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THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS AND SIMILAR DEVICES BY FEDERAL AGENCIES

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 4 AND 5, 1974

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only to personal security testing; whereas, within the Military Departments it is necessary to disburse examiners to strategic locations throughout the world. Additionally, the Military Departments have a criminal investigative mission often requiring the timely use of the polygraph procedure. This Department's response of May 9, 1974, stated that the Army has 32 polygraph examiners whose duties primarily pertain to the administering of polygraph examinations.

See answer to question No. 7 as regards number of instruments owned by the Department of the Army.

Question 4. Would you explain to the subcommittee the original justification for the acquisitions by the Army, Air Force, and NSA of their psychological stress evaluators—3, 1, and 2, respectively—as well as the nonuse by the Army and NSA and the high-incidence use by the Air Force?

Answer. The psychological stress evaluators were procured by the DOD components for test and evaluation purposes involving both mechanical and operational aspects. The device was used by NSA and Army as well as the Air Force for test purposes. The apparent difference in figures reported may stem from the fact that the Army and NSA laboratory tests were not considered as being usage of the equipment. These acquisitions and tests were conducted in accordance with the provisions of DOD directive 4210.48.

Question 5. What plans exist for future use of these psychological stress evaluators by any DOD major component wishing to perform research with these instruments?

Answer. (*a*) The two psychological stress evaluators provided to the Department of the Air Force are to be used as part of a DOD-approved research project relating to physical security and intrusion detection systems.

(*b*) The question as to the use or disposition of other psychological stress evaluators in the Department of the Army is the subject of a detailed inquiry initiated by the Office of the Secretary of the Army. When the results of this inquiry are available, they will be provided to the committee.

Question 6. What is the explanation for the relatively large number of polygraphs owned by the Air Force, compared to the number of tests administered? Why are there so many certified examiners although none has this as a primary duty?

Answer. (*a*) The Air Force initial acquisition of the instruments was based on the disbursement to each regional operating location so that examiners did not have to carry an instrument with them at all times. In 1970, the Air Force changed its system to require individuals to carry their own individually assigned instruments. Excess instruments were maintained as backups or for repair parts for the ones in use in the field. Plans to eliminate excess instruments in the Air Force inventory are being effected at this time.

(*b*) Up until July 12, 1974 the Air Force had assigned polygraph duties as an additional duty which permitted timely administration of examinations. Due to program revisions in the DOD directive, the Air Force is planning to go strictly to primary duty polygraph examiners and will be assigning primary duties in that area resulting in a future cut of over 50 percent of the present AFOSI DOD-certified examiners as well as a 50- to 75-percent cut in the equipment.

Question 7. Reconcile the number of Army-owned polygraphs reported to GAO in November 1973—285—32 at Fort Gordon School; 51 at military intelligence units; 58 at USACIDC; and 144 inoperable in the Army Materiel Command inventory—with your June 5, 1974, submission showing a total of 416 Army-owned polygraphs, of which 140 are inoperable and 276 presumably operable.

Answer. The report to GAO in November 1973 did not include the inoperable polygraphs stockpiled by the Department of the Army while the June 5, 1974 report to your committee reported all polygraphs owned by the Department of the Army. The difference of 144 inoperable polygraphs according to the November 1973 report versus the 140 inoperable in the most recent report was based on the repair of four instruments. The Army has disposed of 74 polygraph instruments that were procured prior to 1960 and efforts are underway to reduce the stockpile even further. The majority of the Army polygraph instruments were procured prior to the committee hearings of 1964. As the instrumentation has not changed appreciably since 1960, it was considered feasible from an economical standpoint to retain instrumentation that cost $740 when replacement of a like item is presently procured at approximately $1,450.

Question 8. Has the Department of the Navy ordered or procured a psychological stress evaluator recently from Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc.? If yes, what efforts were made by the Navy to satisfy its stated requirement by acquiring one of the units dismantled by the Army or declared surplus by NSA, to avoid unnecessary expenditures of Federal funds?

Answer. (*a*) A Navy component in Florida did purchase one psychological stress evaluator; however, this acquisition was not in compliance with appropriate DOD directives or naval instructions. The Navy Department has no plans for utilizing that psychological stress evaluator. The psychological stress evaluator involved has been disposed of to the Defense Property Disposal Office, Jacksonville, Fla., for appropriate disposal.

(*b*) The psychological stress evaluator located in the Navy Patuxent River Center is being tested for possible use with respect to combat and flight-related stress situations. It is not used for investigative case purposes.

Question 9. What are your views on the advantages that could accrue if responsibility for polygraph examiner training were to be assigned to one agency, consolidated at one or two locations, and standardized as to length, course content, and examining techniques?

Answer. It is our view that advantages are presently being accrued from the consolidation of polygraph examiner training within the Department of Defense and that the training facilities of the Department of the Army Military Police School, a designated DOD facility for this purpose, have been utilized by students from other executive departments and agencies. As you may know, by far the largest amount of polygraph examinations are conducted by two Government agencies: The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. We do not believe, at this time, that additional consolidation of training facilities is indicated. Within the military departments all certified examiners are trained at a single facility using standardized techniques as well as standardized courses as to content and duration.

Mr. MOORHEAD. The subcommittee would now like to hear from Mr. Harold L. Brownman, Deputy Director for Management and Services, Central Intelligence Agency.

We are pleased to have you with us, Mr. Brownman, and you heard by the vote taken that we will accede to your request about the executive session.

STATEMENT OF HAROLD L. BROWNMAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes; I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MOORHEAD. The direct testimony will be in open session; it will be only the question and answer period when we go into executive session.

Mr. Brownman, could you summarize your statement? We are running out of time.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Before I go to the formal statement, I would like to take the opportunity to set the record straight, if I may.

