen came from the command post to Youyiguan to bid farewell to the son who had lost his life for the motherland. Beside his son's body he said resolutely, "You fought for the motherland and the people, you have lived up to the fostering of the party and the people. Your death is a glorious one." Deputy Director Zhen requested that his son's body be buried on a hill beside Youyiguan where the border of the motherland could be seen, together with the other martyrs who had sacrificed for the motherland. He took the uniform which had the hole of the enemy bullet and his son's bloodstains to give to his small grandson.

8226
CSO: 4005/2097

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

YOUTH EXHORTED TO BE MODEL DEFENDERS OF MOTHERLAND

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by Wu Zhang [0702 1757]: "Two Generations of Heroes"]

[TExt] In the defensive counterattack, an army cadre went to the China-Vietnam border where he ran into his son who was a soldier in a border defense unit. He spoke to his son in a sincere manner, "It is fitting that I should see you now. There is only one goal, and I hope that in battle you will not prove to be an unworthy son." The boy replied with determination, "I'm worried about that too, and I've made a plan for winning honor." The cadre then said, "The most important thing is to stick to your plan on the battlefield. I just hope that in the battle charge you will be courageous and tenacious." One of the leadership cadres from a forward unit learned of the son's brave sacrifice and said proudly, "The kid did the right thing. He was not untrue to the training of the party." In this self-defense counterattack, such leadership cadres have encouraged their children to win honor for the motherland and there are a great many children of cadres who have bravely killed the enemy.

Hearing these heart-wrenching stories is like hearing a clear and majestic song: "Hark, the mother is calling the son to fight in the East...." One cannot help recalling the lines written by Chen Yi exhorting sons and daughters: "The people reared you, repay them by winning honor. If the motherland is in trouble, you should be in the vanguard." In this defensive border war, the glorious tradition of our party and army has burst forth with dazzling brilliance, too.

What parent does not love his child, and what parent does not look forward to his child's future? Yet there are different ideas on the kind of future and how it can be achieved. In the view of a Communist Party member, children are not one's private property. Only by educating children to make a contribution to the people's enterprise do parents feel they have fulfilled their responsibility. They detest and reject seeking a way out for their children, proceeding from selfish motives, to spoil their children and even to use improper means to curry favor on their behalf. Ordinarily, they demand that their children study and work hard to do their little bit to help build socialism. Once it becomes necessary they generously send their children to the front, with the same lofty sentiments and aspirations they had when they joined the revolution in their youth. They urge their children courageously to kill the enemy and not hesitate to lay down their lives for their country. In particular they scorn the individualistic and mean behavior of those who hold back their children at the critical moment.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

Such parents are farsighted and know how to love and rear their sons and daughters. They definitely do not keep their sons and daughters under their wings but let them go and do battle with the wind and rain. They understand that "A good sword comes from hardening; the fragrance of plum flowers comes from the bitter cold." If they want their children to make something of themselves, they should not begrudge letting them go into the furnace of revolution and be smelted in the fierce flames. Of course, they hope that their children will become scientists, engineers and brilliant military commanders and make an even greater contribution to the four modernizations. They also know very well that relying on a comfortable home, lots of money and high class furnishings cannot pave the way for seizing the "jewel in the mathematical crown." Thus they encourage their sons and daughters to go to the difficult places required for the four modernizations and to the battlefields to protect the four modernizations and be tempered in the flames.

We extol the heroic older generation for being broadminded and farsighted; we also extol the heroic younger generation for its soaring aspirations and heroic vigor. Our promising younger generation understands that like father, like son does not necessarily mean that they are good people; one who relies on a "good daddy, good mama and good patron" in order to loaf about, can only turn into a good-for-nothing and be detrimental to the moetherland, the people and oneself. The early realization of the four modernizations brings joy to working under hard conditions--making their home wherever they are and bravely shouldering heavy burdens. When it is necessary to use their youth and ardor to protect the four modernizations, they step forward bravely and are honor-bound not to turn back. A long time ago Gorki said "Because of their intense yearning for a happy life, one frequently sees among young people, those who do not treasure the things that others have won for them; one can also see some impetuous hawks who fancy too early that they have a comfortable roost. They are in too much of a hurry to enjoy the achievements of the present without a care for the future and they no longer strive to consolidate and strengthen this glorious thing which is beautiful but which still faces difficult times." This message is doubly touching when read now. At a time when these cadres' sons and daughters must be models among the soldiers in the border defense, have not many young people, including cadres' sons and daughters, gotten rid of the defect of "too early fancying they have a comfortable roost"?

