Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

SECRET

18 January 1945

Transcribed for abd by cem
8 January 1953

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

References: a. The Director of O.S.S. memo to the President of 18 November 1944 (J.C.S. 1181)
b. J.I.C. 239/5

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

The Problem

1. To make comment and recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the proposal of General Donovan for the establishment of a post-war Central Intelligence Service (reference a), and alternate proposals by the Joint Intelligence Committee (reference b).

Discussion

2. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in addition to the study of references a and b and the preliminary Joint Intelligence Committee papers from which reference b was evolved, have discussed this subject at length with General Donovan, the Acting Director of O.S.S., Mr. Berle, representatives of the F.B.I., and the former wartime Directors of Naval and Military Intelligence.

3. It was the unanimous opinion of all officials concerned, that there is a great need for improvement in the organization and operation of the intelligence service of our government. Some form of a central coordinating authority is generally accepted as being essential to such improvement. On the other hand, the organization proposed by General Donovan is approved by none of those consulted, except the representatives of the O.S.S. In this connection, however, it should be said that General Donovan, in the course of his oral discussion, considerably modified the views stated in his paper, particularly as regards the proposal that "intelligence control should be returned to the President," that a central intelligence authority "reporting directly" to the President "should be established in the executive offices of the President." This change in the concept of the original paper was further reflected in an organization diagram subsequently furnished by the Acting Director of

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT only, for the use of DCI/HS. The record copy has been released to National Archives * under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM. Date 6/26/91 HRP 89-2
* Subject to DOD concurrence

HS/HC-81 Item 10

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

SECRET

O.S.S. This diagram would head up the central intelligence agency by an "Intelligence Directing Board, consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," with a "Director" immediately subordinate thereto.

4. The Joint Intelligence Committee paper (reference b) finds substantial objection to certain proposals of reference a and submits alternative proposals, which in its opinion, obviate these objections. The Joint Intelligence Committee paper represents a commendable effort toward the reconciliation of divergent views of its membership and was evolved only after lengthy discussions among the service and civilian members. It should be realized, however, that agreement on this J.I.C. paper was made possible, only be limiting it to the basic outline of the proposed organization and by avoiding any effort to meet more specifically the many difficult problems, which must be solved before this basic plan can be developed into an effective working organization.

5. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee considers that the Joint Intelligence Committee proposals are preferable to those of General Donovan and, subject to certain changes indicated later, believes that the organization and directive, as proposed by the Joint Intelligence Committee, offer the most promising approach to an eventual solution of the problem of a more effective intelligence service. A question of policy is involved, however, as to when the new organization should be set up. In the broader question of an over-all military reorganization, now under study by Admiral Richardson's committee, the policy was adopted of thorough study now, with a view to placing the approved plan in effect at a later date. It would seem that this principle should be extended, in a modified form, to the question of the intelligence organization.

6. We should be on guard against undertaking a too radical reorganization with the attendant disturbance of the present intelligence set-up, even though admittedly, it is far from perfect.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

On the other hand, it is highly desirable to agree now on the basic concept of a National Intelligence Authority, a Director of Intelligence, as the head of what will eventually be a Central Intelligence Agency, and on an Intelligence Advisory Board. The directive establishing these groups should prescribe as their first duty, the development of an organizational plan, based on the concept outlined in the balance of the directive. In this connection, it will be noted that initially the proposed Intelligence Advisory Board would have substantially the same membership as the present Joint Intelligence Committee.

7. It is recognized that in the development of a complete organizational plan, many difficult questions will arise which may eventually require decision at the highest level. Among these will probably be the degree of centralization, the responsibility for secret or clandestine intelligence, the future of the Office of Strategic Services and the position of the F.B.I. in the organization, particularly as regards its activities in the foreign field.

8. The following detailed comment concerning the directive proposed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Appendix) is submitted:

Para. 1) It is questionable that a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be a member of the National Intelligence Authority. Aside from the fact that the post-war position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is still not clear, the logical representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, who, under the proposed directive, would in fact be a member of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

On the other hand, it is important, from a practical point of view, that working deputies for the cabinet officer members be provided presumably at the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Chief of Staff level.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

There have been suggestions that the Attorney General be included in the National Intelligence Authority because of the F.B.I.'s interest. This is considered undesirable, or at least impracticable, because of his position as a law enforcement agency, — a connection from which the Intelligence Authority, in so far as possible should keep clear. The Director of the F.B.I. would be a member of the Advisory Board, under paragraph 3 of the directive.

Para. 2) The Director should have a considerable degree of permanence - and should be either a specially qualified, high type civilian or a retired military officer of appropriate background and experience. If the ends desired are to be accomplished, it is considered absolutely essential that the first director should be in a position to exercise impartial judgement in the many difficult questions of organization which will come before him.

After para. 3, it is proposed to insert a new paragraph, which provides that the groups mentioned in the first three paragraphs will submit organizational plans to the President, which, when approved, will implement the balance of the directive.

