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FBI review  
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14 June 1954

Noted by DCI  
15 June 54

15 June 54

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Recommended IAC Action on IIC-ICIS Report of  
1 June Recommending Certain Restrictive Measures  
on Soviet Bloc Representatives in US

1. Problem: To determine mechanics and allocate responsibilities  
for preparation of the IAC comments to the NSC on this paper.

2. Director of the FBI and the Chairman of the ICIS consider  
the matter to be very urgent and wish to bring it to the NSC at the  
earliest possible opportunity. After some difficulty General Cutler  
agreed to give the IAC two weeks to formulate its views. Therefore,  
IAC action on 29 June is indicated.



4. Retaliation Estimate: This should be prepared in the first  
instance by ONE in collaboration with OIR in the form of a National  
Estimate covering the likelihood of Soviet retaliation, its probable  
nature and the effect on the over-all US foreign intelligence effort of  
such retaliation.

Recommendation: That ONE prepare terms of reference  
for the foregoing estimate using Appendix D, "Comments by State Member,"  
as a guide and that through the usual inter-agency procedures the draft  
estimate be submitted for IAC consideration on 29 June.

[Redacted signature box]

ROBERT AMORY, JR.  
Deputy Director/Intelligence

FBI review  
completed.

DOS and NSC review(s)  
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to  
DCI

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IAC-D-83  
9 June 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

NSC Request for Report and Estimate as to  
Probable Effects of Restricting Bloc Representatives

1. Transmitted herewith is an 8 June memorandum from the Executive Secretary, NSC, to the DCI, levying subject request. The referenced IIC-ICIS report of 1 June was disseminated to the IAC members by the NSC Secretariat on 8 June.

2. Mr. Dulles proposes to discuss at the IAC meeting of 15 June procedures and actions to be taken in response to this request. IAC members are requested to initiate immediate agency consideration of the basic IIC-ICIS report.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary

Noted by EO/1  
6/15/54

Noted by [unclear]  
6/15/54

Noted by [unclear]  
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IAC-D-83  
9 June 1954

C-O-P-Y

Tab A to  
IAC-D-83  
9 June 1954

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
Washington

June 8, 1954


MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**SUBJECT:** Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives  
of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in  
Connection with Strategic Intelligence

In accordance with the recommendation contained  
in the second paragraph of the enclosed memorandum from the  
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the  
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security,  
the enclosed IIC-ICIS report is referred herewith with the re-  
quest that you furnish, in conjunction with the members of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee, for the information of the  
National Security Council:

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/s/ James S. Lay, Jr.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

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Tab A to  
IAC-D-83  
9 June 1954

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June 4, 1954

Mr. James S. Lay  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council  
Washington, D. C.

IIC  
ICIS  
to  
Lay

Dear Mr. Lay:

RE: Restricting Diplomatic and Official  
Representatives of Soviet Bloc  
Countries in the United States in  
Connection with Strategic  
Intelligence.

Enclosed is a report on the above subject which has been prepared in response to your memorandum of April 21, 1954, on the Covert Acquisition of Strategic Intelligence Information (Unclassified) by Soviet Embassy Representatives in the United States. The report was prepared by a joint ad hoc group of the IIC and ICIS, and is approved by both of the internal security committees, with the Department of State dissenting. The State Department position is set forth in Appendix D.

It will be noted that the first of the "Conclusions" in the report consists of the recognition of a threat to the United States national security resulting from the recently increased collection of strategic intelligence by Soviet Bloc representatives, which is summarized in Appendix A.

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
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With regard to Recommendation 4(a), for the reactivation of the program on voluntary protection of technical information within the Department of Commerce, it should be noted that, because of the requirement for submission of the report by June 4, 1954, the recommendation was not formally coordinated with the Department of Commerce. Likewise, Recommendation 4(c), for the establishment under the administration of the Department of Commerce of an "Interdepartmental Committee on International Exchange of Publications" and of an "Advisory Committee on Technical and Industrial Information" was not formally coordinated with that Department.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover  
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence  
Conference

Thomas J. Donegan  
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee  
on Internal Security

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REPORT

TO

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

BY

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND  
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

ON

RESTRICTING DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES  
OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN  
CONNECTION WITH STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

JUNE 1, 1954

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S E C R E T

June 1, 1954

REPORT  
TO  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

BY  
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND  
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

ON  
RESTRICTING DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES  
OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN  
CONNECTION WITH STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

PROBLEM

To restrict to the greatest degree practicable the acquisition in the United States of UNCLASSIFIED strategic intelligence materials by diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries.

DEFINITION

As used herein, "publicly available unclassified strategic intelligence materials" refers to aerial maps, aerial photographs and mosaics, topographical maps, geodetic maps, similar specialized maps, city plans, published studies of technical Government or Government-sponsored research projects, and like material, which may be obtained openly in this country by purchase or request and which singly or in combination are particularly susceptible to use by the intelligence agencies of unfriendly nations in support of strategic military plans directed against the

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United States. This does not include newspapers, periodicals, books, technical journals, general purpose maps, and other published material which are normally commercially available.

I. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE

1. The diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet bloc countries in the United States have overt ready access to publicly available UNCLASSIFIED strategic intelligence materials.

2. The overt acquisition of these materials by Soviet bloc representatives has been intensified in recent months.\* It is apparent that emphasis is now being placed on the collection of these materials and particularly aerial maps, aerial mosaics and aerial photographs, which have direct application to the selection of bombing targets or the guidance of hostile aircraft to such targets in the United States. This information in its basic form is unclassified. However, when collected, compiled in substantial quantities, and analyzed, the results are strategic intelligence which is kept in United States files as highly classified concepts of the strategic vulnerability of the United States. The overt acquisition of this material represents a threat to our national security.

3. Voluntary refusals by private American distributors and salespeople to make the more evident strategically significant

\*Examples of this activity are contained in Appendix A.

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materials available to known Soviet bloc representatives represent a potentially important means of limiting this overt collection. However, the utilization of such voluntary cooperation is at present seriously hampered by the difficulty experienced in distinguishing Soviet bloc representatives from the general American public. They are not now required to identify themselves as Soviet bloc representatives and evade doing so whenever possible. On at least one occasion, Soviet bloc representatives evaded identifying either themselves or their unmarked offices in which they were receiving American visitors who came there at the request of those representatives. This has frequently resulted in the assumption by the American distributors and salespeople that the persons with whom they are dealing are in fact American citizens, a misunderstanding which is frequently encouraged by misleading statements and titles, particularly in correspondence, by the Soviet bloc representatives.

4. Generally speaking, Soviet bloc representatives are permitted to travel freely throughout the United States subject to varying requirements of prior notification or permission for travel beyond specified distances from Washington, D C., or New York City. These requirements have been applied by the Department of State to correspond

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to travel requirements imposed on American representatives in the Soviet bloc countries. Thus far, it has not been deemed desirable or feasible to extend such reciprocal action to the prohibition of Soviet bloc travel in specified "off-limit" areas or cities although the travel of American representatives in some Soviet bloc countries, particularly the Soviet Union, is limited in this fashion. Since June, 1953, Soviet bloc restrictions placed on the freedom of travel of American representatives have been significantly reduced. At the present time, American representatives do not have access to approximately thirty-four per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union as compared to approximately eighty per cent which was not accessible to United States representatives prior to June, 1953.\*

5. Comparable types of strategic intelligence materials are not available for overt collection by American representatives in the Soviet bloc countries. It was not possible for the IIC and the ICIS to compare the strategic intelligence materials being obtained in this country by Soviet bloc representatives with information which is overtly obtained in those countries by U. S. representatives inasmuch as the State Department representatives did not submit a list of the types of information being obtained by U. S. representatives although specifically requested to do so.