8226
CSO: 4005/2097

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SOLDIER SUGGESTS IMPROVEMENTS IN TACTICS, EQUIPMENT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 3

[Article by Lo [7482] [given name unreadable]: "Suggestions on Improving Tactics, Equipment"]

[Text] Comrade editor

I am a soldier in the China-Vietnam border self-defense counterattack. All of our officers and men are brave and tenacious in battle and have won great victories against the Vietnamese aggressors. Through battle experience we have proposed a number of issues in strategy and tactics which should get some serious attention and should be improved in the future. On the basis of my own experience I would like to discuss several suggestions here.

1. When fighting in hilly and forested areas against an enemy who has taken defensive precautions and can operate in a dispersed fashion, we should not use conventional daytime attack methods with large units. In battle the Vietnamese soldiers holding hilltops were frequently few in number, but our armies attacked with concentrated units of company or even batallion strength, which is like hitting a flea with a fist: It wastes manpower and increases casualties. In a strategic campaign, "using an ox cleaver to kill a chicken" is undoubtedly correct, specifically each battle move should be applied flexibly on the basis of such objective factors as intelligence on the enemy, terrain and weather. The reason our army fought better and better in the last stage of the self-defense counterattack is that we understood the enemy and had flexible command and tactics.

2. The most threatening thing to an attack in mountainous areas is an established enemy firing point. It is difficult to wipe out an entire unit with patterned artillery fire; field artillery are numerically few and inconvenient to move; bazookas are not very effective against established firing points. Frequently, demolition teams use satchel charges, torpedoes and hand grenades to destroy them, but this greatly delays the speed of attack. If the explosive performance of bazookas were modified, it would greatly reduce casualties and speed up the attack.

3. The semiautomatic rifle's rate of fire is too slow and they are becoming less and less suited to modern warfare. In terms of accurate firing, within 400 meters there is hardly any difference from the submachine gun (in single shots). Due to the extensive use of cannons, light weapons are mostly used between 200 and several

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5

tens of meters and at such times, the submachine gun is the most useful and its power can be fully employed. I propose that the semiautomatic rifle be replaced as soon as possible by the submachine gun or small-caliber high-speed, fully automatic rifle.

4. The present equipment for the individual soldier is of no advantage in combat and not just because it is heavy. The crisscrossing of equipment straps and belts is very inconvenient. Hand grenades, cartridge pouch, canteen, satchel, gas mask and submachine gun (or semiautomatic rifle), etc. brings to 6 or 7 the number of straps around the neck. When on the march in the moutains, there is also a back pack and every so often they all have to be readjusted, otherwise the straps get so tight you can't breathe. When we engage the enemy and jump forward under enemy fire, these equipment straps are extremely inconvenient. Soldiers hope that this can be changed very soon.

5. Physically strong soldiers should be chosen to be frontline medics. Those wounded at the frontlines cannot be sent to the rear promptly mainly because the medics are physically weak, so the soldiers have to help each other to the rear areas and this creates a group of temporary noncombatants and weakens the unit's fighting strength.

6. The steel helmut is a necessary piece of equipment for the soldier and should be provided. Under enemy sniper fire, hand grenades and artillery attacks, some soldiers have suffered head injuries and some have even died of head injuries from stray bullets a thousand meters distant from the enemy. If they had a steel helmut, many would have avoided such an injury.

I believe that those who fought in this self-defense counterattack could recount more and better experiences. So that our army can rapidly modernize to suit the demands of modernized warfare, we urgently hope that the higher leadership and revelant departments will pay heed to the experience of this war and rapidly take effective steps so that our army's tactical thinking and weaponry will be greatly improved.

8226
CSO: 4005/2097

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