Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100110001-9

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Perspectives for Planning and Programming Fiscal Years 1979-1983

Published by the Intelligence Community Staff for the Director of Central Intelligence with the Advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board

Secret

NFIB D-22.1/58

3 January 1977

Copy № 112

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100110001-9

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100110001-9

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Director of Central Intelligence Perspectives for Planning and Programming Fiscal Years 1979—1983

INTRODUCTION

This document, issued annually by the Director of Central Intelligence, provides a focus for continuing development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) over the next five years. It is intended especially that the thrust and scope of the DCI's message contained herein be instrumental in Community identification of the nation's needs for intelligence information during that period and in the annual programming and budgeting of intelligence resources. The *Perspectives* provide a substantive framework within which annual program guidance of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) may be developed.

The *Perspectives* are also intended to stimulate early action within the Intelligence Community for planning and developing intelligence assets for new and more extensive capabilities which will be needed in five to fifteen years. The *Perspectives* are not intended to alter existing guidance for the current situation. However, they are expected to alert Community leaders to new needs.

Part I of this document brings broad focus—geographically and topically—to DCI expectations concerning the 1979-1983 period. Particular attention is given to change in the global situation as it relates to US national security, the attainment of US foreign policy objectives, and the protection of American interests abroad.

Part II centers on the role of intelligence in a more dynamic and demanding environment, emphasizing the increasing need for quick and thorough assessments of evolving international conditions and trends.

Part III provides broad guidance for intelligence planning and resource management based upon the implications of Parts I and II and upon recent Presidential and Congressional guidance. Part III underscores the need for sharper concern throughout the Intelligence Community in its planning and managerial tasks. It is designed to assist the CFI in the development of specific guidance to managers of Community programs and resources.

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PART I—THE CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT

1. **General.** The balance between the US and USSR in the tangible elements of national power, while continuing to change in key areas, is unlikely to change fundamentally. Perceptions of less tangible aspects in the balance of power—national attitudes, will, the momentum and direction of international events—may change importantly in Moscow, Washington or elsewhere. In a situation of overall equality in intercontinental nuclear forces between the US and USSR, other national assets will gain importance as elements of the strategic balance of power.

While the Soviet-American relationship will remain the most important single factor, power will continue to diffuse, both because of the spread and changes in technology and because of the growth of interdependence. Issues not susceptible to familiar methods of diplomacy or force application will grow in importance. Technology and the spread of nuclear weapons, the existence of the OPEC cartel and, to a lesser extent, the growing demand for raw materials have made coercive power available to additional states and nongovernmental groups including terrorists. The United States therefore will be faced not only with a persistent threat to its interests from the USSR, but also with even greater turbulence and challenge in its relations with other nations.

2. **The Soviet Union** and the United States will remain principal adversaries during the next five years. Their relationship will probably continue to be marked by an absence of armed conflict and at least public adherence, by both governments, to the desirability of cooperation and the need to avoid a reversion to cold-war relations. Disagreements between the two powers will continue to abound, however, in the application of this approach to specific problems. There is little reason to believe that the USSR will accept and act on Western views about the content of a normal, fruitful relationship.

The Soviet leaders seem convinced that in the overall "correlation of forces" world events are moving over the long run in favor of the USSR. They will attempt to further this movement through a variety of political, economic, and subversive activities, backed with growing military capabilities. In doing so, the Soviets will probably be cautious, trying to avoid confrontation with the US and foreign policies so assertive as to jeopardize what the Soviets see as favorable trends in US-USSR relations and world affairs generally. They will also continue to combine the use of state power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military fields with the use of "revolutionary politics" which will be exploited in favorable situations. The USSR will probably seek to keep "cooperation" as the leading feature of its foreign policy with the US and Western Europe for at least the next five years, largely for pragmatic reasons—i.e., because the Soviets think it offers them more advantages than any other alternative to:

— reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation;

— control local crises which could lead to general war;

— minimize China's chances of developing anti-Soviet combinations with other major powers;

— obtain Western economic and technological assistance;

— promote the disintegration of US-Allied power blocs; and

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— increase its superpower role with respect to the US in world affairs.

Although the USSR is likely to continue the relatively cautious, low-risk, but steady effort to press its interests against those of the US, it is quite possible that changed Soviet perceptions of the global military balance and the appearance of attractive local opportunities could lead the Soviets to calculate that the risks of an aggressive action on their part had declined to the point where they were acceptable. The soundness of US policy in dealing with the USSR will depend heavily on early indicators of such shifts in Soviet world outlook and behavior.

The Soviets are not likely to be substantially restrained by arms control arrangements, although for political imagery they will not only espouse a variety of disarmament proposals, but will work to approve some actual, albeit limited, agreements. In the field of strategic offensive forces, the modernization program now underway will give the Soviets larger numbers of more accurate missile warheads, improved missile survivability and greater operational flexibility. In their strategic offensive and defensive programs, research and development is aimed at unique applications of existing technologies and applications of advanced technologies which may lead to new weapon systems. The Soviets will improve the "war-fighting" capabilities of their strategic forces, aiming in part to acquire strategic advantages over the United States should US behavior permit. While US and Soviet strategic capabilities will probably remain in roughly equal balance, the longstanding US qualitative superiority in strategic weapons will come under increasing challenge. Given present and planned US capabilities, it is extremely unlikely that Soviet leaders would come to believe that either side could launch an attack which would prevent devastating retaliation. In the conventional field, the Soviets will continue to build and modernize their ground, naval, and air forces for theater warfare along the periphery of the USSR and for limited distant operations. These programs will increase a variety of Soviet capabilities and strain the credibility of Soviet declarations of peaceful intent.

The USSR will continue to see China as a major hostile competitor and will expend considerable foreign policy effort in a global struggle with the Chinese for influence and leverage. At the same time, now that Mao is dead, Moscow will try to influence the Chinese leadership, seeking to identify and strengthen any elements in the leadership sympathetic to improved Sino-Soviet relations.

