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West Europe Report

(FOUO 48/81)



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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

DEFENSE MINISTER ON LIBYAN THREATS, CRUISE BASES

Threats Discounted

PM071150 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 3 Sep 81 p 1

[Report by Dino Frescobaldi: "Italy Demands Explanation From al-Qadhdhafi of Threats to Attack Sicily"]

[Excerpts] Rome--We asked Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio about the real chances of al-Qadhdhafi's Libya putting its threats into practice.

"Let us start with the political aspect," the minister said. "The most important part of al-Qadhdhafi's remarks concerns the possibility of abandoning his policy of neutrality. In that case it would be useful to know the Soviet Union's viewpoint, too." Summing up the defense minister's thoughts, we shall have to see whether Moscow will in turn be willing to "cover" a possible future ally as unpredictable as the Libyan colonel. For one thing, the Kremlin cannot accept Tripoli's vaunted claim to extend the limits of its territorial waters 200 miles into the Mediterranean. If such a claim were to spread and be taken up by other Mediterranean countries, it would become a "closed sea" inaccessible to the fleets of nonlittoral countries, including the Soviet fleet.

"We know," Lagorio said, "that in the past certain Libyan requests for increased military aid presented to Moscow by both Jallud and al-Qadhdhafi have already been received with some degree of coolness. It is true that Moscow may one day find it convenient to establish one or more bases in Libya, though this is something that al-Qadhdhafi has hitherto refused to grant. But such a concession on the Libyans' part would undoubtedly have negative repercussions on the other Arab countries, including the ones whose positions are close to Tripoli's. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that al-Qadhdhafi is keen to maintain his nonaligned image in the eyes of the African world.

"In fact the OAU conference should be meeting in the Libyan capital next year. After that al-Qadhdhafi would hold the chairmanship for a year. Is the colonel willing to give up this plan by abandoning neutrality."

We pointed out to the minister that all this presupposes a logic in his policy. But it is well known that events often get out of hand, especially in the case of dictators, so that one must consider the possibility of al-Qadhdhafi carrying

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out his threats, feeling cornered. But does he have the practical resources to do so? The minister said: "From the technical military viewpoint, he does not have any great potential for reprisals. The military strength available to him does not in fact enable him to assume very much with regard to Italy and the other countries threatened, such as Greece and Turkey."

In this connection Lagorio pointed out that Libya has no nuclear weaponry and that even a conventional bombardment "would not cause a nuclear chain reaction because explosives are always kept separate from detonators." So the threat of a nuclear apocalypse brandished by the fiery colonel can only impress a Libyan audience. Furthermore, examining the matter in detail, it is known that Libyan aircraft--and even the MiG-25's, which are the most advanced model in al-Qadhafi's arsenal--can at most reach Italy's islands or southern regions and then return to Libya only by flying at the highest altitude, where as is known, fuel consumption is lower. That would mean that they would be identified by both Italian and NATO radar.

Does this all mean that we should not attach too much importance to al-Qadhafi? The minister replied: "That is not what I said. Al-Qadhafi may perhaps carry out a few commando demonstrations. Indeed, it seems that special groups of saboteurs are being trained in Libya. It seems that each Libyan battalion includes a component of so-called 'special forces.' As for the Tripoli navy, it can use eight Soviet-made patrol boats for fast sea transport. However, I do not need to point out that NATO has already taken the necessary precautions for every eventuality. We too have strengthened our security measures. Italy," Lagorio concluded, "could defend itself even from a more treacherous and less conventional form of attack."

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Cosimo Missile Base

PM101236 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 8 Sep 81 p 6

[Interview with Italian Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio by Gianfranco Simone: "Lagorio Describes Comiso Military Map"]

[Text] Rome--The Italian general staff is planning to strengthen the southern regions; Italian arms supplied to Libya are about to come to an end; in the event of an attack, trucks mounted with cruise launchers would not leave Sicily, though they would leave Comiso, surveillance of which will be entrusted to 200 specialized carabinieri, among others. Last, there will probably be a revision of the procedures of the "dual key" system to prevent a launching of the cruise missile without agreement between the Italian and U.S. Governments. This is what emerges from Defense Minister Lagorio's interview with CORRIERE and from a conversation with a general staff colonel.

The minister wanted to make the following two points before answering our questions:

1--Now that the preparation of the bases has been started, every effort must be directed toward making East-West negotiations possible, with the following objective: "We will not deploy the cruise missiles if the Soviets withdraw the SS 20's that have been targeted on Italy since 1978."

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2--The preparation of the base is no obstacle to negotiations: This belief stems from statements by high-level Soviet sources. In practice during the Brezhnev-Brandt meeting, the former said: "We understand that the Americans must produce the missiles and that you must prepare the launch areas. But do not deploy the missiles until negotiations have settled all the disputes."

I asked whether the choice of Sicily, only 500 km from the Libyan coast, was due to the need to point a deterrent southward too.

Whereas the general staff officer explained that only an agreement among all the NATO nations would make it possible to use the cruise missiles against Libya and that this would only be envisaged if Soviet missiles were deployed there and targeted on Italy, Lagorio replied: "The cruise and Pershing II program originated in 1978 to reduce an imbalance in the European theater. Indeed we also examined plans for bases in the north. So Africa does not come into it."

[Question] Even following al-Qadhdhafi's recent statements?

[Answer] The issue must not be viewed solely in connection with al-Qadhdhafi's arguments, but also bearing in mind what kind of reaction the Soviet Union might take.

[Question] What might the USSR's reaction be?

[Answer] It is difficult to imagine the present Soviet leadership group intending to create further destabilizing elements on the European chessboard. Moreover, there are the aspects of the Libyan military threat announced by al-Qadhdhafi though subsequently qualified by the Libyan ambassador in Rome. Theoretically it is possible, though it is more difficult to put into practice. Our job is to create a situation whereby a Libyan attack would prove particularly burdensome, difficult and unprofitable for the Libyan government and therefore to have a defense system that will discourage the planning of an offensive.

[Question] Is the possibility not being considered of stopping supplies of Italian weapons, such as the Lion tanks (simplified and Leopard tanks) produced by OTO-Melara?

[Answer] A rapid procedure is in progress to dry up the sources of Italian arms for Libya.

[Question] Why was Puglia not chosen instead of Sicily?

[Answer] Yes, the Puglia region was considered, but finally Comiso was chosen because of the existence of an airport, state-owned land and a suitable road system [Congrua Viabilita].

[Question] So the choice based partly on reasons of viability confirms that the missiles will not be taken out of Sicily.

[Answer] Yes. The choice reflects a national option because it is fairly clear that in U.S. eyes a base located elsewhere would have involved less expenditure and would have been preferred by the U.S. Government.

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[Question] Would it have cost less in Puglia?

[Answer] Anywhere else [but Sicily]. [answer ends]

The inference is, partly also on the basis of other statements that the Americans would have preferred to deploy the missiles in one of their existing bases (Aviano or Camp Derby, near Leghorn) or in an operational Italian base, such as Istrana or Gioia del Colle. Perhaps the rumors circulating earlier this year in Brussels, naming these bases, were designed to force our government's hand. They would have been chosen erroneously from a military viewpoint because as targets they are too valuable: At a strike it would have been possible to destroy an entire army brigade, a fighter-bomber airfield and the cruise base, as well as densely populated and industrialized areas, which are all equally important targets. The negotiations undoubtedly continued several months longer than envisaged: In June 1980 NATO Secretary Luns told us that a decision on the Italian bases was expected that year.

