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2 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Situation Report on Korea--Comments by the Senior CIA Participant

25X1A [redacted] OPR)

Facts

The first interagency task force to produce a "national intelligence situation report" was set in motion on Thursday morning, 19 August by the Director of Central Intelligence. The task force, managed by

25X1A [redacted] (Vice Director for Production, DIA) issued eight "sitreps"--at:

0200 EDT	20 August	1200 EDT	24 August
1400 EDT	20 August	0900 EDT	25 August
2400 EDT	20 August	1000 EDT	26 August
0500 EDT	23 August	1200 EDT	27 August

Task force activity was suspended at noon, Friday, 27 August.

Task force members (and other interested parties) first assembled at the Pentagon's National Military Intelligence Center at about 1300 Thursday, 19 August. At 1500, DIA (as the DCI's "Executive Agent") chaired a free-wheeling organizational meeting of representatives from CIA, NSA, State/INR, and DIA--with observers from the IC Staff and from a number of DOD components. It was decided that the task force would commence a 24-hour operation without delay and, at Lt. General Wilson's instruction, prepare a "base-line" sitrep for distribution very early the following morning. At the meeting, which lasted a few hours, the INR representative announced that INR, short of qualified

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analysts, could not participate further in the exercise. Thereafter, INR had no role in the production or (to my knowledge) coordination of the sitreps. Nor did INR respond on the one occasion (on 27 August) when the task force made a specific request.

A major portion of the organizational session was devoted to varying degrees of assurance from high-level military officers--including General Wilson and Rear Admiral Robertson, DDI (NMIC)--that the task force would have a reasonably complete flow of information on Korea-related US military plans and operations. It was emphasized, however, that material on plans or "options" could not be placed in the sitreps.

Hour-to-hour management of the task force was in the hands of two alternating members of General [redacted] staff. Routinely, action at the assigned NMIC office picked up about four or five hours prior to publication--reviewing the mail, phone calls to parent agencies, preparation of drafts. Generally, the DIA specialist on Korea collaborated with his NSA counterpart on the military input, while the CIA specialist prepared political and international portions of the sitrep. (All this in contrast to the earlier assumption by DIA's task force managers that members would act mainly as funnels for drafts provided by parent organizations.) A paragraph or so on US military actions ongoing in the Korean area was put together by the DIA manager after conference with operational elements. Task force drafts were not much changed by higher military authority; nor was the required coordination of text with parent agencies any problem.

25X1A

Comments

Quality. The Korea sitreps are "fair to good." Allowing for the newness of the interagency process, the product reflects credit on the DIA managers. There are (to my knowledge) no important mistakes of fact or significant omissions in the eight reports. There is one "assessment," in the third sitrep, that the task force would like to buy back.

Process. The strong points of the operation:

1 - While only four or five specialists were made available to the task force, they were able to carry 95 percent

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of the production burden over the week. Each proved knowledgeable on Korea and capable of writing well. Mutual trust and easy teamwork prevailed within 36 hours of beginning operations.

2 - Support from parent agencies (DIA, NSA, CIA) and their respective task forces--each agency (and State) had one, at least until Saturday the 21st--appeared to be excellent. The CIA task force on Korea responded well to my request for a written contribution to the initial sitrep, and to my frequent phone calls for information. On occasion, I visited the CIA Ops Center to review material not readily available at the Pentagon, especially maps and photos. OCI analysts and NID editors responded to my frequent calls on an individual basis after the CIA task force was disbanded. [redacted]

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Now for the bad news:

1 - The military failed to provide the promised flow of background information on US plans and operations. If the DCI gave the sitrep action to DIA in order to complete this (often lacking) piece of the intelligence puzzle, it didn't work! Indeed, at the moment of maximum tension--at 1800 EDT, Friday the 20th--the DCI's personal effort to secure details of the tree-cutting operation exposed the J-3 area's clear unwillingness to cut the intelligence community into the action. Persistent effort by CIA's representative at J-3 did not change this situation through the week. It should be noted too that CIA and NSA task force members had no unescorted access to the hyperactive NMCC area through the entire week.

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2 - The operational information problem was compounded by the inability of the task force to secure the State Department task force's daily publication on Korean plans and activities (prepared perhaps in connection with WSAG discussions). The CIA task force received it. INR received it. The JCS recieved it. The task force managed to acquire one or two rather stale issuances.

3 - The flow of intelligence information for the task force was not managed well by DIA. Paper flow was sporadic; some pieces available to other agencies were totally absent or appeared late; non-coms in charge of the paper flow seemed generally unaware of task force needs, or even of its existence.

4 - The paper flow problem was part of a generally poor physical setup provided by DIA. Room and desk space were at a premium in the Pentagon basement area. Phones were inadequate at some points--e.g., only one gray line. Secretarial help and general clerical assistance were not always available. Some personnel handling Xerox and LDX work seemed indifferent to task force requests for speed.