In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and facilitate its projection abroad. Soviet leaders will continue to use Western purchases to accelerate technological advances but will not become so dependent on such purchases as to lose their freedom of action. Domestically, pressures will grow for modernizing reforms of the Soviet economic system, particularly its administrative structure. As has been the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe (e.g., Czechoslovakia), reforms which seek the managerial benefits of some type of demand system could have implications for liberalizing other areas of Soviet life, and will accordingly encounter powerful party and political resistance. Prolonged cooperation with the West could threaten to erode the pervasive authority of the Communist Party over the Soviet populace. But these are longstanding and chronic problems, and over the next five years the regime is quite capable of resisting unwanted changes in the essentials of the Soviet domestic system.

A key intelligence focus over the next five years will be the Soviet leadership succession, as Brezhnev and the other aging leaders leave the political scene and their replacements consolidate power. Both the new leadership's policy modifications and the relative smoothness or turmoil of the succession process will have implications for bilateral relations with the US and the Soviet stance abroad generally, as well as for domestic Soviet priorities and the Party management of the country. While the odds

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heavily favor continuity, Soviet politics are so centralized—and so secretive—that significant change under a new leadership cannot be wholly excluded.

3. **In the People's Republic of China** for the next five years and beyond, the main issues for US policy-makers will be the stability of the successor Chinese leadership and its attitude towards the United States. This authoritarian communist leadership is dedicated to the creation of a great socialist power by the year 2000, but there are disagreements centering on means to achieve this, on who will run the party, and on the political role of the military hierarchy. Internal strength and peripheral security will be China's main preoccupations.

China is expected to develop its strategic forces gradually, though it will present an increasingly serious retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, it should have the capability of striking the United States with one or two ICBMs and, possibly, will have an operational submarine able to carry SLBMs.

China will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery, but it will be unlikely to commit its forces in the absence of major provocation. China will become increasingly concerned about achieving a solution to the Taiwan problem. There are pressures in China to get the US to end its military involvement with Taiwan and to establish fuller relations with Peking within a shorter time frame. At the same time China will seek to combat what it perceives as encirclement by the USSR. As a consequence China will face some hard decisions:

— how to deal with a continuous Soviet threat while also exerting pressure for severence of US military links with Taiwan;

— how to reconcile its support for North Korea with its desire for stability in North Asia and fruitful relations with Japan and the US.

Internally, China will continue its agriculture-focused economic programs that are essential to keeping food supplies abreast of population. These programs will, nevertheless, enable industry to expand capacity and output selectively and permit some modernization of the defense establishment. Internationally, China will seek to play a major role with the developing countries. It will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures and will increase its influence, but will not succeed in establishing any authority over developing countries. China may become a significant producer and exporter of oil by 1980 and problems could arise in conflicting off-shore oil claims.

China still has to decide on the degree of its reliance on foreign imports, particularly advanced technology, in its modernization process. This historic issue in China is now further complicated by ideology and the competing demands of a modern military-industrial complex. Past efforts used by China to balance ideology and availability of foreign exchange against needs for foreign imports have been erratic, and there is evidence that this issue continues to trouble the current leadership.

Despite the death of Mao, the prime architect of China's anti-Soviet policy, China will probably not seek a significant reconciliation with the USSR. The consequences of the present hostility, however, have been so important to Asia and to the US that even a moderate improvement (which is possible) would cause some alterations in foreign policy calculations in numerous capitals. Outright military conflict, a lesser possibility, would be a critical world event.

4. **In Western Europe** the Northern developed states and the more volatile nations of the Southern Tier are undergoing critical changes. Uncertainties abound, and results are not foreordained; some of the determining factors lie within the control of the nations concerned, while others are international in dimension. US policy will be one variable in determining the course of events; in some respects it may be

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decisive, in others only marginal in its impact. In some respects, events are working to diminish US influence (measured against past benchmarks) while in other, less obvious, spheres—e.g., energy and economic interrelationships—it is being enhanced. But whether US policy is of decisive, important, or very limited impact, Europe's new uncertainties imply need for more innovative analysis and, on certain selected subjects, improved collection.

In addition to the older problems, including intra-European affairs, relations of the European Community with the developing countries, and European relations with the East and the US, there will be newer, less understood issues such as the social and political repercussions of hyperinflation and vastly increased energy costs. Oil and its price remain critical elements. These pressures will bear on such key European issues as Britain's political and economic health, whether or not the Italian Communists gain a role in the national government, and indeed whether or not moderate government in the classic European liberal tradition can cope with current problems while withstanding assaults from extremists of left and right. The same pressures, coupled with other uncertainties in Southern Europe, imply serious difficulties for NATO.

The states of Southern Europe, at both ends of the Mediterranean, share the functional problems just mentioned superimposed on peculiar new political dilemmas of their own. At one end, Portugal and Spain are passing through an uncertain period of transition from long-established authoritarian regimes of the right to governmental systems which will be very different. American use of military facilities in those countries will cost the US more, and over the longer haul both Portugal and Spain will probably become less willing to host US bases. Paradoxically, liberalization in Spain, together with increased military ties with the US, may facilitate Spain's eventual entry into NATO. Prospects for European Community membership for Spain and Portugal will improve as both countries tackle their economic problems and strengthen their democratic credentials.

The situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is more complex and volatile. Neither in Greece nor in Turkey are the odds very high for a sufficiently durable stabilization to enable both countries to approach realistically the problems of Cyprus and of rights in the Aegean Sea. Over the next five years, these problems will generate recurrent, and conflicting, demands for US support, with accompanying pressures on US overseas facilities which themselves are almost certain to be cut back further during this period.

