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NIO/W Contribution to the Watch Committee

Falklands: The British are in a strong political and military position to achieve a victory in the next week or ten days. Prospects are fading that Argentina will be able to avert military humiliation by attracting broad international support for an unconditional ceasefire. The junta probably regards the Falklands garrison as expendable. After its defeat or surrender, the junta almost certainly intends to continue air attacks at a reduced level on British ships and troops. The Argentines also will concentrate on obtaining an OAS condemnation of Britain and solid Latin American diplomatic, military and economic support for long-term resistance to British control of the islands.

An Argentine defeat will impel the junta to adopt an overtly hostile stance toward the US. It probably will withdraw its ambassador from Washington, and an eventual break in diplomatic relations cannot be ruled out.

Iran-Iraq: Saddam Hussein's decision to abandon Khorramshahr averted further heavy losses in personnel and equipment but at the cost of seriously weakening his domestic position. If the Iranians for the time being elect to refrain from invading Iraqi territory, they will at least intensify efforts to incite a Shia insurrection in southern Iraq. Khomeini will refuse to make peace as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, and the Iranians are likely to sharpen pressures on the Gulf states to terminate financial and logistical assistance to Iraq. These pressures and the growing prospect of the fall of the Baghdad regime will lead to even more urgent appeals from the Gulf states and Jordan for prompt US diplomatic intervention.

Chad-Libya: Qadhafi's response to Goukouni's appeal for renewed Libyan military involvement remains unknown, but Habre's advance toward N'Djamena and the precarious position of the Goukouni regime could force Libya's hand. A showdown in Chad could have wider repercussions than the last crisis because of closer collaboration between Libya and Ethiopia [redacted]

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