"We have had tough but excellent relations with the Americans," the colonel said. "We reached a perfect, though hard-won, agreement,"

[Question] Mr Minister, who would defend Comiso in the event of a commando or paratroop raid? The 200 Italian troops responsible for external surveillance belong to the air force's military 'airport vigilance,' a poorly armed group, not very well trained, often demotivated and recruited on a regional basis? Nor would the army be in a position to act in time, with a single motorized brigade split up among the island's main cities. How will Comiso be defended?

[Answer] We are preparing a quick strike military force with a civil intervention capability, which will cost 650 billion lire through 1983, in accordance with the finance law. In a few months' time Parliament will be informed of further details. Still with regard to the south, the main guideline is to rapidly strengthen our radar network for continuous monitoring of low-flying aircraft.

As for surveillance of Comiso, the plan is not to use the military airport vigilance but to use 200 highly qualified carabinieri and 200 Americans. The mobile escort squad will be Italian. There are increased surveillance and security measures at our military bases, a strengthening of the air force squadrons in the south and a plan for air, land and sea exercises in Sicily and the Ionian Sea so as to keep our military units operationally efficient. We will be discussing this again in a few weeks' time. [answer ends]

It seems that a group of 12-18 starfighters will be replacing the squadron of four aircraft stationed in Trapani on a rotational basis from the other bases. The carabinieri might belong to the same units, equipped with German shepherds, which guard the other Italian bases, in very small groups of about a dozen men. As for the intervention force, its basic model is the Second Governolo Light Infantry Battalion of the Legnano Brigade, Centauro Division, trained particularly well for this task since 1979. Other similar units will be established.

[Question] Mr Minister, the "dual key" system is unconvincing. Whereas groups of air force F104's fighter bombers or the Aquileia missiles brigade, both of which

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are equipped with nuclear devices kept at U.S. bases, could refuse to use the nuclear weapon without orders from our government because the aircraft and launch systems are operated by the Italians, on the other hand in the case of the cruise missiles, even the delivery vehicles are in U.S. hands. Even officers belonging to those units are expressing doubts about the existence of a credible "dual key" if the entire system was conceived by the Americans and is, moreover, secret. Who will guarantee us that our "key" is not useless and that there is no copy held by the "locksmith" who made it? Were the FRG and Britain more realistic in leaving both "keys" to the Americans?

[Answer] I can only give you a political reply, namely that the Italian government does not accept that the use of nuclear weapons from its own territory should be decided without express and prior consent from the Italian authorities. However, the technical realization of this point, which we consider essential, must remain classified information. [answer ends]

We can combine the minister's reply with the reply from the above-mentioned officer: "As far as Germany and Britain are concerned, it is by no means certain that that is how things stand. On the other hand, with regard to our direct relations with the Americans, there is a bilateral agreement which defends our sovereignty. However, since we are dealing with systems some aspects of which are new, it will probably be necessary to view the implementation of the agreements precisely in relation to the newness of these weapons."

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TERRORISM

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'MEDITERRANEAN DOSSIER' REVEALS INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST TIES

Milan PANORAMA 24 Aug 81 pp 36-37

[Article by Corrado Incerti]

[Text] French President Mitterand has evidence of terrorism's international ties linking the elusive Carlos with a gang of Palestinians, Soviet intelligence, and the Red Brigades (BR) with the Italian neofascists and with Licio Gelli's Freemasons. A document from France reveals an insidious network of terror.

"The Holy War has reached Pinerolo in the Piedmont. It has since crossed the Alps, and now has sent down deep roots in Paris. This is the threat of the future: today it is busy with the propaganda phase, but tomorrow it will shift into action." At the French Interior Ministry on the Place Beauveau, they are worried: for almost a year, now, the Holy War launched by Iran's holy man, the Ayatolla Khomeyni, has had a beachhead in Europe, carrying with it its explosive destabilizing potential. Here is the evidence gathered by French President Francois Mitterand's security forces, collected in a thick "Mediterranean Dossier" crammed full of documents and testimony on the destabilization of Europe, beginning to the South. The latest confirmation comes from an Islamic periodical which has its corporate headquarters and editorial offices somewhere beyond Postoffice Box 160 in the Piedmont town of Pinerolo.

The name of the magazine, printed in an Italian and a French edition by its publisher, Oggero, at Carmagnola, a small town outside Turin, is JIHAD, which in Arabic means "holy war." The editorial staff consists of five people, apparently all Arabs: Rudollah Idris, Umar Amin, Abb Al Qadir, Mujahid Abd al Haqq, Hossein. Even so, French intelligence people are certain that these are all assumed names cloaking the identities of Italians, Germans, and French nationals active on the extreme right. One of them has been identified: "Umar Amin is Professor Claudio Mutti, who was converted to Islam several years ago," the French file avers. Mutti was in the past a known neofascist (a member of the group calling itself Giovane Europa [Young Europe]), a nazimaoist (he headed the People's Struggle organization), and a propagandist for Libya's leader, Muammar Qaddhafi (he founded the Italy-Libya League); he was

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involved in the investigation into the Piazza Fontana massacre and into the slaughter at the Bologna railroad station.

The front cover of the maiden (October 1980) issue of JIHAD has a lot to say about its political line: it shows Amin el Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, an Islamic religious leader, smiling in a 1944 shot of Hitler's Berlin. As to the content of the magazine, the French intelligence note pulls no punches: "This periodical disseminates a pro-Islamic ideology with elements of antisemitism, fascism, and phony anti-imperialism. It is a confused ideology, in which extreme right-wing and equally extreme left-wing talk is blended inextricably." Attached to the magazine is a membership application form put out by a nascent Europe-Islam Association. "Underlying it is the conviction that it is possible to revive in Islam the principles that could inspire a European renaissance," comments the report.

The file labeled "Islamic Holy War - European Fascists" is not the only one among those in the French Interior Ministry's "Mediterranean Dossier" that documents tight connections with Italy. In two more files, one on the Palestinians and the other on secret societies, there are frightening links with Italian terrorism.

The Palestinians

No news to the French is the dependence of Italian Red terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, a.k.a. Carlos, on the Palestinian extremists of the rejectionist front ("No to any negotiations with Israel"), itself obedient to political orders from the Soviet Union. Carlos has put his signature on assassinations in every country in Europe and has coordinated his action with the Basque terrorists in the ETA, with the Irish in the IRA, with the Germans, and with the Italians in the Red Brigades (all of it documented in the "Mediterranean Dossier.")

Real news, however, is the report that European right-wing (Black) terrorism, which exploded a year ago with the almost simultaneous mass murders in Bologna (at the railroad station) at the Oktoberfest in Munich, and in Paris (at the synagogue on the Rue Copernicus) may stem from the same source: the Rejection Front Palestinians.