5. **While Eastern Europe** will continue to be under Soviet control, economic uncertainties and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture. Relatively poor in natural resources, plagued with the inherent inefficiencies of overly centralized economies; and stymied by an often adverse economic dependence on the Soviet Union, the region is faced with a slowdown in economic growth rates which could have repercussions at the political level. The five-year period could see major upheaval, e.g., within some East European country against Soviet dominance; but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony, by force if necessary, whatever the price in terms of other policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may gradually find themselves able to expand some areas of autonomy, primarily in domestic policy, while adhering to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters. The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty and contest over the succession as well as the external orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be risky should the Soviets try to intervene either to prevent a westward drift or to pull the country eastward.

6. **Progress in the Middle East** toward a long-term resolution of the Arab-Israeli confrontation seems unlikely to proceed at a pace rapid enough to satisfy the aspirations of the Arab side. As a result, regional volatility will remain at a

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high level, and the danger will persist that events could rapidly degenerate to produce a major military conflict.

On the Israeli side political contention on issues such as negotiating policy and the settlements in occupied territories will sharply limit the government's capacity for bold decisions on non-military subjects. The Arab world will continue to be torn by traditional enmities, to be plagued relentlessly by Palestinian irredentism and the displaced Palestinian population, and to be split into economically handicapped frontline states and oil-producing donor states. Arab-Israeli hostilities are likely to recur unless momentum is apparent toward a negotiated peace, including the visible achievement of some milestones in that process.

Important potential sources of regional instability include the continuance of politico-religious friction in Lebanon, the overthrow of key national leaders—such as Sadat, Asad, Husayn, the Shah or the Saudi royal family—or marked shifts in attitudes toward either or both of the superpowers. If war resumed in the Middle East—an ever present and largely unpredictable possibility—Israel would have a decisive military advantage over any combination of Arab forces and could be expected to win the conflict within several weeks. Soviet reaction to the prospect of an Arab defeat could include the rapid implementation of a massive resupply effort, and possible introduction of token Soviet forces in order to exert further political and psychological leverage. Such actions by the USSR would increase substantially the risks of US-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East. In view of increasing dependency by the US and its allies on Middle Eastern oil, resumption of fighting or even lesser crises could again imperil Western economies via the cutoff or slowdown of oil shipments.

Although US ability to influence events in the area is increasing, this phenomenon is fragile and depends upon American success in bringing about real progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while avoiding confrontation with the USSR.

7. **Japan's** political party structure and procedures—the main elements of which have been remarkably stable for two decades—may undergo significant change as a part of a long-term drift away from traditional political commitments of the electorate. This situation and other developments could increase the leverage of the largely disunited opposition parties. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the basic lines of policy developed in the course of twenty years of Liberal Democratic rule will change markedly or rapidly. The prime importance that Japan places on its defense relationship with the United States will make Japan highly sensitive to indications of reduced US interests in its security or to signs of US neglect of international measures deemed essential to Japan's economic health. Its peculiar dependence among the advanced powers on imported raw materials and energy sources and the close interrelationship between its economy and ours are bound to create intermittent difficulties between us. Japan is interested in matching its economic power in the world with a more active and responsible political role, especially in the Asian area. And while Japan will try to remain in tandem with us in such efforts, it may not go as far or as fast as we would wish.

8. **In North and South Korea** there is little in the present situation to suggest that the political situation in the two capitals five years from now will look markedly different from the way it looks today. Domestic American pressures for the withdrawal of US ground forces from the South will affect the calculations of both North and South. Because of its concern over a decline in US military presence, the nuclear option is likely to look increasingly attractive to the Republic of Korea, despite obstacles that may be put in its way.

The present state of "no war-no peace" will probably continue. Efforts by the ROK to strengthen its independent military capabilities are likely to be met by equally vigorous North

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Korean efforts to do the same. Although the level of tension could rise with the departure of American forces, both sides are likely to remain cautious. There are no signs of a revival of the Rhee "March North" psychology. For its part, the North will take into account the strength of South Korea's own forces, the continuing US military commitment to the ROK and the uncertainty of support by their own allies in Moscow and Peking. Northern choices are further complicated by relations between the US, Japan, China and the Soviet Union. Although changes in these relations have not yet had significant impact on the political stalemate between the two Koreas, diplomatic shifts—together with possible local changes—could work toward a breakthrough on the "Two Koreas" issue over the next five years.

9. **Southern Africa and the Horn** will be areas of turmoil during the next several years. There will be an increasing risk of communist meddling and an increasing likelihood of developments which will threaten US interest and foreign policy objectives in these areas. In the Horn, there is a serious danger of hostilities between Somalia, which will look to Moscow for support, and Ethiopia, which may turn to the US. In southern Africa, black-white confrontation is likely to intensify. In the event of Kenyatta's death, a stabilizing influence will be removed. Whether by force or by negotiation, Rhodesia and probably Namibia will have black majority governments well before 1983. In Rhodesia, if the black successor rulers are not pro-Western moderates and if the blacks have no option but to gain power by force of arms, the government will probably be strongly anti-US In South Africa, the government appears to be determined to maintain its apartheid policies despite mounting unrest among urban blacks. In such a situation, there is real danger that neighboring states may begin active support for insurgency within South Africa which might provoke strong retaliatory action.

10. **In Panama,** if current treaty negotiations do not proceed to the satisfaction of the Government of Panama, a crisis could ensue. This situation could lead to confrontations in Panama and could adversely impact on the operations of the Canal and the security of US personnel and installations in the Zone. **In Cuba,** Castro's desire to maintain his revolutionary credentials may cause him to intensify efforts in the internal affairs of other hemispheric countries.

11. **Nuclear Proliferation** will become a more significant cause of international insecurity and tension by contributing to regional instabilities and by increasing the risk of multilateral nuclear confrontations involving the major nuclear powers. The expanding worldwide spread of nuclear technology and materials through international nuclear commerce and through the growth of indigenous development programs will result in an increasing number of countries having the capability to produce nuclear explosives and weapons in the years ahead, with a corresponding reduction in the time available for US political or military reaction. Further proliferation probably will be spawned by any perceived reduction in credibility of security assurances of nuclear powers and by the growing danger felt by countries whose unfriendly neighbors seem to be acquiring nuclear weapons.