5 - Maps, photos, and other graphics were sparse, totally inadequate to task force needs.

6 - Other "housekeeping" problems included the usual complaints of slow "badging" of task force personnel, our inability to enter the Pentagon at night without escort, lack of food and beverages over long night shifts, and parking problems. The same problems would probably be encountered at McLean. ??

7 - Finally, all task force members agree that there was no substantive need for sitreps after Monday morning, the 23rd; the task force should have been terminated at that time.

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Recommendations

The national intelligence sitrep system adds another to the long list of task forces which emerge in crisis situations. At the Pentagon last week, there was a DIA task group, a Crisis Action Team, the usual NMCC mechanisms--and our own task force. The competition for military information was lost by the National Intelligence Situation Report Task Force. Intelligence, in my view, will always lose to operational support in the Pentagon. Perhaps the DCI should review the idea of casting DIA as "Executive Agent" for future sitreps.

JCS unwillingness to provide information to intelligence operators in time of crisis is an old story. I despair of "solutions."

The new sitrep system adds another element of competition to the usual interagency struggle for area specialist personnel in time of crisis. In this case, two of the three CIA bodies provided the task force were not up to the mark on Korean affairs.

"National" intelligence sitreps could reasonably be expected to reflect awareness of all important aspects of a developing situation; the name certainly conveys such an impression. The interagency task force, lacking information on planned US military moves and lacking information (from State) on evolving US political strategies (e.g., our posture at upcoming Panmunjom sessions, results of private Chinese contacts), could not properly sharpen its focus on North Korean actions and statements in preparing certain of the sitreps. For a truly "national" intelligence product, for a report that takes account of the "real world," the customary DOD and State barriers would have to be lowered, at least for task force participants. 25X1A

[redacted]

CIA Representative on the
National Intelligence Sitrep Task Force

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CONFIDENTIAL

27 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence

25X1A

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT : The Korea Task Force of 19-20 August

Mission

1. With military alerts on both sides of the Korean DMZ following the murder of two American officers on 18 August, the Korea Task Force was given the general mission of concentrating the assets of the agency to be ready as needed. It was specifically admonished, however, not to write and disseminate a situation report under its own name--this being the responsibility of the National Sitrep Task Force in the Department of Defense.

2. The task force nevertheless prepared itself to provide written and oral briefings by the afternoon of 19 August. Each eight-hour shift produced an in-house situation report which was made available to the Operations Center senior duty officer, as background for CIA personnel assigned to the task force in the Department of Defense, and as a contribution to the National Intelligence Situation Report. These informal sitreps were also made available to a few agency personnel who requested briefings on developments in Korea.

3. This production helped exercise the analysts and established a record of events and nonevents. It also helped prepare task force officers to brief senior agency visitors on short or no notice.

4. The task force also coordinated some work on the Korea problem produced by other offices in the agency, and it maintained liaison communications with the Department of State task force and the Department of Defense task force.

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Core of the Task Force

5. The main core of the task force consisted of four three-shift rosters of personnel from OCI and OSR. The four rosters kept a round-the-clock watch on Korean military developments, Korean political developments, and on possible Soviet and Chinese reactions to Korea-related developments. It was necessary to find officers who knew the territory and have them assigned to the task force without seriously damaging the work of the contributing offices. In assembling the task force, an attempt was made to avoid excessive staffing while assuring that the force on hand would be adequate to work on a really serious crisis should one develop. The limited supply of Korean talent was stretched thin. When the shift chief on duty was well versed in Korean affairs, it was possible to use analysts with less background. From the outset, shift hours were set to permit each officer to remain in good health while working under heavy pressure through an extended period, if necessary. 25X1A

6. In addition to the four rosters from OCI and OSR, a three-shift roster was provided by [redacted] 25X1A The functions and purpose of [redacted] were not clear to other members of the task force, including experienced support personnel. A subsequent interview indicates [redacted] personnel who appeared also had a very vague idea of what their function should be, and they decided on their own initiative to make an Order of Battle map and to make available other military background information-- [redacted] The motivation of all concerned was good, and [redacted] good rapport developed. [redacted] did produce a good order of battle briefing board, which was badly needed by the task force early on. It remains unclear, however, whether the special talents [redacted] truly germane to the mission of the task force. It would appear that task force needs for military information could have been met by the OSR team alone. The role [redacted] needs further clarification. [redacted] statement of its activities with the task force is attached.)

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Support

7. The task force chief was most importantly assisted by his able branch secretary, who works well in flap situations. Both the senior duty officer provided by the Operations Center and the DDS&T psychologist assigned to observe crisis management in the Task Force Center were extremely

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valuable sources of advice for the task force. The support of such assistants makes a great deal of difference to the new task force chief, particularly during the first hours of the group's constitution and operation.