The whole story grew out of the investigation into the attack on the synagogue on Rue Copernicus. Suspicion fell initially on the French fascist groups, but for months there was no shred of specific proof. Then suddenly came the turning-point. The man who had organized the massacre, it was found, had paid \$1,000 in cash 10 days prior to the attack at a store on the Avenue de la Grande Armée in Paris for the Suzuki motorcycle which was blown apart by the bomb it carried. He had shown a Cypriot passport made out to Alexander Panadryu. The passport was false, but the French intelligence investigators managed to piece together every move the terrorist had made. Panadryu had come to France on 7 September of the previous year. He had taken a room at the Hotel Celtic, on the Rue Balzac, a hotel which of recent years has been a haunt for a good many Italian fascists. He had bought the

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motorcycle and rented a yellow Citroen GS. He had met and often visited an Italian prostitute. On 3 October, immediately after the attack on the synagogue, he had taken a plane to Rome, where he had dropped out of sight.

It was a "coincidence," reported to the French by Palestinians in the Palestine Liberation Organization opposed to the Rejection Front's pro-Soviet line, that provided the vital clue in the investigation of the synagogue attack: Carlos the terrorist, the hit-man for the pro-Soviets, who provided would-be revolutionaries from every nation, be they of the Black or Red persuasion, with fake Cypriot passports, had been busy throughout the whole month of August on Cyprus, recruiting youngsters for a training camp set up on the island of Socotra, in South Yemen. Furthermore, the Italian prostitute Panadryu had patronized in Paris had told police that the attacker had told her that he was circumcised because he was an Arab. The French are sure that the terrorist belongs to the Black October gang, the newest and most mysterious of the Palestinian extremist organizations.

The Secret Society

"I am convinced that the terrorism and arms traffic in the Mediterranean played a central role in the Auriol killings," a friend from Marseille told French Interior Minister Gaston Defferre.

The inquiry into the massacre uncovered the existence of a secret Masonic group which was infiltrated by arms dealers and fascist terrorists: it was known as the Sovereign and Military Order of the Temple of Jerusalem, commonly referred to as the Templars.

The first person to mention the Templars, or rather those who had infiltrated them -- in France they are known as the negative Templars ("But we have them in Italy too," report Maria Lo Mastro and Rocco Zingaro, who head the Italian Order) was Dominique Calzi, a 007 agent who has worked for several European intelligence agencies. In a book about the way they operate in secret, he revealed kidnapings, drug trafficking, and links with terrorism. Most important of all, though, was their heavy trafficking in weapons, most of it on behalf of terrorist groups.

Calzi, whose charges were borne out by the Marseille inquiry, maintains that the Templars are not the only secret society tilling this particular field in Europe. And he talks of several deliveries of diplomatic documents in Rome to French fascists by the Hospitalers of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, the Knights of Malta.

The Mediterranean Dossier ordered by the new-direction French government under Francois Mitterand is waxing still fatter with the results of inquiries into the activities of these secret societies, too, not to mention reports of their ties with Licio Gelli's P2, which used to meet with the Templars in Marseille.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PS DECENTRALIZATION POLICY: RESPONSIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18-24 Jul 81 pp 24-27

[Interview with Gaston Defferre, minister of state for interior and decentralization, by Josette Alia and Georges Mamy, date and place not specified]

[Text] Decentralization: What the New France Will Be

It is a quiet revolution, but it is nevertheless a revolution: as of 15 July the way France looks is going to change. The reign of tentacled Paris, of Paris as absolute master in the French wilderness, is over. The regions are regaining power and recovering their freedom. In order for this to occur it took the stubborn determination of one man, Gaston Defferre, minister of state for interior and decentralization, who with great effort has just gotten a body of measures adopted in the Council of Ministers preparing for decentralization and devolution in France for the first time, a fine double victory. Local elected officials, freed from the meddlesome supervision of Paris, will be masters in their own houses. But as a fair exchange they will also be held responsible and will be able to be punished in the event of a serious mistake. Freedom is winning out. As for prefects, they will no longer be the executory agents of excessive central government but they will find an indispensable role to play at the department level in monitoring and coordinating; the facade of government administration is splitting up. In short, "Jacobin" France, which has been in place for centuries, is beginning to fade away before the reawakening of the former provinces. This is a great watershed which has just begun. Gaston Defferre received Josette Alia and Georges Mamy this week in his Marseille mayor's office; he conjured up the new prospects opening up and also tackled some hotly debated subjects: Corsica, the Basque country, the police, and "cases" left in abeyance by the previous government.

[Question] Are you in such a rush to decentralize? You have the political assets and you have time ahead of you. Then why this haste to have irreversible pieces of legislation voted on as early as the next parliamentary session?

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Answer Experience has taught me that right after an election and the formation of a government, for a fairly short time period, it is possible to get really innovative pieces of legislation through parliament. Once that period of time is over everything becomes more difficult. Now then, the legislative texts I am proposing are going to change a lot of things. In short, it is a matter of taking power from where it is at present--in ministries in Paris which decide everything--and transferring it to the communes where they are affected, to the departments, and to the regions. This is a revolution and like any revolution it implies an end to the exercise of some powers: for example, the Paris offices of ministries are going to see their jurisdictions cut down. How will they accept this? To be sure, the new ministers supported decentralization during the election campaign. Decentralization has even proven to be very popular. But as time passes and ministers get settled into their agencies. I am starting to feel the beginning of resistance, which is quite a normal development. Agencies have explained to their ministers: "You cannot do that: they will take away your funds from you!" In these conditions, if decentralization is not done now, it will be more difficult to do it in a few months: that is the first point. The second point is that we are coming to power as a government carried by a real popular current. If we let the enthusiasm die out without our acting, we run the risk of sinking and being jeopardized. On the contrary, if we act quickly, we will create a favorable political and social climate. There are three successive and important pieces of legislation to get passed. If the first does not pass now, the other two will not follow within the anticipated deadlines.

Question The first piece of legislation involves the transfer of powers. What does that mean exactly?

Answer The transfer of powers has two aspects. Number one: There is no more supervision over local authorities. Communes, departments and regions deliberate and make decisions without a prefect or minister having to step in. So the decision will be operative without prefectorial or ministerial approval. Local elected officials will be completely free. Number two: However, since they are free, they must also be responsible. I lay stress on this because it is a very new idea. Decisions made by local authorities can be contested after the fact by the representative of the national government (for that he will rely on the Court of Accounts' examinations which will take place each year). If the mayor, the chairman of the general council or the chairman of the regional council has violated the law, if he has committed a serious error, the decision which he made can be voided. In addition there will be a penalty which can go up to dismissal from office which can be invoked against the deliberative assembly and, if need be, against the mayor or chairman.

Question On a personal basis?

Answer On a personal basis. Freedom must be accompanied by political and personal responsibility. Otherwise people sink into carelessness, disorder and ineffectiveness.

Question But this penalty will come too late: The decision will already be implemented.

Answer It is true that the national government's recourse will not involve postponement. So the decision will be implemented while awaiting the outcome of legal proceedings. For example, if it is a question of building a tunnel, then studies or even actual construction will be carried on.

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Question What happens then if this decision is subsequently voided by the state?

Answer It is the municipality or the department or the region which suffers the political and financial consequences.

Question That will be expensive.