12. **Economic** issues will tend to become even more intimately involved in US relations worldwide during this period. Globally-shared inflation, recession and recovery, supply interruptions and material shortages continue to underscore the high degree of economic interdependence among countries and its pervasive impact on American interests.

With demand for Middle East oil rising through 1980 and beyond, US and other free world nations will be increasingly affected by cost pressures and transfers of income inherent in progressively higher oil prices. It is certain that OPEC will increase oil prices at a rate that at least matches inflation in the major developed countries, resulting in reducing growth rates in the Western industrial states and complicating

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stabilization measures in such weak economies as the UK, Italy, and Portugal.

At the same time, the less developed states without oil resources of their own will find themselves increasingly less able to purchase such necessities as food and oil, let alone capital goods needed for internal growth and development. The stridency of the North-South dialogue over the distribution of income as between rich and poor countries undoubtedly will increase as less developed countries demand more aid and credit. This will place further demands on traditional public and private lending institutions as well as upon the OPEC countries themselves.

As financial pressures on the industrial states of the free world expand, the maintenance of a viable world monetary and trading system will be challenged. The issues of world food uncertainties, such as the possibility of some countries being priced out of the food market, will have serious political implications. Coping with these international economic problems will increasingly occupy the policy attention of the US and its Western allies and necessitate greater efforts toward cooperative solutions.

13. **The International Energy Situation** will continue to pose complex problems through 1983. The viability of the OPEC cartel and its willingness to provide enough oil to meet rising demands of consuming countries, and at what price, will be the focus of these problems. Development of alternate energy sources will continue to be retarded by high costs and uncertain markets. The net result will be that the energy balance will tend to become even more delicate and sensitive to political and military incidents and crises. Particularly, the effectiveness of the Arab oil weapon is not likely to decline over this period.

14. **New Powers and Blocs** will continue to evolve. OPEC's domination of the non-communist world's energy situation is likely to inspire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small nations to control other important raw materials, such as bauxite and phosphates. Although most of these attempts will fail, efforts to form various types of producer associations by these developing countries already have had some political effects within many industrial consuming states as well as on international economic and political relationships. Whatever agreements are negotiated between producer and consumer countries concerning the supply and price of raw materials, the political and economic effects on the international economic system—including the connections of the communist states to that system—could be significant. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are becoming regional powers and are playing more substantial roles in international forums. Aside from these, several nations whose ties to the US have traditionally been close will display greater independence. This will be seen more prevalently in the field of economics, but may also affect certain US strategic interests. Such nations are Canada, Mexico, Panama, Australia, and the Philippines.

15. **The Developing Countries** will present other major problems to US policymakers. The nature and severity of these problems will hinge in part on foreign, especially developing world, perceptions of America's ability—and willingness—to aid its friends, to protect its interests and those of its allies and, to generally play a supportive role in areas beyond its borders. The developing countries will be especially concerned with US willingness to support transformations, in their favor, in the international economic and political system.

If the developing countries consider that the US and other rich industrial states are not sufficiently forthcoming in closing the gaps between the developed and less-developed worlds, they are likely to intensify their challenge to the existing international system. Domination by the developing countries of certain international forums will result in increased confrontation and could eventually incapacitate these forums as useful international organizations for the industrial states.

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16. **Social change** will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas stemming from increased expectations and a perception of the growing rather than narrowing economic gaps between developing countries (and classes within developing countries) and the more developed industrial world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, and in Latin America, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and possibly even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some authoritarian governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but they will face difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term.

17. **Terrorism** will continue to disturb the public order in both developing and advanced states. Terrorists will continue to threaten both US installations and officials abroad and US private enterprises and institutions. Foreign governments may well be involved, and terrorists may acquire increasingly sophisticated weapons.

18. **The acceleration of events** will be characteristic of the years ahead. This will come from improved communications and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence, posing further handicaps to successful negotiation. There will be a resulting tendency toward breakdowns of overloaded institutions, the attention spans of national decisionmakers will diminish, and a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships will develop. Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology, but the pace here will have substantial effects on the rate of sociological, industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be needed more quickly by US foreign policymakers.

19. **Interdependence** will become an increasingly important characteristic of the world of the future, most noticeably in economic matters. The following related key areas must be watched constantly: economic growth, population growth, energy supplies, raw materials and food production.

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PART II—THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. **The USSR** will remain our major intelligence target. Intelligence will be expected to provide analyses, assessments and precise data on Soviet military capabilities and intentions, economic activity, and efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological skills to improve the Soviet strategic posture in global affairs. We will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet internal politics and foreign policy intentions. While some data for these assessments will be available through open sources, the USSR will remain secretive and a very difficult intelligence target. One high priority task will be demonstrably accurate monitoring of US-USSR arms limitation agreements. In the military field, special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development applicable to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially alter the balance of power, including antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missiles, space satellites, and advanced technology systems. A new awareness on our part of the high burden of the Soviet defense effort raises important questions about the relative efficiency of, and structural differences between, the military and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy. A better understanding is needed of the process of West to East technology transfer, particularly the differential ability of these two sectors of the Soviet economy to absorb and proliferate this technology.

Because of the enormous consequences of misjudgment, US intelligence will be required to maintain the sharpest watch, not only on Soviet military capabilities, but on the foreign policy intentions of Soviet leaders, their relative priorities, and, most importantly, their willingness to run risks of confrontation in potential crisis areas. Particularly important elements in this larger estimate will be Soviet-US, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet-US relationships, followed by Soviet leverage and intentions in Western Europe and the Middle East. Anticipating makeup and attitudes of any new leadership policy consensus will be an important intelligence task, as will the identification of significant reform tendencies or trouble areas in the Soviet economy and society.