On the 17th of April we informed this committee, in response to its questionnaire, that the CIA did not possess and did not use psychological stress evaluators. We assumed by that phrase that you were referring to the general field of voice analysis. To keep the record straight, on the 24th of May 1974 this agency procured a Mark II model voice analyzer from Mr. Frederick Fuller at a cost of $3,500. We are looking at this device prior to a firm decision as to whether to engage in any serious research.

Mr. MOORHEAD. It is good to have the record clear.

Mr. BROWNMAN. If you would like to speed this up, I can summarize it.

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Mr. MOORHEAD. If you want to make a particular point, go ahead.

Mr. BROWNMAN. There are a couple of particular points. And let me make them very rapidly.

Mr. MOORHEAD. And without objection the entire statement will be made part of the record.

Mr. BROWNMAN. That will be excellent, sir.

This is a bar chart [showing chart] which shows a bit of history over the last 10 years. It is interesting to note—let's take the year 1964 as a specific example—security disapprovals for staff employment numbered 152 in that year. Of the 152, 134 were either triggered by or totally substantiated by the use of polygraph. And that pattern is throughout the period of time. This is one of the types of research study that we continue to perform in the Agency both directly in the agency and with a contractor, to evaluate our results and see if we see any trends. And I believe the key point that this chart shows is that the polygraph is a very useful adjunct to the security screening process for staff employment at the CIA.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, could that chart be made a part of the record? I think it would be very useful to our study.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Can you do that?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Without objection it will be done.

Mr. BROWNMAN. We will provide that for you.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you.

[The bar chart referred to follows:]



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Mr. BROWNMAN. As a key point, and being sensitive to some of the questions I heard previously, the issue about polygraph records, after the completion of the polygraph examination, these are maintained apart from the regular security records. These are not included in the security file of the individual, pass or fail, they are separate and isolated records.

They are not now, nor are they contemplated to be, put into any computer storage device. Polygraph information is released only to appropriate Agency officials when it has a direct bearing on a decision to be made by that official. Polygraph acquired information can only be released outside the Agency after a determination has been made, which is approved by the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that such a release is necessary in the interest of national security.

Another key item that I would like to stress is that in the framing of the questions for the polygraph examination we do take cognizance of age of the individual, sex, as well as some of the background material.

Before a person undergoes a polygraph examination his consent is obtained in writing. If an applicant asks, he is told if the polygraph examination is being monitored or recorded. Occasionally we will record or monitor a polygraph examination.

The individual, prior to being polygraphed, has been interviewed by the Office of Personnel, the Offices of Medical Services, and a major portion of the background investigation has been completed.

As a matter of fact, the background investigation could lead to specific questions on the polygraph examination where clarity or confirmation is required.

The examiner's instructions have been prepared in sensitive question areas to insure that persons undergoing polygraph interrogation are not subjected to questioning about irrelevant, unwarranted, or trivial matters. The interview is not used to probe a person's thoughts about conduct which has no security implications—for example, religious beliefs, practices, and affiliations; opinions regarding racial matters, political activities, or organizational affiliations of a nonsubversive nature—and since last night, I might add, one wonders what that means—and personal views concerning proposed or existing legislation.

I feel it appropriate here to make three basic points. The polygraph examiner makes no recommendation as to the security suitability or status of the person tested. The polygraph report is evaluated as but one element of the total investigative record. At no time is security action taken solely on the basis of the polygraph chart.

About the research program, we have a very aggressive research program. I think I might read this.

Moving from procedures into the research area, you recall that one of this committee's primary recommendations was that a program of research on polygraph be undertaken to investigate the validity and reliability of the procedure. We are conducting such a program.

Reliability, defined as consistency of interpretation of polygraph charts, has been looked at by means of examiner agreement studies. Agreement figures from our studies are comparable to figures from similar studies of other groups interpreting data germane to their specialties.

On the other hand, validity—or the degree to which polygraph charts measure what they purport to measure—has been a more difficult issue to evaluate. Satisfactory independent criteria for validating real life conditions are scarce, and the differences in polygraph subject attitudes between real life and laboratory conditions have prevented much headway through laboratory experiments. The data so far available have not been disappointing, but they are limited, and we still lack an appropriate scientific base for any conclusions.

We also investigated validity in the sense of utility—the degree to which the polygraph program does what it is intended to do. As you can see from this chart, in each year since 1964 a significant number of security disapprovals of applicants who were processed to the point of the polygraph interview has been due to the polygraph portion of our security processing.

Alternative sensors have been evaluated—for example, a more sophisticated electrodermal sensor; impedance rather than mechanical sensors; electromyography; electroencephalography; microvibration; electro-oculography; pulse-wave velocity; and cardiotachometry. We can generally state that while many of these alternatives show some promise, they have not shown sufficient practical promise to cause us to modify our present instrumentation. This does not close the door on new parameter research. This is a continuing process.

We have shifted to a different model of polygraph instrument than the one we were using at the time of the last hearing, and we feel it is mechanically superior. We are continuing to evaluate new instrumentation as it becomes commercially available, and we are continuing our own search for improved instrumentation.

We have developed a computer system which was utilized heavily in the previously mentioned studies of reliability and of mathematical modeling of examiner performance. We were also, naturally, interested in determining the computer system's practical utility as an additional parameter to actual polygraph operations. Utilizing all that was learned during the evolution of our experimental arrangement, we have full specifications for constructing a dedicated computer system to assist the examiner in chart interpretation. We are now in the process of evaluating the cost-effectiveness of the dedicated computer system.

Preliminary efforts have been undertaken in the field of countermeasures to polygraphy. We have plans for a long-range systematic program studying the possibilities in this field, but of course results are not yet available on these studies.

Voice analysis has drawn our attention. We have been interested in this field for several years, and have been monitoring research in this area conducted by other institutions. We do not believe that research to date has been exhaustive or conclusive and, accordingly, we are planning our own analysis of its possibilities. This project is still in its developmental state.