Answer No, because I do not believe that mayors or elected officials will put themselves in that situation. Let us take an example: In my capacity as mayor, I decide, along with my municipal council, to build a subway line in Marseille. This decision is challenged by the national government. At this point I have two possibilities, either to say to myself, "Too bad, I will just keep at it," or to ask myself, "It is challenged: why?" I believe that in this case a responsible politician will ask himself questions. I believe also that before taking important steps a responsible man does some consultation. If in spite of everything the alarm bell rings and the government's representative says, "Watch out, you are not abiding by the law," what mayor, elected officeholder, or official is going to persist and continue on without asking questions?

Question Are you not thinking too much about the big cities? There are also some pretty small communes. Do you believe that elected officials will all be capable of facing up to their new responsibilities? Will they have sufficient competence, and are they not running the risk of being paralyzed at times?

Answer I believe that the mayors of small communes are competent. And then perhaps those mayors more than others will be influenced by the observations which the government's representative might make to them. But it is true that one must consider what their situation is. When the mayor of a small commune works out a plan he does not have services at his disposal for conceiving and executing it like they do in large cities. What does he do? He turns to either the installation people or the agricultural engineers, which is to say he turns to a government agency which will advise him just as it has always done. From now on the decision is up to him but he will make it after consultation with representatives of the national government. Therefore there is little risk that he will make an enormous mistake.

Question But is that not indirectly a form of supervision?

Answer Yes, it is. True freedom presupposes that studies not be carried out by those who were the supervisors up to now. That is why we are searching for another system. For example, some intercommunal research agencies might be devised which are answerable only to mayors, like the ones which already exist in large cities except that they would group together several small communes.

Question Then there would be a political risk. You are well aware that in certain large municipalities the research agencies are in the hands of political parties....

Answer Perhaps. But I believe it is important to settle on a formula which will ensure both the independence of communes and the effectiveness of the work.

Question All the same the prefect was useful. When something was not going well, people went to demonstrate in front of the prefect's office. Where will they go now? In front of the mayor's house? Are you not afraid of an extreme politicization of the local scene?

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Answer It must not be thought that the prefect is no longer of any use. Quite the contrary. What exactly is his role these days? In order to find out I looked at how things went on in the field in my own department. What was to be seen? All the ministries--installation, public health, agriculture, youth and sports, cultural affairs, and others--all have their department-level management personnel tied in directly to the Paris offices and they are not responsible to the prefect. The department-level management sometimes work in collaboration with the prefect, but when they are not in agreement with him, off they go and telephone, turn up in Paris, and settle the matter in Paris. Not to mention the interministerial missions sent for 6 months--we have the Fos group mission and the Berre pond mission here--which are still there 10 years later. So much so that there is a tangle of government operations in the departments which totally eludes the prefects. That is what we are going to change. All these operations are going to be under the command of the prefect who will represent the state, which will be the guarantor of national unity. Matters will no longer be able to be sent up to Paris by bypassing prefects. The key to the reform is there.

Question In sum, prefects will be Paris local-style.

Answer Yes.

Question Is not this a purely theoretical view?

Answer Not at all. It is in fact the only way to arrive at genuine decentralization--since power is going to be handed back to elected officials--and also to arrive at genuine devolution--since the ministry offices will no longer be answerable to the Paris ministries. So the prefect on the spot will have extensive responsibilities and will make decisions which did not fall to him previously. He will no longer be the representative of only the interior minister but of all the ministries. You see that his role is not diminished. Quite the opposite.

Question Do you not foresee great difficulties in implementation when you cut the ministries off from their regional offices?

Answer Yes indeed. But that is reform.

Question In the end what will be left in the central government if everything is decentralized in this fashion? Very little.

Answer A great deal will be left. There can be no confusion or difficulty within the division of powers between the central government and regional authorities: the jurisdictions are clearly established and they will not change. Communes take care of street lighting, refuse disposal, traffic, etc. Hospitals for general medical treatment and for surgery come under the municipalities, mental hospitals come under the departments, and welfare system expenditures come under the general council. All of that is very clear. Mayors will take action but will always do it within the context of the law and their jurisdictional competence.

Question Then the problem of standards for public health, sanitation safety, urban development, etc. will arise. According to which criteria is action to be taken? Criteria set in Paris? In that case nothing will have changed.

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Answer Yes it will because it is the prefect who will be saying on the spot at the department level "apply these or those standards." Obviously the ideal would be to make these standards regional. What is unsupportable for us local elected officials is Paris' arbitrariness which imposes an administrative supervision on us which is not of a legal nature (is the decision to build such-and-such day care center or school legal or illegal?) but with regard to appropriateness (your day care center must have 15 beds, your grass area is too big, you have to do this rather than that), that is to say that we are being substituted for in the appreciation of the needs of our cities. The first hospital that I had built in Marseille, which is a very fine hospital, has rooms so small that you cannot put a table in them. I fought in numerous committees in Paris and I told them, "That's insane." It was no good. Fortunately I like ships. I had folding tables put into the hospital rooms like the ones you have in the navy: a board with a hinge held up by a leg. When you raise the board the leg collapses. However, you will admit that this business really takes the cake. Not to mention the day care center standards which have been forced on me, with more bathtubs than there are children when one employee per bathtub is required, all of this without any operating subsidy of course. Everything is like that. Well, from now on of course the government will lay down the general system of regulation but implementation and carrying things out will be decided on the spot by local elected officials; and I am convinced that everything will run better.

Question So there will remain a vast area within the national sphere.

Answer Of course there will! The next battle in the National Assembly, I am positive, will be concerned with that. The right is going to maintain that we are dividing up France. They will do this by pretending to believe that we are going to give mayors, general council chairmen and regional council chairmen jurisdictional areas of the central government, areas which are not theirs. Now then, there is no question of doing that.

Question That means that education, defense, the police, treasury operations....

Answer...Are remaining within the jurisdiction of the national government. Furthermore, all of that will be clearly laid down in the legislation. The first law up for passage will deal with the elimination of administrative supervision over local authorities and the transfer of responsibilities to local elected officials. The second piece of legislation up for passage will define all of the procedures, the directives and the jurisdictions. A third law, without a doubt the most difficult one to set in motion, will deal with the transfer of certain national government funds to the local communities. For there is no freedom without financial resources. Now then, in France at present the national government collects 81 percent of tax receipts, and local communities collect only 19 percent as against 25 to 30 percent in most industrial countries. So this or that funding allocation will have to be taken away from the ministries in order to allocate them directly to the local communities.

Question Will certain taxes be collected directly by the local communities?

Answer Yes. It is conceivable that such-and-such tax may go to communes and such-and such tax to departments. In addition, the local tax system, professional taxes, and property taxes on residences have to be completely transformed. Since the regions do not all have the same resources, a tax to feed into an equalization fund, for

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example, will have to be provided for. This is a matter of legislation and imagination. The main thing is for the local communities to have their own funds, for there no longer to be a need to "ring the doorbell" in Paris, and for subsidies to disappear. From the time you receive a subsidy you are under administrative supervision, you are dependent, and you are no longer free. Believe me, as soon as elected officials have the power in their own hands to make decisions they are also going to clamor for financial liberty, which is to say for modification of the tax system. In this area as well we will have changed the mood and demonstrated movement by going forward.

Question But in the event of dispute, who will decide? Say that two neighboring cities each want to build an airport: Which one is chosen? Say somebody wants to set up a factory in either one region or another: Where will it be of the most use?