2. **China's** increasing power in Asia, the importance of Taiwan in US-Chinese relations, and the implications of any change in Sino-Soviet relations, all dictate that China will remain an important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to find out what we need to know. Our efforts in the short term ought to focus on stability and policies of the successor leadership and on Taiwan. In the longer term we should focus on growing Chinese strategic power including capabilities against the US itself and China's position relative to the Soviet Union and Asia. To obtain a better assessment of internal forces and factors of instability in China, information is needed on social, economic, and political development on a continuing basis.

3. **Western Europe** will continue to be an area of critical intelligence concern in view of US economic and security interests in the region and its importance to the overall relationship between the US and the USSR. The means adopted by Western European nations to cope with the increasingly serious economic and sociological problems confronting them, changes in their attitudes toward integration and Atlanticism, and the goals of local communist parties will be constant and major intelligence targets. Subsets of these targets will be Western Europe's internal political developments and foreign economic policies. Intelligence collection in Western Eur-

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ope will be, in great part, a matter of following open political, economic, and military activities, [redacted] cult areas—the region's communist parties, for example. The challenge will lie in providing useful assessments of such activities and likely future developments. [redacted] Greater attention must be given to the opportunities (and dilemmas) presented to the USSR by European political trends, particularly in southern Europe.

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4. **Eastern Europe** will be a constant target for collection and analysis in order to assess stability in an area where breakdowns in internal order or major divergences from Moscow could have profound political repercussions. The importance of economics will increase, both as a factor in internal stability and because of the political implications of a growing dependence on imports from the West as well as the USSR. During the five-year period, an important intelligence target in this area will be Yugoslavia, where a major shift in international alignment is possibile. Rumania's growing propensity to develop independent economic and political linkages to the West and to China is another trend to watch.

5. **Africa** will almost certainly continue to grow in importance as an intelligence collection and assessment target. The situation in this part of the world is likely to become more unstable, at least during the first part of the period under review, and, if the US Government's interest in the area remains high, it is likely that our intelligence effort will be intensified in order to serve US policymakers adequately.

6. **Proliferation Intelligence** must provide senior decisionmakers with a significantly better integrated understanding of foreign nuclear proliferation-related activities and their implications for US national security. The Intelligence Community must provide data on worldwide stocks and flows of plutonium, analyses of foreign nuclear explosive devices and weapon development programs coupled with multidisciplinary assessments of political, economic, and military intentions, and a continuous monitoring of foreign proliferation-related activities in order to provide advance warning of situations that might require US political or military action. Also, the Community should provide accurate assessments of the significance of observed or anticipated activities for regional stability and for US political or military security interests. Finally, the Community should assess foreign intentions concerning safeguards and the international transfer of nuclear technology and materials and, where applicable, verify compliance with related political agreements.

7. **Economic intelligence** will continue to grow in importance worldwide. The past few years of globally-shared inflation, recession, supply interruptions and material shortages have underscored the high degree of economic interdependence among countries and the pervasive impact this interdependence has on American economic interests. Intelligence has an important role to play in support of US policymakers and negotiators. To be of value, economic intelligence must provide timely explanations of the meaning and implications of internal and external economic developments and their political impact on major free world and communist nations. It must also provide analytical support on such issues as the maintenance of world monetary stability; the distribution of income between rich and poor countries; the role of multinational corporations; the problem of international debt and its impact on financial stability; technology transfer; and the problems of smoothing the fluctuations of the commodity markets. Countries of particular interest will be the Arab oil states; [redacted] major suppliers of food and raw materials; and nations where severe economic distress internally can create world problems (e.g., India). Defining the role of the Intelligence

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Community in meeting the needs of the government for foreign economic intelligence, allocating resources to serve competing requirements and consumers, and developing improved means of collection and analysis are among the most difficult and important tasks faced by intelligence during the next five years.

8. **Other Priorities.** Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of, and explain, new situations posing problems to American interests. Intelligence will be expected to identify, for example, the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in developing countries, so that the component elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated, or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts on our part to understand and communicate the differences among societies, cultures, and national "personalities." Intelligence will be called upon more often to penetrate terrorist groups to obtain intelligence on their capabilities and plans in order to provide the basis for appropriate counter and protective measures to abort attacks on US installations and officials as well as private enterprises and citizens abroad, and attacks on the personnel and installations of other nations friendly to the United States. Intelligence will also be required to assess the risk that some terrorist may acquire nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Other priorities include the need to continue to increase our knowledge of international narcotics trafficking, a policy issue that affects our relations with several key countries. Counterintelligence against the expanding presence of Soviet intelligence services in the US and abroad and their increased efforts to acquire penetrations within our society are topics of concern for intelligence.

The future will require a greater integration of many intelligence concerns which in the past could be handled separately. Political and social developments will be heavily influenced by economic and scientific changes. Situations in individual nations will be subject to major impact from regional developments and even from worldwide changes. Intelligence will also play a larger role in the international arena. Its conclusions, made available to other nations, allied or even adversary, will focus attention on latent difficulties, raise the level of understanding upon which more rational negotiations can be conducted, and surface possible long-term negative implications of apparent short-term positive gains. The increasing interdependence of intelligence problems will require more complex models for analysis to give full weight to the number of disciplines involved. For example, intelligence on the ability of the USSR to acquire and absorb Western technology will require a sophisticated interweaving of political, economic, military and psychological analysis. Thus, intelligence must extend its application of new analytic methods, must integrate wider varieties of specialties, and must look to a positive role in the international arena, in addition to its responsibilities to the constitutional components of our Government.