\*Appendix B contains a summary of the appropriate travel restrictions applied by Soviet bloc governments, and reciprocally, by the United States Government.

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## II. METHODS OF SOLUTION

1. Restriction at the source: Controls over the publication or dissemination of the presently unclassified and publicly available strategic intelligence materials would greatly simplify and lessen the problem of their direct overt acquisition by Soviet bloc representatives in this country. In order to be completely effective, this would necessarily have to take the form of classification, screening and/or actual censorship, of such scope and magnitude as to be not feasible under present legislation and peacetime Government-public-private relationships.

2. Voluntary restriction by distributors and salespeople: As previously noted (I-3), this method represents a potentially important means of limiting direct overt collection. This potential could be realized if some form of appropriate "public education and guidance" were supplemented by steps to insure that Soviet bloc representatives could be readily identified.

3. Further restriction of Soviet bloc representatives: The overt collection of publicly available unclassified strategic intelligence materials by Soviet bloc representatives can be halted, limited or controlled by formally notifying the missions of those countries of appropriate restrictions, limitations or prohibitions to be henceforth applied to the activities of their representatives in this country. This might take the form of

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outright prohibition against the procurement of specified materials, prohibition against procurement without prior permission, further travel restrictions, requirements for full identification in all or specified personal contacts, requirements for full identification in correspondence, or a combination of one or more of these measures.

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### III. DISCUSSION

Regarding Methods 1 and 2, it should be noted that the ICIS in July 1950 approved a program on the voluntary protection of technical information. Implementation was undertaken by the Department of Commerce, within its Office of Technical Services. This was a voluntary program whereby business and industry were afforded a central clearing house to which they could refer inquiries as to the advisability of publicly releasing technical information. ICIS was notified that as of June 30, 1953, the program would not be continued for budgetary reasons.

In November 1953, ICIS requested the Department of Commerce to activate a related program, having to do with the control of the export of unclassified government technical publications to the USSR and satellite governments. The ICIS proposed that in view of the functions of the Secretary of Commerce in the administration of the Export Control Act of 1949, an "Interdepartmental Committee on International Exchanges of Publications" be established within the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce declined to take action on this request pending ICIS action on an outstanding proposal for protection of scientific technical industrial and economic information against publication where prejudicial to the defense interests of the United States. The outstanding proposal is for the establishment of an "Advisory Committee on Technical and Industrial Information," which it would appear might well be established

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under the administration of the Department of Commerce. If these functions were established under the administrative auspices of the Department of Commerce, they might include the function of a clearing house through which Soviet bloc requests (in this country or from abroad) could be channeled. Such a device would enable us to make such materials available on a reciprocal basis and might also aid in presenting the prohibition in a positive light as a "service."

The American public has become increasingly aware of the direct threat posed to the national security by the activities of Soviet-Communist agents in this country and frequently shows commendable initiative in approaching agencies of the Government for advice as to the desirability of fulfilling requests or orders received from Soviet bloc representatives, agencies or "fronts" in the United States and elsewhere. This initiative can be encouraged by appropriate public information activities undertaken to promote voluntary refusals on the part of American distributors, salespeople, and the like to distribute or sell certain categories of publicly available materials to Soviet bloc representatives and agencies. Channels already exist through which United States industrial, business and educational establishments could be urged not to make certain categories of unclassified scientific and technological materials available to Soviet bloc representatives or agencies.

It should not be overlooked that voluntary cooperation in this regard by private American individuals and groups can be

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effective only if supplemented by some means of insuring identification of the Soviet bloc representatives and agencies in their contacts with Americans. If certain materials are informally publicized as "not for Soviet bloc representatives" the distributors and salespeople could request identification by prospective over-the-counter purchasers of those materials. Inasmuch as the making of such requests for identification would not be practical in correspondence contacts, proper identification could be effected only by requiring that Soviet bloc representatives reveal their official status in all mail communications with American citizens, companies and institutions. Concealment or deliberate falsification of identity in response to a direct request would permit formal action to be taken by this Government against the Soviet bloc individuals concerned.

The institution of appropriate additional formal restrictions and limitations on the activity of Soviet bloc representatives in the United States would constitute the most simple, direct and effective solution of the problem under consideration. Once the Soviet bloc missions had been notified of these restrictions and limitations, our Government would be in a position to initiate formal action against individuals violating the conditions set forth in the notifications. Similar action could be taken should Soviet bloc representatives attempt (as anticipated) to obtain "forbidden" materials covertly through Soviet and American Communist agents or unsuspecting "third parties."

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The Department of State has emphasized the possible danger which the further restriction of Soviet bloc representatives would pose to the continuation of the overt intelligence collection activities of American representatives in Soviet bloc countries. The State Department has noted that the risk of precipitating undesirable Soviet bloc government countermoves, further restricting the activities of American representatives, would vary according to the nature of the new restrictions imposed by the United States and, to some extent, according to the degree of technical reciprocity reflected by the United States action. Any Soviet countermoves could be met by reciprocal U. S. action.

No evaluation of the risk posed to United States intelligence collection activities as a result of restrictions which might be placed on the activities of Soviet bloc representatives in this country could be made, because, as indicated above, no information was furnished as to the quality of intelligence collected by U. S. representatives in Soviet bloc nations. However, strategic intelligence materials as defined herein are not normally available commercially or otherwise to overt collection by American representatives in the Soviet bloc countries, and the latter are not permitted to take photographs or make sketches except of completely innocuous subjects.\* Thus, it would seem that the principal objective

\* Appendix C contains the text of and a discussion of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Circular Note to Foreign Missions which sets forth current regulations applying to photography and sketching by foreigners in the Soviet Union.

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of the present problem might be realized with minimum risk of "reciprocal" retaliation by denying to the Soviet bloc representatives only those materials which formally or by virtue of their unavailability are denied to United States representatives in the Soviet bloc countries. Individual American representatives in Soviet bloc countries rarely, if ever, have cause to correspond with Soviet bloc individuals, agencies or institutions and such correspondence contacts as may exist have no bearing on overt United States intelligence collection activities. Therefore, it seems unlikely that requiring Soviet bloc representatives to identify themselves properly in correspondence with American individuals, companies, agencies or institutions would result in unfavorable Soviet bloc counteraction.

The Soviet bloc representatives in the United States accredited to or assigned with international organizations have the same opportunity to collect overtly unclassified strategic intelligence as other Soviet bloc representatives in the United States. Several of these Soviet bloc representatives have engaged in espionage activities. Hence, there is no reason to believe that they would hesitate to collect overtly unclassified strategic intelligence materials.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. A threat to the United States national security presently exists as a result of the extensive overt collection of unclassified strategic intelligence information by Soviet bloc diplomatic and official representatives in the United States.

2. United States representatives in Soviet bloc countries are unable to secure overtly comparable types of strategic intelligence due to restrictions which have been placed against them or due to the unavailability of such material either commercially or otherwise.

3. Some diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet bloc countries in the United States are obtaining this strategic intelligence information without identifying themselves in their official capacity, by misleading statements, and by the use of evasion when requested to identify themselves.

