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28 September 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 33/81)

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BAHRAIN

MODERATING ROLE IN PERSIAN GULF REGION OUTLINED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 233, 31 Jul-6 Aug 81 pp 24, 25

[Article: "Sectarian Tensions Ease with Decline of Iranian Threat; Bahrain Washes Its Worries in the Troubled Waters of the Gulf"]

[Text] The problems of the small Arabian island which leans heavily on the Saudi coast are numerous and diverse. But confidence and a sense of assurance about the present and the future are greater. The inclination to cooperate with the Gulf states and to coordinate efforts with them is increasing and growing day by day in a country that is distinguished by an atmosphere of relative liberal openness.

The island is a small semi-desert island, but it is full of vitality and activity. If one were to look from the window of a high-rise building in al-Manamah, one can see the features of fast progress and the rapid pace of daily life: the modern buildings, the banks, the dry dock and the ships and tankers coming and going. One can use the most modern telephone and telex system not only in the area, but also in the world. Bahrain Airport has turned into an important crossroad between Europe, the Middle East, Asia and the Far East.

The island's unique geographic location in the upper course of the Gulf, leaning strongly on the coast of the Arabian Peninsula is what qualified the small island to play its historical, distinctive role as a trade center for several centuries. Geography too makes the island a sensitive indicator whose movement and fluctuations reflect any events or developments in the area.

In the last quarter century a new factor has come onto the scene that is no less significant than the geographical factor in determining the social climate and defining Bahrain's policy. That factor is oil. Oil in Bahrain is not new. It was discovered and exploited for the first time in the Gulf 51 years ago.

But because of Bahrain's meager oil reserves and because of its limited production, oil did not provide the country and its citizens with the relative prosperity that is being enjoyed by the people of other Arab Gulf countries which are wealthier and more productive [than Bahrain].

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Bahrainis nevertheless knew how to take advantage of the oil prosperity of neighboring fraternal countries. They adapted their island so as to turn it into a crossroad; a commercial, financial and maritime location; and an industrial center for joint development Gulf projects, beginning with the fishing industry, all the way to petrochemicals and iron and aluminum factories. This also includes the surface road project that will connect the island with the Saudi coast.

This ability to adapt to the prosperous oil and economic conditions in the area has created a unique social climate in Bahrain, making it the most socially developed and advanced Gulf state.

Thus the Gulf fortune, the need for export markets for a prosperous industry and the historical ties [Bahrain has in the area] compelled it to turn towards its Gulf sisters. Even before the establishment this year of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Bahrain had offered the citizens of the other Gulf states major benefits in residence, working, trading, purchasing land and transferring and investing funds.

Bahrain realizes that it is a small Arab country with limited capabilities and resources. Therefore, it finds a sense of peace, security and stability in cooperating and coordinating [its efforts] with its Gulf sisters, and especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait. This orientation toward the Arabian Gulf is the basic cornerstone in the policy of the Khalifa government which goes back to the 18th century and which coincided with the island's prominent role in the evolution of political, social and commercial life in the area.

A Relatively Open Liberal Atmosphere

The rapid social and economic development in Bahrain has created an atmosphere of relatively open liberalism that we may not perhaps find in other Gulf societies and policies. Education here is deep-rooted; political awareness is acute and in step with the developments [that are taking place]; women are more liberated; and workers are more politicized.

Out of a sense of this liberal openness, there are Bahrainis who express their concern over the current trend toward cooperation and coordination with the other Gulf states because the liberal climate in Bahrain will be affected by the southern and conservative climate in those countries. Most Bahrainis, however, support this trend. In their opinion it is the only guarantee for the independence and Arab character of Bahrain and the survival of its distinctive role which protects it from traditional Iranian ambitions.

The ruling family here, like any ruling family in the Gulf states, has its method in governing the citizens and dealing with them through traditional Arab customs. But at any rate these are less apparent and less prominent in the area of government administration. The number of ministers is not more than a third the number of government members, and the public administrations and most of the higher offices in the government agency are held by Bahraini citizens.

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The ruler al-Shaykh 'Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa is an amiable personality who is popular with everyone who knows him personally. He enjoys a good reputation among his citizens, and till today he still holds public audiences to receive average citizens and to hear their demands and complaints.

However, this does not do away with the feeling that an observer visiting Bahrain gets from Bahrainis who feel that it is necessary to go back to the parliamentary experiment which was started in the first half of the seventies and which ended suddenly in 1975. There is no doubt that the resumption of parliamentary life in Kuwait will make its resumption in Bahrain likely and merely a matter of time.

The economic and commercial prosperity and the political stability [in Bahrain] do not prevent one from saying that Bahrain is suffering from numerous problems. Bahraini officials themselves speak about these problems without any embarrassment. But they say that these problems are a general phenomenon, common throughout the Gulf. The difference is that Bahrainis speak about these problems openly, but in the other areas they are mentioned secretly or furtively.

The principal problem in Bahrain is the fact that the government cannot provide its citizens with the privileges, the facilities and the services that other fraternal countries provide for their citizens. The reason for that is evident: on the one hand, oil resources in Bahrain are meager, and, on the other hand, the number of people in Bahrain is relatively high.

The standard of living rose; housing, health and education projects were expanded; and the middle class grew. At the same time, however, the problems that usually accompany this rapid shift from a traditional society to a modern society emerged, and they were accompanied by negative phenomena imported from the advanced societies.

Bahrain today has problems that have to do with inflation, unemployment, foreign labor, the high cost of rent and the need for new housing. These problems go even further so that it may also be said that there is a divorce problem, a television problem and an alcoholism problem.

Labor Is Aware and Politicized

Labor in Bahrain is vital, energetic, aware and somewhat politicized. Because of its growth and the extreme sensitivity [it has acquired], labor is worried about the present and the future. It is trying to obtain rights and gains. At the same time it wants the new industrialization projects to provide it with security and safety.

Labor laws and regulations in Bahrain do not allow workers to form labor unions, nor do they give them the right to strike. But they do provide for some kind of labor participation in the management of production. There is a call among labor for increasing Bahraini participation in the foreign projects operating in Bahrain.

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It is estimated that the number of unemployed persons in the country is a little over 5,000 workers. However, officials say that the real figure is no more than a few hundred. They refuse to consider those who refuse to work unemployed. Employment opportunities in the country are available to those who want to work. If there is a need to have Bahrainis in those positions, young Bahraini people must endure the arduous nature of difficult work and vocational training to prepare themselves to assume professional, technical and management positions that are assumed by foreigners. In fact officials would tell one that the government is pressuring and requiring foreign companies and private sector companies to encourage them to employ, train and qualify Bahrainis.

The government intends to conduct a new population census--the first one was carried out 40 years ago. Semi-official figures indicate that the number of people in Bahrain today is 350,000 persons and that 70 percent of them are Bahraini citizens. The ratio of Arabs and foreigners [to the native population] had risen in the last few years from 18 to 30 percent.

There are 20,000 government employees and about 70,000 civil servants, workers and employees in the private sector. Only about 20,000 of those are Bahrainis, and the rest are foreigners. Salaries in the government sector in general are lower than salaries in the private sector. But official working hours do not exceed 6 per day. This allows the civil servant the opportunity to pursue his commercial and private business outside the official hours of work.

The Sectarian Problem Disappeared and Its Tension Has Been Reduced

The impact of the sectarian problem was considerably reduced following the Shi'ite citizens' disillusionment with the false steps that the Iranian Revolution is suffering from and the chaos, the disputes and the divisions [that are taking place] between its commanders and leaders and as a result of its military defeat in front of Iraq. The impact of the emotional outburst that accompanied the early days of the Iranian Revolution diminished; Khomeyni's pictures gradually disappeared; and the voices that were calling for fomenting social unrest and sectarian tensions became faint.

Shi'ite citizens who labor and toil to improve the standards of their incomes and their conditions do not want what befell the Iranians to happen to them. The economic and social conditions of the Iranians declined because of the factors of neglect and destruction that the regime in power spread there. Shi'ite citizens in Bahrain no longer accept the recalcitrant appeals that used to be made by Ayatollah Sadiq Rohani from Tehran calling for annexing Bahrain to Iran.

If this state of calm inspires the government and security agencies with reassurance and comfort, officials share with citizens of limited income [the realization] that a great deal has to be done in the areas of housing, wages and social services in general.

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The other phenomenon that attracts the attention of everyone who visits Bahrain is Bahraini women. Women in Bahrain are educated either in local schools or in the universities of Cairo and Beirut. They are advancing in positions. In some government administrations one hardly finds men [sitting] behind desks.

The other phenomenon is unfortunately a negative one. It is the television phenomenon. Recreational western programs which are popular with adolescents and young people convey to them some of the features that are prevalent in youthful societies in the West and especially in the United States. There is no doubt that censorship which deletes the sexual scenes from these programs is compelled to impose stricter censorship so that these programs would be free of scenes of violence, crime, drugs and alcoholism.

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IRAN

## INCIPIENT 'CIVIL WAR' SEEN EMERGING

London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Sep : 81 pp 18,20

[Article by Hasan Dabdub]

[Text] It is 1:00 a.m. and Tehran is quiet. Suddenly the silence is broken by a dull explosion and rounds of automatic rifle fire. Sirens scream as revolutionary guards, ambulances and fire engines rush to the spot. These have become the familiar night-time sounds of the Islamic Republic. More fragile than ever, Ayatollah Khomeini's republic struggles on. Early attempts to re-establish a central order have long since been abandoned, and a virtue has been made out of the revolutionary chaos. The question of what the Iranian Islamic Republic is, or what it will become, remains as hard to answer as ever.

Although the words "civil war" have been over-used in relation to Iran, the events of the past three months certainly merit this term. Iran is now a country where all room for manoeuvre by forces dissenting from the regime has disappeared, and where the number of active armed dissidents runs into tens of thousands.

Iran's civil war is being fought out in slow motion. It began in earnest on Saturday, 20 June. The day began quietly enough, with a rather staid parliamentary debate to impeach President Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr. As the hezbollahis (the militants enforcing fundamentalism at street level) were already outside clamouring for Bani-Sadr's execution, the result was a foregone conclusion.

By the late afternoon, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (People's Warriors) had mobilised thousands of their supporters and taken over central Tehran. Joined by thousands more (Mojahedin sources say they numbered half a million), they began the first of a series of bloody clashes with the revolutionary guards that left 30 dead and hundreds wounded and under arrest.

One doctor said revolutionary guards had forced him at gunpoint to let them take

away his patient, a badly-injured Mojahed girl, within two hours of a major operation to remove her kidney. "I'm sure she must have died," he said. "They would not even let me send a nurse with her."

According to other doctors, several hospitals were simply sealed off as the hezbollahis and revolutionary guards went through the wounded. "If you were anti-regime, you were just dragged off to Evin Prison," a nurse reported.

In Evin, the revolutionary court and firing squads were kept busy that night. According to opposition sources, some 250 people, all of whom had refused to give their names on arrest, were executed. Some were boys and girls under 15 years of age. The revolutionary guards wanted to avenge the death of 14 of their members killed in the day's clashes. The vicious cycle of revenge was born that night.

Among those executed was the writer and poet Said Sultanpour, who had been in jail since mid-April. He was accused of plotting with those held after the 20 June demonstration. Another was leading Mojahedin member Muhammad Saadati, who had been sentenced to 10 years in jail on "spying charges" in April 1979; he was summarily retried and executed.

By then, Bani-Sadr was already underground and, as far as most people knew, silent. The minority in Iran that had heard his taped message to Ayatollah Khomeini knew he was still hoping for a change of heart that would allow him to return to public life.

As the executions and arrests continued, the word went round the streets that a "big blow" was in store, but no one had an inkling of what it was. They found out on 28 June, with the explosion of the "most successful terrorist bomb" in history that killed the regime's key organiser, Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, and 70 other

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members of the Islamic Republican Party leadership. Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of Islamic justice was being used with a vengeance.

At this point, it was "war to the finish", as the official radio put it. The hezbollahi squads were equipped with new motorcycles, and roamed the streets looking for anything suspicious. Heavily-armed revolutionary guards moved in to uncover the meeting places of Mojahedin members and other leftists.

Those caught in the middle soon forgot which side had fired the first shot, and started learning to live with the situation. "Both sides are terrorists, we have only to choose" was the feeling of the man in the street.

**T**he clash between the Mojahedin and Khomeini's regime runs far deeper than differences over day-to-day policies. Ever since the revolution began, the fundamentalists have reserved their greatest hatred for the Mojahedin, the only other organised Shiite Islamic group. The Mojahedin boasted the longest list of martyrs during the anti-Shah years and its combination of tolerance and radicalism appealed to both the poor and the middle classes.