That, I believe, would conclude my statement.

[Mr. Brownman's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAROLD L. BROWNMAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the Central Intelligence Agency is happy to be of all possible assistance to the committee and its staff concerning the CIA's use of the polygraph. This opening statement has been prepared with that thought in mind. However, we believe that an executive session of the committee for the ensuing question period will permit us to more freely respond since we may have to touch upon classified matters in satisfaction of your questions. May we request, Mr. Chairman, that the question and answer period of this hearing be held in executive session.

The CIA is familiar with the recommendations of this committee which were made in its 10th report, including the recommendation that an interagency committee be established to study problems posed by the Federal Government's use of polygraphs and to work out solutions to those problems.

In the years 1964 to the present, the CIA has attempted to comply with your recommendations and with the spirit of the recommendations made by the interagency committee.

The CIA, as an agency with an intelligence mission, uses the polygraph in its applicant security screening program. All positions in the Agency are sensitive within the criteria established in Executive Order 10450. All full-time, permanent employees of the Agency possess top-secret clearances.

The Director of Central Intelligence has put out a directive governing our use of the polygraph. Under the terms of this directive, a copy of which has been provided the committee, the Director of Security is responsible for the supervision and training of polygraph examiners and for the conduct of the polygraph program of the CIA. He is charged by the DCI with the responsibility of insuring that the highest standards of operating procedures and equipment capability are established.

The polygraph is used in the CIA as an aid to investigation for determining the security eligibility of persons for employment by or assignment to the Agency; staff-like access to sensitive Agency installations; utilization in operational situations; or continued access to classified information where implications of a security nature or investigative information require clarifying security interviews.

The polygraph is not used on official or administrative matters involving possible malfeasance, or for the sole purpose of determining violations of the criminal laws of any country.

If a polygraph examination involved a question pertaining to the violation of a criminal law, the individual would be informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to consult with legal counsel or other professional assistance prior to the examination. Notification of such rights would be formally recorded.

Each applicant for employment is notified, at the time he is given application forms, of the intent to use a polygraph examination in the course of his employment processing. A copy of this form has been provided to this committee.

He is told, before testing, the general content of all questions which he will be asked. The questions, since they are couched in broad terms, are discussed carefully with the applicant and the examiner works with the applicant to tailor the question to his/her age, sex, and background. All the testing procedures are explained.

Before a person undergoes a polygraph examination, his consent is obtained in writing.

If an applicant asks, he is told if the polygraph examination is being monitored or recorded.

Before an applicant is polygraphed, he has been interviewed by representatives of the Office of Personnel and Office of Medical Services. A security field investigation has also been initiated. Guidance from the Office of Personnel and the medical staff is routinely provided to the Office of Security if any information has been developed as a result of their screening procedures that might preclude the advisability of conducting a polygraph interview.

The Director of Security is responsible for establishment of adequate safeguards designed to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy.

All questions must have specific relevance to the person being polygraphed, and to the purpose of that particular test.

Examiner's instructions have been prepared in sensitive question areas to insure that persons undergoing polygraph interrogation are not subjected to questioning about irrelevant, unwarranted, or trivial matters. The interview is not used to probe a person's thoughts about conduct which has no security implications; for example, religious beliefs, practices, and affiliations; opinions regarding racial matters; political activities or organizational affiliations of a nonsubversive nature; and personal views concerning proposed or existing legislation.

The Director of Security maintains separate files for information obtained during polygraph examinations. By separate we mean separate from security files as well as separate from personnel files and, of course, we do not put any polygraph derived information on computers or in computer data banks. Polygraph information is released only to appropriate Agency officials when it has a direct bearing on a decision to be made by that official.

Polygraphed acquired information can only be released outside the Agency after a determination has been made, which is approved by the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that such a release is necessary in the interest of national security.

I feel it would be appropriate here to make three basic points:

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In conclusion, it should be made clear that we feel this committee, in looking into polygraph procedures, has performed a very useful function. It has stimulated much-needed research by our Agency and has made us take a careful look at our procedures. And now, Mr. Chairman, may we request executive session for the question-and-answer period?

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, D.C.

APPLICANT INFORMATION SHEET No. 1

To all persons applying for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency:

Your signature to this paper is the first step in applying for employment or consultant status with the Central Intelligence Agency. No application may proceed beyond this first step if the applicant is not in agreement with the conditions stated below:

General considerations

1. The National Security Act (50 USC 403), which created the Central Intelligence Agency as of September 18, 1947, places upon the Agency the responsibility:

(*a*) "To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

(*b*) "To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(*c*) "To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government * * *;

(*d*) "To perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(*e*) "To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The special character of this national responsibility requires the Agency to maintain special employment criteria which may be different from the employment standards of other Government departments and agencies. It follows that the investigation of applicants, which is prerequisite to their employment, is a time-consuming process. It includes, in addition to loyalty and security checks, an evaluation as to competence, physical and emotional fitness, and a determination that a suitable position exists.

2. This comprehensive review may result in a determination that an applicant is not to be offered employment. Frequently, such determination would not be the result of any single event or element in the applicant's personal background or qualifications but would reflect the composite results of the several evaluations involved. In any event, determinations by the Agency are conclusive and final, and no statement of specific reasons is made to the applicant.

3. It should be understood by each applicant that appointments are extremely competitive and that not everyone who is investigated or considered is finally employed. Employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is not a right upon which an applicant can insist. Any offer of employment is subject to full security clearance and does not constitute a commitment of employment on the Agency's part. Applicants must realize that a substantial portion of those who apply are not offered employment even though only a few are rejected for security reasons.

Statement of understanding and agreement

I have read, understand, and agree to the foregoing General Considerations. I have also seen and read Applicant Information Sheet No. 2.