4. The United States national security necessitates that steps be taken to restrict to the greatest degree practicable the obtaining of this material in the United States by the diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet bloc countries.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The IIC and the ICIS recommend:

1. That all Soviet bloc missions in the United States be officially notified:

- (a) Of the privileges of their diplomatic, official, and other personnel, including international organizations and quasi-official agencies, insofar as their obtaining unclassified strategic intelligence information in the United States is concerned. (For State comment see paragraph 6, page D-2).
- (b) That the official notification include but not be limited to the applicable types of information included in the Soviet notification to the United States of February 11, 1954 (see Appendix B) but that it additionally contain the prohibition of obtaining this information by any means, including photographing and sketching. The notification should include in the list of unclassified strategic intelligence those items enumerated in the definition on Page 1. (For State comment see paragraphs 5-7, pages D-2, 3.)
- (c) That the list of types of information to be prohibited and included in the notification to be given to the Soviet bloc missions be determined by the Departments of State, Defense (including the Army, Navy and Air Force), and Justice.

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- (d) That such notification contain the provision that the deletion from the list of prohibited items will be considered when and if comparable materials are made available to, or can be purchased by, American representatives in those countries. (For State comment see paragraph 3, page D-1.) Such consideration for deletion should be given by the Departments of State, Defense (including the Army, Navy and Air Force), and Justice.
- (e) That the Soviet bloc missions be required to have all their missions in the United States, and any separate establishments or offices thereof, plainly marked as such in order that individuals entering those missions, establishments or offices may be aware of their official nature. (For State comment, see paragraph 5, page D-6.)
2. That the Soviet bloc missions be officially advised that the failure of their representatives to reveal their official affiliation with the mission, or international organization, in correspondence with United States citizens, companies and institutions, will henceforth be considered a violation of the accepted norms of diplomatic conduct.
3. That travel restrictions on the Soviet bloc representatives in the United States be on a strict reciprocal basis and that they be enforced on at least a basis comparable to the restrictions on U. S. representatives in the Soviet bloc countries. (For State comment see paragraph 8, page D-3.) In this connection, it is recommended that

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the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice in consultation with other departments and agencies as appropriate, be directed to compile a list of areas in the United States from which representatives of Soviet bloc countries would be barred.

4. (a) That the program on voluntary protection of technical information which was approved by the ICIS in 1950 and which has been relatively inactive be reactivated within the Department of Commerce.
- (b) That the military agencies and the Atomic Energy Commission circularize companies and facilities manufacturing or engaging in research for those agencies, advising of the practices of these Soviet bloc representatives, in attempting to obtain technical and strategic intelligence with the suggestion that persons requesting information from those companies be identified and that foreign officials be referred to the appropriate Government agency.
- (c) That the program for the control of the export of unclassified government technical publication to the USSR and satellite governments and the program on the protection of scientific, technical, industrial, and economic information against publication where prejudicial to the defense interests of the United States

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(see page 7 above) be activated under the administration of the Department of Commerce.

- (d) That when Soviet bloc representatives in the United States desire unclassified Government documents they be required to apply at a central office or point. (For State comment see paragraph 6, page D-2.) This would enable this Government to refuse these Soviet bloc representatives any unclassified Government document considered to be within the definition of unclassified strategic intelligence as used herein and would enable this Government to follow more closely the requests being made by these Soviet bloc representatives with a view to establishing a more realistic reciprocal arrangement.

(This recommendation is not intended to interfere with the normal course of business that these representatives have with the military and State Departments. If approved, it is recommended that the ICIS be instructed to prepare the details for this plan.)

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## APPENDIX A

EXAMPLES OF UNCLASSIFIED STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE BEING OBTAINED  
IN THE U. S. BY SOVIET BLOC COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES

The diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States have during recent months increased to a considerable extent their efforts to obtain unclassified strategic intelligence information. The following examples of such activities on the part of these representatives will provide a specific idea of the type of information that is being obtained. It is to be noted that this information is being obtained without these representatives revealing their official connections, by statements which leave an erroneous impression, and in some cases by outright subterfuge. The national security implications of the type of information being obtained is readily apparent.

During October, November and December of 1953, representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache visited Minneapolis, Minnesota; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In each city telephone directories were purchased and oblique aerial photographic maps were either purchased or an attempt made to purchase such maps. In Philadelphia, in attempting to purchase a particular map, a visitor's pass was signed which bore the printed certification that the signer was a U. S. citizen.

APP  
A

Since August, 1953, representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache have obtained a total of 127 documents from the Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, and the Department of Commerce, relating to research and experimental studies on military, industrial, and scientific matters.

During December, 1953, a member of the Office of the Military Attache renewed his membership in the Society of Automotive Engineers and during January of 1954 ordered a total of 58 research papers prepared by the Society on varied topics relating to the automotive field.

During the period July, 1953, through March, 1954, 48 industrial concerns in the United States, including such concerns as the Atomic Instrument Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Nuclear Instrument Company, Chicago, Illinois, were contacted by a representative of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache

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with requests for catalogues, pamphlets or brochures concerning the products of the company.

An attempt was made during March, 1954, by a representative of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache to subscribe to the magazine, "The Military Engineer," which subscription was refused.

Representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache made an extended trip through New England between July 17 and July 24, 1953. They obtained highway maps, street guides and pamphlets concerning economic, industrial and cultural institutions in Buffalo, New York, and Rochester, New York. They purchased maps of Syracuse, New York; pamphlets and maps of Utica, New York; and maps of Scotia and Schenectady. They purchased maps and street guides of Albany, Monroe County, Northern New England, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Philadelphia and Ticonderoga, New York.

During October, 1953, representatives of the same office were observed visiting East Rock Park, Connecticut, which offers a good view of the city of New Haven, Connecticut, and the New Haven Harbor. The same representatives were observed making sketches while visiting locations overlooking the city of Providence, Rhode Island. They purchased two topographical maps of Providence, Rhode Island, and observed a radar display at the Massachusetts Department of Commerce in Boston.

During December, 1953, a representative of this same office purchased sixteen millimeter motion pictures prepared by United Films, Incorporated, which films related to Washington, D. C., Niagara Falls and similar beauty spots in the United States.

A representative of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache accompanied by a representative of the Office of the Soviet Naval Attache during September, 1953, attended the National Electronics Conference in Chicago, Illinois, and obtained various literature available. Maps of Chicago and vicinity were purchased and attempts made without success to purchase topographical maps. These same individuals purchased street guides and a map of Indianapolis while in that city and subsequently visited Cincinnati, Ohio, where they also purchased maps and street guides. In October, these two individuals

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attempted, without success, to obtain a map of Wheeling, West Virginia.

During February, 1954, a representative of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache obtained by mail from the Library of Congress microfilm copies of 39 reports known as Publication Board Reports. These reports dealt with engineering, mapping, radio, electronics, radar, explosives, chemical research and other matters.

Representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache in October, 1953, visited Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where they attempted to obtain aerial and topographical maps of Milwaukee. They purchased a railway atlas containing a large sized scale drawing of all United States railway systems. They obtained a map of Milwaukee, the Milwaukee telephone directory and a large scale map of the Milwaukee transportation system.

During October of 1953, representatives of this same office purchased five books and pamphlets dealing with Cincinnati, Ohio, industry and toured the Cincinnati industrial area.

Also during October, 1953, representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache visited Minneapolis, Minnesota, where they purchased maps of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Alaska. They also purchased 15 oblique aerial photographs of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. They did not identify themselves as Soviet officials.

On December 8, 1953, the Office of the Soviet Military Attache attempted through correspondence with eight concerns to purchase aerial views of the city of Philadelphia taken at a forty-five degree angle. No indication was given to diplomatic connections. The orders were not filled.

On December 23, 1953, a representative of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache purchased a Masco two station wireless system.