Answer If the airport is of national or international magnitude, the national government makes the choice. If it is an airport for tourism or light aircraft the arbitration can be done by the region. If the factory is a private sector factory, it will make the choice itself to set up where in its view conditions seem best. If it is a nationalized factory, the national government will decide after having compared advantages and possibilities. It is always possible to determine which authority has the jurisdiction to make the decision.

Question The fact remains that in spite of everything all of this will have to be made to fit into the framework of the plan, which under a socialist government ought to regain all of its powers. How is a fervent sense of responsibility to the plan to be reconciled with local freedoms?

Answer Planning, which as you know socialists have defended right from the start, is all the more important in a decentralized system. In practice there will be two plans, in keeping with each other of course: a regional plan and a national plan. Communes which have work projects to undertake will have to find a spot either in the regional plan or (when it is a question of large projects like the Marseille subway or the purification station) in the national plan.

Question Nevertheless, at that point there is encroachment on the freedom of the local government.

Answer Yes, but the freedom of each one is limited by the freedom of all. We local elected officials will be working in the framework of national guidance, and this will be all the easier and less burdensome since we will be free in other respects.

Question However, in the explanatory preamble of your first law, you really go quite far: thus, it says there that the municipal council "will take necessary measures for the protection of the economic and social interests of the people of the commune." Will the commune, for example, have to rescue businesses which are in trouble? That is what the Court of Accounts has just reproached you for having done in Marseille....

Answer I do not disown anything about what I have done in Marseille. What I did was, I believe, useful. What has taken place? The Titan-Coder Company, a very large truck trailer building and railway repair company, which employed 800 workers, was

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going to close down. I had the land, buildings and equipment bought up by a joint venture company combining the City of Marseille and the Caisse des Depots Deposits Office (so it was without private sector participation). And we rented the whole thing to a manufacturer who got the business going again thus avoiding a wave of dismissals. Was not this exactly the part for the local community to play? Was it not necessary to rescue Coder? The same thing applies to the Terrin Ship Repair Company. When Terrin stopped making payments, you saw industrialists from all over Europe arriving to buy up its ultramodern equipment at low prices. I called a meeting of the municipal council and we decided to put in a bid in the event the property was sold off. In this fashion I was able to block sales which would be threatening to Marseille's economy. Following this, the liquidation agent for Terrin gradually resold to companies who had decided to put the workshops back in operation, and once the crisis of this ship repair activity was over, the industry was back in operation in Marseille. A few days ago a CGT General Confederation of Labor trade unionist from among the ship repair activity's workers told me on the telephone that the shipyards are bustling with activity, so much so that one of the owners, after having threatened to file for bankruptcy, has "wonderful morale" because his business is so prosperous. Did Terrin have to be broken up? Who can block or prevent business failures better than the mayor in his own commune, in the event that is possible at all? This must not prevent him from saying no when he is asked to do so in a dead-end situation.

Question If you follow this course you are going to be obliged to start helping all lame ducks.

Answer No, because the mayor is responsible for his budget. Now then, a municipal budget must be balanced, which rules out risky ventures. In municipalities we do not have any "money-printing presses."

Question But tell me: Is not being mayor going to become a full-time job?

Answer No more than it is now.

Question There will be many more responsibilities. Will mayors not have to devote themselves entirely to their office as mayor? How will they be paid?

Answer It will probably be necessary to work out an elected officials statute and provide for a salary.

Question By professionalizing the functions of mayor and general council or regional council chairman this way, does one not run the risk of creating a class of professional local politicians?

Answer Even if that risk exists it is worth taking in order to gain our freedom. But I do not believe there is such a danger. In France the penalty in politics, especially at the time of municipal elections, is a direct function of the results of management. Demagoguery does not pay. Certain mayors are always reelected, even by raising taxes, because people know that they are making good use of public moneys. Other mayors who go in for very low tax rates but who accomplish little get beaten in elections. The peoples' penalty in politics exists. The voters are rarely wrong.

Question And what about Paris?

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Answer I had the ambition of doing everything, Paris and the provinces, right from the first bill. But when I saw how complicated the pieces of legislation for the capital were, I had to agree that we would never get through them this July. It was impossible in practice. But that was not a political choice at all. It will be done as quickly as possible. And Ile-de-France is one of the regions affected by the first set of measures.

Question And what about Corsica?

Answer I am going to go to Corsica to explain to the Corsicans myself what the special status will consist of which they will receive. You saw that the Corsican movements decided to extend the truce. At the time I said that I was ready to engage in dialogue: with all democratic organizations. And since above all I do not want everything to start up again and the cycle of violent acts to begin again, I am struck by the political need to move quickly. The decentralization reform must therefore be implemented in Corsica before it comes into effect on the mainland.

Question What will this status be?

Answer The main thing is that it is a matter of setting up an assembly endowed with wider powers than those of the other regional assemblies. I explained these proposals in Corsica during the legislative election campaign. They were well received. But I also expect various forms of resistance.

Question What about the Basque region? Is there still a question of creating a new department?

Answer Not for the time being? The tragedy of the Basque country, in my opinion, is that there is no solution but a political one. Now then, if the Spanish Government one day agrees to grant special status to the Basque country, would the 150,000 French Basques, who are not even all grouped together, agree at that time to be absorbed by the 2,300,000 Spanish Basques? I doubt it. In any case, for the moment difficulties with the Spanish Government on the subject of Basque terrorists compel us to be cautious.

Question Are you going to extradite the prosecuted Spanish Basques?

Answer No. Perhaps because I have experienced clandestine resistance, I feel very strongly that to extradite is contrary to all France's traditions, especially when it is a matter, as in this case, of a political combat. I will go to Madrid soon to meet with the Spanish interior minister. I will explain to him what we are doing; but extradition--no, that is not possible.

Question And what about your police force? Is it war? With you? With the police hierarchy?

Answer No! Absolutely not. I saw Bernard Deleplace (secretary general of the Autonomous Federation of Police Unions) for a long time last week. No, it is not war. But we find ourselves faced with a very understandable two-sided phenomenon. For years the police force was under the authority of rightist governments which entrusted it with basically repressive tasks, directed against the left, the far left, occupied factories, strikers, immigrants, etc. Bad habits catch on all too quickly. I undertook

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to change that, first of all by renewing dialogue with the unions. At that point, these unions demanded "some heads." I responded that I would not be the cause of "heads rolling." Everyone has his part to play. Besides, as far as I am concerned, it is not my nature to knuckle under to demands. Changes will doubtless have to occur, whether it is because certain persons were too zealous in the past or because others were unjustly penalized for their opinions. But that can only be done in peace and quiet and away from any pressure or any demand.

Question But can you achieve a change of atmosphere in the police force?

Answer I had the top men in the police come to see me and I told them: "Going after Arabs is over. Racism is over. Antisemitism is over. Here are written instructions: go after people who commit crimes and the far right with all the energy that is needed and as effectively as you can, but with other methods." I even said to them, "If at the end of a trail you find a very important politician, I promise you that you will be completely protected." They asked me why I was saying this. I answered, "Because, since the security services of certain politicians, and by no means minor ones, were picked by these far right groups, it is not impossible that one day you will run up against one of them." But for this to get down to the rank and file is another matter. I have been able to verify it in Marseille, and a few days ago it was reflected by a reordering of that local police force. Perhaps via this example others will begin to understand. But you cannot change the bad habits of 20 years in 1 month.