(Signature of Applicant)

APPLICANT INFORMATION SHEET No. 2

1. In accordance with its special national responsibilities, the Central Intelligence Agency is obliged to judge carefully the suitability of each person selected for employment in the Agency. To assist in this determination, an extensive investigation, which includes a polygraph interview, is conducted with regard to the loyalty, background, and character of applicants under consideration for employment with the Agency. This investigation includes, but is not limited to, inquiries concerning:

(*a*) Professional competence;

(*b*) Any behavior, activities or associations which tend to show that the individual is of questionable character, discretion, integrity or trustworthiness;

(*c*) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omission of material facts;

(*d*) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug use or abuse, or sexual perversion;

(*e*) Physical fitness;

(*f*) An adjudication of insanity, serious mental illness, neurological disorders, or emotional instability;

(*g*) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security;

(*h*) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition;

(*i*) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means;

(*j*) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means;

(*k*) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means;

(*l*) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulation; and

(*m*) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency's standards require strict interpretation of the above and other relevant factors in considering applicants for employment. In the event an applicant is in doubt as to whether anything in his background may disqualify him, he is at liberty to describe the matter in writing, place it in an envelope bearing only his name and marked "Confidential Disclosure" and forward it with his application.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Thank you, Mr. Brownman.

The subcommittee will now go into executive session.

I will ask our guests to leave us.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee went into executive session.]

[NOTE.—The CIA, after reviewing this testimony, agreed to publication, with certain deletions.]

Mr. MOORHEAD. Will you introduce the others?

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TOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL; SALVATORE CIANCI, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; PAUL RICHTER, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES; AND CHARLES PHALEN, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES

Mr. BROWNMAN. There is Mr. Charles Phalen of the Office of Security. And Mr. Paul Richter of the Office of Security, who is liaison with Dr. Cianci from the Office of Research and Development. This is George Cary, Legislative Counsel.

Mr. MOORHEAD. What level of classification is this? Maybe you won't know that until after we have finished.

Mr. BROWNMAN. I presume it will be secret. If we get into a problem, we will flag it; but I doubt it.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Is there anything, Mr. Brownman, that you would like to tell us, now that we have gone into executive session, that you didn't want to put in your public statement?

Mr. BROWNMAN. No, sir, I don't think so. I think the public statement is pretty complete. What we have avoided in the public statement, except for the one chart, is numbers which are essentially related to the size of the Agency, and items of that sort. There may be budgetary numbers that you would like. And instead of volunteering all those numbers, we might respond to them selectively. We avoided cost figures in the public statement.

Mr. MOORHEAD. I was curious about your statement on page 3, that if the applicant asks, he is told that he is, has been monitored or recorded. If you go that far for an applicant, why not tell applicants even though they don't ask that they are being recorded?

Mr. PHALEN. The reason for this is to not unnecessarily upset an applicant or unnecessarily bring this into his consciousness at the time of the interview. It is not an effort to keep it away from them. In the case of most of them, this doesn't cross their minds. They are not conscious and curious about it, and we try not to interject any other element as far as their feelings are concerned. Certainly we have no intent to conceal it.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Of the tests that you give the applicants, is there a difference between a secretary, a researcher and someone who will be engaged in covert operations?

Mr. PHALEN. Yes, sir. A covert operations test is tailored to that particular individual and the covert operation that he will go into. There is no set format for that type of test. For applicants there is a basic set format.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Does the polygraph give you any clue as to whether an applicant who is being considered for covert operations is of suitable personality and character for that type of assignment?

Mr. PHALEN. The polygraph interview in its entirety, that is, the eliciting, the testing, the physiological reactions, his own reactions, his oral reactions, the observations by the examiner both before and after the test. Yes. Absolutely. But not just the polygraph charts themselves.

the total number of applicants rejected. And the green part is the one where the polygraph helped you to make a decision to reject him.

Does the white part of the chart mean that the person was subjected to polygraph and passed with flying colors, but you still didn't trust him?

Mr. PHALEN. It can be any mix that you set up. Primarily the white portion represents people when our own internal indices check; the national agencies (which would include the FBI); or our own investigation has brought up the disqualifying information. There could be, as you move on and polygraph this person, there could be some of this disqualifying information that we would be aware of, it could be supplemented and enhanced and highlighted by the polygraph information. So that if I am answering your question, if this is responsive to what you are asking, the polygraph portion, that green portion, is either solely material which has never come to our awareness before, that has come to our awareness for the first time during the polygraph, or second, there are hints or indications in these other sources that we have called upon which are then brought out by the polygraph, and the polygraph-acquired information again becomes the predominant reason for the disqualification.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Could there be outside that green section people who were polygraphed and passed the polygraph test but were still rejected?

Mr. PHALEN. Absolutely.

Mr. MOORHEAD. So the chart doesn't tell us too much really about that; it merely tells us that a certain number took the polygraph test and were not accepted.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact, the chart is not intended to show the infallibility of the polygraph.

Mr. MOORHEAD. I realize that. You might very well have rejected or passed somebody that you shouldn't have.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOORHEAD. I am concerned about this—I would like to get a little explanation about this computer system.

What do you put in the computer? What is your objective? I am talking about page 6 of your testimony.

Mr. CIANCI. In this instance, sir, the computer is not used in the classical sense. This was used for data analysis only. And on the basis of various analytical programs, and experimental ones that we developed, we attempted to classify the physiological responses. That is the only material that goes into the computer. In fact, this computer doesn't exist. The experimental portion was handled at a contractor facility. We do not have an internal dedicated computer system for categorizing, classifying polygraph charts. The nature of the output of that system, should we pursue this further and move in that direction, would be, the computer would print an output stating the level of stress for any given epoch on the polygraph chart. And that level of stress really translates back to historic data with this kind of signal, with this kind of physical characteristic.

Examiners in the past assigned a stress classification to it with such and such a probability. And that is all it is. It is just simply numbers. The analog traces are digitalized and then converted into a probability statement about stress.