Para. 4 a) Synthesis and dissemination of intelligence is probably the most important function of the Central Intelligence Agency, and presents the most promising field for improvement over the present system.

Para. 4 b) The phrase "including the direct procurement of intelligence" is intended primarily to include secret (clandestine) intelligence.

Para. 6) With a view to emphasizing the importance of protecting certain methods and sources of obtaining information, the following should be added:

> "In the interpretation of this paragraph, the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Agency will be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods which due to their nature, have a direct and highly important bearing on military operations."

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

9. The changes proposed by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee in the letter to the President and the draft directive proposed by the Joint Intelligence Committee are indicated in the usual manner in the Enclosure and the Appendix.

RECOMMENDATION

10. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the Enclosure and the Appendix and forward them to the President, through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

The Memorandum of the Director of Strategic Services, dated 18 November 1944, on the establishment of a central intelligence service was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendation. The matter has received careful study and consideration.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize, as does the Director of Strategic Services, the desirability of (a) further coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security; (b) the unification of such activitiesof common concern as can be more efficiently conducted by a common agency; and (c) the synthesis of departmental intelligence on the strategic and national policy level. They consider that these three functions may well be more effectively carried on in a common intelligence agency, provided that suitable conditions of responsibility to the departments primarily concerned with national security are maintained. They believe, however, that the specific proposal to these ends made by the Director of Strategic Services in the Appendix to the subject Memorandum is open to serious objections--in that it would overcentralize the intelligence service, and place it at such a high level that it would control the operations of departmental intelligence agencies without responsibility, either individually or collectively, to the heads of the departments concerned. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend against the adoption of the draft directive of the Director of Strategic Services.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff append hereto an alternative draft which, they believe, retains the merits of the Director's proposals while obviating the objections thereto. They recommend approval and early issuance of the appended draft directive--with a view to setting up the National Intelligence Authority, the nucleus of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Intelligence Advisory Board, to form a group whose first duty will be to prepare and submit to you an organizational plan for eventually implementing the complete directive.

Enclosure

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

SECRET

APPENDIX

DRAFT

DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In order to provide for the development and coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security:

1. A National Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, each with an appropriate deputy, is hereby established and charged with responsibility for such over-all intelligence planning and development, and such inspection and coordination of all Federal Intelligence activities, as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security.

2. To assist it in that task the National Intelligence Authority shall establish a Central Intelligence Agency headed by a Director who shall be appointed or removed by the President on the recommendation of the National Intelligence Authority. The Director shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

3. The Director shall be advised by a Board consisting of the heads of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies having functions related to the national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

4. The first duty of the National Intelligence Authority, assisted by the Director of Intelligence and the Advisory Board, shall be to prepare and submit to the President for his approval an organizational plan for implementing this directive in accordance with the concept set forth in the following paragraphs.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

5. Subject to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency Shall:

a. Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intelligence relating to the national security and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.

b. Plan for the coordination of the activities of all intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to the national security, and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

c. Perform, for the benefit of departmental intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished by a common agency, including the direct procurement of intelligence.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.

6. The Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police or law-enforcement functions.

7. Subject to coordination by the National Intelligence Authority, the existing intelligence agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, synthesize, and disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein defined as that intelligence required by the several departments and independent agencies for the performance of their proper functions. Such departmental operating intelligence as designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely available to the Central Intelligence Agency for synthesis. As approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of the Departmental intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by by the Central Intelligence Agency

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

in connection with its planning function. In the interpretation of this paragraph, the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Agency will be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods which due to their nature, have a direct and highly important bearing on military operations.

8. The National Intelligence Authority shall have an independent budget upon which the Central Intelligence Agency shall be dependent for budgetary support. The National Intelligence Authority budget shall also be available for other intelligence activities as the National Intelligence Authority may direct. Within the limits of the funds made available to him, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities, and services. With the approval of the National Intelligence Authority, he may call upon departments and independent agencies to furnish such specialists as may be required for supervisory and functional positions in the Central Intelligence Agency, including the assignment of military and naval personnel.

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

SECRET (When Filled In)

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATIONS	SUBJECTS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
HQ	JSSC*	Organization		DATE:
	JIC**	Planning		18 Jan 45
	OSS	Legislation		
		Operations		
		Origins, Joint Strategic		CLASS. S
		Survey Committee, Intell		NO.:

IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)

Coordination

"Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee," Subject: Proposed Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service; 10 pp.

LOCATION: HS/HC-801 Item 22 & HS/HC-31 Item 10

ABSTRACT

In this report the Joint Strategic Survey Committee* (JSSC) reviewed the plans of General Donovan and the Joint Intelligence Committee**(JIC) on creating a Central Intelligence Service. The JSSC chose the proposal of JIC because they felt General Donovan's plan would put too much emphasis on centralization of the intelligence service. Included in the text is a letter to the President stating the flaws in General Donovan's plan and a draft which proposed new coordination of intelligence activities.

(Source document for HS-1, Chapter I, page 55.)

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090009-2