Question Are you going to bring out some old buried files again?

Answer Well, about those "old files," I am in the process of having them completely investigated in order to hand them over to the Evaluation Committee.

Question The committee chaired by Francois Bloch-Laine?

Answer Yes, it is that committee which is also responsible for setting up ethical evaluation. The chief of state and prime minister have given me their assent. The Broglie case, the Curriel case, the Goldman case, the Delpy one, etc. They must all be examined. Do you know that the file on far right factions in the police, which the examining judge asked the previous government for, had never been handed over? Then, since evaluation is being set up, I myself wish that the chairman of or the spokesman for the Evaluation Committee might be able to assess all these strange cases, including those which, like the attack on Copernic Street, are still in the hands of the judicial system.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

REASONS FOR INCREASE IN TENSION BETWEEN PSI, PCI

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 17 Aug 81 pp 30-32

[Article by Fabrizio Coisson]

[Text] Discredit Cards: Suspicions surrounding PSI finances involve Cali and P2. Suspicions floating around some fringe Reds who wound up in the PCI (the USSR is involved there). These and other tales of money, deals, politics and judges bid fair to poison relations on the left. Caught between the feuding parties: the DC.

Here is a story the communists tell. It is about Roberto Calvi and the PSI. It is a matter the banker revealed to the Milanese court of inquiry during questioning: Umberto Ortolani, one of the biggest wheels in Masonic Lodge P2, had long been pushing to get a foreign bank account opened in the name "of a party." Acceding to his repeated requests, Calvi opened the account (and that account reportedly swelled in short order to \$20 million); immediately thereafter he received telephone calls "from top socialist leaders" thanking him. All this is down in the verbatim proceedings, and protected by the cloak of secrecy surrounding such inquiries.

The socialists tell another story. It has to do with Deputy State Prosecutor for Milan Guido Viola. As the P2 scandal was breaking, Viola went to the mayor of Milan, Carlo Tognoli, a socialist, to tell him something like this: "Look, this is really something big; the leaders of your party are involved; the only way to get out of it is to get rid of Craxi." Tognoli lost no time in reporting that conversation to the heads of the PSI.

Whispers in the corridors, rumors spread (in strict confidence) about these stories (along with others recounting unsavory tales of deals, money, politics, and police investigations) may well send relations on the left into a perilous spiral of attack and reprisal. There was the war of words between Enrico Berlinguer and Bettino Craxi, between the PCI and the PSI, and that it was bitter, tough, and occasionally contemptuous in tone, was an old story by then, one everybody knew. But the clash was contained -- with some exertions -- within the realm of politics, far away from that war of the files, of revelations, of sensational

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disclosures that had almost always been a monopoly of the internecine battles within the DC (occasionally, perhaps, with the involvement of government bureaucracy troops).

Helping to spread the flames to the left as well was the Calvi-P2 investigation, suspicions cast on PSI finances, and charges against Milanese magistrates for behaving (on behalf of the PCI) in antisocialist ways. More than that: in the PSI's home offices in Rome there was a kind of declaration of war ready for release: a report to the High Council of the Magistracy containing a list of "pressures, intimidations, threats, and violations of judicial secrecy" committed against the PSI by the Milanese courts in the Calvi-P2 case. It had been none other than Craxi, at the last minute, who decided not to send the report, and to hold the bloodshed inside the political arena for a while longer. But in fact he had slipped the charges against the prosecutors into the text of his speech in the Chamber, during the debate on the vote of confidence for the Spadolini government. "A fine way to calm the waters," was the reaction in the PCI.

Not even Calvi's release from durance vile was enough to soften the shrill tone of polemics. On the contrary, rumors about what the banker had actually told the court during the investigation simply fed the smouldering fires of suspicion. "I do not answer questions of that kind," was Calvi's terse reply to Enzo Biagi, who asked him in an interview for LA REPUBBLICA about some "mysterious financing that had traveled via America and Germany to wind up with an Italian party."

"So far as we know," say the socialist leaders soothingly, "Calvi did indeed speak of the PSI, but in these terms: that in various quarters and in several circles there had been a lot of talk about the need for giving the PSI a practical hand, to help speed Craxi's new course." But no secret financing ever materialized, they say. "Quite the contrary, early this year Calvi was pressing for repayment of at least part of the PSI's line of credit with the Banco Ambrosiano," protested Claudio Martelli.

And so it came to pass that, shortly before the Palermo party congress, two payments of 400 million lire each went to the Banco Ambrosiana, thereby reducing the debt to around 11 billion lire: the biggest part of the official PSI budget deficit, which comes to 27 billion lire in all. Of this, one-tenth had been inherited from the stewardship of Francesco De Martino. In the 5 years of Craxi's management, in short, 17 or 18 billion lire of indebtedness has somehow managed to build up. "You do have to consider the interest, though, plus the fact that since he took over there has not been a single year without elections," say the PSI's administrators, certain, even so, that they can clear up the debt when the Party's government subsidy is doubled.

As for that money from America and Germany, Craxi's managers swear that there were a lot of promises, but very little money ever actually materialized. By way of example, they tell about something that happened on the eve of the 1979 political and European elections. After repeated assurances of help, some money actually arrived from Germany: 120 million lire. "Chickenfeed, not boxcars full of gold!" Furious, Craxi

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fired off a telegram to the German leaders: "We are endorsing your contribution, and adding a matching sum, to a foundation for the development of cultural relations between our countries."

Is that the whole story of socialist finances? The Milanese probers, particularly now that they have finished questioning Calvi, do not seem thoroughly convinced that it is. With the matter of the "Protection" account apparently shelved (pinned, on the basis of some detailed statements by Licio Gelli, to Bettino Craxi's right-hand man, Claudio Martelli), they are now looking for the holder of another account, opened at the Swiss UBS bank under the obviously assumed name of "Virgilio."

All these add up to so many floating mines, quite beyond the various political motivations behind them, which would go far toward explaining even the tough positions Berlinguer took vis-a-vis the PSI, which he compared with the DC in his denunciation of the corruption of the party system in Italy. In other words, Berlinguer was asking the many doubting Thomases in the PCI: how can you conceive of an alliance with a leadership crew like the socialist one which might at any moment be swamped with a flood of indictments?

"I refuse to believe in these versions of what has happened. The debate on the left is not supposed to be a diplomatic exchange, yet even so it must invariably reflect the rules of politics, of the battle of ideas," says Martelli (who has already written an essay in response to Berlinguer's latest interview; after that is delivered, he will be leaving for America with his wife and son, to travel across the United States in a camper, coast-to-coast). "It would really be dreadful if the PCI were to decide to start playing politics with the files and the prosecutors," insists Luigi Covatta, a socialist from Lombardy. "On other occasions it has leaned in that direction, but that's a losing game." "To put it simply, that is not the way we work. We leave that kind of behavior to others," was the retort at the Botteghe Oscure, "unless the socialists' concerns really turn out to have something to do with the magistrates' courts. The police courts are simply doing what they are there to do, simply doing their job."

