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Supplementary material provided to the DCI for the NSPG

--Talking points on strategic options
--C/NIC memo on Soviet responses to M-X
--Tables and charts on strategic forces from NIO/SP

3 August 1981

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The originals on the attached were pulled and used for the 17 August NSC meeting in California.

12 AUG 1981

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A Comment on Cruise Missile Options

Cruise missiles pose a very difficult problem for Soviet defenses. They are so small and fly at so low an altitude that only advanced terminal SAM defenses have much of a prospect for intercepting them -- and advanced SAMs are costly and won't be deployed widely for a long time.

Our ALCM buy, I believe, uses the full capacity of B-52s and B-1s (except for reloads). However, we have unexploited options for putting many cruise missiles on surface ships and submarines. These ships and subs would have other primary missions than nuclear delivery. Nonetheless, the Soviets would be faced with a much larger number of mobile sea platforms capable of nuclear weapons delivery against the Soviet Union than they now face.

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