Formed in 1965, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq preach a blend of Shiite Islam and socialism, the exact mixture depending upon which member one talks to. Their leader is 33-year-old Massoud Rajavi, who spent many years in prison under the Shah. Rajavi, the only surviving member of the 12-man central committee which the organisation established in 1971, escaped to France with Bani-Sadr in July.

The regime's fight against the Mojahedin is partly a conscious attempt to rid itself of an embarrassing reminder of the past. Many of the clergy and Islamic laymen went to jail under the Shah not for any association with Khomeini, but for association with or membership of the Mojahedin. These included the new President Muhammad Ali Rajai, Parliamentary Speaker Hashmi Rafsanjani and many others.

One Mojahedin member describes the current struggle as "ironically between the Mojahedin and those 'rightists' that had left it in the mid-60s while we were fighting the pseudo-leftist tendency".

The struggle between the Muslim sections of the Mojahedin and what was to become the Maoist organisation Pkykar in

1975-76 overshadowed the fact that many moderates left the Mojahedin. These are the ones who now hold powerful posts in the Islamic Republic. "These 'rightists' provided the base for Khomeini's movement in the late 70s," the same Mojahedin member says.

It was in Rajavi's manifesto for the first presidential elections that the movement's pragmatism was made clear. The main highlights of the 12-point programme were: the formation of councils (*shorah*) in all places of work and institutions, as the basis for democracy; severing all links with imperialism by nationalisation, cancellation of contracts and treaties, expansion of domestic production; safeguarding the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation; complete freedom of expression, of political and religious beliefs; recognition of the rights of all peoples, including the Kurds, to determine their own affairs; workers' control of production by abolishing peasants' debts, giving technical and financial help and creating peasants' councils; new legislation drawn up by the workers.

Although Rajavi was barred from running in the election on Ayatollah Khomeini's direct order, the Mojahedin concentrated on building up its strength rather than on open conflict with the regime. By early June members and supporters are thought to have totalled over 150,000. Even after their newspaper was banned, it could be bought on almost any street corner, usually from a female member dressed in the uniform blue headscarf and smock. Some 300,000 copies were being sold each week - before the June clashes.

The regime calls the Mojahedin "hypocrites pretending to be Muslims". Anti-Mojahedin propaganda on radio and TV is constant, but of a rather special kind. The regime is trying to win over the young supporters of the movement by a combination of flattery and threats.

This reflects the fact that in the family of almost every fundamentalist there is at least one young Mojahed. Even heads of revolutionary committees and leading clerics are confronted by this problem, and often blood has proved thicker than water. When the clashes intensified, several top revolutionary guards were sacked and committee heads removed for not being enthusiastic enough about pursuing the Mojahedin.

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REVOLUTION SAID TO BE CONFISCATED BY 'OBSCURANTIST CLERGY'

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 246, 17-30 Aug 81 pp 55-56

[Article by Hedi Dhoukar--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Iran's revolution has been disastrously confiscated by the  
obscurantist clergy in a way that sweeps away the myth of the  
so-called Islamic road.

During the long reign of the shah, the overwhelming majority of Western media and governments passed over his crimes in silence. When he was forced on a March day in 1980 to take the road to the Mahabad airport, with tears in his eyes, to go into exile that ended with his death in Cairo, a majority of Western governments lamented his passing. Today, it is lamentable to see Paris imposing silence on former President Bani Sadr and the leader of the People's Mojahedin, Messaoud Rajavi, who is presently taking refuge in France.

The objective of the Iranian people, to bring down the Pahlavi dynasty, has certainly been achieved. But the least one can say is that we are far from seeing the new Iranian regime outline even the smallest positive steps, or lay the foundations for any kind of social renewal. All its actions are limited to repressing its nationalist and revolutionary opponents, grouped around the leader of the Mojahedin, Messaoud Rajavi, who has been joined by ex-president Bani Sadr; both of whom are today accused of practicing "blind terrorism,"--to be contrasted, no doubt, with the legal and "enlightened" terrorism of the PRI [Islamic Republican Party]. After all, in less than a month, following the ousting of Bani Sadr, it has brought about the execution of more than 300 people (nationalists and Mojahedin) after kangaroo courts behind closed doors with no lawyers in attendance. Nothing could be more natural, Tehran retorts: Islam, while it recognizes the judicial function, does not accept the idea of an advocate. This latter function is in fact assumed by...the judge himself! This is why the lawyer's guild was dissolved. And this is the logic--which is Islamic in name only--which makes Khomeyni both the representative and the judge of the people. Some time back, in his book "Toward an Islamic Government," the imam from Qom wrote that the function of guide is comparable to that of /"tutor for children who have not yet reached the age of majority."/ And, in his speech disavowing Bani Sadr, he did not hesitate to assert that /"even if all the people are in agreement with him, I will oppose him."/ /"He who scorns maktabi"/ (that which is Islamic, according to Khomeyni) /"scorns Islam. If he is doing it on purpose, he is excommunicated and he will be deprived of his wife. His property must be distributed among his heirs and he must be killed."/

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In effect, things happen in Iran now as if murder were a minor sin compared to the "heresy" of which all those who are opposed to the actions of the PRI--the only authorized representative of God and Islam in Iran--are accused. This explains why deputy Salamatian was seriously wounded in a knife attack following his exit from parliament where he had spoken in the defense of the first president of the republic. This is why the ayatollah from Mashad, Ali Teherani, is obliged to go on a hunger strike in his prison cell, in order to continue to denounce the inquisition which is convulsing the country.

The nature of the catastrophe can be better understood when one discovers that the report of the Iranian interior ministry on the last elections, which brought Mohammed Ali Rajai to power, estimated the number of voters at about 2 million, out of a population of 35 million!

One should also reflect on these statements by Messaoud Rajavi, who maintains that /"a man who stole \$250 worth of food and clothing had his hand cut off with a saw. At the same time, the ayatollahs were filling their pockets. The present minister of the interior can be cited as an example: he stole \$1 million in antiques which he sent out to Europe."/ The Iranians also recall that, during the shah's time, Rajavi's organization, the Mojahedin, mounted suicide operations in 1973, 1975 and 1976, for example, during which some American officers perished. Now Messaoud Rajavi, whose sympathizers are fighting on the Iranian-Iraqi front, did not hesitate to assert that he holds /"proof, recorded on tape cassettes, of actions designed to provoke the Iraqis that were ordered by the religious dignitaries."/

Why then should it be unthinkable that this war was wanted by the PRI to keep the army occupied while Beheshti's organization was busy consolidating its power? Apparently, that objective has been completely attained. The exile of the /"enemy president"/, Bani Sadr, on 29 July, and especially the sudden exile of Messaoud Rajavi in France, leave the political arena in Tehran completely to the PRI, except perhaps for Nouredine Kianouri's Tudeh party, which has chosen to support Khomeyni.

The ex-president's collaborators have for the most part been arrested or gone into hiding. In prison currently are Mrs Soudabeh Sadifi; Antezarioun; Bani Sadr's own brother, Fathoullah; Mohamed Djaffari, and numerous other personalities close to the former president, or quite simply nationalists such as the Iran Party's leader, Nasser Homayun.

In hiding in Iran are men like Karim Sandjabi (National Front) and other nationalist notables (Tarizadeh, Moussevi, Nobari) as well as Ghotbzabeh and Yazdi, former ministers, and ayatollahs Achouri and Alemi.

According to Messaoud Rajavi, more than 7,000 other members of his organization are in prison. Six of them, held since the time of the shah, have reportedly been executed in their cells recently. This merciless repression, nevertheless, does not prevent Iran from being the site of an increasing number of terrorist attacks, aimed particularly at members of the ruling clique and the pasdarans. The creation of a national resistance council headed by Messaoud Rajavi, whose Organization of the People's Mojahedin (OMPI) constitutes the armed wing in Iran, and which comprises nationalist forces--the Mossadeghist groups around Bani Sadr--remains the only possible alternative. The OMPI, which relies heavily on the Vietnamese

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revolution in its theoretical texts, offers profound social reforms based on an Islamic identity and on anti-imperialism. Its greatest ally, however, remains the government in power in Tehran, incapable of promoting concrete reforms, hostile to any redistribution of land out of respect for private property, committed to economic dependence on the West, especially in the food sector, even more so than at the time of the shah, and, finally, preaching a /"dialogue between the various classes"/ to use Khomeyni's exact words. An old myth, the principal virtue of which is that it changes nothing in the existing order or in the conditions of the oppressed masses. Thus doomed to batter down in the wind because of its ideological incompetence, and destitute of any coherent political program, the regime established by Khomeyni appears in the last analysis to be even more fragile and diseased than that of the former shah.

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IRAN

SECURITY COUNCIL HOLDS MEETING DURING BOMB ATTACK

PM021410 London THE TIMES in English 2 Sep 81 p 6

[Dispatch by Tony Allaway: "Tehran's Security Chief's 'Attended' Fatal Meeting"]

[Excerpt] Tehran, 1 Sep--Hojjat Ol-Eslam Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kania, the Iranian interior minister, who was named today to fill the country's vacant prime minister's seat, was himself almost a victim of the bomb that killed the president and prime minister on Sunday, according to usually well-informed sources.

Official reports on the circumstances of the bombing have been extremely sparse and conflicting, and it has never been said what was the purpose of the meeting in the room in the prime minister's offices where the explosion happened.

But according to the sources, President Rajai was chairing a meeting of the shadow national security council, comprising the heads of counter intelligence services in the military and revolutionary guards, the head of police and the chief of intelligence. They were discussing the current wave of violence in the country launched by the leftist, Islamic Mojahedin Khalq guerrilla group and others.

The sources said the bomb was hidden either in a cooler or an electrical junction box near the head of the table where the president and prime minister were sitting. Next to them, the sources said, was a third empty chair.

It was meant for Hojjat Ol-Eslam Mahdavi Kania, but he was late. The clergyman himself told television viewers on Monday night that he was on his way to the building from his ministry when he was told of the explosion by radio telephone.

The sources added that they believed some of the others at the meeting, possibly three, also died, but they were unable to name them. Nor was it clear who was wounded.

The sources said three members of internal security at the prime minister's office had been arrested after the explosion.

They also claimed that the official silence on the incident was the result of acute embarrassment over the fact that it occurred during the council meeting.

Despite the resilient face being put on the explosion by the authorities, the source said the circumstances of the blast had shocked Iran's leaders to the core.

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Hojjat Ol-Eslam Mahdavi-Kania was named in parliament today as the choice to become interim prime minister following the death of Hojjat Ol-Eslam Bahonar. Parliament will vote on the suggestion tomorrow and is expected to ratify it. It will mean that he will also sit on the three-man presidential council.

His choice is somewhat surprising in the wake of hardline statements from many top officials at yesterday's massive funeral ceremony in Tehran. The minister is regarded as a moderate on the terrorist question and has been publicly criticized for his handling of the police.

But his choice, and a speech by Ayatollah Khomeyni this morning, indicated that those seeking to sweep all restraint aside in the terrorist war are still being held in check.

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IRAN

INTERVIEW WITH BANI-SADR ON NATION'S SITUATION

OW091426 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 8 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] Paris (ASAHI SHIMBUN)--Former Iranian president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr Monday ruled out a compromise with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni and said he was daily in touch with an anti-government organization in Iran.

He indicated in an interview with the Paris bureau, ASAHI SHIMBUN, that he is more confident of returning to Tehran than when he arrived here in late July.

Asked of the people's resistance council, the anti-government organization which is said to have been set up in Iran, had anything to do with the assassinations of President Mohammad 'Ali Rajai, Prime Minister Hojato-Leslam Mohammad Javad Bahonar and prosecutor General Rabbani Amlashi, Bani-Sadr avoided making a direct reply and said all responsibilities rest with Khomeyni.

He said he guarantees that if Khomeyni stops the executions and closes the revolutionary courts, assassinations will immediately come to an end.

Asked whether his statement that he will return to Iran as soon as possible was more than an expression of resolve, Bani-Sadr pointed out that he had said on his arrival here that the Khomeyni regime had ended.

But the world, he said, did not believe it, and thought instead that the existing Iranian regime is strongly entrenched. He said that all the people now know a government does not exist in Iran.

Bani-Sadr disclosed that he is the top leader of the people's resistance council. He indicated that his instructions and reports from Iran are exchanged by various means.

He also said the memoirs he is writing, including sections on the future of the revolution, will be published within half a month.

