



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

25X1

SUBJECT:

Revised Draft of Section on Political  
Intelligence for IAC Report to the NSC.

In accordance with our telephone conversation of July 31, I transmit a revised draft of the section on Political Intelligence for the IAC Report. I trust this will more nearly meet your requirements.

Allan Evans  
Director

Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis

Attachment:  
As stated.

Copy to: IRC: Mr. Buford

WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS,  
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State Department review completed

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### Political Intelligence

[The many crisis or near-crisis situations throughout the world in the past year have caused a steady increase in political intelligence efforts in the areas of spot information or current intelligence, estimates of political trends within foreign countries, and surveys of actual and probable reactions of foreign peoples and governments to particular events and developments. The struggle for power within the Soviet Union, the status and role of Communist China, the policy of both USSR and Red China toward the European satellites and Tito, the rise of deGaulle to power in France, the disorders attendant on the visit of Vice President Nixon to Latin America, the Indonesian situation, Cyprus, and the recurring crises in the Middle East are illustrative of the events and issues which caused many levels of government to turn even more than usual to political intelligence sources and production for assistance.]

[Sino-Soviet Bloc. There has been a marked improvement in the availability of political intelligence on popular opinion in the Soviet Bloc, stemming from the expansion of East-West contacts, -- i.e., the increased travels of Soviet representatives of all levels in various areas of the world.] At the same time, a general Soviet stress on the attainment of ideological conformity throughout the Bloc and Soviet attacks on "revisionism" have tended to bring about a decrease in access to intelligence on official attitudes and actions, and greater uncertainty about these attitudes, thereby creating difficulties for further analysis. This has been particularly true in Yugoslavia following Tito's rupture with the USSR, and in Poland. [Both countries have in the past been sources of intelligence on Soviet party matters and on party thinking, but in Warsaw, for example, many Polish officials are less well informed today about Soviet developments than they were six months or a year ago. To be sure, attacks on the doctrine of revisionism which are carried in the Bloc press frequently prove the existence of differing political and ideological attitudes. At the same time, however, they fail to provide clear indications of the real nature of these differences.]

*(As for other Bloc areas,)*  
 There is a significant lack of political intelligence on Albania and Bulgaria, where there is no official United States representation. Some political intelligence is acquired through Italian, French, or British sources, but this is comparable neither in quantity nor quality to intelligence on other Bloc areas. Political intelligence on Hungary has been reduced somewhat with the dwindling in the high rate of flow of refugees to the West following the Revolution.

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*no para* ← As in the past, political intelligence on Communist China remains a major problem and is inadequate for an assessment of the country's future actions. Publications acquired in an overt manner by our Consulate General in Hong Kong continue to provide the most valuable source of political intelligence. Even less intelligence, relatively speaking, is available for North Korea and North Vietnam than for Communist China. [The primary source of basic political intelligence on North Korea is still material gathered during the Korean police action, and in North Vietnam the scarcity of published materials essentially limits our knowledge of the country.]

Free World. Throughout the Free World generally, there has been a continuing increase in the flow and use of political intelligence. A significant trend in Western Europe in particular has been the intense public interest in international political developments generated after the launching of the first Soviet satellite and in relation to the various proposals for disarmament and disengagement. In the United Kingdom, for example, official British policy has become more sensitive to public opinion, which seems to play a major part in the determination of policy on disarmament and disengagement. Political intelligence has therefore had to focus more sharply on studies and analyses of popular opinion, and on the press and other publications.

In Latin America, intelligence on Soviet Bloc activities is improving gradually, but emphasis must still be given to further development in this field. In the Middle East, the continuing crisis situations and the active interest of all levels of our government in these situations have thrown a heavy burden on a relatively small number of area experts. Political intelligence on the Far East has generally met requirements, particularly from the various national capitals and urban centers. Deficiencies do, however, exist in intelligence available from and on rural areas, which are becoming increasingly significant in the over-all political structure of the area.