Down on the Via del Corso, though, the top PSI brass are battening the hatches for what might turn out to be an all-out war, with no quarter given. Meanwhile, they are stockpiling records on deliveries of Soviet methane, with some 15 billion lire in "undocumented expenditures" authorized, beginning in 1973, by the Foreign Trade Ministry. Whose address was on that particular slice of pie?

According to IL SETTIMANALE, it was addressed to the Communist Party (and the communists are convinced that IL SETTIMANALE got the information from some Socialist Party leak or other).

"Then of course we could also bring up the matter of the 2,400 or so corporations which have ties, one way and another, with the PCI," the socialists warn, as they toss into the pot both the companies active in trade with the Eastern bloc countries, and the farms in the Cooperative League. ("There are socialists in those outfits, too," they point

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out, "but the socialists have very little to say in matters of control or decision-making."

If politics is really destined to yield the floor to the battle of the files, more or less explosive, more or less documented, relations between the two parties on the left would run the very serious risk, when business resumes in September, of a permanent rupture. "If that were to happen, you can bet that the DC would move for elections right away, even ahead of time." That is a prediction you can hear, despite all the other quarrels, from socialists and communists alike.

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POLITICAL

UNITED KINGDOM

MORI POLL: LIBERAL,SDP ALLIANCE COULD WIN NEXT ELECTION

PM141323 London THE TIMES in English 14 Sep 81 p 2

[Unattributed report of Robert Worcester analysis: "Conservatives Stay in Opinion Poll Doldrums"]

[Excerpts] Five months since the launching of the Social Democratic Party, the Conservatives show no sign of recovery in public support, according to a Mori poll conducted exclusively for THE TIMES.

In a measure of spontaneous voting intention ("if there were a general election tomorrow"), Labour leads the Conservatives by 9 percent, an 8 percent swing from the Conservatives to Labour since the election (Table 1).

The Conservatives have suffered a long, slow slide in public support, dipping to 28 percent last March and settling for the last two months at 30 percent, figures that have not been reached by either big party, in or out of government, since Labour's Nadir in November, 1976, at the time of the International Monetary Fund crisis.

Interestingly, the launching of the Social Democratic Party made no dent in Liberal Party support until Warrington, when, as the graph shows, spontaneous support for the SDP overtook that for the Liberals; there has been only a slight, statistically insignificant, drop in SDP support over the period since the Warrington by-election on July 16.

When prompted with the idea of an alliance between the Liberals and the SDP, public support again rises dramatically to 41 percent, considerably more than the 29 percent achieved by the two parties separately. Labour supporters are somewhat more likely to shift to the Alliance than are Conservatives, as the table shows.

Changes in part support since the general elections are set out in Table 2, which shows:

--Conservatives losing proportionally among all classes.

--Labour gaining slightly among working-class electors.

--Both the Conservatives and Labour losing support among trade unionists to the SDP.

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--Liberals staying roughly the same, apparently unaffected by the emergence of the SDP.

The importance of achieving an alliance between the Liberals and the SDP is underscored by the findings in Table 3, which shows how much stronger the whole (Alliance) would be than the sum of its parts (the Liberals and SDP separately).

The Liberals on the one hand are stronger with women, younger electors (although not first-time voters), unskilled working-class (DE) voters, and people in the southern area of the country.

The SDP, on the other hand, is weaker with women, older voters (especially pensioners) and working-class people, and is evenly balanced geographically.

Put them together in an alliance, and they become almost equally strong among all sexes, ages, classes and regions of the country, with their only important weakness being with those aged over 65.

One notable finding from the study is the considerable strength the SDP has with trade unionists, apparently siphoning off former conservative trade union support.

An alliance, according to these figures, would come first among all sectors of the population except working-class, where Labour would narrowly win, by 3 percent, and in the north of England and Scotland, where Labour would win by 2 percent.

Ninety-three percent of Liberals in the poll said they would support an alliance at the general election, as did 96 percent of (spontaneous) SDP supporters. Among trade unionists, the SDP would come one point ahead of Labour, 42 to 41 percent.

Other finds from the Mori poll are that 26 percent now think economic conditions in the country will improve the next 12 months. Although still nearly half (44 percent) expect things to get worse. That is a marked improvement in earlier Mori findings: In July, 54 percent expected things to get worse, as did 61 percent of the public last March.

Least optimistic about the future are the young, working-class respondents, and people living in the north.

Unemployment is still, overwhelmingly, though to be the most important issue facing Britain today. Two-thirds (67 percent) of the public say that, which compares with 10 percent who thought so at the time of the last election. In February, 1979, (during the "winter of discontent"), just over the electorate said strikes and trade unions were the most important issue; only three percent think that today.

This issue has been at or near the bottom of public concerns since last September. It compares with 14 percent who say that prices and inflation are the most important issue, while law and order, the EEC and northern Ireland are most important to only five, two, and two percent respectively (Table 4).

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Technical note: This survey was carried out by Market & Opinion Research International (Mori) for THE TIMES by personal interviews among a quota sample of 1,775 adults, aged over 18, selected to be representative of the adult population of Great Britain by sex, age, social class and region. Fieldwork was conducted between August 20 and September 2, 1981, in 153 sampling points throughout Britain.

Table 1/SDP/Liberal Alliance

(A) "How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow?"

(B) "If there was a general election tomorrow and the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party formed an alliance to fight this election, which of the parties on this card would you vote for?"

	(1979 Election)	Spontaneous (A)	Prompted (B)	Net Gain
	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Con	(45)	30	25	Minus 5
Lab	(38)	39	31	Minus 8
Lib	(14)	13		
	29 (Lib/SDP)	41 (Alliance)		Plus 12
SDP	(-)	16		
Other	(3)	2	3	Plus 1

Base: All adults giving voting intentions (excluding "don't knows").

Table 2/Change in Party Support

All	May, 1979	Now	Change
	0/0	0/0	0/0
Con	45	30	Minus 15
Lab	38	39	Plus 1
Lib	14	13	Minus 1
SDP	-	16	Plus 16
Other	3	2	Minus 1
Middle Class (ABC1)			
Con	59	44	Minus 15
Lab	24	20	Minus 4
Lib	15	13	Minus 2
SDP	-	22	Plus 22
Other	2	1	Minus 1

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Table 2 Continued

All	May, 1979	Now	Change
Skilled Working Class (C2)			
Con	41	23	Minus 18
Lab	41	48	Plus 7
Lib	15	13	Minus 2
SDP	-	14	Plus 14
Other	3	2	Minus 1
Unskilled Working Class (DE)			
Con	34	19	Minus 15
Lab	49	53	Plus 4
Lib	13	15	Plus 2
SDP	-	10	Plus 10
Other	4	2	Minus 2
Trade Unionists			
Con	33	19	Minus 14
Lab	51	48	Minus 3
Lib	13	12	Minus 1
SDP	-	18	Plus 18
Other	3	3	0

Table 3/Profile of Party Supporters

	Electorate	Con	Lab	Lib	SDP	(Alliance)
All	(100)	(30)	(39)	(13)	(16)	(41)
	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Men	48	42	50	38	59	49
Women	52	58	50	62	41	51
18-24	13	11	17	10	13	13
25-34	20	16	19	22	29	24
35-44	19	16	17	26	19	21
45-54	14	12	15	13	12	14
55-64	17	27	16	12	20	15
65 Plus	17	27	16	17	7	12

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Table 3 Continued

	Electorate	Con	Lab	Lib	SDP	(Alliance)
AB	16	27	4	17	23	18
C1	23	29	15	19	30	25
C2	33	25	39	30	27	28
DE	28	20	41	34	20	29
TU Member	28	18	34	24	32	28
North (Incl Scot)	37	27	41	31	36	33
Midlands	25	26	29	20	26	26
South	38	46	30	49	38	42
Home Owner	59	73	41	62	68	63
Concil	35	19	55	32	24	30
Telephone	73	83	60	74	83	76
No 'phone	27	17	40	26	17	24

Table 4/Most Important Issue (Trends)

What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?