Attempts were made by this same office in December, 1953, to obtain aerial maps of the Milwaukee area. Official connections were not revealed. The order was not filled.

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On April 5, 1954, a representative of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache without revealing his Soviet connections purchased 29 aerial photographs of Boston, Massachusetts, and 5 of Newport, Rhode Island. Attempts were made without success to purchase aerial photographs of New London, Connecticut; Hartford, Connecticut; and other New England cities.

During recent months a representative of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache has ordered microfilm copies of 133 reports from the Publication Service of the Library of Congress. These reports related to research and experiments in aeronautical and scientific fields which had been prepared under contract by the United States Government for various branches of the armed services. These items were not classified.

During October and November of 1953, representatives of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache traveled to St. Louis, Missouri; Kansas City, Missouri; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Fort Worth, Texas; and Dallas, Texas. As a result, they obtained street maps of St. Louis, Missouri, and aerial maps of Dallas, Texas, and vicinity; Tulsa, Oklahoma, and vicinity; and Fort Worth, Texas, and vicinity. They did not identify themselves during this trip as representatives of a foreign country. Photographs requested included areas of Dallas, which included the Dallas Naval Air Station, Hensley Army Air Field, aircraft manufacturing plants in the vicinity of Dallas and Carswell Air Force Base in the vicinity of Fort Worth, Texas. The latter photograph was not obtained.

During recent months, a representative of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache, without revealing his official status and using his home or business address, contacted the Library of Congress, Department of Agriculture, the U. S. Census Bureau, and the U. S. Geological Survey. He requested aerial maps of Topeka, Kansas; Los Angeles, California, and vicinity. Other requests of these Government agencies included microfilm copies of publicly available research reports conducted under Government contract for various branches of the armed services on topics including ordnance, electronics, and related subjects. The material obtained was forwarded to either his residence address or his business address in Washington, D. C.

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Recently a representative of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache contacted five firms and identified himself as an engineer or a Lieutenant Colonel or with no identification whatsoever. In no instance was his official connection with the Soviet Embassy revealed. Two instances reflected requests for classified items on jet propulsion and rocket data and in one of the instances the correspondence was signed with the title of Lieutenant Colonel resulting in return correspondence by the firm involved assuming that he was associated with the United States Armed Forces.

A representative of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache was identified in one instance contacting the General Electric Company, Washington, D. C., where he consistently refused to divulge his Soviet Embassy connection until, under persistent questioning by the firm representative, he admitted he represented the Soviet Embassy. This same individual has been identified in ten instances submitting requests to industrial firms for items advertised in trade journals. He consistently omitted his identification or characterized himself as an engineer.

During the National Aircraft Show at Vandalia, Ohio, in September, 1953, a representative of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache was observed photographing airplanes at the show including the B-36, B-47, PT-1, H-21, XF-85 and H-19.

During August and September, 1953, representatives of the Office of the Soviet Naval Attache visited Connecticut and Maine as well as Chicago, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana; and Cincinnati, Ohio. They obtained maps, photographs, topographical maps, and industrial data. In Chicago, they attended the Annual National Electronics Conference and obtained copies of all literature available.

During a four-month period in 1953, representatives of the Office of the Soviet Naval Attache placed eight orders with the Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, totaling 156 technical documents. In each case the order was submitted by mail and payment was made by personal check. The total cost of this microfilm was \$397.75. The documents dealt with such subjects as metallurgy, armor plate, supersonic wind tunnels, explosives, electronics, and aircraft.

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A representative of the Office of the Soviet Naval Attache has communicated with a number of firms without revealing his official status. One such contact was with the U. S. Department of Commerce requesting that his name be added to the subscription list of "Synopsis of U. S. Government Proposed Procurement and Contract Awards."

In September, 1953, a representative of the Office of the Soviet Naval Attache became a member of the Arctic Institute of North America without divulging his identity as a Soviet official. Members receive the publication containing various articles of a scientific nature having to do with the geography and life in the Arctic regions. Its research program has been supported in part through a contractual relationship with the Office of Naval Research and with other funds provided by the defense agencies of the United States and Canada according to a representative of the Institute.

An Assistant Soviet Air Attache directed a letter dated March 10, 1954, on plain bond paper addressed to RCA, Camden, New Jersey, signed M. Krylov, 2552 Belmont Road, N. W., Washington, D. C., (address of the Office of the Soviet Air Attache). The letter requested information on an RCA intercommunications system, which is best and highest fidelity type used in aircraft. This item was manufactured under Air Force contract, was recently declassified, but was not available to the public.

An Assistant Soviet Air Attache on October 19, 1953, directed a letter to the California Institute of Technology, signed L. E. Pivnev, Lieutenant Colonel, 2552 Belmont Road, N. W., Washington 8, D. C. The letter requested Jet Propulsion Laboratory Progress Report No. 20-187, a list of reports of jet propulsion laboratory and a catalog of other engineering and related publications. The acknowledgement by the California Institute of Technology indicated copies of Report No. 20-187 were not available and copies of jet propulsion laboratory bibliography were classified. The acknowledgement indicated recipient of Pivnev's letter assumed Pivnev was connected with the U. S. armed forces.

In February, 1954, representatives of the Soviet Embassy purchased from the Map Information Office, U. S. Geological Survey, copies of all published topographical maps within a

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radius of 50 miles of Washington, D. C. During April, 16 maps covering the Fort Bragg, North Carolina, area and all maps available in the vicinity of Raleigh, Durham and Chapel Hill, North Carolina, were purchased. Also during April an inquiry at the same establishment was made to determine if all the published topographical maps in Michigan, Illinois, and Kentucky could be purchased. Information was furnished that they could be purchased except for some maps that might be classified. An inquiry was made concerning the classified maps but no information was furnished. An order for complete coverage of Michigan, Illinois, and Kentucky was placed and index maps of Ohio, Texas, Tennessee, and Washington were requested and received by this Soviet representative.

Lieutenant Colonel Leonid E. Pivnev, Assistant Soviet Air Attache, contacted a photographer in Washington, D. C., and, while using a fictitious name and stating that he represented a private firm, requested vertical aerial photographs of New York City, including the Bronx, Queens, Manhattan and Brooklyn, the photographs to be on a scale of 20,000 to 40,000. He made an advance payment of \$400 on an agreed \$700 price. Pivnev was tentatively identified as the individual who purchased 33 aerial photographs of Washington, D. C., and vicinity in early March, 1954. This individual also desired aerial maps of Chicago, Illinois. The photographs obtained by him were described as suitable for mapping or mosaic work and were photographed at a conversion ratio of 20,000 to one.

Representatives of the Office of the Soviet Military Attache and the Soviet Naval Attache, while in California during May, among other things, ordered \$80 worth of aerial photographs from a Los Angeles photography shop covering the Los Angeles area. They obtained maps of Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbors and purchased a book entitled, "Southern California Coast," which contains pictures and maps of the coast line. They obtained maps of Oceanside, Carlsbad, San Diego County, the city of San Diego and Southern California.

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During the Armed Forces Day Parade, military employees of the Soviet Embassy were observed in civilian clothes photographing the personnel and equipment in the parade. Military representatives of the Soviet Embassy visited Bolling Air Force Base during the Armed Forces Day exhibitions on May 15 and 16, 1954. They made extensive notes and carefully and thoroughly took motion pictures of the following items: "Nike" guided missile, "Matador" B-61 aircraft, "Barc" troop carrier, F-86F "Sabre Jet," B-36F bomber, F-89D "Scorpion," U. S. M-97 tank, [redacted] "Sky Sweeper" gun turret, 57 and 75 mm. recoilless rifles, [redacted] ditch digging machine of the U. S. Army Engineer Corps, mobile radar equipment, USAF radar ground control approach unit, other military exhibits, and a mock invasion by U. S. Marine Corps helicopters.