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Mr. BROWNMAN. If I may add to that, Mr. Chairman, perhaps you are familiar with the technique in the medical field where people look at EKG wave forms, digitalize them, and put them in a computer, and categorize certain unique characteristics of wave forms as a certain type of heart disease or heart affliction. This is an extension or an adaptation of this technique, but related to the output of a polygraph device.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Then for an applicant who is either accepted or rejected, could you get his polygraph record out of the computer?

Mr. BROWNMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MOORHEAD. It is not tied to that?

Mr. BROWNMAN. No, sir. We will not store, nor do we ever intend to in terms of our intended thinking, polygraph data which the applicant related in any computer system.

Mr. PHALEN. That is why we use the word "dedicated computer" in our presentation, that is the sole purpose of this computer. But it doesn't exist at this point. I want to stress that.

Mr. MOORHEAD. But how do you protect yourselves from John Jones, who applies and is rejected and comes back 5 years later and applies again?

Do you just run the test all over again, or do you have a record to pull out on John Jones?

Mr. PHALEN. We maintain a polygraph file, as we said, separate from the security file and separate from the personnel file in a special vault area solely for polygraph files. So that we would have a record of that man for a reasonable period of time.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Cornish?

Mr. CORNISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brownman, do I understand that every single member of the staff of the CIA has undergone this initial polygraph examination?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Except for the Presidential appointees. And in that case I guess it only refers right now to General Walters, since Mr. Colby, the director, had been polygraphed previously in his other assignments.

Mr. CORNISH. Do you make periodic polygraph tests on employees after the initial one?

Mr. PHALEN. We have a reinvestigation program which is cyclical, and it is based as closely as we can make it on a 5-year cycle. In the course of that 5-year cycle we send out another questionnaire to the individual and ask him to update his data. We also conduct a field investigation updating what we have in our security files. When all this is put together there is a determination whether or not this is something that would require a clarifying interview.

Now, this clarifying interview could be just a straight interview, just asking him, or it could be that we might think that a polygraph would be helpful, and also the individual occasionally thinks that a polygraph might be helpful, particularly where the information comes from an area where we can't reach by our investigative processes.

For example, some overseas areas where people do spend much of their lives.

This is getting to your question. We polygraph, I would say, no more than one to five people a year under that arrangement. So my short answer to your question is, we do not polygraph people as part of our reinvestigation program, that is, periodically. It is only at the time that something comes up in the course of our reinvestigation which we feel requires clarification, or it would be helpful if we could clarify it. The number is almost minimal.

And second, I think we should stress that it is completely voluntary. We do have people who have said, I do not wish to take a reinvestigation polygraph. We have accepted this. We have asked them why. And they are all still employed, and there is no record of this in their personnel files or in their security files.

Mr. CORNISH. That is an interesting observation you made there, an interesting point, on people, after taking an initial one, when it comes up for a security check again, they would prefer not to do it. You asked them why, you say?

Mr. PHALEN. That is right.

Mr. CORNISH. What is the reason generally given?

Mr. PHALEN. One of the reasons is—and it fits many of them—is that their career has been outstanding, and their life is relatively an open book. And, of course, in our relatively closed society of the intelligence community it is quite a bit of an open book. And on that basis they would prefer not to go through it. Of course, some of this is a hangover from questions that have been asked in the past which were a little too broad. Frankly, our earlier approaches to screening might have been a little too broad, and evoked responses in rather personal areas which we don't go into any more.

And this possibly is a feeling from that earlier time.

We have refined our questions down—and I can go into some examples there if we wish where we do not do that any more—this would be an example, that a person says he would rather not go through it. Occasionally they have touched on their own personal philosophy, the integrity of themselves. They would prefer not to subject themselves to this.

Mr. CORNISH. So actually it sort of divides itself into two categories. One is, look, I have got a proven record here; and second, there are certain things that I don't want to be probed too deeply on. Would that be a fair statement as to their reasons for rather not having polygraph tests?

Mr. PHALEN. Yes.

Mr. CORNISH. You stated that the only two people that you didn't polygraph or that aren't required the polygraph are the two Presidential appointees.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes.

Mr. CORNISH. So we have a case, once again, where all the Indians are required to march into the tepee but not the chiefs. Is that correct?

Mr. PHALEN. That is not an unusual situation.

Mr. CORNISH. Here are actually the important people in the agency; and yet they don't have to undergo the polygraph.

Mr. BROWNMAN. In our case right now the Director of Central Intelligence has been polygraphed.

Mr. CORNISH. But if he had not been, he would not have been required to go through this?

Mr. BROWNMAN. That is right.

Mr. CORNISH. Do you find any contradiction in that at all, or see any contradiction?

Mr. BROWNMAN. No, sir.

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Mr. CORNISH. You don't?

Mr. PHALEN. We feel there would be if you cut down a few levels and began to pick up Deputy Directors, yes. But I think at that level it is reasonable.

Mr. CORNISH. I am interested in why you don't see any contradiction in that. Here are the two top people in the Agency, and they don't have to undergo a polygraph screen.

Mr. BROWNMAN. But these are gentlemen who have undergone other things that the Indians haven't undergone.

For example, they have been subjected to Senate confirmation, and the investigative process related to that. And so I think it is just a different process to perhaps get into the same building. But Presidential appointees have undergone investigative activities out of the White House, the Senate hearings, the confirmation of the entire Senate. This puts them in a vastly different category than the rest of the people in the agency.

Mr. CORNISH. So this would cover what, the Director and the Deputy Director?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CORNISH. The Deputy Director is generally the Director's alter ego, isn't he?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CORNISH. I can't help but draw certain comparisons between the situation in Germany where one of the closest aides of the German Prime Minister turned out to be a no-goodnik, shall we say? And yet—well, it is conceivable that this could happen here, couldn't it?

Mr. BROWNMAN. It certainly is. There is a small but finite probability, yes, sir.