During the interview at his residence in the suburbs of Paris, Bani-Sadr did not use honorifics in referring to Khomeyni. At one time, he said Khomeyni has become a devil. He described the religious leader as a dictator.

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The former Iranian president, who issued a call to the anti-government forces in Iran Monday to bring down the Khomeyni regime, appeared to be resolved to wage an all-out war against the religious forces in Iran.

Bani-Sadr emphasized that although he will join hands with those who had fought to topple the old imperial system, he will keep distance from the supporters of the shah and the mullahs. He denounced the pro-Soviet Tudeh Iranian Communist Party as always opposed to moves to liberate the people.

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IRAQ

'AL-THAWRAH' EDITOR INTERVIEWED ON ROLE OF IRAQI MEDIA

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 233, 31 Jul-6 Aug 81 pp 76-77

[Interview with Mr Hani Wahib, general manager and deputy editor-in-chief of AL-THAWRAH by Kamal Hasan Bikhayth; in Baghdad; date not specified: "General Manager of AL-THAWRAH Says, 'The Battle Prepared a Generation of War Correspondents in the Field; Islamic Values Have Been Revived Again on Iraqi Territory' "]

[Text] The media played a role in the Iraqi-Iranian war. The Iraqi media were able to keep up with the battle confidently, knowledgeably and with quiet objectivity inside the country and abroad. They were also able to contribute to the psychological mobilization [of the people] without letting this mobilization assume the character of mindless blabber as some agencies of the Arab media did in the fifties and the sixties. Mr Hani Wahib, general manager and deputy editor-in-chief of the Iraqi newspaper, AL-THAWRAH has served as officer in the Iraqi army. He played a prominent guidance role in explaining the dimensions of the battle. The importance of this interview with him is twofold: it is informative and strategic.

[Question] How did the Iraqi media handle the battle which you are waging against Iran?

[Answer] The media in Iraq are an effective and vital part of the course of the July Revolution. They have been keeping up with this course since it began, contributing effectively and seriously to spreading the ideas and the notions of the Socialist Arab Ba'th party and explaining the accomplishments of the revolution which are manifested in putting the principles of the party into practice.

Despite being a response to aggression, Saddam's Qadisiyah battle was a qualitative development in the course of the revolution with its introduction of positive changes in the sacrifices an Iraqi would make. The battle was also a significant indicator of the general victory that the national socialist 17 July Revolution achieved.

The media have been able to stay earnestly in step with the battle ever since the first days of its outbreak. This became evident in the distinctive media work that was presented on radio, television and in the press

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and in the cultural movement in the country in general. There were unconventional presentations of the same battle that continued day and night in non-rigid formulas. Newspapers in particular were able to give a bright picture of the battle, and they dramatized the importance of the morale factor in deciding victory in favor of the revolution in Iraq and in favor of the Iraqi people and the Arab nation against the Persian enemy.

The media had the honor of uncovering the facts about the battle with extreme detail and clarity. They did not focus on the rousing, emotional aspect of the battle to arouse people's emotions, despite the importance of that aspect [of their work]. Instead, they appealed to the intellect of the Iraqi citizen, the Arab citizen and the citizen of the world. They eruditely and objectively clarified the dimensions of the Persian aggression on Iraq and on the Arab nation. They explained how we reluctantly had to choose war. They were also able to portray a bright picture of the rare heroics that were demonstrated by the fighters of the Iraqi army and the popular army and by all Iraqi citizens as well as the citizens of the Arab nation who fought alongside their brothers, the Arab people of Iraq. They were able to explain with logical arguments the value of a person in achieving victory quite apart from conventional military balances. The Iraqi army fought an army that is three times its superior in materiel and number. It is equipped with the most advanced U.S. weapons, and, for almost 30 years, it was being prepared specifically for missions that go beyond the purposes of defending the Shah's Iran. It is an army that has military bases on the Iraqi borders and is psychologically prepared for aggression against Iraq. This was being done in the age of the Shah or in the age of the racist Khomeyni junta by means of stirring up Persian resentment of the Arab nation and of Iraq especially.

Those who are fighting in the ranks of the Persian army or in Khomeyni's guard are also fighting for specific misguided motives. Their spirits are high despite the erroneous convictions which they draw upon. However, those spirits faded in front of the spiritual strengths of the Iraqi army as the battle incidents scored new modes of facts in military science that have not been familiar in past conventional wars. The purge of al-Muhammarah was unfamiliar in urban warfare due to the fact that regular armies often fail to occupy and liberate cities because of the population's resistance and because of the difficulty armored vehicles have in moving about in cities. There are numerous examples [of such battles], even though they differ in significance and content, such as the Stalingrad experience and others. Despite the qualitative difference in the nature of the military confrontation and its national, pan-Arab and ideological motives, one may cite as examples this and other incidents as far as pure military interaction is concerned. The Iraqi army was able to purge al-Muhammarah and to fight inch by inch to defend the honor of the Iraqi citizen despite the fact that it was not fully familiar with the topography of the area. This is what military commanders in the country have affirmed.

The case was the same in repelling the counteroffensive in al-Khafajiyah which took place in 36 hours, half the usual time determined by military science. Repelling any attack takes 72 hours. The case was the same in

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repelling the other counteroffensive in Sirbil Zihab and Sayf Sa'd) and all along the front that extends over 1,200 kilometers. The Persian enemy had counted on creating a breach in this front, but they did not succeed.

[Question] For the first time in Iraq media people have the experience of being war correspondents. What was the outcome of the experience?

[Answer] Many years before the battle numerous preparations had been made for the war correspondent experience. We can say that the outbreak of the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah provided a serious opportunity for Iraqi journalists to become involved in the practical aspects of the experience without prior theoretical and academic preparation. In doing so they scored unprecedented success and were able to provide the newspapers and the agencies of the media with the latest developments in the battle from the front lines and from the contact lines with the enemy all along the battle fronts. They did a good job in a manner that ensured the accuracy of information and [adherence to] the standards of military security in publishing the information.

The Iraqi media correspondent who prepared himself in the battle was able to comprehend all the standards that would ultimately serve the outcome of his battle against his enemy. This experience was truly the best school of warfare from which a successful war correspondent would graduate.

The First Lessons

[Question] What were the first media, economic, social and cultural lessons learned from the war with Iran?

[Answer] In my judgment one of the most important lessons to be learned from the Iraqi-Iranian war on all these levels is that the 17 July Revolution is so firmly established that the enemy camp was not able to undermine its power, regardless of the powers and new tools it used to strike at it. This is because the Iraqi-Iranian war in my judgment is the product of a new tactical and qualitative attack carried out by the enemies of the 17 July Revolution who come in all races and colors. This time they used their tactical tool to carry it out: Khomeyni's Persian junta. They did so on the basis of historical, strategic, racist [and] ethnic considerations as well as carefully calculated strategic and tactical considerations that count on Iran's conditions, the characteristics of those conditions and the characteristics of the Khomeyni phenomenon. They also counted erroneously on the characteristics of the Iraqi people and their national and sectarian makeup as well. They based their considerations on erroneous considerations derived from the social reality that prevailed in Iraq before the July Revolution. This is the extremely important lesson which affirms that Iraq's revolution has become an invulnerable wall to all forms of attacks which fail regardless of the formulas used.

The lessons of the battle have also affirmed that the authentic values of the Arab nation, and chief among them is the Islamic message in particular, have been revived again in Iraq through the events of the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah, through the competition to win the honor of dying in

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battle, through fighting with the spirit of a freedom fighter and through the fact that all the people have been awakened and drawn to the battle despite the fact that 11 months have gone by since its outbreak. There is an ability to continue the war regardless of its duration. This is the spirit of the earliest Muslim Arabs in fighting for what is right, in defending the right of the Arab nation, in raising its status and strengthening its contribution to spreading Islamic thought.

**The Role of the Revolution**

[Question] What did AL-THAWRAH, the newspaper of the Socialist Arab Ba'th party offer the Arab masses in general and the Iraqi masses in particular during the time of war?

[Answer] In my judgement, and not because I am one of the employees of the party's newspaper, the newspaper has been a formidable platform of information on the battle. It was a strong counterpart for the combat fronts in explaining the facts of the battle locally, nationally and worldwide. It was a shining beacon of information, carrying out its activity diligently. Work in the newspaper went on all night and parts of the day. It was always vital and non-conventional by always keeping up with all the data of the battle and making adjustments in the newspaper to serve the battle. In addition, a balance was achieved so that the political, economic and social activities of the leadership of the party and the revolution would be covered. There was also coverage of the significant political events in the Arab homeland and in the world. AL-THAWRAH published many special issues to serve the interests of the battle. Among them was its special issue of 6 January, the 60th anniversary of the creation of the Iraqi army. That special issue was truly a document that registered the profuse activity of the Iraqi army in our local and national battles ever since it was established. The newspaper underscored the army's role in Saddam's Qadisiyah.

The newspaper receives many letters from Iraqi citizens, from Arabs and from citizens of the world. They all indicate the readers' reactions to the facts which were presented by the newspaper about the war. Many newspapers and world news agencies have cited the subjects that AL-THAWRAH published and underscored about the battle. They also cited the political commentaries and the editorials that were written to explain the proportions of the battle from the point of view of the revolution in Iraq.

**The Future of Iran**

[Question] As a media person, a writer and a politician, how do you see the future of the regime in Iran?

[Answer] The future of the regime in Iran has become clear, especially following recent developments in the makeup of this regime and the intensifying struggle between its leaders. The most recent such struggle was the one in which Bani Sadr was removed from office, the headquarters of the party were bombed and many party leaders were killed. In addition, the regime has been pursuing dead end roads in all economic, political and

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social areas, and it is now experiencing a deadly and stifling crisis because of deteriorating conditions in general. The regime failed in the war with Iraq, and this contributed to a large extent in informing the world about the actual nature of the makeup of the Iranian regime, its curious practices and its poor dealings with the outside world, especially with the Islamic countries which experienced a considerable share of this regime's hostile practices before and after the al-Ta'if conference was convened. There is now general agreement over the predicament from which this regime is suffering and over the failure of Khomeynism as a racist, backward phenomenon of the past. This is not only true with regard to intellectual and media circles in the Arab homeland, but also with regard to all the circles in the whole world.

[Question] How would you evaluate the position of the Arab media on the Iraqi-Iranian war?

[Answer] There is discrepancy in this subject. It is linked to a large extent to the nature of the existing regimes in the Arab homeland. However, I notice that free newspapers and free writers played a memorable role in this war, especially the Kuwaiti press and the AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI magazine which played an honorable and a good role. In addition, the Jordanian press and numerous Arab newspapers and magazines that are published inside and outside the Arab homeland also played an important role. Many Arab writers with an authentic nationalist orientation became prominent. They expressed in their works a profound affiliation with the soil of the Arab homeland and their sensitivity to the facts of the Arab-Israeli struggle throughout history and to the renewal of those facts under the situation that we are experiencing.

By way of emotional loyalty to the writers who write with the glow of authentic nationalistic conscience, I find myself compelled to commend the contributions of Mr 'Abdallah Ahmad Husayn, the Kuwaiti writer who also wrote numerous articles that accurately expressed the nationalist nature of the battle which we are waging. The value of these writings is manifest in their nationalistic character and in the fact that they are not exclusive to the regional circle. [Their value is manifest in] the gleam of faith they have in the authenticity and unity of the Arab nation against any aggressive foreigner regardless of his nationality.

Books about the War

[Question] You published two books in the past about the war. What did you want to say in these two books?

[Answer] The first was entitled, "Some of the Implications of Saddam's Qadisiyah." The second is entitled, "Saddam's Qadisiyah and the Spirit of Victory." Part of [the latter] is a collection of essays that were written in AL-THAWRAH [as part of the effort] to stay in step with the battle. But despite the journalistic nature of some of these essays, their intellectual aspect focused on the realities of the battle and on its human and moral

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dimensions and on the relationship that military facts and military operations have with the course of revolutionary struggle that was led by the revolution in Iraq.

These two books were a natural contribution for me as a writer committed to serve the battle within a freedom fighting framework.

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ISRAEL

EBAN: 'INTERIM AGREEMENT' NEEDED ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUE

PMO41328 London THE TIMES in English 4 Sep 81 p 12

[Article by Abba Eban: "Why America Holds the Middle East Key"]

[Text] In his article on this page on August 24, Mr U'Mar al-Hasan London representative of the Arab league, called on European statesmanship to extricate the Middle East from the attentions of a "floundering America."

This kind of language will appeal to the traditional sentiment with which Europe has regarded the United States for most of the past two centuries.