Representatives of the Soviet Satellite countries have the same access to this unclassified strategic intelligence as do the Russian representatives. Investigative results indicate that they are also availing themselves of this information. They are, in addition, purchasing items which they are not allowed to use in the United States and which cannot be shipped out of the United States without a license as required by the Export Control Act of 1948. Such items include radio station equipment and electronics materials. Investigative efforts have also indicated that quantities of this material are apparently being taken out of the United States in diplomatic pouches.

It is specifically noted that the foregoing incidents are only examples of the types of strategic intelligence information which are being collected by Soviet bloc representatives in the United States.

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## APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS APPLICABLE  
TO AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES IN SOVIET BLOC  
COUNTRIES AND TO SOVIET BLOC REPRESENTATIVES  
IN THE UNITED STATES

Comparison of Soviet-American Travel Restrictions

1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Soviet Government on  
The Travel of U. S. Embassy Personnel in the Soviet Union.

Embassy personnel may not travel more than 40 kilometers from the center of Moscow without prior notification to the Foreign Office. In addition, approximately 28 per cent of the total area is officially off-limits including a number of cities located in areas not designated as restricted. As a result of this latter limitation, which frequently renders surrounding "free" areas inaccessible, approximately 34 per cent of Soviet territory is blocked to travel by Embassy Officers.

2. Current Restrictions Imposed by the United States Government  
on the Travel of Soviet Embassy Personnel in the United States.

Since March 10, 1952, Soviet official personnel of the Embassy in Washington, TASS representatives and others who are Soviet citizens assigned for newspaper work in Washington have been required not to travel to any point more than 25 miles (about 40 kilometers) from the center of Washington without previous official notification at least 48 hours in advance. Similarly, Soviet official personnel assigned to Amtorg may not travel more than 25 miles from the center of New York City without previous official notification at least 48 hours in advance. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is notified immediately upon receipt of these notifications.

3. Discussion

The current Soviet restrictions, effective June 22, 1953, represent an appreciable relaxation from their previous Soviet position. Under the earlier restrictions, effective on January 15, 1952, nearly 50 per cent of Soviet territory was officially off-limits and approximately 80 per cent was blocked by the restriction of certain key cities in "free" areas. Instead of banning entire border areas, the Soviet Government has now specified only the 15 kilometer zone bordering non-satellite countries.

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Embassy personnel made a total of 41 extended trips during the course of Fiscal Year 1953, a lower figure than normal as the result of the Embassy's move to a new location. Since the travel relaxation in June, Embassy travelers have enjoyed a much greater freedom of travel and have visited such areas as Central Asia, Southern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia. For the first time in years, they have frequently been able to obtain permission to travel by automobile. Surveillance seems to be less constant than previously, and fewer difficulties are now being experienced with regard to obtaining tickets and accommodations.

It should also be noted that Soviet travel restrictions are applied to all foreigners in the Soviet Union, including the personnel of satellite missions.

#### Comparison of Polish-American Travel Restrictions

1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Polish Government on the Travel of U. S. Embassy Personnel in the Soviet Union.

Embassy personnel are permitted to travel freely throughout most of Poland. Service Attache personnel must notify the Polish Army liaison officer three days in advance of each trip outside of Warsaw.

2. Current Restrictions Imposed by the United States Government on the Travel of Polish Embassy Personnel in the United States.

There are no travel restrictions which apply to Polish officials resident in this country other than the reciprocal requirement that their Service Attaches must notify the Department of Defense three days prior to each trip they make out of the Washington, D. C., area.

3. Discussion

Our Warsaw Embassy personnel do a great deal of useful traveling throughout Poland with little surveillance attention except for Service Attaches. No administrative impediments which might be interpreted as Polish efforts to supplement the virtual lack of travel restrictions are encountered.

#### Comparison of Hungarian-American Travel Restrictions

1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Hungarian Government on the Travel of U. S. Embassy Personnel in Hungary.

Embassy personnel may not travel outside Pest County (approximately 20 miles from the center of Budapest) without notification to the Foreign Office 24 hours in advance of travel. In addition,

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a border strip 30 kilometers wide facing Yugoslavia and Austria and certain border counties as a whole are banned for travel by foreigners. Transit by rail or road to Vienna, Belgrad and Bucharest is allowed.

2. Current Restrictions Imposed by the United States Government on the Travel of Hungarian Embassy Personnel in the United States.

Hungarian Embassy personnel are required to notify the Department of State 24 hours in advance of all travel in excess of 40 miles from the center of Washington, D. C.

3. Discussion

The present Hungarian travel restrictions which came into effect August 10, 1953, represent an appreciable relaxation from the previous Hungarian position on travel by foreigners. Since January, 1951, and prior to this August, U. S. official personnel in Hungary were not permitted to travel beyond a radius of 30 kilometers (approximately 18 miles) from a central point in Budapest without written authorization from the Foreign Office. Comparatively few permits were granted for travel wholly within Hungary. Embassy personnel may now travel quite freely throughout most of Hungary.

This Government's restriction of travel by Hungarian officials in this country was revised on October 13, 1953, to correspond more closely to the less stringent restrictions applied to Americans in Hungary since August 10.

Comparison of Czechoslovakian-American Travel Restrictions

1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Czech Government on the Travel of U. S. Embassy Personnel in Czechoslovakia.

Service Attaches assigned to the American Embassy in Prague are required to notify the Czech Government of the date and itinerary of proposed trips over 24-hours duration three days in advance. Except for a few restricted areas, all United States representatives are permitted to travel freely in Czechoslovakia.

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2. Current Restrictions Imposed by the United States Government on the Travel of Czech Embassy Personnel in the United States.

There are no restrictions on the travel of Czech Embassy personnel in the United States other than the reciprocal requirement that their Service Attache notify the Department of the Army of the itinerary of trips outside of Washington two days in advance.

3. Discussion

Areas of Czechoslovakia closed to travel by foreigners include a narrow border strip, the uranium mining area in Bohemia, and the sites of military installations.

Comparison of Rumanian-American Travel Restrictions

1. Current Restrictions Imposed by the Rumanian Government on the Travel of U. S. Embassy Personnel in Rumania.

American Embassy personnel must request permission of the Foreign Office 48 hours in advance of travel outside the Bucharest area. According to the present regulation which went into effect October 15, 1953, travel by train or airplane is permitted to a large portion of the country, excepting a 50-kilometer-deep border zone and certain interior industrial areas. Travel by automobile is restricted to the immediate vicinity of Bucharest although permission may be granted in response to 48-hour prior request for automobile travel to several mountain resort towns south of Bucharest.

2. Current Restrictions Imposed by the United States Government on the Travel of Rumanian Embassy Personnel in the United States.

Since May 25, 1950, the travel of Rumanian officials in the United States has been restricted to an area 35 miles from the boundaries of the District of Columbia. Travel beyond this area can be undertaken only by special authorization. Such authorization is rarely granted (or requested) except for trips to and from New York City.

3. Discussion

Subsequent to May 5, 1949, and prior to October 15, 1953, by far the greater part of Rumania was closed to travel by foreign officials resident in Rumania. However, they were permitted to make frequent automobile trips in the area south of Bucharest. The new regulations, while opening some formerly prohibited areas to train and airplane travel, virtually ban automobile travel.