Mr. CORNISH. That is the contradiction I see in the thing.

Let me ask you this. You mentioned that when you have females being given the initial employment polygraph examination that a policy is not in effect that there will always be someone monitoring those?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Right.

Did I state that correctly?

Mr. PHALEN. In the first place, we have somebody monitoring on a roving basis all the time. We have a man whose only job is—he is a supervisor, he is a man that has been with us about 20 years—his job is to sit there and rove through the spectrum, in other words, as a control, to make sure that there is nothing going on that we are not aware of.

Mr. CORNISH. He is a monitor?

Mr. PHALEN. That is right. That is monitoring.

Now, as far as recording, in other words, actually taking it—that is what I think you are addressing yourself to.

Mr. CORNISH. But it is always done in the case of females; certain care is given to female applicants in this regard, am I correct?

Mr. PHALEN. Yes.

Mr. CORNISH. When did this policy start?

Mr. PHALEN. It has been in effect since we started testing females, I would say, years ago.

Mr. CORNISH. The reason I am bringing this up, this wasn't brought on by the testimony of former Congressman Gallagher before the subcommittee in which he related the experience of a young female applicant for a job at NSA, was it? Do you recall that?

Mr. PHALEN. I recall generally the case, yes.

Mr. CORNISH. But it is not as a result of that?

Mr. PHALEN. No.

If you want to get into the female category—would you like to develop that a bit, as far as our reaction to testing females.

Mr. RICHTER. Before we go on, let me break in and indicate something a bit here. I am not quite sure what has happened in this recent conversation. But we don't routinely record females; we did for a while. And I know when you were with the shop the last time through it was standard. That is not the case now. And I just mentioned that to you, it didn't seem critical, but I am surprised to see that cropping up now.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Is that part of the reaction to women's lib?

Mr. RICHTER. You mean the recording or the cessation of recording? At any rate, neither of them has been a reaction to women's lib. turns out that this was no particular reason to have done so. We originally went into that for protection in case there were complaints from young females about having been mistreated or insulted or frightened during the interview. And they just didn't complain.

Mr. CORNISH. That was brought out in the testimony, yesterday—and I know you were here, because I saw you—that some of the abuses that are frequently mentioned are in relation to the examination of females.

Mr. RICHTER. That left me kind of confused, too. I don't know what the basis was for that statement. Was it Mr. Backster, or who was it?

Mr. PHILLIPS. It was in the Senate hearing.

Mr. CORNISH. It also stems from some of my own investigations of the polygraph.

Mr. PHALEN. This is what we did, feeling the same way and following it at the last hearings. We had a woman of mature years, a charming woman who was in the process of raising three of her own teenaged girls at the time, and she talked to every female that was examined by us for a period of something like 4 years, she talked to a 2,000 of them, every single one—I will throw this one qualifier, under 25, every female under 25. And we finally stopped this, because in the course of that time there was never a single person examined, female, that complained to her or brought up a problem as far as her test was concerned. That was the only reason she was there, was to talk to each one of these and to draw them out—and she could, she was very good at this—to draw them out and try to identify for us and isolate for us such things as, should we have female examiners.

We also have done spot checks on people who have left the tests. There have been some 2,000. We have asked them the question, among others, would they rather have a male examiner or female examiner or what have you. The percentage of females that have asked for a female examiner is infinitesimal. The percentage of females that say they would prefer a male examiner is preponderant. This doesn't mean we have closed the doors as far as a female examiner, we still are looking for one. But the reason we haven't, our examiners have to be flexible, they have to be both overt and covert, they are both domestic and overseas, they serve both here and overseas, on a TDY basis and

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on a permanent basis. We haven't found a woman that was flexible enough to adopt this life. But we are searching. But I think we have gone into what troubled us, and we haven't any isolated problem.

Mr. CORNISH. One final question.

I don't know, Mr. Brownman, whether you were in the room when I was questioning the witnesses from Defense and State and FBI.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Just at the tail end.

Mr. CORNISH. But anyway, I was trying to reconcile something in my own mind there. In any case, these three agencies, I think you will admit, handle all very highly classified material, very sensitive material, and much of it related to national security. And yet they don't see the need for preemployment polygraphs. I think in the case of one witness there were only 10 people screened by the polygraph. And they have a special defense intelligence agency function which may have some relation to your agency, I am not sure.

But in any case, those were the only ones. Everybody else, regardless of what they were doing, working on atomic weapons, or in the most sensitive political intelligence coming through the political officers of the embassy, et cetera, they are not subjected to these employment screening examinations. I understand that the NSA personnel are and your personnel are. And I am asking, why is it necessary for your people and NSA people to go through this process, but not Defense, State, and the FBI?

Mr. PHALEN. I think what we are reaching for there is staff-like access. It is not the level of clearance or the amount of information they are getting or the sensitive information, because we don't, for example, polygraph our contractors, who do get all the information that is necessary for them to carry out their contract, which is [deleted] top secret information.

The dividing line comes when a person gets into an environment where he has what we called staff-like access, where he mixes with our covert component. We can't divide up our building so that you can't intermingle. And you do go from place to place. You are accepted—we are trying to get it so that everybody is even and you are accepted and we know that the security levels are even across the board. If we began to pick and choose—and we thought of this—a question of equity which you raised earlier comes through. We did it one time for all our communications people; we used to test them every time they went out and every time they came back. They began to feel, and I think rightly so, that there was a little bit of an imbalance coming up here. And we could apply this to some of our other covert operations.

So it is the staff-like access where everybody can mingle together, that's the test. And it is not the level of information or the sensitive information or the clearance by the agency, that is not part of it. But that is our philosophy.

Mr. CORNISH. I would say just as a postscript that many of these officials in Defense, State, and the FBI would be vulnerable to the same type of thing that your people would be, certainly, in the way of blackmail and control and what have you.