According to this stereotype, European diplomacy overflows with talent, realism, sobriety and experience, while American diplomacy, if it exists at all, is held to be crude, boisterous simple-minded gullible and out of touch with international complexities. It follows that the wisdom of the old world should march forth to rescue us from the follies of the new.

If this fantasy were ever true, it has surely lost its validity in recent decades. Responsibility and experience have sharpened American skills, while many Europeans, looking back over the tragedies of recent generations, might conclude that there is more reason for humanity than for pride.

That is certainly true of the recent phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the 1973 war there has been an arduous but constant move towards greater stability. The American airlift of October 1973 created a military balance in which negotiation became possible. The ceasefire itself marked an end to the military phase of the conflict with Egypt and Syria. One after the other came the Geneva peace conference. Israel's disengagement agreements with Egypt and then Syria, the Sinai interim agreement of 1975, the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

The conflict had entered a contractual phase. To say that the process is still incomplete does not change the fact that this has been a fruitful period for conciliation. Europe was totally absent from each and every one of these achievements. American mediation was assiduous and indispensable.

More important than the distribution of credit is the need to understand the reasons for relative success in a process in which America, Egypt and Israel have all played a part. The United States, under four presidents, made its mediatory

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services available. There were no bombastic incantations like the Venice declaration, no detailed blueprints such as those formulated in furtive concealment at Brussels. When violence erupted again in the Israeli-Lebanese PLO triangle, American mediation registered another success in consolidating a ceasefire.

Neither Israelis nor Arabis had reason to feel that the United States was involving its own energy problems in confused association with its role as a conciliator. And there was a commonsense understanding that peace is most likely to be promoted by those who have a fundamental commitment to its realization. That means that there is no rationality in the obsequious pursuit of an unrepentant PLO.

European leaders reacted with sceptical envy to the Camp David agreement. Their attitude towards the American role was competitive not cooperative. That would have been understandable had the agreement really been negligent of Palestinian interests. But if the text is really honored it can give those interests a large measure of satisfaction. The agreement envisages an interim period after which the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza is to be determined. It cannot be determined unilaterally by Israel, but only by "negotiation and agreement between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants."

The agreement thus reached must conform with "the legitimate rights of the Palestine people and its just requirements." It must be subject to their ratification. In the interim period the Israeli military administration must be "withdrawn and replaced" by an Arab authority in conformity with the principle of "self-government." The Palestinians would have "full autonomy" for some years together with the full rights to press their claim for secession from Israeli jurisdiction after the interim period.

It is only in the somewhat crazy world of Middle Eastern diplomatic history that a text such as this could be presented as anti-Arab or anti-Palestinian. But the diplomatic history of the Palestine Arabs is full of instances in which they have vehemently rejected proposals conceived largely in their interest, and which they have nostalgically tried to revive after they had passed from sight.

European leaders would have done more kindness to the Palestinians had they focused their attention more seriously on the ideological and operative advantages of the Camp David text. The PLO opposes the Camp David agreement not because it denies Palestinian interests but because it minimally safe-guards Israeli rights to security and peace. Europe has no reason to follow the PLO into this paradox.

Men and nations sometimes act wisely once they have exhausted all the other alternatives. If the EEC has the courage to admit that its "initiative" has failed, the way could be open for a more constructive role. The first decision should be to work with those whose aim is stability and balance, not revolutionary violence. The second decision should be to recognize that a "permanent solution" is not immediately available.

The desire to see problems integrally "solved" is the heroic fantasy-wish of statesmen. A settlement with final acceptance of permanent boundaries embracing

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the entire Middle East is a dream of perfection outside the bounds of early reality. It would be possible only in two contingencies; that an Arab signatory would accept boundaries that any large section of Israeli opinion would regard as secure, which means boundaries different from the armistice demarcation lines of 1949-1967; or that an Israeli government would agree to return to the previous lines, including a territorial or juridical division of Jerusalem.

I believe the first condition to be unrealistic, and I know from absolute conviction that the second is not feasible. The only course, apart from deadlock, is to work for an interim agreement that would take each party some way towards legitimate goals without precluding any final option. If Egypt and Israel had not concluded and carried out two interim agreements in 1974 and 1975 they would not have signed a peace treaty in 1979. Interim agreements allow antagonisms to cool, create confidence in contractual processes, develop habits of contact and generate an atmosphere in which ideas that seem inconceivable at the beginning appear feasible after the lapse of a little time.

The Israeli-Palestinian equation would not follow the same lines as the Egyptian-Israeli settlement, since Israeli memories and vulnerabilities are more sensitive here, but the psychological evolution that carried the Egyptian-Israeli relationship so far is not out of the question if we resist the lure of perfection in favour of that which is possible and real.

If this logic is accepted, the question is not how the Israeli-Palestinian problem is "solved" but how we can live together without violence or deadlock in the next few years. On the Israeli side this would involve a reduction and eventual easing-out of the military administration, a policy of administrative non-inter-vention and a willingness to limit the Israeli role to the needs of security. On the Arab side the need would be for the renunciation of terrorism, the establishment of representative institutions not obsessed by the radical ideologies of the PLO covenant and a willingness to leave the final constitutional future, including the boundary settlement, in abeyance for a few years.

A joint committee implementing the interim agreement would be the forerunner of the broader dialogue that will have to be enacted one day or another. Since the Palestinians have a massive physical presence on their side they would not lose anything by accepting the evolutionary approach--except the non-existent prospect of a Middle East without Israel. All that I have recommended here is inherent in the Camp David agreement, but "a rose by any other name would smell as sweet."

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MOROCCO

ROLE OF ISLAM IN MOROCCAN POLITICS ANALYZED

London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in French Jan-Apr 81 Vol 6 Nos 1-2 pp 10-18

[Article by Remy Leveau of the Paris Institute for Political Studies: "Islam and Political Control in Morocco"]

[Text] Oddly enough, an examination of this topic seems to take us back to the time of the protectorate and the quarrels between reformists and traditionalists. Independent Morocco put an end to such opposition by establishing Islam as the state religion. Reformism triumphed officially and religion helped to legitimize the sovereign's government. The constitution of 1962, appointing him commander of the faithful and defender of Islam, only sanctioned a situation which was already largely accepted by all political groups. But beyond such formal observations, the triumph of Islam poorly concealed a much more profound and rapid secularization of Moroccan society than that attempted under the protectorate. Public works engineers have far fewer qualms and problems today in routing roads through the middle of cemeteries than they did prior to 1956.<sup>1</sup>

The relationships between reformist Islam and Moroccan nationalism are too well known for there to be any need to recall them.<sup>2</sup> They parallel the manipulation of religious confraternities by the colonial government and the clumsy attempt of the Berber decree, considered an attack against Islam and Moroccan unity. The struggle against the protectorate greatly helped to confuse the two notions for a long time, but there is no separation between recent history and the development of a more ancient past which greatly increased the status of the monarchy as the defender of Islam and the nation for more than 300 years. Schoolboys were brought up on the history of the Alawite dynasty, the battle of the three kings, the sultans' long resistance to the Spanish, Portuguese and then the French. Moulay Ismael and Moulay Hassan (I) are depicted as strong and pious men who strengthened the state to better defend the country against the Christians; loyal in that respect to its lineage dating back to the prophet, the monarchy is also portrayed as continuing the work of the first Moroccan dynasties, as supporting the caliphs of Damascus and Cordova and resisting the control of the Ottoman Empire. Without having to rely heavily on historical references, the sovereign has clearly capitalized on an Islamic legitimacy of which the Hashemites or Saudis could well be envious.

Thus independence naturally took on the appearance of triumphant Islam and nationalism, personified by the king-imam and popular hero who Mohamed V was after returning from exile. With extreme skill, the sovereign used Islam to assure his power over

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the other nationalistic factions and even to wisely initiate a policy aimed at broadening the bases of his legitimacy through controlled economic development and some limited attempts to democratize the political system.

But in reality, the end of the colonial period also put an end to the myth according to which Islam and the modern world were in conflict only because of French domination. To build their state, the Moroccan nationalists accepted the legacy of the protectorate without really making a critical inventory of it. In an area as sensitive as education, the need to quickly train cadres justified the full continuation, in the beginning, of a system copied from the French model. Independent Morocco very quickly took on the external aspects of a modern secular state while striving to maintain the theoretical unity between religion and politics and to preserve its Islamic cultural heritage. To conceal this secularization, in fact, the problem was circumvented by more or less putting the modern state in the service of developing the institutional and social base of Islam. But the actual progress made could not really conceal the rise of secularization.

In the long term, however, Islam has apparently reestablished itself as an unpredictable factor in the political process. It has exceeded its role of legitimizing the government, to which it had supposedly been confined. External factors were certainly involved. Nasserism was not a formidable competitor of the Moroccan monarchy. Beginning in 1970, Qadhdhafi violently opposed the Moroccan sovereign by attacking him specifically for not observing Islam. The conspiracies of 1971 and 1972, even if their interpretation remains ambiguous, also demonstrate that it was possible to find in the army a certain number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers who were ready to condemn the regime in the name of a stern Islam which strongly resembled that of the Libyan leaders.

## Legitimation of the Government by Islam

As an opposition force, following independence Islam became the main source of the government's legitimation. Mohamed V focused on it that feeling which the Istiqlal<sup>3</sup> Party expressed with more clarity than any other political force, but without any opponent contradicting it on this issue. Much to the contrary, the Moroccan Communist Party took advantage of its trial before the Tribunal of Casablanca in 1960 to demonstrate its loyalty to the principles of Islam and to monarchical institutions. That did not prevent the Court of Rabat from dissolving the party by its decree of 9 February 1960: "Whereas the Moroccan state is a theocratic monarchy in which the sovereign, the lieutenant of the prophet, is both the temporal king and spiritual leader of the Moslem community; whereas the Moroccan state is Moslem not only because of the fact that it practices the Moslem religion, but also because it identifies with the corpus itself of Islam, which constitutes its reason for being; whereas it follows that in Morocco, by virtue of the political community's total identification with the doctrine from which it derives its essence, any attack on the Moslem religion is simultaneously an attack on Moroccan public order ... Whereas His Majesty Mohamed V has on several occasions proclaimed that any ideology based on materialism was contrary to the religious precepts of which he is the spiritual guardian, as in particular in the speech which he delivered on the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of his accession to the throne ...."

This decision of the Court of Rabat deserves some examination, inasmuch as it is much more precise and detailed than Articles 6 and 19 of the constitution, which are generally cited as references in this connection.

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The decision gave a very broad positive content in advance to the function of defender of Islam and in a way put the Islam-monarchy relationship above any other institution--above any other source of positive law, including the constitution, since it was a question of the king, as commander of the faithful, thus being able to neutralize the effect of a law concerning public freedoms merely by means of a speech. The system could not be more overtly theocratic and in this respect the constitution became rather secondary in relation to jurisprudence.

It will be noted that the first version of the constitutional text of 1962 did not include the term "commander of the faithful," which was apparently included in the discussion at the request of Dr Khatib with the support of Allal El Fassi to demonstrate that the government was of divine origin and did not derive solely from a referendum or party struggles. It is striking to note that when the king became concerned about giving the monarchy a legitimacy based on votes, it was party representatives who reintroduced divine right as one of the government's instruments. In reality, the sovereign had probably never renounced it, but in utilizing the referendum and elections, he was instead thinking of beating the Moroccan left on its own turf in order to preempt part of its modernization program. The entire conduct of Hassan II since his accession to the throne also lends significance to this interpretation. The crown prince was not considered a pious man. The first public appearance by the new king going to pray in traditional dress showed the extent to which the estate was vested in the heir following the death of the previous owner. Hassan II was careful to capitalize on the image of an Islamic sovereign, which Mohamed V had personified so well. In Morocco, Islam took the place of a typical single-party "political religion." The commander of the faithful was actually the leading ulama. If Islam does not have a religious hierarchy, there has nevertheless been a diffusely encouraged development toward a structuring of institutions.

The League of Moroccan Ulamas was established in Tangier in 1961 with the purpose of reviving Islam in the country and spreading it to African nations. The Ministry of Habous, later the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, occupied shortly afterwards by Allal El Fassi, followed a policy of religious institutional support with the result of strengthening a veritable network of ecclesiastical authorities whose political homogeneity was not uniform but whose doctrinal unity was almost assured. At the top was the Karaouyne University of Fez, whose students became qadis, notaries and imams in charge of mosques in the main centers in the north of Morocco. The university was almost entirely of Istiqlal allegiance since the time of the protectorate, but it was not in a monopolistic position, since more recent and less prestigious educational centers sprang up, such as Ben Youssef University of Marrakesh, schools in northern Morocco and even at Tarudant. The UNFP and the popular movement were rivals of the Istiqlal in the 1960's.

