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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

S-6138/DE-3

28 AUG 1975

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

(S) I understand that the China NIO has proposed that a study be prepared for the NSC staff examining the possibility of a "Pro-Soviet Lean" by central and regional Chinese leaders. The study would be undertaken by a private contractor utilizing academic and Intelligence Community resources. I believe that the proposed subject is certainly one that needs to be examined.

(S) The proposed study, however, would address only one aspect of a larger and more complex problem. We need a broader look at how the Chinese leadership will sort itself out during the post-Mao transition period. An estimate, or preferably a series of estimates, could help identify the numerous difficulties that would face the Chinese leadership after the passing of Mao and assess the alternative solutions. Such an assessment, or assessments, could also analyze the possible effects of external forces on Peking's future domestic and foreign policies.

(S) Subjects addressed should include the prospects for ideological consensus and institutional stability in China, and the role of the military. Other areas of discussion would include how the Chinese might reconcile revolutionary ideology with economic aspirations, establish some kind of balance in their foreign relations, and how they might solve the succession question. In short, the proposed estimates would assist in identifying alternative prospects in the period ahead and in answering the following questions: Will China be severely weakened, politically unstable and highly vulnerable? Or will China be unified, stable, developing, and play an increasing role in the world? Or will China be troublesome in pursuit of revolutionary interests?

DIA review(s) completed.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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(S) Such estimates could also identify future milestones -- political, economic, and military -- that would indicate to us the direction in which China is heading. The series of estimates would also allow us to periodically review unfolding events in the PRC, measure them against our previous assessments, and thus make estimative "course corrections" for the policymakers.

(S) I recognize that this will be a major, and a highly complex, estimative undertaking. But I feel that our national-level decisionmakers would be well served by continuing in-depth evaluations of Chinese policy directions, and that the proposed series of estimates should be undertaken on a priority basis.

(U) I would appreciate your comments on this proposal. Should there be need for further clarification, or amplification of the concept, [redacted] of our Estimates Staff, telephone [redacted], can be of assistance to you or your staff.

DIA
25X1

Sincerely,

DANIEL O. GRAHAM
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

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