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1. A Panamanian of any political acumen at all has to realize that his country must work with the US as long as the US controls the Canal and the Zone. There may be a lot of fundamental nationalist resentment at this fact and some of the Communist and far-left people would be willing to undertake the most drastic measures to change that interdependence. But any politician in his sober moments has to admit that the two countries have to find a modus vivendi. Therefore, I would not look for any sharp and basic change in Panama's attitude toward the US in the near future. It is true that Remon through his close ties with the US and his strong control of the country kept to a minimum the latent anti-Americanism so that relations have been better with the country under his regime than for a long time. This may deteriorate to a certain extent without his firm guiding hand.

2. The situation in the final analysis, of course, depends to a very large extent on the political solution which eventuates. As is the trouble with all strong-man regimes (even though Remon's was benevolent in general), they leave a political vacuum. There was no really organized opposition to him and naturally within his own party he was not building up someone else for his job. As a result there is bound to be a major struggle for power, probably behind the scenes.

3. Unless he shows unexpected strength--not so far apparent--President Guizado appears to lack the necessary personal qualifications to unite the country and keep it on the even keel of progress that Remon started it on. His past associations with former President Arnulfo Arias, chamelion-like political opportunist of Panama, will not weigh in his favor.

4. This means he may very well be overthrown, perhaps by a Guardia Nacional coup in which the armed force leaders would most likely enlist support of conservative elements that have backed Remon.

5. The question too is whether the Guardia Nacional people have sufficient personal prestige to hold the country without the use of naked force. Since the Guardia Nacional was really a creature of Remon's, neither Col. Bolivar Vallarino, commander, or

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Saturnino Flores, his assistant (and perhaps the stronger man), have had a chance to prove their leadership ability on a national scale. Neither have they naturally had a chance to attract much public attention or support.

6. The picture in general, then, looks quite confused. No man has arisen who can assume, as yet anyway, the mantle left by Remon. And yet perhaps there is a built-in demand in the popular thought today to continue the advances made in the brief period of Remon's regime and to avoid a return to the chaotic political situation before Remon assumed the presidency. Another factor complicating predictions is the emotionalism of Latin American politics. In the present vacuum-like situation, an explosion might take place but the positive effects of Remon's cautious progressive policy would seem to militate against it.

7. Panama is a country which lives pretty much to itself. That is, while geographically it is in Central America, yet it does not consider itself Central American. Neither is it truly South American, although carved out of Colombia, originally. Therefore, its internal troubles do not have as much repercussion in neighboring countries as, say, those of Guatemala. For the other Central American countries are bound closely together economically and spiritually by long historic tradition. And while the unsettled conditions in Panama may add slightly to already existing tensions in Central America, they will not have the same crucial effect they would have if the ties were closer. Panama does not, for example, belong to the Organization of Central American States, although invited for years by the other participants.

8. As for the general area, exclusive of Panama, turbulence is certain to mark Central America for some time to come. The inconclusiveness, unsureness of the Guatemalan regime, the rivalry between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, based on fundamental ideological grounds as well as personalities, the indecisiveness of the elections in Honduras and the conditions there make for uneasiness for some time to come.

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