It is difficult to estimate the annual output of students educated by these institutions, but it is far from negligible. Today there is probably a total of more than 30,000 persons, ranging from the most prestigious to the most modest figures, who are totally or partially involved with religious functions (muezzins, preachers or readers of the Koran ...) with various titles and generally enjoying a popular trust that is not commensurate with their modest incomes. Construction of public and private mosques has more than doubled since the end of the protectorate. The division between the limited number of religious "officials" and those whom institutions and authorities tolerate and allow to collect alms from the faithful is very loose,<sup>4</sup> but in general it is reasonable to assume that their number and influence in rural areas rival those of elementary schoolteachers and other minor officials of the modern state.

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Allal El Fassi's term in office as minister of Islamic affairs in 1961-62 provided these trends with a doctrinal guarantee and their initial implementation. The minister dreamed of a religious organization and educational system establishing total control of society. Each village would have had its own mosque with an imam paid by the government and schools would have necessarily provided religious instruction. But that brief period included too many immediate political projects for Allal El Fassi's requests to be considered and for the necessary budget funds to be found for them, especially when they were in competition with irrigation projects.

Moreover, if the king wanted to mobilize the support of Islam, he was also careful not to let himself be outdone by an overzealous institutional apparatus that would tarnish his image as a modernistic sovereign inside and outside the country. This was evident in the affair of the Bahai converts who were arrested during the summer of 1962 and accused of both heresy and conspiring against the government. Allal El Fassi played a leading role in this affair, followed by the Tribunal of Nador, which sentenced the Bahais to death in December 1962. The emotions aroused by this judgment caused reactions both inside and outside Morocco. The trial for heresy shocked Ahmed Reda Guedira, then general director of the royal staff, as much as the left. Pressures mounted from outside, particularly in the United States, where it was feared that the repression might subsequently affect Moroccan Jews accused of supporting Israel. The king pardoned the sentenced Bahais.

In this confused affair, there was clearly the impression of an ever increasing rivalry between the king and the Istiqlal, in which each tried to embarrass the other. By entrusting the Ministries of Islamic Affairs and Justice to the Istiqlal, the sovereign knew that he could rely on men who were capable of mobilizing the religious community to his advantage. But the feeling quickly developed that the Istiqlal wanted to build for itself, using the apparatus of the state, a network of correspondents among the imams in charge of mosques and the fquihis of Koranic schools. The king's associates thus suspected the Istiqlal of wanting to return to a single-party structure, which had been banned by the constitution of 1962.

In fact, in its propaganda the Istiqlal expressed a certain number of views dear to its modest following of men of law and religion. Their anxiety derived from the feeling of being left behind by an emerging new Morocco that would threaten their positions in the long run. Their infatuation with elementary education made them afraid that children and families would prefer the teaching of mathematics to that of the Koran.<sup>5</sup>

By embracing such views, by demanding a reduction in the number of Christian churches and advocating stricter measures for emigrating Moroccan Jews who supported Israel, the Istiqlal satisfied this faction and embarrassed the king, who would have liked to maintain traditions while seeking the support of young technocrats, whose sympathies were originally more favorable to the left.

The debate broadened and became more complex when the Istiqlal left the government. The parliament assembled in 1963, because it was composed of a rural, Arabic-speaking majority, constituted a select forum to please the advocates of traditional education. Allal El Fassi then demanded that Morocco follow a foreign policy based more on Islamic solidarity. He made references to Palestine as well as to Turkish Cypriots bullied by Makarios, to Ethiopian Moslems persecuted by the emperor and in general to the problems which Islam was encountering in Africa in the face of a veritable crusade spirit inspired by the West.<sup>6</sup>

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The government responded to such implicit criticism by hardening its attitude toward breaches of religious practices. With parliament during the month of Ramadan, the police stepped up arrests of those not observing the fast. The king officially inaugurated mosques and for the first time openly linked the development of modern education to the need to preserve the role of the Koranic school in moral and religious upbringing.

It seems obvious that the monarchy did not want to let it be possible for any other figure in political life to outshine it in the matter of Islam. If the ulamas were worried and felt threatened by modernization, Hassan II preferred to slow progress rather than incur their criticism. It was relatively easy for him to again find a common ground of understanding with them, inasmuch as official Islam in Morocco was still rich enough to maintain religious buildings and a good number of ecclesiastical officials. Even if such opulence did not permit the expansion which Allal El Fassi would have liked, the religious leaders were conscious of their favored status in comparison to their colleagues in Algeria and Tunisia.

Immediately following the 1963 conflict, the government learned how to subtly utilize this difference. In the eyes of the ulamas, the Moroccan monarchy constituted a more reliable support than the secular regimes of neighboring countries. The beginning and ending dates of the fast of Ramadan even became a symbol of national identity in practice, with Moroccans tending to fast an extra day so as to be considered better Moslems than their neighbors.

Thus it is impossible to speak of the legitimation of the government by Islam as a simple and uniform process affecting all figures in Moroccan public life. We have seen that the monarchy sought other sources of legitimacy at certain times, such as nationalism, certain forms of democracy and modernization of the country. Among the figures most involved in the government's legitimation by Islam, the Istiqlal Party sometimes seemed strangely prepared to dissociate Islam from the monarchy--or at least to compete with it to promote the principles of an authentic Islam in political life. The situation was complicated insofar as the institutional apparatus of Islam, that of the mosques, traditional universities and the League of Ulamas, was devoted to the party as much as to the monarchy. When the Istiqlal was part of the opposition, tensions between the two sides risked becoming dangerous, since the qadis and fquihis could not remain hostile to the government for long, no more than the government could do without them. They therefore had to pretend to distinguish between the sovereign, whom they never openly challenged, and his advisers.

The most serious tensions therefore seemed to derive from a secular development of Moroccan society, which the monarchy encouraged in the name of structural modernization while denying its disruptive effects.

#### The Secularization of Society

In the eyes of traditionalists, Islam's influence had only declined since Moroccan independence. If the number of mosques and Koranic schools had increased considerably, they were no longer the only ones dispensing knowledge. But above all, the religious leaders no longer held in the new society the position which they had occupied in the past or even under the protectorate, in which they constituted the majority of the makhzen cadres. After the recently organized nationalists took the place of the

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protectorate's officials, the importance of the traditionalists' role was reduced, this time by their fellow countrymen and with the collective suspicion that they had collaborated with the colonists. Through the years and despite official Arabization campaigns, graduates of traditional universities or of Arabic language departments of modern universities have not been well respected and rather unsure of themselves when they did not know French.

In this regard, the development of the educational system is revealing of the reduced role of Arabic language graduates. Even in the beginning, the Koranic schools were in competition with kindergartens. This was the necessary transition for middle class children whose parents wanted to enroll them in the establishments of the French Cultural Mission. The development of Moroccan public education (more than 2 million students) reduced private Moslem education to symbolic status (60,000 students), which had formerly played an important role under the protectorate (such as the Balafrej school in Rabat). The phenomenon was even more evident in secondary than in elementary schools; at the secondary level, there were no longer any protest movements of Karaouyine students and Arabitized sections to be treated on an equal footing with their French-educated schoolmates.

If the educational system was of the French type, the press, radio and television, including their broadcasts in Arabic, propagated Western-type cultural models. Except for the reading of passages from the Koran at prayer times and the broadcasts in the month of Ramadan, television had rather few programs of Islamic character.

It was in fact the entire scope of modern Moroccan life which seemed to be slipping from Islam's grasp. At the highest level, trends in thinking, the press and published works reinforced a general tendency similar to the one provided by television at the middle class level. Urban life, whose style now borrowed more from that of the former European middle class of North Africa (including the lottery and the tierce [French system of forecast betting on horses]) than from that of the traditional middle class, was also a factor restricting religious conduct. The education of women, their growing numbers in educational and office jobs and the striking changes that were noticeable in their behavior within a few years were perhaps an even greater attack on the traditional Islamic model.

In the broad sense, economic factors also favored secularization, but their effects must be evaluated with discretion. In comparison to Algeria, the transformations in Morocco had only a limited influence. The monarchy reestablished its base in rural areas in the years following independence by blocking the industrialization and agriarian reform projects which the Moroccan left was then advocating. But it could not be satisfied with a status quo program in the modern sector. Exercising restraint in the beginning, reserving its efforts for sectors in which it would be possible to substitute national production for imports, employing a great amount of manpower and upgrading the country's raw materials if possible, Morocco moved forward with a policy of industrial growth. This development became more pronounced in the 1970's with the rise of phosphate prices reaching 6 percent annually, providing an equivalent net growth in view of a population growth of approximately 3 percent.

Industrialization, which increased for about 10 years, led to a rural exodus and urban development, in particular along the coastline from El Jadida to Kenitra. The rural population, which represented nearly 80 percent of the total population following independence and even almost 70 percent in 1965, today constitutes only 61 percent.

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In rural areas, small population centers have also expanded in comparison to the countryside.

These movements have also been accompanied by a profound change in the age pyramid, even more pronounced in urban than in rural areas (56 percent of residents are less than 20 years old and only 4.5 percent are older than 60). Based on the decline of the average age of the population and its urbanization, it would be simplistic to automatically conclude that there has been a change in attitude toward religious practices. In urban areas, however, there is a higher concentration of people in the national average age bracket of 15-29, which alone represents as many people as everyone over the age of 30. Their personal experience is different from that of the previous generation. They did not experience the protectorate. They have had less exposure to religious instruction via the Koranic school or the family unit. The family is also tending to disintegrate, as demonstrated by Fatima Mernissi's surveys on divorce, which in particular point to the weakening of the value system linked to the related family.

According to the qadi quoted by Fatima Mernissi,<sup>7</sup> divorce used to represent an uncommon practice with stern sanctions imposed by the community, while families settled the marriage problems. The married couple is a victim of industrialization, employment and compulsory education "enabling women and youth to free themselves from the patriarchal yoke." But nothing has been planned either by religious or civil law to replace the family's power of control. Social and economic tensions have affected married couples, increasing the number of women and children abandoned by husbands who are no longer able to assume the economic burden of a family. Moroccan radio has significantly devoted a regular program to families abandoned by the father.

Alcoholism represents another sign of the deteriorating system of Islamic values in urban areas. Beer and wine consumption has increased among the middle class. Significantly and inexplicably, it has dropped by 30 percent during the month of Ramadan;<sup>8</sup> the middle class indulges instead in whiskey.

A final factor, emigration to Europe, continues to influence Moroccan Islam. At first glance, it has the same effect as urbanization and industrialization. It breaks up families and drives workers to alcoholism and to adopt an implicit value system which complicates their rehabilitation. The phenomenon is even more pronounced in the case of children born outside the country or who have lived abroad for a long time. They have not been subjected, especially girls, to social pressures and religious indoctrination. They are marked even more by Western education, since the society in which they live rejects them and since they can no longer really be an integral part of their native country because of their poor knowledge of Arabic. There are now nearly 2 million Moroccans living abroad. Nevertheless, emigration is an ambiguous factor. The worker's rejection by European society forces him to make an effort to preserve his own identity. This often means keeping up religious practices and observing the fast of Ramadan. Upon returning to the country, workers hope to again find a social behavior and religious practice which were abandoned abroad. At the family level, emigration may be a means of preserving the extended family in rural areas, since it alone is apt to preserve the virtues of wives who have remained at home and to provide for the education of children.

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The penetration of Moroccan society since independence by a dominant value system, of which Islam is a smaller part, certainly seems to be an obvious factor. An educational system in which Arabic is secondary to French, rapid urbanization and emigration are the most striking factors. But if the process of transformation seems too rapid to those experiencing or observing it, it is nevertheless much less traumatic than in other neighboring countries, such as Algeria in particular. It may also be noted, as in the case of emigration, that a reaction against this process of accelerated modernization may take place in the name of Islam, whether it is a matter of challenging the established government or its skillful efforts at adaptation.

## Toward a Revival of Islam?

The events in Iran and the support which Hassan II gave to the shah in exile raise the question of a possible contagion of the Moroccan system by the Islamic populist trend.