A few of the major problems which are likely to be the subject either of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be of priority intelligence interest are:

a. Critical regional confrontations (including some now dormant):

1) China/USSR

2) Arab/Israeli

3) North Korea/South Korea

4) Greece/Turkey

5) China/Taiwan

6) Pakistan/India

7) Indochina, Thailand and Maylasia

b. Rates of production, availability of supplies, consumption, pricing of raw materials and energy sources, and international commodity arrangements as a means to share the burdens of price fluctuations between producers and consumers of primary commodities;

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c. Nuclear proliferation, including the worldwide movement of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology (especially that relating to reprocessing and enrichment) and the effectiveness of safeguards;

d. Price and non-price restrictions on international trade;

e. The international payments mechanism and the coordination of national fiscal-monetary policies;

f. National policies with respect to military sales, receipt of foreign military and economic assistance, and foreign business activity and investment, including policies toward multinational corporations;

g. Arms limitation and crisis avoidance;

h. Jurisdiction and exploitation in the oceans and on sea beds; and

i. Destabilizing effects of over-population, under employment, competition for food and other resources.

Much of the information that intelligence analysts will need to discharge their responsibilities will have to be collected by techniques and sources—some simple, some awesomely sophisticated—easily jeopardized by public disclosure which compromises them and facilitates the development of countermeasures to frustrate them. Thus an essential aspect of the intelligence mission will be our ability to maintain the necessary secrecy and effectiveness of operations while satisfying legitimate public interest in their legality and propriety.

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PART III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

1. **The Planning Environment.** Servicing the ever-widening needs of US foreign policymakers and national defense leaders for intelligence information requires a continual effort to improve and expand the capabilities of the intelligence apparatus. Critical to the satisfaction of those needs are the quality of means, the expertise, and the alacrity of intelligence response.

In assisting the President to achieve a balanced national budget before 1980, the Intelligence Community will emphasize in its planning effort the attainment of better and broader intelligence capabilities at the lowest possible expense to the Government. This is a most formidable challenge at a time when costs continue to rise, especially in the continued development of unique technologies—the mainstay of the information collection system. US dependency on such technologies and their improvements will increase as the world becomes a smaller place and as each nation raises barriers against the intelligence "reach" of other powers. Technological advancement is accelerating among an increasing number of nations, enhancing the capability of each to counter or thwart intelligence collection initiatives by another. While the Intelligence Community continues to take advantage of US technological superiority today, the high proportions of intelligence budgets required annually to maintain this lead limit resource allocations in other areas. In addition to these concerns, new obstacles are rising which could limit the effectiveness of the US technical collection systems, e.g., increasing vulnerability of intelligence satellites to hostile initiatives and counter measures, a lessening in the number of US intelligence space vehicles, and less certainty of US opportunity to continue technical collection from bases in foreign territory.

Soviet and Chinese military capabilities and crisis monitoring continue as our major concerns, consuming about three-fourths of all national intelligence resources annually. New and emerging needs for intelligence relate increasingly to binational and multinational political relationships, international economic problems, and interdependent socio-political problems, terrorism, law of the sea problems, and the aspirations of less developed nations. Trends in these areas will add substantially to tasks which are now consuming the remainder of US intelligence resources.

Planning for improved capabilities in all areas of intelligence, for both the near and longer term, will center, therefore, on resource/capability tradeoffs and innovation in the application of current assets. The CFI and senior managers throughout the Community will face harder decisions entailing higher risks, particularly in those decisions which call for relatively expensive multiyear investment in collection technologies.

A special effort is being put forth now within the Intelligence Community Staff to search out and analyze the future in greater depth. As the reaction time for intelligence narrows and both the cost and development time of complex intelligence systems increase, the community must have an effective means of addressing the spectrum of conceivable alternative futures with their inherent challenges, opportunities, and uncertainties. The task at hand is to develop a long-range planning methodology that will serve

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effectively the intelligence program and budget development process.

2. **Guidelines for Planning.** The likelihood remains high that localized economic, social, political and military events will interact with the real or perceived power relationships of the major power blocs in ways which will engage priority US national interests. This presages a busier substantive arena for the Intelligence Community. The number of problems that require simultaneous handling increasingly tend to overload some existing mechanisms. Concurrently, there is a lessening of time available for the Community to recognize and alert policymakers to significant new developments. To meet these demands, intelligence planners and programmers must be ready to consider new ideas.

Collection

Fiscal constraints will continue to place greater emphasis upon program justification and corporate forms of management. Primary collection managers must place greater emphasis upon substantive planning and programming requirements and priorities in the justification of their program proposals. This situation demands that collection managers have a greater familiarity with each other's programs and proposals to assure that unwarranted duplication and inefficient redundancies are avoided. The *ad hoc* nature of past efforts in this area must be replaced by more sophisticated mechanisms designed to enhance more meaningful exchanges between collection managers, especially where major expenditures are involved.

There are several key problem areas which impact upon collection management:

- The paradox of continuing in a near-static budget environment to operate against high priority needs involving the Soviet Union and PRC, while at the same time expanding to more global capabilities associated primarily with political and economic intelligence needs, demands constant attention.

- The nature of the expanding requirements for intelligence suggests that increased attention be given to the organization and collection of overt and semi-overt materials. It is essential to know the degree to which these means can satisfy collection needs before more expensive technical assets are tasked. It is recognized that strategic clandestine collection operations must continue to be improved for they are often the only source of intelligence on certain critical targets, e.g., R&D on major weapon systems prior to testing. It may be that a reasonably small investment devoted to better organization and collection in this area can provide significant gains related to evolving needs.

- Technical collection systems, like other sources, must consider developments by the opposition. The USSR, for example, is increasingly using concealment and deception as a means of reducing the intelligence information collectible. In addition, new technical collection techniques will be required as, for example, higher frequencies are used by new weapon systems or as newer physical phenomena, e.g., lasers, are incorporated in weapon systems. It will be necessary to stay ahead of these and other activities by the Soviet Union and by other countries to ensure the essential flow of technical intelligence information. Such information is vital to an understanding of Soviet military and economic capabilities and to permit acceptable monitoring of arms limitation treaties.