8. In addition to the round-the-clock teams, contributions from many offices in the DDI assisted the task force. The Intelligence Analysis Staff sent a small team with a variety of briefing boards showing North Korean order of battle and selected military positions. Task force analysts [redacted] own initiative, OER prepared a paper on North Korean sea and air transportation. Cartography worked long and hard on a variety of briefing aids, some which in the final event were not used by the task force but which are being held in case of future need.

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9. Round-the-clock liaison teams were staffed at State by [redacted] and in the NMIC by officers from OPR, IAS, and OSR. [redacted] In view of the competing demands for DDI people familiar with Korea to work on the agency task force and at the Department of Defense, the offer [redacted] to take care of the liaison staffing problem at the State policy task force was particularly welcome. The arrangement seemed to work very well.

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10. Cooperation from all agency offices was very good.

Facilities

11. The space provided by the Task Force Center was adequate for the work of the Korea Task Force, but it would not be adequate if a national intelligence task force should be constituted in the center. There would not be enough space to accommodate liaison officers sent from DIA, NSA and State.

12. The separate office provided the task force chief, which also served as a briefing room for senior agency officers, is extremely important for the effective functioning of the task force. In the confusion that inevitably attends the constitution of the new task force, the availability of a separate room allows the chief to determine his priorities, delegate tasks to others, and monitor the work

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with some protection from the constant tugs and pulls of the main work room.

Senior Officers Present

13. The interest shown by the DCI, the D/DCI/IC, and other senior CIA officers in the crisis occasioned special opportunities and problems for the task force. Visits by senior officers of course facilitated task force briefings for those same officers. These senior officers also stood ready to assist in the task force's work, manned telephones during the critical period, and helped acquire information not readily available from the Department of Defense.

14. The presence of senior officers sometimes in large numbers can occasionally distract analysts engaged in digesting reports and preparing written and oral briefings. To provide orderly briefings in an appropriate atmosphere, briefing facilities were maintained in the separate room. The Deputy Division Chief of EAPD/OCI assisted the shift chief by keeping himself available to work with the visitors and to see that they were briefed as appropriate.

15. Had the cutting of the tree at Panmunjom been followed by really serious developments, the presence of the large number of agency officers not directly engaged in the task force work or being supported by it would have made it difficult for the task force to do its work.

Coordination Problems

16. As perceived from the vantage point of the Korea Task Force, activity by the National Sitrep Task Force at the NMIC began rather slowly. The agency liaison representative suspected that the NSTF would have difficulty meeting its deadlines in the early hours of 20 August and issued a call for help. The evening shift of the Korea Task Force sent its own in-house situation report to the liaison officer who made it available for the use of the NSTF, and much of it was incorporated into the first National Intelligence Situation Report published. A draft of this Sitrep was received by the Korea Task Force and coordination was effected. The following afternoon additional material was sent to the agency

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representative at the NSTF. The leadership of that task force, however, apparently then forgot that national intelligence by definition must be coordinated, and no draft of the second NISR was provided to the Korea Task Force for coordination purposes. This lapse suggests that some further education is needed in the community on the need for coordination in the production of national intelligence.

17. It should also be noted that, although the Department of State sent a representative to the organizational meeting of the NSTF, it did not maintain a liaison officer at that task force. As far as we know, State did not participate in that task force's work or coordinate its product.

18. As is frequently the case when US operations become an important part of the picture, the intelligence arm of the government was often kept in the dark about US operational intentions. Requests even from highest levels of the agency could not shake loose important operational traffic--some of which was sent by the Department of Defense to State but not to CIA.

19. A request was made for Department of Defense photographs of the 18 August incident for the DCI, but the photos were never provided. Interagency parochialism clearly continues to impede the national intelligence effort.

Recommendations

20. The crowd-control problem in the task force center requires the retention of the separate room now provided for the task force chief's use and for briefing.

21. It would be extremely helpful to station a receptionist at the entrance of the Task Force Center to screen out bystanders, badge appropriate visitors, and direct telephone calls to the officers working in the task force.

22. The task force chief needs an intercom facility to talk to officers in the main workroom without being forced to leave his desk.

23. All OCI personnel should be given a tour of the Task Force Center and briefed on the real functions, formal and informal, of intelligence task forces as they are organized in the Washington community today.

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24. Personnel who might be sent as liaison officers to task forces in the DOD and State should be identified and given tours of those facilities now. They should also be briefed on the opportunities and problems encountered by liaison officers who have served with past task forces.

Enclosure: a/s [redacted] 25X1A

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

25X1A

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - Chief, EAPD/OCI

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