



-8 JUN 82 20 53z
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**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

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ACTION NODS-00 COPY 20 OF 20 COPIES

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
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Z 002022Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2370
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01701

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E.O. 12865: ROS 1,3,4 6/8/82 (GROVE, BRANDON) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SECOND MEETING WITH BEGIN --JUNE 8, 1982

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET EVENING JUNE 8 WITH PM BEGIN AT KNESSET FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE AND A HALF HOURS, NOT COUNTING PERIOD WHEN HE ABSENTED HIMSELF FOR KNESSET ACTION ON NO CONFIDENCE MOTION. BEGIN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FONMIN SHAMIR AND SAM LEWIS AND HOWELL JOINED ME.

3. BEGIN OPENED MEETING WITH REQUEST THAT I TAKE MESSAGE (WHICH IS SUBJECT OF SEPTTEL) TO PRESIDENT ASSAD. DURING HIS ABSENCE FOR KNESSET DEBATE, HE DRAFTED TEXT (WHICH HE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED) AND CABLE TO DAMASCUS WAS SENT WHILE MEETING CONTINUED.

4. FOLLOWING BEGIN'S RETURN, I TOLD HIM THAT I SAW NO
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WY THAT I COULD PICK UP IMMEDIATELY AND GO TO DAMASCUS WITHOUT MAKING CERTAIN THAT ASSAD WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE ME AND, IN ANY CASE, IT WAS MORE EFFICIENT, IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THE MESSAGE, TO TRANSMIT IT TO AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI FOR PRESENTATION TO SYRIAN CHANNEL WHO COULD ASSURE ASSAD'S EARLY RECEIPT. I SAID THAT IT WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY BE TRANSMITTED TO BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. BEGIN AGREED TO THIS PROCEDURE AS WELL AS MY INTENTION TO OFFER TO GO TO DAMASCUS SOONEST FOR DISCUSSIONS. IN COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION BEGIN CONFIRMED THAT HIS COMMITMENT TO END MILITARY OPERATIONS INCLUDED THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST THE PLO IF ASSAD IS PREPARED TO MOVE PLO ELEMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN BEKAA BACK A FURTHER 25 KILOMETERS, SO THAT THEY WILL BE 40 KILOMETERS FROM ISRAEL.

3. ONCE DCM BROWN DEPARTED TO SEND MESSAGE TO DAMASCUS, I TOLD BEGIN I WOULD LIKE TO TALK IN MORE DETAIL ABOUT ENDING THE HOSTILITIES, BEGINNING WITH THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE CITY OF BEIRUT, WHERE I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE LACK OF GAS, ELECTRICITY AND OTHER BASIC NEEDS. IS IT NECESSARY, I ASKED, TO CONTINUE TO BOMB BEIRUT IN LIGHT OF BEGIN'S POINT THAT THE IDF HAD ACHIEVED ITS OBJECTIVES, EXCEPT WITH REGARD TO PLO ARTILLERY IN THE SOUTHERN BEKAA? BEGIN WAS INITIALLY QUITE DEFENSIVE, ARGUING THAT HE HAD NOT BOMBED BEIRUT BUT ONLY THE PLO HEADQUARTERS WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE ARAFAT WAS KILLED. SAYING THAT I RECOGNIZED HIS STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, I THEREFORE ASKED HIM TO CONSIDER ENDING AIR STRIKES THAT, WHATEVER THEIR TARGET, INEVITABLY CAUSED HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN A CITY OF 2 MILLION. AT THIS POINT, BEGIN WAS INTERRUPTED BY A PHONE CALL FROM SHARON TO REPORT THAT A STIFF FIGHT

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IS UNDER WAY IN SIDON WHERE THERE ARE 1000-PLO EFFECTIVES AND 30 TANKS. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED AN END TO THE BOMBING RAIDS AGAINST BEIRUT WITH SHARON AND ASSURED ME THAT MY REQUEST WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT "WITH SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING."

6. BEGIN THEN RETURNED TO OUR CONVERSATION OF JUNE 7, PREFACING HIS REMARKS WITH THE COMMENT THAT THEY REFLECTED INTENSIVE CABINET DISCUSSIONS THE PREVIOUS NIGHT BUT REPRESENT ONLY ISRAELI "THOUGHTS" REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE IDF MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON. HE LISTED THREE POSSIBLE OPTIONS IN DESCENDING ORDER OF ISRAELI PREFERENCE:

-- A U.S. FORCE WHICH WOULD BE IMMUNE TO PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL WITH A SIGNED AGREEMENT REGARDING THE PROHIBITION OF PLO ENTRY INTO THE 40 KILOMETER AREA OF OPERATIONS;

-- AN MFO ALONG THE LINES OF THAT IN THE SINAI, WITH A DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND OTHER APPARATUS BASED ON A SIGNED AGREEMENT.

-- "LAST AND LEAST POSITIVE", AN ENLARGED UNIFIL WITH A CLEAR AGREEMENT ON PREVENTING ANY PLO PRESENCE. BEGIN SAID UNIFIL HAD BEEN "USEFUL" BUT PERFORMANCE VARIED GREATLY AMONG NATIONAL CONTINGENTS.

BEGIN AGAIN STRESSED THAT THERE MUST BE A CLEAR AGREEMENT ON TERMS OF REFERENCE UNDER ANY OF THESE OPTIONS AND I REMINDED HIM THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST ALSO HAVE ISRAELI COMMITMENTS AND AGREEMENTS.

7. RETURNING TO HIS COMMENTS DURING OUR FIRST MEETING ABOUT THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A RETURN TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT, BEGIN SOFTENED HIS APPROACH

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SOMENHAT. HE INSISTED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT,

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