- Finally, a viable balance between the main two elements of the intelligence process (collection and analysis) must be obtained. To that end, technical collection systems must be flexible, permitting selective options as to the kinds and amounts of information to be collected. This places greater importance on the system for establishing current and projected intelligence priorities against which needs for collection options and/or enhanced analysis and production can be weighed. The CFI has stated its readiness to support sound justifications by program managers for budgetary increases to achieve the kind of balance needed.

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Production

Paralleling the problem of processing a greater volume of raw data, increasing demands of another sort are being placed on the production function. Identifying consumer markets; determining their intelligence needs; and providing finished products rapidly, and in forms which increase their utility, will be the keys to meeting the expanding market for intelligence information.

Throughout the program period the intelligence market will continue to be dominated by traditional national security consumers; however, new Executive Branch consumers must be anticipated and planned for. Similarly, the Congress and the public must be taken into account. The *ad hoc* committees, councils, boards, and agencies which handle international, commercial and financial relations associated with foreign policy considerations will all want intelligence support. The recent investigations of the Intelligence Community by select committees of the Congress have had the effect of expanding the consumer market for national intelligence as the Legislative Branch demands more information on which to base its decisions. The extent of this "new" market for intelligence has yet to manifest itself completely, but as new issues in the international environment described in Parts I and II develop, increased demands for intelligence must also be anticipated.

Determining the nature and extent of existing and new intelligence markets will provide some insight and illumination into the question of what must be produced. The national security market will continue to demand finished intelligence on the military capabilities and intentions of the communist countries. With no lessening of interest in these traditional areas of intelligence concern, events in both the industrialized and less developed nations in the non-communist world will take on new significance as intelligence problems. These problems will be increasingly transnational and interdisciplinary in nature, complicating and sharpening needs in the analytic processes. Crisis monitoring will continue to be a key production problem; however, the previous politico-military nature of this function must be modified to enable the prediction of economic and scientific concerns as well. Indeed, energy, environmental, or food crises could impose the same crisis reporting load on intelligence resources as major political disorders.

Production managers must devise improved means for determining what their consumers need and how well those needs are being met. The decision to commit resources must be based on demonstrably important consumer needs. In the traditional areas of production—communist military capabilities and intentions—choices must be made concerning "how much is enough." New demands for national intelligence on economic issues, energy, and social change can only be given adequate production consideration if unnecessary duplication in the traditional areas is eliminated.

We will have increasing situations in which intelligence must be provided to friendly nations to serve as the basis for negotiation or monitoring of agreements reached or, equally important, in peacetime for combined military planning and exercises with our Allies in Europe and the Far East. We must also continue to intensify our efforts to downgrade, sanitize, and decontrol, where possible, compartmented products so that they may be more widely disseminated and used, particularly in support of our military forces and Allies.

National-Tactical Interface

An important problem area meriting close scrutiny over the program period will be the assurance of careful management of intelligence resources to achieve optimum benefit to national, departmental, and field intelligence consumers. Rising costs of collection systems create demands for closer control over all activities, avoidance of duplication and ensurance of full exploitation of approved systems capabilities.At the same time, care must be exercised to avoid jeopardizing the

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most important needs of one group of consumers in providing for marginal needs of others.

Current studies of US national reconnaissance vulnerabilities and related interest in exploitation of these assets for warfighting intelligence purposes tend to emphasize hardware approaches. Greater attention needs to be given to the impact of this trend in terms of global peacetime requirements as they relate to performance, costs, and the foreign policy implications of proposed directions. Cost-wise, in a period of fixed or decreasing intelligence investments, the tradeoff is one of increasing invulnerability versus increasing information gain capabilities; a dilemma of choosing between our capabilities to support war avoidance and crisis control and our capabilities to provide tactical intelligence from national systems at such time as our military forces may be committed. The viability of national intelligence systems as wartime assets must be carefully examined.

Additionally, the entire question as to the extent to which national assets constitute alternatives or substitutes for tactical assets, and vice versa, is at issue.

Finally, the resource management problem of the proper forum for central control, if such central control is to be exercised, and the role of the DCI in such a forum, remains at issue.

Manpower

The years ahead will almost certainly call for different organizational mixes of Community manpower as well as greater breadth of expertise in manpower skills. Organization heads and program managers will be required to formulate plans annually to:

- Train and familiarize personnel in new and better analytic methodologies to improve the balance of Community skills to meet the demands of a changing intelligence environment;
- Emphasize and accelerate training in foreign languages and cultures of nations that will be important targets in the 1979-1983 time frame;
- Provide intelligence officers with greater familiarity in matters of policy formulation, policy negotiation issues, the anticipation and identification of issues, and how to relate them to the need for intelligence collection and production;
- Ensure availability of technical and academic talents and expertise on subjects of importance to intelligence in the 1979-1983 time frame; and
- Reassess existing manpower commitments against future rather than past or even present requirements.

Research and Development

Research and development continue to grow in importance in the planning and management of US foreign intelligence. Along with R&D initiatives already underway, the Intelligence Research and Development Council should concentrate efforts on:

- Identification of opportunities and potential problems for intelligence management addressal throughout the next decade and beyond;
- Surfacing of topics and areas of research not included now in the Community R&D effort—topics that should be added to our plans against longer-term problem areas; and
- Insuring that increased investment in out-year R&D is done on the basis of demonstrated need and that common technology programs are reviewed to effect major cost avoidance savings wherever possible.

Information Handling

During the past decade, Intelligence Community members have developed and installed large automated data handling systems to store and retrieve intelligence materials in support of their own organizations and missions. For the

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future, much greater attention to the broader and longer range planning required to achieve effective capabilities in data automation and in telecommunications to serve the Intelligence Community and its customers as a totality is required. Uncoordinated individual systems will become seriously inadequate to support the increasingly complex, time-dominated and interdisciplinary work of intelligence production.