	Feb 79	Feb 80	Sep 80	Dec 80	Jun 81	Jul 81	Aug 81
	(All figures in percentage)						
Unemployment	10	16	57	59	68	70	67
Prices/Inflation	30	38	23	23	18	12	14
Trade Unions Strikes/Industrial Disputes	51	25	3	4	3	2	3
Law and Order	3	4	2	3	3	6	5
Common Market	2	4	5	2	2	1	2
Northern Ireland	1	2	x	2	2	1	2
Immigration	1	1	2	1	2	3	3
Housing/Rates/Rents	1	1	1	1	1	1	x
Schools/Education	1	2	2	x	1	1	1
Pensions	1	1	1	x	1	1	x
National Health Service	1	1	1	x	1	x	x

Base: All 18 plus

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GENERAL

FRANCE

NEW GOVERNMENT'S STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN POLICE FORCE

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Aug 81 pp 13-15

[Article by Philippe Krasnopolski: "The Defferre Line"]

[Text] The police are not being spared the "change."
But the structural reforms prepared by Mr Defferre
are being well received by them.

Meetings in the police stations to denounce "despotic chiefs:" this is one of the projects of the new session of the Autonomous Federation of Police Unions (FASP).

FASP, which has close ties with the Socialist Party, includes a little over 50 percent of uniformed and civilian police. It was founded in 1969 and until 1975 was directed by Gerard Monate, a peace officer who entered the "big house" and unionism in 1946. Today he is one of the closest advisers of Gaston Defferre, the minister of Interior, on police questions.

On 23 June, at its congress held in Rouen, FASP asked that sanctions be taken against certain highly-placed officials "to get the police out of the crisis into which it was plunged by the ministers and leaders of the former regime."

Mr Defferre then rejected any "witch hunt:"

"The unions have asked me for heads. I am not going to make heads roll. The present hierarchy has followed the dictates of the preceding governments, which were elected normally. It was their duty and it was the sense of the state."

Half laughing and half troubled, a highly-placed official of the national police explains, however:

"Mr Defferre is trying to reassure the hierarchy. But his words are ambiguous. So not much comes of it. No question of initiatives. The work suffers because of it."

Actually, speaking of "those who have done too much with it, who have exceeded their role and who by their behavior have done in the promotion of some who did not think as they did," Mr Defferre, after his installation in the Place Beauvau, undertook to reorganize the police departments.

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"To change the spirit you have to change the men," he asserts.

Change has chiefly hit the men who denounced the FASP: Pierre Somveille, the prefect of police in Paris, was replaced by Jean Perier, who had been until then the prefect in Ille-et-Vilaine; Maurice Lambert, the director of the National Police, by Bernard Couzier, until now prefect at large. Mr Lambert, it is true, becomes director general of administration in the Interior Ministry.

Another appointment: Mr Bouhin, the former prefect of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, has just become the head of the Public Security Board, a service that was dissolved in 1978, which will bring together the supervision of the urban police and the CRS [Republican Security Companies].

Other "heads" wanted by FASP: Maurice Bouvier, the central director of the Criminal Investigation Department; Michel Guyot, the director of the Paris PJ [Criminal Investigation Department]; Marcel Chalet, head of the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance]; Roger Chaix, director of the Urban Police; Roger Pinaud, director of the CRS; Philippe Massoni, Technical Services director and former adviser to Raymond Barre on police affairs; Robert Broussard and Marcel Leclerc, who are respectively head of the Antigang Brigade and head of the Criminal Brigade. "The 10 key persons of the police promoted by the former regime," the unionists emphasize.

FASP also wants to "moralize the profession." At least, that is what its secretary general, Bernard Deleplace, says:

"We have to get rid of the black sheep, involved in the rackets, procuring, in lower-police operations or in missions that sometimes imperil democracy."

These words call up this observation by a police commissioner:

"Moralization is only an excuse for those who are incapable to get rid of those who are better. You can see it in the Ayme-Blanc affair."

Lucien Ayme-Blanc is the head of the Central Office for the Repression of Crime (OCRB) and one of the most effective of French policemen. Today he is criticized for his relations with a crook who had been sought since October 1980 and was arrested last 23 July by the police of the International Information Bureau (BRI).

The whole problem of infiltration and use of informers is raised again here.

The FASP is the only union to ask for "purging." The leaders of the Independent National Police Union (SNIP), the second largest uniformed police union, are content to ask for "reforms."

Shortly after the second round of the presidential election, Francois Mitterrand explained in a letter to the police union organizations:

"We must return to techniques of prevention, protection and aid to the population, that is to say to walking the beat. The use of the troops will be reviewed."

"That is the only way to rehabilitate the profession. Twenty-five years ago the 'cop' was respected because people knew him," a SNIP member declared with satisfaction.

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Here and now, patrolling the beat exists as an experiment in Rennes and in the Hauts-de-Seine, notably in Boulogne-Billancourt. The Mobile Security Units (UMS), which were created by Christian Bonnet, should be dissolved soon.

Mr Defferre put Mr Monate and Maurice Grimaud in charge of preparing the police reform. Mr Grimaud was prefect of police in Paris in 1968; at that time he was hostile to any brutal repression of the student demonstrations.

The two men have worked together before. In 1980 they published a work reflecting on the mission of the police. In opposition to the idea of "maintaining order" they suggest the idea of prevention. The book calls for abolishing the special brigades, reform of the General Inspectorate of the Services (IGS) and the General Inspectorate of the National Police (IGPN), the "police of the police forces."

These reforms are in progress. Thus it was decided to decentralize the CRS and take away from them the mission of maintaining order, and give them prevention tasks (on the roads, in the mountains, etc.). Under the direct authority of the minister of the Interior, the CRS will be responsible to the director of the urban police forces. It is said in the Place Beauvau:

"Gone is the day when the Marseilles CRS went up to Lille to put down the steelworkers. The Marseilles members of the CRS will work in the Bouches-du-Rhone, the Lille members in the North.

Some reforms, however, are stirring up protests. Thus it was decided to abolish the Central Company for Parisian Metro Security (CCSM), which was accused of "ratonner" [translation unknown] in order to give the neighborhood police stations the job of surveillance of the metro stations. That decision was to take effect on 1 August. The manager of the RATP [Independent Parisian Transport System] (who is now Claude Quin, a Communist) obtained from the government a postponement of that decision by emphasizing the lowering of the crime rate in the metro, which is due to the CCSM.

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