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## APPENDIX C

CURRENT REGULATIONS APPLYING TO PHOTOGRAPHY AND  
SKETCHING BY FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on February 11, 1954, directed Circular Note No. 42 to all foreign missions in Moscow setting forth the regulations governing photography and sketching by foreigners in the Soviet Union (see full text below). Noting that in the past it had been difficult and even dangerous for Americans and other foreigners to take any sort of pictures in the Soviet Union, the American Embassy welcomed this circular as a clarification which would prove helpful and advantageous if the rules therein established were actually honored by Soviet officials. This has subsequently proved to be the case, and American representatives in the Soviet Union have been accorded a correspondingly greater degree of freedom in overt photography and sketching.

There follows a full translation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Circular Note No. 42/pr of February 11, 1954:

The Protocol Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents its compliments to the Embassies and Missions and, in connection with the question of a number of Embassies and Missions regarding the regulations for photography on the territory of the USSR, has the honor to state that according to existing regulations foreign citizens:

1. Are permitted on the whole territory of the USSR, except points and localities which foreigners are forbidden to visit, to take photographs and also to sketch architectural monuments; buildings of cultural, educational and medical institutions; educational institutions; theaters; museums; parks of culture and rest; stadiums; streets and squares; living quarters; and also scenes and landscapes in the background of which there are none of the objects listed below in points "a," "b," "c," "d," and "e."

In industrial enterprises engaged in the manufacture of civilian products, state farms, collective farms and MTS, railroad stations, airdromes, river ports, governmental institutions, educational institutions, and social organizations photographs and sketches may, in individual cases, be made with the permission of the administration of these institutions and organizations.

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2. The taking of photographs and sketching are forbidden:
  - a. In the 25 kilometer frontier zone, except for the places and localities which foreigners are not prohibited from visiting, where they are permitted to photograph the objects listed in point 1;
  - b. Of all types of military technology and armaments, all military objects and institutions and storage places of combustibles;
  - c. Of seaports, large hydroelectric installations (sluices, dams, pumping stations), railroad junctions, tunnels, railroad and highway bridges;
  - d. Of industrial establishments, scientific research institutions, design offices, laboratories, electric power stations, radio beacons, radio stations, telephone and telegraph stations;
  - e. From airplanes on flights over territory of the USSR and also surface panoramic photographs and sketches of industrial cities.

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APPENDIX D

Supplement to Draft Report to the National Security Council  
by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the  
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security on  
"Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of  
Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection  
with Strategic Intelligence"

Comments by Department of State Member

25X1 I. The Department of State believes that the severity of the risk posed  
to the  activities of American representa-  
tives in Soviet bloc countries precludes the imposition of the additional  
direct restrictions on the overt intelligence collection activities  
of Soviet bloc representatives in the United States as envisaged in  
Recommendations 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 1(d), 3, and 4(d) of this report.  
( The Department bases its dissent on the following considerations.

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3. The report notes that materials comparable to the "publicly avail-  
able unclassified strategic intelligence materials" as defined there and

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25X1 available to overt collection by Soviet bloc representatives in the United States are not available to overt collection by American representatives in Soviet bloc countries.

The fact that strictly comparable materials are not available must not be so construed as to minimize the value of the United States collection effort.

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6. On the other hand, the Soviet bloc states and particularly the Soviet Union possess networks of agents and sympathizers both in the United States and in those countries with which this country has broad exchanges, public and private, of publicly available unclassified information, including strategic intelligence materials as defined in this report. There are many channels through which the Soviet bloc intelligence agencies, through concealed agents, third parties, third countries and through the domestic and international mails, can and could obtain publicly available unclassified

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strategic intelligence materials originating in the United States. These channels could and would be used if the overt collection of these materials by official Soviet bloc representatives in the United States was curtailed. Restriction of the latter would amount to little more than a serious inconvenience.

7. The Department questions whether the strategic intelligence significance of many of the materials now being openly collected by Soviet bloc representatives in this country should not be reassessed in the light of such revolutionary military developments as the atomic and thermonuclear weapons. For example, it would seem that the pilot of an enemy bomber now would need only to locate and to identify a general area, whereas a short time ago he would have had to be concerned with individual specific targets.

8. Except for the designation of certain cities and areas as "off limits", this Government's restriction of the travel of Soviet bloc representatives has attained a full measure of reciprocity as compared to the restrictions imposed on the travel of American officials in Soviet bloc countries. The Department continues to feel that little if anything would be gained by so designating certain cities and regions of the United States. It is unlikely that over-all travel by Soviet bloc representatives would be reduced, but rather that travel in "open" areas would be increased to compensate for the lack of access to the comparatively small "restricted" areas. Other channels would readily provide the publicly available materials and other information formerly obtained by direct collection in the closed areas and cities.

Such action would be technically reciprocal. However, this would by no means preclude anticipated Soviet bloc retaliation in any of a variety of

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means available to them in restricting the travel of foreigners. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Furthermore, the

designation of "restricted" cities and areas in the United States would create a serious problem with regard to this Government's public relations with state and municipal organizations.

9. It has not been demonstrated that Soviet bloc representatives connected with international organizations have engaged in overt intelligence collection activities of the sort with which this report is concerned. Because of the sensitivity of this Government's relationship with these organizations and many of the Governments represented in these organizations, the Department feels strongly that Soviet bloc representatives connected with international organizations should not be considered for inclusion in any measures designed to limit overt intelligence collection activity until such time as they actually commence such activity on a significant scale.

II. The Department understands the contradiction inherent in the term "publicly available unclassified strategic intelligence materials" which results from the informational needs of our democratic society and the difficulty of imposing and justifying complex censorship and screening controls in "peacetime." Nevertheless, the Department feels that "restriction at the source" and, to a lesser extent, "voluntary

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restriction by distributors and salespeople" represent the only practicable means available of restricting Soviet bloc access to such materials without precipitating Soviet bloc retaliatory action contrary to the National Interest. Consequently, the Department supports the action envisaged in Recommendations 1(e), 2, 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c). In this regard, the following comments are submitted for consideration.

1. The recommended requirement that Soviet bloc representatives properly identify themselves in correspondence with United States citizens, companies and institutions is essential to the effective utilization of "voluntary cooperation" by American distributors and salespeople in denying "publicly available unclassified strategic intelligence materials" to overt collection by Soviet bloc representatives.

2. Appropriate publicity of this Government's action in requiring Soviet bloc representatives to identify themselves properly in correspondence would contribute substantially to any "public education" program aimed at promoting such "voluntary cooperation" in limiting Soviet bloc access to these materials, either by correspondence or by direct personal contacts.

3. A formal requirement of this nature would probably be interpreted by the Soviet bloc missions as a hint of future action should their representatives continue to improperly identify themselves in direct personal contacts with American distributors and salespeople.

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Consequently, the requirement for proper identification in correspondence is likely to effect a reduction of the evasive and misleading tactics employed by Soviet bloc representatives in their direct, personal dealings with United States citizens. Furthermore, the Department is prepared to call to the attention of individual Soviet bloc missions the improper behavior of their representatives in cases where there is sufficient documentation to prove deliberate misrepresentation or concealment of identity. Flagrant misrepresentation or continued deliberate concealment of identity would provide the basis for requesting the departure of individual Soviet bloc representatives or for refusing re-entry privileges to them.

4. Certain of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports concerning the activities of Soviet bloc representatives have contained indications that some procedure is already in existence which requires certain private companies to inform prospective customers that appropriate "clearance" must be obtained before certain photographs or maps can be purchased. If such a procedure is in existence, it should be possible to extend it to include more of the materials with which this report is concerned. It would seem that such a procedure would be particularly suitable for government publications, maps, photographs, and documents.