Thank you.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Just three very brief areas of questions, Mr. Chairman.

Do you share any of the results of the polygraphs of your employees with other agencies?

Mr. BROWNMAN. No, sir.

Mr. PHILLIPS. There is no interagency transfer?

Mr. BROWNMAN. We cannot transfer.

Mr. PHALEN. We can't, until the DCI approves it. This is a normal process. Release would have to go to the DCI for his signature. It is conceivable that if there was a national security issue or something very critical it might not, but otherwise it would have to go through that very formal process.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Has it happened before?

Mr. PHALEN. I would guess six times in the last 4 years.

Mr. PHILLIPS. To get an idea of the scope of your operation, how many full-time operators, polygraph operators, do you have?

Mr. PHALEN. [Deleted.]

Mr. PHILLIPS. Where are they trained?

Mr. PHALEN. They are trained internally. And that is one of the reasons Mr. Richter is here. He is the man who personally trains them, and we try for an internal one-on-one situation.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Because it is a unique kind of situation?

What types of instrument do you use—or have you found more effective, to put it that way?

Mr. PHALEN. We have all Stoelting Deceptographs.

Mr. PHILLIPS. I referred earlier in a question to Mr. Gentile of the State Department as to the polygraph tests that were administered by CIA on ACDA employees—you are shaking your head.

Mr. BROWNMAN. I think that is a slight inaccuracy.

Mr. PHILLIPS. This would have been 2 or 3 years ago.

Mr. BROWNMAN. We may have lent them an operator and equipment, and they supervised the testing of the individual. We did not. This is just like lending somebody your car. It was our operator and our equipment, and they took them and they supervised them and they managed the operation. The CIA did not.

Mr. PHILLIPS. They supervised the framing of questions and all that?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir. And the evaluation process.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Is this a common occurrence? Do you do this for other agencies on request?

Mr. PHALEN. Only State Department.

Mr. PHILLIPS. I was wondering if you had been asked to do anything like this in connection with the Watergate investigation.

Mr. PHALEN. No.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Have you ever come across a situation where an employee in his preemployment screening has passed his polygraph tests and then you later discovered that he was less than reliable—in other words, is it possible for a pathological liar or a potential double agent to beat the test?

Mr. PHALEN. Yes; it is possible for a normal human being, yes.

Mr. PHILLIPS. What percentage, can you estimate based on your experience how often that occurs?

Mr. PHALEN. The only way we know how common it is, is by eventually finding out that there was something wrong. But what the rest of

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it is, I don't know. But as far as our finding out subsequently that something is wrong, it is almost infinitesimal, it would be below 1 percent, much lower than that, very unusual. But the rest of it is unknown.

Mr. MOORHEAD. We will have to adjourn now. It occurs to me that there was nothing very classified that came out.

Mr. PHALEN. We didn't know what questions you were going to ask.

Mr. MOORHEAD. I realize that. But if we can clear it——

Mr. BROWNMAN. I think we would like to review the transcript and then clear it.

Mr. MOORHEAD. On that basis the subcommittee will adjourn until next Tuesday, when we will commence the telephone monitoring phase of these hearings.

Thank you for your cooperation, gentlemen.

[Questions submitted to the CIA and the replies thereto follow:]

QUESTIONS FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Question 1. What is the nature of research by CIA into the subject of polygraph testing and have inquiries been made to DOD to ensure that there is no duplication of that department's research effort?

Answer. The CIA's polygraph research effort was comprised of an internal data collection program and an external experimental program. The internal program's goals were: (a) to develop a technology to objectively measure and classify the polygraph signals and (b) to assess the utility, reliability and validity of the polygraph to the Agency in its security practices for employment screening. The external program examined: (a) new sensors; (b) alternate modes of question presentation and/or subject response; and (c) various analytic techniques for chart interpretation. The external studies also addressed the issues of reliability and validity.

The external research effort was coordinated with DOD through attendance at meetings of the Joint Services Group established by the DOD to monitor research. Though the data base of the internal research program was not shared with the DOD members, they were kept apprised of technical developments and problems.

Question 2. What are the results of the research already performed, and what research is currently under way or planned for early performance?

Answer. Though Agency sponsorship of the external research effort was often classified, the work itself was not and the bulk of it has been placed in the public domain through reports in professional and scientific journals. The decision to publish or not was left to the principal investigators who conducted the studies. By and large, the studies demonstrated that: (a) there is a rational and scientific basis for polygraph; (b) the polygraph is an effective detector of stress (though clearly not infallible); and (c) while several new sensors showed promise, none was sufficiently so to warrant changes.

The results of the internal research program are based on data pertaining to Agency operations and they therefore have not been disseminated to DOD elements generally. NSA has been briefed on the internal program.

The current research effort will examine techniques to identify attempted countermeasures. This program was only recently undertaken and there are no results thus far.

Question 3. Are there any peculiar training requirements for CIA polygraph examiners that require an in-house training program, separate from those of the FBI or the Army?

Answer. This question must be answered in three parts.

(A) There are no peculiar training requirements that require an in-house training program separate from those of the FBI or the Army when training is considered to be limited to familiarization with the mechanical aspects of instrumentation, instrument operation and chart interpretation.

(B) For our needs, the training of an individual must be integrated into a closely supervised, carefully progressive on-the-job program before a determination can be made that he is qualified. We can only do this in-house.

(C) There are also peculiar training requirements which indicate the advisability of a CIA in-house training program when the full scope of application of the polygraph program in CIA is considered. CIA polygraph officers are also intelligence officers and they are required to support the clandestine foreign intelligence operations of the Agency by testing foreign agent assets. This concept is worked into the training program, from the very outset of training, as an integral part of the procedure, interview formats, test construction, and recommended procedures for the varied situations involved in agent testing are assembled from training materials and charts derived from actual agent interviews. Ethnic and cultural considerations are woven into the training program from its inception so that CIA examiners are offered a totality of preparation for all ranges of possible work experience. Further, CIA polygraph officers are provided courses in intelligence trade craft, operational procedures, and counterintelligence activities. It has been CIA experience that non-CIA polygraph training has not served to satisfy the overall needs of the CIA polygraph program.