Actually, the alert concerning Islam dates back much earlier. It was Qadhdhafi<sup>9</sup> who began as early as 1970 to first challenge the government of Hassan II in the name of purity of Islamic principles. For the Libyan Government, Morocco is above all an obstacle to the Arab unity which it wants to achieve. Neither its Islamic character nor its past of resistance to colonial powers impress the Libyan Government any more than the same qualities attributed in their time to the Senoussie monarchy. At the time of the Skhirat conspiracy in 1971, Qadhdhafi expressed his immediate and outspoken support for the rebel Moroccan soldiers; he continued to do so after their defeat. There was a long-lasting war of the airwaves between Morocco and Libya. The Moroccan opposition found a way to publicize in detail the system's failings and improprieties. The accuracy of the accusations was a very consistent source of information at a time when the monarchy controlled the press and removed parties from the government. The Libyans focused their criticism on the gap between the practices of government leaders, including the sovereign and his associates, and the Islamic ideal. Allegiance to Libya hardly increased, but the accusations gained ground.

The Libyan free officers could certainly feel some kinship between their movement and that of the cadets of Ahermoumou. As soon as they reached the site of the feast in Skhirat, they attacked all of the symbols of wealth and consumption contrary to Islam: alcohol, pork, food in abundance, expensive watches which they crushed, etc., but the king regained control of the situation by reacting in Islamic fashion, in particular by reciting the fatiha with the cadets, whom he rallied. Then he stated in his self-critical speech of 4 August 1971: "... The poor have not grown any richer. The wealthy have increased their fortunes. The gap between the two classes has widened. The situation is intolerable in a country like Morocco, whose real constitution is the Koran. The Koran in fact instructs us to practice equality and equity" ....

The sovereign's good intentions to reform matters did not last very long, but the crises of 1971 and 1972 constituted a serious warning which led both political leaders and observers to wonder about the system's ability to withstand such tensions, their causes and the role of Islam. An initial simplistic reaction consisted of using the failure of the conspiracy as an argument to conclude that the royal "good fortune" had strengthened the government. But it was not so much fervor as fear and

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passivity which characterized relations between the government and the masses at the time of the Skhirat and Boeing affairs.

Practically nothing serious has been done to open up the political system with regard to the Western Sahara. At first glance, this conflict between Moslem powers is not a war of religion. The matter is not as simple as it appears. The tensions with Spain and then with Algeria enabled the Moroccan monarchy to regain control of the political system and to reintegrate the main opposition forces into that system. Hassan II had dreamed of the operation since the conspiracies of 1971-72. He was not prepared to really pay the price by sharing power with parties and trade unions as long as he was afraid that such a relinquishment of power constituted a danger equivalent to that represented by the military. The other figures of political life were in turn wondering what a new compromise with a weakened monarchical government could hold for them. They therefore set the stakes high, at least while waiting to see what would happen next.

The king had also scored points by siding with Syria and Egypt in the 1973 conflict. Not having the army as a power base, he had to mobilize Islam and Arabism. Circumstances were favorable and the survivors of the battle of Mount Hermon, after parading through the streets of Rabat, left immediately, with the aid of caution and symbolism, for the Saharan front. The political parties could not allow the king to pursue such a course of action alone for too long without running the risk of being edged out of the picture. With the Saharan affair creating a new consensus of public opinion and the fear of a military coup d'etat preventing the parties from pressing their demands, a new compromise with the monarchy seemed possible. Under these conditions, it was in the king's interest to strengthen the Islamic features of his government to increase his autonomy.

The king's position in relation to the other figures in political life was quite strong in this regard. By fighting Spain and indirectly Algeria to recover the Sahara, Hassan II preempted a propaganda issue dear to the Istiqlal and to Allal El Fassi. Sensitive nationalism and loyalty to Islam are issues constantly found in the party's doctrine since 1958, but with even more insistence in 1962 when impending Algerian independence thwarted Moroccan hopes concerning the Sahara. The UNFP and the communist party (which became the PLS [Party of Liberation and Socialism]) could not be outdone after the many statements which they had made about this issue. The objective features of a compromise between the king and the parties thus converged and it was to some extent a result of the recognition of his role as commander of the faithful that the sovereign committed himself, with their support, to the Green March, a "pilgrimage to recover that ancient Moroccan territory." The entry into the recovered Saharan territory began with a solemn prayer. The marchers waved Moroccan flags, portraits of the king as well as verses from the Koran. The Green March took on the appearance of a jihad, even though the main adversary was a brother, Arab and Moslem country.<sup>10</sup> But using a classical approach, Algeria was accused of lacking Arab solidarity and the materialistic character of its socialism was stressed. Actually, a new political consensus was formed on the basis of the unity established at the time of the Green March, which made possible Morocco's commitment to the series of elections beginning in November 1976 and ending with the Istiqlal's reentry into the government in late 1977.

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The collapse of the Iranian monarchy and the attack on the mosque in Mecca thus occurred in a context of reestablished national unity. The events caused a reaction of anxiety and tension in political circles, but without apparent dramatic effects. When the king decided to receive the shah in Marrakesh, public opinion and political circles could not remain aloof from the matter. The sovereign's opinions concerning the Iranian revolution were at once evidence of a bitter hostility toward the Iranian revolutionaries, although without excusing the shah. In an interview with France-Inter on 9 March 1979, the king described Khomeyni as a heretic in the eyes of 900 million Moslems, condemning in particular the existence of a clergy and expressing the fear that the events in Tehran might result in a communist takeover of holy places. The sovereign reiterated his accusations of the Iranian leaders in October, going so far as to say that he would prefer to be an atheist rather than follow Khomeyni's brand of Islam and that he would not apologize to a heretic. It may be noted that if the official press embraced such criticism and stressed Moroccan unity, the League of Ulamas made no reference to the events in Iran during its Oudja congress in May 1979, whereas it did talk about Palestine, Eritrea, the Philippines, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The ulamas' support of official views concerning the Sahara was total and was accompanied by stern judgments of Algerian socialism. It may therefore be concluded that the representatives of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs were unable to obtain the condemnation of the Iranian revolution which they desired. In the areas of education, religious instruction and family planning (which they condemned), the congressional participants also recommended measures which Qadhdhafi and Khomeyni would not repudiate, as well as certain symbolic gestures such as banning Christian feast days and Sundays as holidays.

The Istiqlal's position was not so remote from that of the ulamas. Al-Alam was amazed and commented on ... Europeans' amazement at the revival of Islam, but did not condemn Iranian Islam; at most, he mentioned the communist threat which could emerge behind the religious leaders if the West did not demonstrate more intelligence and understanding.

But it is conceivable that the events in Iran brought about a revival of religious reactionism in Morocco, as it did elsewhere in the Moslem world. Until then, this movement was hardly of any importance in Morocco. Official Islam there was powerful and more tolerant of Moslem fraternal-type movements than of Baathist-motivated groups. The Islamic protest movement was channeled through the Istiqlal to a large extent and while exhibiting certain marked differences, it has become reconciled with official Islam and has granted the government its support. But a more radical movement seems to be taking shape. Its members no longer come from Arabicizing circles educated in traditional universities. They are found instead among students and professors of the humanities in modern universities, who formerly would have been committed to Marxist-based groups. The movement's leaders are some elementary school inspectors, such as Abdesselam Yassine, who publishes the AL JAMAA ("The Community") journal in Marrakesh. The first issue of this journal deserves special attention inasmuch as it presents a contrasting view with respect to official policy, without openly opposing it, however. The judgment on Shi'ism is not in the same vein as that of the king. The author talks of differences, not heresy;<sup>11</sup> Khomeyni is described as a holy man who "has renounced the possessions of this world and has risen above its pleasures and false glories. He directs his people and is leading them to a rare ideal ...." All attempts to secularize Moslem society are condemned, including those of both Ataturk and the shah. Egypt is vaguely mentioned, with Sadat as the prime target: "The bloodthirsty tyrant of this century, as well as Nasser." On the other hand, Bourguiba is not mentioned.

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The condemnation of modernization, which accompanies this criticism of secularity, goes further: "The present system of unrestrained and disorderly development, which knows no bounds, threatens to plunge the world into chaos. Humanity's heritage is being squandered to satisfy the extravagant tastes of the wealthy at the expense of the world's underprivileged. The role of reemerging Islam is to oppose and to quash the tendencies of some to monopolize wealth and to construct a fraternal Islamic economic system capable of satisfying the needs of man, of every man, in adequate proportions and not in excess."

The author appeals to the ulamas<sup>12</sup> and to students to support this revolution. He urges young people to free themselves from the hold of the false Marxist shepherds, whom he also fears for the Iranian revolution, which he cites, however, as an example to be followed by the entire Moslem world: "A new face of Islam is emerging among the Iranian people, a face which enlightened leaders are gradually illuminating and which will in turn illuminate, God willing, all peoples of the Islamic nation. Wake up, learn how to distinguish between what is true and what is false. Do not put your faith in the opportunism of the communists who, creeping in Khomeyni's shadow ... only fish in troubled waters .... Those people will learn a hard lesson from the faithful Mojahedin in Afghanistan and in Yemen ...."

Issue no 4 returns to the theoretical aspects of the divisions between Sunnites and Shi'ites with an outlook of unity, and Khomeyni's appeal to the Moslem world is situated in this context. Moving from theory to an analysis of symbolic acts, the journal extols the ulamas of Tangier, who publicly broke their fast 1 day before the rest of Morocco in a spirit of unity with the entire Moslem world and were arrested by the police.

Beyond this legalistic appearance, the group nevertheless seems to have a more disturbing, hidden face. Issue no 4 of AL JAMAA echoes a statement of the National Bureau of Islamic Youth, dated 29 September 1979, protesting the conspiracy against the "brothers": Abdelkim Mouti and Brahim Kamal, who were implicated by the police in the assassination of USFP leader Omar Benjelloum in December 1975. The two accused men are president and vice president of Moroccan Islamic Youth. Mouti, an elementary school inspector with a modern education, like Abdesselam Yasmine, began by militating in the teaching union and in the UNFP.<sup>13</sup> Suspected of having organized the assassination of Omar Benjelloum, he fled to Saudi Arabia, protesting his innocence. But strangely enough, he was among the foreigners who attacked the mosque in Mecca. It would no doubt be a bit hasty to conclude that Moroccan Islam is involved in a conspiracy which is both reactionary and revolutionary and affecting the entire Moslem world. But a response and ties may exist or be formed, particularly during the pilgrimage, while following the age-old roads which have carried ideas, men and goods since the beginning of Islam.

This explains the anxiety of all political factions in regard to the reactionary movement. The left views it in more or less the same way as the military and in any case prefers to make a compromise with the monarchy. The Istiqlal is being careful not to allow itself to be outdone and is relying on official Islam. While remaining in the government, it will insist on accelerating Arabization of education and on personal status which is not too liberal.

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The monarchy is divided between concern for prudent control and the necessity of not allowing itself to be outdone by anyone with regard to Islam. The greater commitment to the Palestinian cause is an indirect response to the criticism of reactionaries, who point to the Iranian revolution. In May 1979, the king was appointed by the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers as chairman of the Al-Qods Committee, assigned to direct attention to Jerusalem's status and to loosen the Zionist hold on holy places by getting Christians to side with the Moslem world. He has taken his job seriously and is also busy with Saudi Arabia, showing that in Morocco's opinion, true solidarity is to be found in Islamic Arabic unity, in which the symbol of Palestine plays an essential role. The king has implied that solidarity with the PLO is more important to him than to Khomeyni, who did not hesitate to repeatedly reject Arafat's proposals to act as intermediary in the case of the American hostages. The king's recent visits to France and Saudi Arabia, probably for political, military and financial reasons concerning Morocco and the Saharan affair, are described as actions in the service of the Palestinian cause.

Morocco has also been careful to implement the Baghdad Conference resolution condemning Egypt following the Camp David accords and broke off diplomatic relations with Cairo in early 1979, despite American pressure and the unofficial role which Hassan II could have played in preparing Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

If we try to evaluate the situation created by the revival of religious reactionism, we would be tempted to make a rather positive assessment in the case of the monarchy. Social upheavals have been much less profound than in Algeria or Iran. The monarchy has never had a confrontation with official Islam. It has regained the active support of the main political party, which represents the Islamic faction in the heritage of nationalism. Despite the Saharan affair and the conspiracies challenging his ability to lead the country, even among the reactionaries there are few who do not accept the king as religious leader. In the final analysis, it is probably the country's modernization since 1960 which is the most controversial factor, but the monarchy had instinctively chosen to make limited changes without allowing itself to be carried away by the prospect of heavy industry projects. The dominant economic sector, phosphates, is old enough so that the social aspects of its development can be integrated without disruptions.