5. The Department does not interpret Recommendation 1(e) to mean that all Soviet bloc missions should be notified that their various offices and establishments must be properly marked regardless

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of whether or not such offices or establishments are now so marked. As far as the Department is aware, there has been only one instance when the absence of visual identification of a single office may have led to confusion or misunderstanding on the part of American visitors to that office. The Department is prepared to take appropriate action in individual cases as they arise.

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
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IAC-D-91/3  
6 May 1955  
(Limited  
Distribution)

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

Formosa Straits Problem

1. The question of the frequency of issue of the reports of the IAC Current Intelligence Group on the Formosa Straits Problem was referred to the White House pursuant to IAC-M-195, item 2.
2. The Director was assured on 6 May that the reports could hereafter be issued weekly, supplemented by special reports as necessary.
3. Accordingly, effective 7 May, the Group will meet only on Wednesdays, except at the request of one of its members.



Secretary

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IAC-D-91/3  
6 May 1955

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IAC-D-91/2  
28 March 1955

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Coordination of Intelligence Activities Regarding

the Formosa Straits Situation

In view of the fact that no meeting of the IAC is planned for 5 April, the attached proposal of the Director of Central Intelligence has been added to the Agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 29 March.



Secretary

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IAC-D-91/2  
28 March 1955

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IAC-D-91/2  
28 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Coordination of Intelligence Activities Regarding the Formosa Straits Situation


1. As a means of providing prompt and authoritative joint current intelligence summaries to the President and other senior policy-makers regarding the Formosa Straits situation, the IAC has established the Current Intelligence Group meeting daily in the Indications Center. The reports of that group have been disseminated every day since 21 March.

2. The Watch Committee has prepared and caused to be disseminated to field collection agencies, a sharpened list of "indicators" bearing on this area, as a collection guide. This list will be kept under continual revision.

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5. Accordingly, I suggest that the IAC note the steps being taken by the military authorities in the area, and the other steps indicated above.

IAC-D-91/2  
28 March 1955

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
Colonel Robert O'Brien, USA (G-2)  
Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)  
Colonel William S. Boyd, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)  
Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA (JIG)

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Evidence Concerning Yugoslav-Soviet Relations

REFERENCE : IAC-D-90, 29 September 1954

1. In accordance with IAC-D-90, para. 4, we are forwarding for your information evaluations of certain evidence concerning Yugoslav-Soviet relations, which were discussed at a meeting of the Board of National Estimates and the IAC representatives on 28 September.

2. The evidence presented at that meeting by Major Pyle falls into three categories: (a) the Raditsa article in Freeman; (b) statements attributed to pro-Cominform Communists concerning the reasons for the dissolution of the pro-Tito Communist party in Trieste; and (c) certain FBI reports.

3. The attached evaluations are as follows: (a) on the Raditsa article, we have enclosed an evaluation made by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, dated 29 January 1954 (TAB A); (b) on the Trieste matter, we have attached two articles from the Current Intelligence Digest (TAB B); and (c) on the FBI reports we have attached an evaluation of a series of FBI reports which cover much more than just the Tito matter, but which shed light upon the source's

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reliability. This evaluation was concurred in by several offices of CIA (TAB C).

4. These evaluations bear only on the three categories of evidence specifically raised by Major Pyle. We have not attempted to evaluate herein the broad mass of other evidence bearing on the problem.

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Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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IAC-D-90

29 September 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations

1. In accordance with instructions of the IAC (IAC-M-170), the Board of National Estimates and IAC representatives met at 1000, 28 September, with Major Pyle of the office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff, to consider certain evidence regarding Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

2. After discussion, the consensus was that no immediate revision of the estimates in NIE-93, "Probable Developments in Yugoslavia," was called for.

3. Action Recommended:

- a. That we hold to our present plans for preparation of a new estimate on Yugoslavia in 1955, though possibly moving the scheduled date of completion from the third to the second quarter.
- b. That collection resources of the intelligence community be particularly alerted with respect to developments in Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union and the Bloc.

4. It was noted that evaluations have already been made of much of the evidence discussed by Major Pyle and that these evaluations should be assembled and circulated to the IAC. The Board of National Estimates has assumed responsibility for this action.

SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman  
Board of National Estimates

Authenticated:

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Secretary

IAC-D-90

29 September 1954

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IAC-D-89/1  
27 September 1954

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Withdrawal of Information Concerning the Atomic Energy Programs of  
Other Nations from the RESTRICTED DATA Category

All of the IAC members having concurred in the transmission of the proposed communication, circulated for approval with IAC-D-89 dated 2 September, a communication incorporating amendments proposed by the Air Force was transmitted to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Director of Central Intelligence on 9 September.



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IAC-D-89/1  
27 September 1954

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IAC-D-89  
2 September 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Withdrawal of Information Concerning the Atomic Energy Programs of Other Nations from the RESTRICTED DATA Category


1. There is attached a communication which the Director of Central Intelligence proposes to transmit to the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of establishing agreement on the above subject, pursuant to Section 142 (e) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Copies have already been placed in the hands of your representatives on the JAEIC.

25X1 2. Your comments would be appreciated. They should be communicated  
25X1 to [redacted] of the Central Intelligence Agency, [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] Expeditious consideration of this matter is deemed essential in order to avoid a hiatus in the flow of information to intelligence agencies. A reply prior to the close of business on 7 September 1954 is, therefore, desired.

[redacted]  
Secretary

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IAC-D-89  
2 September 1954

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IAC-D-88/2  
16 November 1954

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence

and Intelligence Information

The proposed DCID 11/2 (see IAC-D-88 and IAC-D-88/1)  
"Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence  
Information," in which the IAC members have concurred, was  
approved by the Director of Central Intelligence on 15 November 1954.  
It will be distributed to holders of the looseleaf book of INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTIVES.

[Redacted Signature]

Secretary

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IAC-D-88/2  
16 November 1954

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Approved For Release 2007/11/15 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500100001-4

IAC-D-88/1  
4 October 1954

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

**Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence**

**and Intelligence Information**

1. IAC-D-88, 9 August 1954, set forth in Tab B a proposed DCID 11/2 to standardize controls over the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information. This proposal now has the concurrence of all the IAC agencies with concurrence by the FBI subject to the following revision of paragraph 2 of the proposed DCID 11/2 to read:

"2. a. The standardization of the stamps and the procedures set forth in this directive do not preclude a department or agency from adding those internal controls it considers essential to meet extraordinary internal requirements.

b. Further, these stamps and procedures will not apply to the FBI, which has established controls over the dissemination and use of its information nor do they affect the special controls over the dissemination and use of special and atomic intelligence; information subject to copyright, libel, slander and communication laws; information which for moral, ethical or legal reasons must be protected; or unclassified material published for non-governmental use."

IAC-D-88/1  
4 October 1954

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Approved For Release 2007/11/15 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500100001-4

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IAC-D-88/1  
4 October 1954

2. This change by the FBI is to make clear that the proposed DCID 11/2 does not affect the control of FBI information.

3. Please telephone your concurrence or non-concurrence

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business on 11 October 1954.

Secretary

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IAC-D-88/1  
4 October 1954

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Approved For Release 2007/11/15 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500100001-4

IAC-D-88  
9 August 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE  
AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

1. Problems concerning the protection of sources and methods arising from the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information have, over a period of years, produced uncoordinated control mechanisms resulting in confusion and unnecessary overhead expense.