Question 4. Are individuals who undergo polygraph tests told of the results of those tests and of the conclusions of the examiner?

Answer. No.

Question 5. Why is the individual undergoing the polygraph test told, *only if he inquires*, whether or not the examination is being monitored or recorded?

Answer. The polygraph interview situation itself serves as a disturbing stimulus to many people and the additional apprehension which may accompany the knowledge that they are being recorded or monitored is counter productive to the efforts of the polygraph examiner to put the individual at ease. For this reason only, the information is not volunteered by the polygraph examiner to each individual. The individual is told truthfully whether or not the interview is being monitored or recorded whenever the question is asked.

Following discussions with the Subcommittee on this issue, the Agency has initiated a procedure whereby each applicant will be informed in writing prior to polygraph interview that the polygraph test may be monitored and recorded for purposes of accuracy. We plan on including a statement to this effect in the polygraph agreement which is provided to each applicant before the test. A copy of the modified polygraph agreement is attached. This proposal has now been presented to our Office of General Counsel for coordination.

Question 6. In fiscal year 1974 has information from or the results of CIA-administered polygraph tests been made known to other Federal agencies or offices in the Executive Branch? Under what circumstances?

Answer. CIA releases information derived from polygraph tests only on request of federal employers. In fiscal year 1974, CIA disseminated information resulting from CIA polygraph tests in 7 cases, in each case, the individual involved was employed or assigned in a civilian or military capacity to a federal department or agency involved in sensitive intelligence affairs or requiring sensitive information in the national interest. Authorization to release this information was obtained in each case from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Subsequent to the authorization, information was passed verbally through established security channels for investigative lead processing only. The receiving department or agency was then to conduct its own independent investigation to substantiate the lead provided by CIA.

Question 7. Is it a requirement, prior to an individual being given a polygraph test, that he be *examined* by a physician and by a psychiatrist or psychologist? Are such examinations more than an interview?

Answer. This question must be answered in two parts.

(A) The procedure followed by CIA in processing an applicant for employment has been structured so that physical examinations and psychiatric screenings are performed prior to the polygraph interview.

(B) The examinations are more than interviews. The examinations are good physical examinations which assist in the determination whether or not the applicant is physically fit for that category of duty for which he is contemplated. Applicants are also psychiatrically screened. Where a mental problem is indicated, a full-fledged evaluation is made.

Question 8. Would you recommend such prerequisite examinations be adopted Government-wide, by all agencies administering polygraph tests?

Answer. Although the CIA orders its processing so that all candidates for employment are first given medical examinations and screened psychiatrically and believes this is a sound procedure, the CIA refrains from commenting on procedures of other government agencies in administering polygraph tests and from recommending a course of action to be adopted government wide.

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Question 9. To what extent are full and free discussions by CIA personnel with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board inhibited by the fact that neither the members of that board nor its Executive Secretary nor any of the Board's employees must take and pass a polygraph test as a condition of appointment or employment?

Answer. Full and free discussions by CIA personnel with the PFIAB are not in any way inhibited by the fact that associated personnel are not polygraphed as a condition of employment or appointment.

Question. 10. Why is it necessary for CIA to use polygraphs for pre-employment screening when the State and Defense Departments and the FBI do not believe it is necessary for their many sensitive jobs?

Answer. The CIA respectfully refrains from comment on the applicant processing procedures of the Department of State, the Defense Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The CIA has found the use of the polygraph to be a positive assistance in employment screening and personnel investigation. The loss of the polygraph program would have a negative and undesirable effect on the continued secure operations of the Agency.

Question 11. The top two officials are not required to undergo polygraph testing yet all other CIA officials and employees are. What possible justification could there be for testing all the Indians but not the two biggest Chiefs?

Answer. There are only two positions in CIA filled by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. These appointees are subject to whatever screening procedures may be prescribed by the President, or suggested by Congress and approved by the President. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate that CIA require additional screening procedures, such as the polygraph test, for these appointees.

Question 12. What are your views on the advantages that could accrue if responsibility for polygraph examiner training were to be assigned to one agency, consolidated at one or two locations, and standardized as to length, course consent, and examining techniques?

Answer. There are some advantages that could accrue if responsibility for polygraph examiner training were to be consolidated and standardized. Among these are:

Selection of best training personnel available.

Establishment of criteria for examiner qualifications.

A better overview of government's polygraph requirements and applications.

A potential for contact with commercial efforts on polygraph research, developments and application.

A pooling of experience.

A focal point for government sponsored polygraph research, development and application.

A possible financial advantage.

As to disadvantages:

A consolidated school would, of necessity, be limited to presenting a general curriculum of polygraph training not designed to accommodate special requirements unique to a specific government agency. As explained in our response to Question 3, a general curriculum divorced from our particular needs and separated from our on-the-job capabilities would be inefficient and time-wasting.

POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT

I, _____, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Polygraph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time to time. Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution, I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Polygraph tests, and I consent to the monitoring and recording of these tests for the purpose of accuracy.

I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.

In witness whereof, I place my signature below, this ____ day of _____ 19_____.

_____
Signature

The above was read and signed in my presence this _____ day of _____ 19_____.

_____
Signature

POYGRAPH AGREEMENT

I, _____, an applicant for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Polygraph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time to time. Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution, I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Polygraph tests, and I consent to the monitoring and recording of these tests for the purpose of accuracy.

I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.

In witness whereof, I place my signature below, this ____ day of _____ 19_____.

_____
Signature

The above was read and signed in my presence this _____ day of _____ 19_____.

_____
Signature

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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