In the long term, it is difficult to say whether the Moroccan monarchy will emerge stronger from these trials and tensions. Algeria's recent development, which has apparently slowed its frenzied industrialization and has made concessions to Islam and Arabization, would suggest that Morocco has been wise in its policy of controlled change. The reestablished political consensus concerning the Saharan affair also seems essential to the government's stability. None of the enemies of Hassan II, either inside or outside Morocco (including Algeria), sees any preferable alternative solution to the monarchy. In the long term, what is really at stake perhaps is Maghrebian domination by a political system which would provide evidence of the most lasting internal solidarity.

Discussing the Almohade state in connection with the works of Paul Pascon, Edmond Amran El Maleh wrote:<sup>15</sup> "For the communities with which we are mainly concerned, this vision is exclusively religious and Islamic; the categories deriving from any secularity are totally irrelevant." The ancient system, in which religious representation and the concept of government were closely related, has continued even

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with the growth of central government. The Moroccan monarchy's strength lies in its having learned to manipulate this representation, although without being able to prevent a certain concept of secularity from infiltrating the system with a large degree of complicity by political officials in the beginning. But modernization has crushed a part of society that will no longer accept this sacrifice in silence and, if pushed, would prefer to challenge changes which they do not consider legitimate. A new group of rather lucid and educated Moslems is emerging in opposition to a modernization which they reject and from which they do not really benefit. In comparison to the monarchy, they offer a social and intellectual plan that is acceptable to the masses.

An important factor has remained outside the field of observation for lack of information.<sup>16</sup> This is the Islam of religious confraternities, holy men and local sanctuaries. Two contradictory views can be cited in this regard. On one hand, there is the hostility of reformist Islam toward it, which dates back to the protectorate and has never stopped; in this respect, the reactionaries are just as reproachful as the ulamas or the Moroccan left. On the other hand, local government officials have often shown great kindness toward the confraternities. That may be interpreted as a new version of the politics of prominent figures, inasmuch as the families of local holy men and the chiouk of confraternities are to be found in circles close to the Popular Movement or Independents, and sometimes even in the USFP, which does not exclude the possibility of good relations with local government. Another more prosaic reason for the interest of officials is to be found in the "folkloric" events and festivals (moussems) associated with such organizations, which increase trade with city residents and foreigners and provide a market for local products.

But the possibility must not be ruled out of one day finding in this repressed Islam a source of protest for a regional movement in the Rif, Souss or Middle Atlas mountains, or even a form of opposition to industrialization and modernization, which could then be combined with the protest of reactionaries.<sup>17</sup>

Thus it is difficult to draw conclusions today concerning the nature of the control exercised in the name of Islam over society and the political system. An impression of continuity prevails, of course, but it specifically reminds us that in Moroccan tradition dynasties have been challenged in the name of a revival of Islam.

For centuries, that tradition has been closer to puritanism and doctrinal austerity than to the religious liberalism of the Ottoman Empire, for example. Since Moroccan independence, the state has actually intervened very little in regulating the social conduct of individuals, except with regard to observance of the fast of Ramadan. The result has been a real secularization of daily life that is more pronounced than in Algeria, where the process of re-Islamization is progressing, particularly concerning the place of Arab culture and language in education. This has led to a weakening of the government, despite the skill demonstrated by Hassan II in establishing a broad political consensus after the conspiracies of 1971-72. The various reactionary factions, whose following is difficult to assess, are certainly not in a position to bring about a change by themselves. But if other forces, such as the military, were to succeed in bringing about such a change, puritanical Islam would immediately provide them with an alternative doctrine that would offer an exceptional range of means of extending control over society as a whole.

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FOOTNOTES

1. "The body of the faithful must remain in the same place until the time that the angel Israfil sounds the trumpet of resurrection" (Andre Adam, "Casablanca," CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], Paris, 1968, p 606).
2. See in particular: Clifford Geertz, "Islam Observed" (New Haven, 1968); Jacques Berque, "Maghreb, histoire et societe" [Maghreb, History and Society] (Duculot, Gembboux, 1974), pp 162 and 55; E. I. J. Rosenthal, "Islam and the Modern National State" (Cambridge University Press, 1965); Stuart Schaar, "Rebellion, Revolution and Religious Intermediaries in Some Nineteenth Century Islamic States," in Kalman H. Silvert, "Church and States" (AUF, N.Y., 1967); L. C. Brown, "The Role of Islam in Modern North Africa," in L. C. Brown, "State and Society in Independent North Africa," Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1966), pp 97 and 55.
3. See the program of the 1960 congress, cited in Claude Palazolli, "Le Maroc Politique" [Political Morocco] (Editions Sindbad, Paris, 1974), p 146; "The Istiqlal Party remains loyal to Islam, which was the central factor in the formation of the Moroccan nation, the unification of our country and the flowering of our civilization. Islam has effectively contributed to maintaining the fighting spirit, which the Moroccan people have demonstrated to achieve their freedom ..." See also Michel Rousset, "Le Royaume du Maroc" [The Kingdom of Morocco] (Berger Levrault, Paris, 1978).
4. The dualism between a bureaucratized Islam and an Islam maintained by the population is not without some similarity to the structure of local government--see Remy Leveau, "Le Fellah marocain defenseur du Trone" [The Moroccan Fellah, Defender of the Throne], FNSP [National Political Sciences Foundation] (Paris, 1976).
5. And yet the number of Koranic schools, like that of the mosques, has doubled in 10 years. They are probably far beyond 100,000. But Morocco, which does not have more than 300,000 students in the entire educational system, has more than 2 million in the public elementary school system alone and nearly 100,000 teachers at all levels.
6. See MAGHREB, No 8, March-April 1965--"Religious Ideology and Political Tactics in Morocco," pp 24-27.
7. Fatima Mernissi, "Divorce," AL ASSAS, Nos 15-16-17, December 79, January and February 80.
8. Andre Adam, "Casablanca," p. 595, op. cit.
9. Ruth First, "Libya--The Elusive Revolution" (Penguin Books, Harmondworth, 1974).
10. But in his speech to parliament on 12 October 1979, the king put the sacrifice of Moroccan chouhadas on the same level as the Golan Heights, the Sinai and the Sahara (LE MATIN DU SAHARA, 13 October 1979).

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11. "The uprising of the Islamic people in Iran is only a partial illustration of Islam's exemplary revolt, in which Selmane (The Persian) formerly participated under the banner of the prophet."
12. "And you, the ulamas of Islam, the salt of the earth, you who sleep<sup>6</sup>, you hold the truth: Speak! Your Iranian brothers have given the turban back its full glory."
13. JEUNE AFRIQUE, Nos 990-991, 21 December 1979, p 38.
14. The two countries organized the first conferences of Islamic chiefs of state as early as 1969.
15. Edmond Amran El Maleh, "La notion d'Etat et l'experience du Tiers-Monde" [The Concept of the State and the Experience of the Third World], PEUPLE MEDITERRANEEN, No 6, January-March 1979.
16. Ernest Gellner, "Saints of the Atlas" (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1969).
17. See REVUE POUVOIRS, No 12, 1980, "Islamic Regimes."

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MOROCCO

CASABLANCA TO BE DIVIDED INTO FIVE DISTRICTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Jul 81 p 2045

[Text] The riot of 20 June revealed the seriousness of the social situation in the working-class districts of Morocco's economic capital. Bloodily put down, its significance has been systematically played down by authorities, who have shifted the blame for it onto several leaders, but in any case it was foreseeable that administrative measures would quickly be taken to completely restore order. In fact, following a meeting on 20 July to study the matter, over which King Hassan II presided, the decision was announced to divide Casablanca into five prefectures.

The decision which resulted from the meeting of 22 July, over which the prime minister and Minister of Justice Maati Bouabid presided with the assistance of Minister of Interior Driss Basri in the presence of parliamentary representatives, local elected officials and representatives of some of the city's professional associations, is justified by the fact that the city's population has more than tripled in 25 years, from 1.050 million residents in 1955 to more than 3.5 million today, or one-sixth of the kingdom's population. Casablanca, which has grown constantly from the rural exodus, which has increased even more as a result of this year's drought, accounts for 40 percent of all available jobs, 53 percent of national industry, 40 percent of energy consumption, 60 percent of commercial operations and 70 percent of imports-exports. The government press has pointed out that the poorly controlled urbanization of outlying districts has swallowed up vacant areas one after the other, resulting in a continuous process of population growth without regard for social, educational, commercial and transportation services for them. This has favored speculation to the advantage of the private sector and to the detriment of the public interest and public services.

According to authorities, the quest for a new administrative framework for the prefecture, which actually has only one administrative center, that of Casablanca, must obviously be oriented toward: eliminating the situation of having only one center; a better conception of facilities for outlying areas; slowing growth from the population exodus by decentralizing economic activities; establishing new centers of attraction in suburban areas; developing the centers of satellite cities such as Berrechid, Settat, etc., within the economic region in accordance with the king's guidelines; developing a guide plan as quickly as possible to thus determine the options and guidelines for developing greater Casablanca; systematically including recreation at the housing level, thus the importance of playgrounds and sports fields; working out a clearly defined policy for urban development and construction supervision; establishing a balance between urban transportation and

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individual automobiles; creating jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors through a policy of industrial and commercial decentralization.

As Mr Maati Bouabid pointed out, the five prefectures must have all the resources necessary for them to play their legally established role. At the royal palace of Casablanca on 28 July, King Hassan II received the five new governors appointed in the economic capital: Mr Ahmed Fizazi, appointed governor of the prefecture of Casablanca-Anfa; Mr Ahmed Chaouki, appointed governor of Hay Mohammadi-Ain Sebaa; Mr Mustapha Alami, governor of Ben Msik-Sidi Othman; Mr Larbi El Ouazzani, governor of Hay El Hassani-Ain Chok; Mr Abdellah El Ouazzani, governor of Mohammadia-Zenata.

Mr Driss Basri, in installing Mr Ahmed Fizazi as governor of the prefecture of Casablanca-Anfa and of the social and economic region of greater Casablanca on 28 July in United Nations Square in front of the prefecture headquarters in Casablanca, stated the reasons for the new division of Casablanca: to balance the housing situation in Casablanca-Anfa; to reorganize the industrial zone and to solve the economic, social and administrative problems of the prefecture of Hay Mohammadi-Ain Sebaa; to consider urbanization, industrialization and antipollution measures and to encourage small and medium-size businesses in the prefecture of Ain Chok-Hay Hassani; to encourage industry in the prefecture of Ben Msik-Sidi Othman, starting with the Tit Mellil area, and to continue the efforts for industrial, tourist and urban development in the prefecture of Mohammadia-Zenata.

Mr Driss Basri pointed out that King Hassan II, in appointing the five new governors on 28 July, had urged them to work not only on the economic and social plans in the interest of the city's population, but had also asked them to make Casablanca one of the most important and most envied metropolises in the world.

King Hassan II presided over the religious vigil of the Night of Destiny on 28 July at the Mohammadi mosque in Casablanca.

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TUNISIA

CONFLICT AMONG OPPOSITION GROWS IN WAKE OF PCT LEGALIZATION

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 245, 3 Aug 81 p 17

[Article by Hedi Dhokar: "Liberalization with Pitfalls"]

[Text] On the night of 18 July, a few hours after the announcement that the ban on the Tunisian Communist Party [PCT] since 1963 had been lifted, following an interview between PCT General Secretary Mohamed Harmel and President Bourguiba, the police arrested, in their homes, more than 40 leaders of the Islamic Way Movement (MTI) and the Progressive Islamic Movement (MIP).

Among the leaders arrested were MTI President Rached Ghanouchi and General Secretary Abdelfattah Mourou. If no official communique reported that police operation, the press of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) devoted several articles to it, questioning the responsibility of religious reactionaries in "disorders" noted in mosques, disorders which were, in reality, probably due to the action of agents provocateurs in the pay of the PSD.

"Religious Unrest"

In any case, the government is hardly in a position to denounce the "medieval inquisition" and the "political-religious fanaticism of Islamic reactionaries" (L'ACTION) today, when it was the government itself which provided fundamentalists with their first organized structure: the Association for the Reading and Promotion of the Koran. That was in 1970, when it was difficult--to say the least--for the opposition to organize within the country in complete safety. The government's purpose was to counterbalance, or even to indirectly repress, leftist forces, which were becoming particularly outspoken in university circles. And actually, as a result of their "dirty work" tactics, the henchmen of the religious right have been able to impose their will in student and university circles.

The government's responsibility in this matter is twofold. Not only has it created what it wants to destroy today--and by what means!--but quite obviously, the religious phenomenon cannot be understood only in its political context. The socio-cultural situation which made possible the emergence of such Islamic-based groups actually still has not changed. It is the result of a more than 25-year-old rule which has never really been able to reconcile its liberal and tolerant aims in the case of religion and its elite nature, thus if the affluent classes have adjusted to these features without difficulty, the vast majority have had to put up with

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reformism mixed with the PSD's overall policy, the effects of which are disastrous from the standpoints of culture, information and the economy (tourism, subcontracting, etc.).