Programs of Community-wide planning for information handling must be pursued and should reflect the breadth of Community needs and concerns. We should achieve the maximum practicable commonality and interoperability in our computer and communication systems. Such planning should highlight the shared nature of the responsibility for the creation and maintenance of organized intelligence data bases to be accessed widely by remote users, particularly the operating forces. Additionally, planning must focus on our increasing dependence on communication satellites for intelligence reporting and dissemination. That dependence, coupled with the recognition of the present vulnerability of these assets, provides further compelling evidence of the need for comprehensive telecommunications user planning for the Intelligence Community as a companion piece to planning for Community overall information handling.

Before the detailed planning for Community-wide information handling can proceed, it is necessary to delineate the specific objectives which Community capabilities should achieve. Should there be a single intelligence data handling system, or are there legitimate requirements for a multiplicity of intra-intelligence Community systems? The Congress has already raised this kind of question with respect to CIA's SAFE and DIA's DIAOLS systems and their possible interrelations. In our appraisal of objectives, the nature and roles and missions of the separate organizations within the Intelligence Community will have an important bearing on the degree of commonality that may be achievable in automated information handling system planning.

A common flaw in planning for the design and use of large scale computer systems is to focus on technical capabilities of the hardware and to seriously underemphasize the role of the human who is to be the user and beneficiary of such a system. In addressing these problems, the focus is not on the automation of collection systems—which is well underway—but on improved automated support for all of those people who deal with substantive intelligence materials in all forms in order to evaluate, analyze, manipulate and organize data in all forms in the course of creating and using intelligence end products.

As an indispensable part of our total planning, we must make sure we understand the work processes and the support needs of our analysts in order to fit automated systems to them, rather than the reverse. Intelligence analysts should not be required to become computer programmers. Production managers must be more willing to permit analysts to be assigned for temporary periods of duty during which they will work directly with planners and designers of automated systems and will operate a number of analyst-support test beds that combine various types of computer hardware and software.

A further matter for inquiry is the role of analyst assistants—information specialists and specially trained technicians—who may be required in increasing numbers to relieve the substantive analysts of the need to master the computer and communications procedures needed for rapidly accessing remote data bases and information systems.

Within the next decade it is foreseeable that new capabilities will become available for analysts to have ready access to easy-to-use secure voice, and where appropriate to video, for analyst-to-analyst conversations. The key to resolving misunderstandings about data is not to rigidly standardize all data bases, but rather to provide analysts with the means for easy dialogue with one another. There are a number of important problems which are subsidiary parts of

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the process of planning for Community-wide information handling and telecommunications. Among those which deserve the most immediate attention are the following:

• *Intelligence Communications.* We need to establish a more formal and orderly mechanism for examining and projecting Intelligence Community telecommunications requirements—which are large and increasing—particularly in connection with the shared use of communications satellites.

• *Multi-Level Security.* Automated interfaces between intelligence data bases pose two problems for the security of compartmented information: security during transmission over the network and security for data stored in computers. Although research and development in the public and private sectors is currently devoted to this problem, it is not now possible to assure the absolute technical security of automated equipment. Senior managers and other intelligence policy-making officials must be prepared to work out pragmatic agreements concerning an acceptable degree of human and technical security to which interconnected automated systems will conform.

• *Computer Terminals for Analysts.* At present, Intelligence Community organizations design and procure terminals to serve their particular needs. From a Community standpoint, this limited focus can be costly, and the lack of terminal compatibility and interoperability will complicate interagency communications. The magnitude of this problem must be highlighted and further investigated; thereafter, Community management should reach common agreement looking toward acting in concert on the findings and recommendations resulting from such investigations.

• *Data Element Standardization.* Internetted Community-wide data base systems—such as COINS—cannot operate with the simplicity that analysts require unless major improvements are made in Community-wide data element standardization. One of the tasks inherent in overall information handling planning will involve determining the degree to which standardization of data bases, data elements, file structures, and information processing software is practicable and desirable for the Intelligence Community. Improvements in data element standardization are required, and a substantially heightened degree of cooperation by managers at all levels is called for to achieve this objective. It is likely that greater resources will have to be programmed to deal adequately with this problem.

• *Community Data Bases.* The COINS concept takes as axiomatic that certain intelligence files should be made widely available to Community analysts. The Community needs to reach new agreements as to which files shall be officially considered to be "Community" data bases, who is responsible for their content and continuing maintenance, and what standards of accuracy and timeliness are to be observed to improve their usability.

• *Planning Responsibilities.* Responsibility has been accepted at the Community level for sponsoring and producing medium- and long-range comprehensive plans on the subject of information handling. The year 1985 is an appropriate target date toward which this planning should be projected (as it has been in the development of an architecture for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System). To accomplish these major tasks, there must be unstinting cooperation among all members of the Community. In addition to the Intelligence Community Staff and appropriate DCI Committees, the NFIB, the Intelligence Research and Development Council, and consultants will be involved in order to provide guidance and carry on the detailed work of elaborating architecture and plans. The work will be subject to regular review at the highest levels, including the CFI.

Resource planning must make provision to fund external contracts in support of all these major planning undertakings.

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3. **Summary.** The Intelligence Community planning and resource management focus should be directed toward substantial achievement in:

- The need for a continuously sensitive national intelligence nervous system—one that will be instantly responsive to warnings, tipoffs, and conditions of opportunity;

- Continuing reappraisal of our intelligence products—their styling, utility, and degree of comprehensiveness with regard to an increased diversity of intelligence matter and consumer needs;

- Assurance that substantive consumer needs drive investment in our expensive technical collection systems;

- Development of intelligence operational systems for the future that will be less dependent on, or vulnerable to, foreign actions and countermeasures;

- Planning that is tuned to longer range concerns (15-20 years) and future demands.

- Concentrated efforts to develop a stronger relationship between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.

Above all, flexibility in allocating collection resources and in applying analytical resources must be enhanced. This must be accomplished within the context of greater intra-Community understanding and cooperation so that the total output of the Community is of the greatest possible value to the Nation.

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