The solution chosen by the government, always tempted to use repression, may well produce the opposite result and cause the reactionary religious organizations to look like victims and martyrs. In any case, it will not make it possible for the underlying causes of "religious unrest" to be attacked. Only real democratization would be capable of bringing the religious movements out of hiding, which constitutes their strength, and to reveal their views in a broad and healthy debate which could only put those who advocate religious fanaticism in their proper place and even expose their ideology and backward methods.

But such considerations did not serve as the government's motivation. Its action has apparently been determined by motives of an entirely different nature. The PCT's legalization, as positive as it may be, was nevertheless actually used to conceal the repression of Islamic factions, which immediately followed such legalization. The fact that Mohamed Harmel has refrained from taking a position on this serious matter is significant in itself.

Thus differences have increased among the various opposition factions, which had been united in rejecting and denouncing the government's actions in connection with its so-called "liberalization." The PCT, let's make no mistake about it, is the first victim of "Bourguiba's clemency" toward it. From now on, it will actually look like the government's "democratic security."

Opinions were quickly expressed in Tunisian political circles to the effect that Mohamed Harmel's party had been rewarded for its policy of "critical support" of the government--a policy which in particular led to its denunciation of the "wildcat" strikes of 1977 and to its dissociation from the general strike of 1978, which resulted in the massacres of 26 January, a grim memento. The PCT may also be viewed as a hostage of Bourguiba, who would not fail to recall at the first opportunity, as he usually does, that Tunisian communists were against the national movement at the time of the "fight for liberation" and are today among the few Arabs to recognize the existence of Israel.

These are some of the factors which have sown discord among the opposition, whereas the government can now boast that the PCT's legalization has put an end to single-party rule. From a logical standpoint, at least, this means that Tunisia has become a "democracy."

"Final Examination"

It is nothing of the kind, of course, since in Bourguiba's opinion, the Popular Unity Movement [MUP] of Ahmed ben Salah, Prof Mestiri's Socialist Democratic Movement [MDS] and the Tunisian National Opposition Movement of Ibrahim Tobal, in addition to the Islamic movements, should also undergo a "final examination"! To be recognized, they should obtain at least or more than 5 percent of the votes in the upcoming parliamentary elections which have been moved forward to 1 November 1981. Among other conditions, that would represent nothing less than a practically insurmountable handicap, since these movements would have to be legally recognized in order to conduct a campaign and have the time and means necessary to circulate their ideas.

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This is why Ahmed ben Salah's MUP has requested, as minimum guarantees, the dissolution of special courts, the reduction of police custody, full restoration of freedom of expression and freedom of association and the right to strike.

Ibrahim Tobal has in turn refused to "play the game according to the rules established by the government," while the MDS, which already applied for recognition long ago, has expressed the same reservations.

Only the MUP faction opposed to Ahmed ben Salah accepted the "game rules" when Bourguiba personally agreed to receive some of its representatives, who have been authorized to publish a newspaper. This was another divisive move aimed at weakening or even disrupting the reformist rally which has formed around Ben Salah.

The outcome of a process of democratization, which the government has cleverly turned into a test of strength, indeed into an obstacle course, now depends on the conduct of the various opposition factions and in particular on the degree of solidarity which they will demonstrate.

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TUNISIA

## FOREIGN TRADE FOR 1980 SHOWS INCREASING DEFICIT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Jul 81 pp 1987-1988

[Text] The provisional Tunisian foreign trade statistics for 1980 show a deficit of 500.3 million dinars (MD; 1 dinar = approximately 10.30 French francs in average 1980 value), an increase of 16.5 percent over the preceding year. The rate at which imports were covered by exports nevertheless rose by 1.3 percentage points, to 64.1 percent from 62.8 percent in 1979.

The increase in the trade balance deficit was thus sharply higher than economic budget forecasts, which estimated only 466 million dinars.

The development of trade in 1979-80 shows the following variations (in millions of dinars):

	<u>1980/1979 Variations</u>				
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>In %</u>
Imports	899.7	1,156.8	1,391.7	+234.9	+20.3
Exports	468.4	726.7	891.4	+164.7	+22.7
Deficit	431.3	430.1	500.3	+ 70.2	+16.3
Rate of Coverage	52.1	62.8	64.1	+ 1.3	+ 2.1

This table shows that the trade deficit rose by 70 MD despite the increase in exports. The rate of this increase was not the same as in 1979, of course: only +22.7 percent instead of +60 percent, but we know that the jump in 1979 was rather unusual in nature, due mainly to petroleum revenues, as a result of which the increase in the deficit was able to be limited to 0.4 percent.

Imports: 20.3 Percent Increase

The value of Tunisian imports last year rose 20.3 percent over the previous year, totaling nearly 1.4 billion dinars, as opposed to slightly less than 1.2 billion in 1979. All product groups showed an increase over their previous levels. Energy products accounted for 20 percent of all Tunisian imports and capital goods accounted for 23 percent. The structure of product groups remained essentially the same as in 1979.

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The following observations can be derived from an examination of Tunisian imports:

Imports of foodstuffs continued to grow at a rate of 12 percent (+17.7 MD). Purchases rose to 167.6 MD in 1980 from 149.8 MD in 1979. The increase included the purchase of grain (69.8 MD) and sugar (30.5 MD) in particular. These two products alone represent two-thirds of food imports. Grain purchases (40 percent of the total) rose 13.5 percent despite a reduction of the amounts imported. This development originated with the rise of import prices, whose average rose from 69 dinars per ton in 1979 to 91 dinars per ton in 1980. This price effect is even more pronounced in the case of sugar, whose imports rose by 75 percent in value and declined by 15 percent in quantity. On the other hand, the price of soybean oil fell, which softened the impact of this product's purchases on the balance of trade: expenditures dropped by 6.4 MD (-27.4 percent) for almost the same quantities imported (80,000 tons).

Sustaining the operations of manufacturing industries and unavoidably suffering the increase in prices, purchases of raw materials and semifinished goods rose by 32.6 percent, totaling expenditures of 691.8 MD, or nearly one-half of all imports.

Energy products showed the most noticeable increase, since expenditures to purchase these products amounted to 278.4 MD, including 112 MD for crude oil purchases. Petroleum purchases in 1979 amounted to only about 80 MD. The recorded increase was 40.3 percent. In the case of gas oil, the increase amounted to 28.3 percent and to 212 percent in the case of heavy fuel oil (18.4 MD, as opposed to 5.9 MD in 1979).

With regard to raw materials and semifinished goods of animal or vegetable origin, their share of total imports remained relatively low (5 percent). They rose by 30 percent, causing additional expenditures of approximately 16 MD.

Imports of products of mineral origin more than doubled, rising from 23.6 MD to 52.8 MD (+123.5 percent), due to the purchase of large quantities of unrefined sulfur (705,000 tons as compared with 580,000 tons in 1979), for a total of 40.4 MD (+143.2 percent in comparison to 1979).

Purchases of other intermediate goods also increased. These included textile products (122.6 MD or +20 percent), plastics (44.6 MD or +86 percent), timber (31.5 MD or +42 percent) and metallurgical products (38.6 MD or +40 percent).

Finished products' share of total imports did not increase in 1980 and amounted to only 38.3 percent as opposed to 41.9 percent in 1979. The rate of increase of purchases was higher in the case of capital goods (+14.2 percent) than in the case of consumer goods (+3.6 percent). These proportions were reversed in 1979 (1.7 percent for capital goods and 13.4 percent for consumer goods). Appliances, machinery, pumps, engines and transportation equipment represent most of this category.

Exports: 22.7 Percent Increase

Tunisian exports in 1980 increased at a much slower rate than that recorded for 1979. At the end of the year in question, they did not amount to the 928 MD

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estimated by the economic budget. Amounting to 891.4 MD, they rose by 22.7 percent (+164.7 MD).

Energy products accounted for more than one-half of all Tunisian sales in 1980 (53 percent as opposed to 48.6 percent in 1979). As a result of the increase in prices, petroleum revenues rose by 34 percent and amounted to 472.7 MD (+119.7 MD over 1979), totaling revenues of 891.4 MD. Crude oil alone accounted for 450 MD.

Revenues from the sale of phosphate products also increased, amounted to 104.4 MD as opposed to 82 MD in 1979. Exports of calcium phosphates amounted to 22 MD in 1980 as opposed to 17.9 MD in 1979; phosphoric acid exports came to 42 MD compared with 32.1 MD in 1979; exports of superphosphates amounted to 40.4 MD as opposed to 32.1 MD in 1979.

In the case of textile products, exports also grew, particularly as a result of the increase in quantities exported (clothing and accessories). In the case of cotton fabrics, they amounted to 10.8 MD in 1980 as opposed to 9.1 MD in 1979; to 26 MD as opposed to 19.9 MD in the case of hosiery; to 100.9 MD as opposed to 89 MD in the case of clothing; to 4.3 MD as opposed to 3.8 MD in the case of accessories.

Exports of foodstuffs were unfavorable overall, inasmuch as the revenues recorded for 1980 were below their 1979 level. The decline was caused by a very sharp drop in olive oil sales, which tumbled from 80,400 tons in 1979 (45.8 MD) to 37,700 tons in 1980 (22.7 MD). This was a loss of approximately 50 percent (-23.1 MD). This situation was due to the reduction of available quantities. Exports of live plants, vegetables and dates also declined in comparison to the previous year. Cube sugar exports showed a drop of 72 percent, declining from 5.4 MD to 1.5 MD. On the other hand, exports of certain commodities rose, such as oranges (46.1 percent) and shell-fish (+20 percent).

Geographic Distribution of Trade: Greece, Leading Customer; France, Leading Supplier

With regard to the geographic distribution of Tunisian foreign trade, it will be observed, first of all, that trade with the EEC accounted for 58.9 percent of imports and 53.4 percent of Tunisian exports.

Trade With EEC

(in millions of dinars)

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1980/1979 Variation</u>
Imports	652.9 (56.5%)	819 (58.9%)	+25.4%
Exports	425.3 (58.4%)	475.6 (53.4%)	+11.8%
Deficit	227.6 (52.9%)	343.4 (68.6%)	+50.9%

The trade deficit in the case of EEC countries amounted to 343.4 MD, an increase of 50.9 percent over 1979 (+115.7 MD); it represented 68.6 percent of the total deficit of the Tunisian balance of trade. In the case of imports, Tunisia's main European customers were Greece (163.1 MD), Italy (142.6 MD), France (136.1 MD) and the FRG (114.4 MD). The main suppliers continued to be France (349.6 MD), Italy (219.4 MD)

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and the FRG (142 MD). The rate of coverage in the case of EEC countries dropped by 7 percentage points, from 65.1 to 58.1 percent.

The decline in olive oil exports and the increase in petroleum prices affected the balance of trade with Tunisia's traditional trade partners. Thus the deficit increased in the case of France and Italy, large purchasers of olive oil. This was also the case with Saudi Arabia, the main supplier of Tunisian crude oil.

On the other hand, the situation was somewhat rectified in the case of trade partners other than those of the EEC. Exports to those countries increased in value by 13.7 percent and imports by 38 percent.

The deficit with countries other than those of the EEC was reduced by 22.5 percent (or 45.5 MD).

Main Tunisian Trade Partners in 1980

(in millions of dinars)

	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>1979 Balance</u>	<u>1980 Balance</u>
Africa:	30.6	69.8	+ 27.2	+ 39.2
Algeria	2.9	15.7	+ 11.6	+ 12.8
Libya	3.9	7.4	+ 18.7	+ 3.5
America:	131.8	151.5	- 27.3	- 80.3
United States	79.8	240.2	- 5.7	+ 50.3
Canada	26.3	0.1	- 13.6	- 26.2
Asia:	152.9	33.5	- 88.3	-119.4
Saudi Arabia	108.2	0.5	- 50.5	-107.7
Japan	15.9	0.4	- 7.7	- 15.5
Europe:	1,074	676.4	-314.9	-397.6
France	349.6	136.1	-162.9	-213.5
Greece	77.5	163.9	+ 45.7	+ 86.4
Italy	219.4	142.6	- 6.8	- 76.8
FRG	142	114.4	- 38	- 27.6
Spain	46.6	3.9	- 42.3	- 42.7
Netherlands	34.3	39.9	+ 0.8	+ 5.6
United Kingdom	27.7	12.8	- 11.6	- 14.9

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