2. IAC representatives have refined a draft DCID 11/2 (Tab B) which, through standardization of control practices, is designed to reduce overhead expense and eliminate confusion by provision of a single written policy and procedure agreed by all concerned.

3. The most important consideration was the need to obtain maximum necessary use of intelligence while, with a minimum of administration, protecting sources and methods.

4. A brief staff study (Tab A) presents the problem, outlines present practices and the problems thereunder and recommends IAC approval of the draft DCID 11/2. Please telephone your concurrence or nonconcurrence to [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] by close of business on 27 August 1954.

[redacted]  
Secretary

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CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE  
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PROBLEM:

1. To clarify and standardize among the IAC agencies the various controls on dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information other than internal agency controls and special controls on special and atomic intelligence, information subject to copyright, libel, slander and communications laws, information which for moral, ethical or legal reasons must be protected, and unclassified material published for non-governmental use.

DISCUSSION:

2. At present throughout the IAC community there are various control devices used in restricting the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information. Existing control devices include such stamps as "U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY" (used by State and CIA); "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force); "LIMITED DISTRIBUTION" (used by CIA); "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" (as used by several agencies in the field); "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" (as used by the State Department in Washington); two stamps used by CIA/CS in controlling information, one for critical security reasons and the other for operational or administrative reasons; a limiting stamp or caveat used by [ ] on another series of information which restricts the dissemination of that information to IAC components and a caveat used by [ ] to protect CIA against attribution as the source of their publications. In addition there are restrictions in CIA regulations, applicable only within CIA, which govern the use of raw information in finished intelligence in order to protect sources and methods of intelligence. There also are bilateral agreements between components of CIA and other agencies which limit the use of information, for example: [ ] has required the State Department, in writing, not to disseminate [ ] Further, there have been efforts made in response to particular problems to educate

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recipients of intelligence and intelligence information on the controls which should be exercised and a temporary arrangement is in effect between this Agency and G-2 with respect to the certain uses which may be made by G-2 of this Agency's material.

3. The above description of the present system does not pretend to be an exhaustive explanation of existing practices but rather outlines the number of stamps and other mechanisms in existence to achieve control over the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information. Several questions have arisen with respect to existing controls. Some of these questions are as follows:

a. Are the two stamps, one utilized by the three services and other by State and CIA (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS and U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY), designed to accomplish the same purpose?

b. Are part-time employees, external research personnel, consultants, aliens employed by the U. S. Government or foreign officers integrated into G-2 considered U. S. officials for the purpose of dissemination, under "U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY" or "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS?"

c. Is it necessary and desirable to have two "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" stamps, one for use in the field and one for use in Washington, using the same words but designed for entirely different purposes?



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e. How is controlled information cited in finished intelligence?

f. Which information series require the deletion of source references and which do not when used in finished intelligence?

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
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g. When controlled information is used in a finished intelligence product to what extent must that product be similarly controlled?

h. How does an analyst recognize information, the very substance of which should not be placed in finished intelligence products?



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4. After examining present practices and taking advantage of the experience of CIA collectors, producers and disseminators, a draft DCID 11/2 was developed to standardize control practices in the intelligence community. This draft was then subjected to further refinement by representatives of the IAC agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

5. It is recommended that the IAC approve the draft DCID 11/2 (Tab B).

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 11/2

CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION AND USE OF  
INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

( \_\_\_\_\_ : CONFIDENTIAL)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 11 and paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of NSCID No. 1, and for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and intelligence information, the following procedures are established to control the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information (hereinafter called information):

1. Classified or controlled intelligence and information originating in another department or agency will not be disseminated or used outside the receiving agency without permission of the originating agency except as provided in paragraph 7, NSCID No. 1, and paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Directive. In controlling dissemination and use of intelligence and information, the policy of "need-to-know" will be closely followed.

2. The standardization of the stamps set forth in this directive does not preclude a department or agency from adding those internal controls it considers essential to meet extraordinary internal requirements nor does it affect the special controls over special and atomic intelligence; information subject to copyright, libel, slander and communication laws; information which for moral, ethical or legal reasons must be protected; or unclassified material published for non-governmental use.

3. Whenever it is deemed necessary to provide for control of intelligence or information, in addition to the protection provided by a defense classification, the appropriate control stamp or stamps will be placed (preferably underneath the defense classification) upon a document. These stamps may be followed by the definitions below, or used alone. Stamps will be in full capitals.

a. "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS."  
Dissemination limited to U. S. officials. No dissemination of

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
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this material will be made to foreign nationals and immigrant aliens, including U. S. government employed, utilized or integrated foreign nationals and immigrant aliens, without permission of the originating agency.

- 1) The originating agency may abbreviate this stamp to "NOFORN."



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- 3) The absence of this stamp on classified material does not mean that the receiving agency may disseminate such material to foreign nationals and immigrant aliens without permission of the originating agency.

b. "NO DISSEM ABROAD." Dissemination limited to the continental United States exclusive of territories and possessions without permission of the originating agency.

c. "NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY" Dissemination limited to the Bureau of the Budget, Foreign Operations Administration, Department of Treasury, Office of Defense Mobilization, staff of the Operations Coordinating Board, Federal Civil Defense Administration, all components of Defense, State, AEC, FBI and CIA unless permission of the originating agency is obtained.

d. "INTELL COMPONENTS ONLY." Dissemination limited to CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs, unless permission of the originating agency is obtained.

e. "LIMITED." Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on

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
short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating agency is obtained. "

f. "CONTINUED CONTROL." Information may be used in only that finished intelligence which bears the same controls as the information itself.

g. "BACKGROUND USE ONLY." Information bearing this stamp will not be included in any intelligence publication without permission of the originating agency.

4. "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." Unclassified information bearing this stamp may be used for official purposes by U. S. departments and agencies. It may be used for official purposes by foreign governments which have been authorized to receive it by the originating agency. This information may be disclosed to non-governmental persons and organizations only with permission of the originating agency.

5. If an item of information bears neither the stamp "BACKGROUND USE ONLY" nor "CONTINUED CONTROL," it may be used in finished intelligence, except digests and summaries, without regard to any control stamps appearing on it, provided that:



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c. While the producing agency is responsible for the dissemination of its finished intelligence, citation of the

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documents listed in 5a and 5b, if made, will be removed before release to foreign nationals and immigrant aliens unless permission of the originating agency is obtained.

6. All controlled information, except that which bears the stamp "BACKGROUND USE ONLY," may be quoted, extracted or summarized in digests and summaries, provided the dissemination of such digests and summaries conforms to the controls on the information and the controls are reprinted with the information. Agencies originating information may notify the offices which produce such digests and summaries of special requirements with respect to referencing the information. Permission to include information in such digests or summaries to receive a broader distribution than allowed by controls on the information will be requested of the originating agency.

7. Letters or memoranda, and single papers of a non-recurring nature, will be controlled as determined by the originating agency.

8. Intelligence and information collected, produced and disseminated prior to the effective date of this directive, which will be ninety days after its approval, will be controlled as provided herein when such intelligence or information is removed from files for dissemination or use. Questions with respect to any conflicts between control stamps or statements on such intelligence and information and this directive will be referred to the originating agency.

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IAC-D-83  
9 June 1954

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**NSC Request for Report and Estimate as to**

**Probable Effects of Restricting Bloc Representatives**

1. Transmitted herewith is an 8 June memorandum from the Executive Secretary, NSC, to the DCI, levying subject request. The referenced IIC-ICIS report of 1 June was disseminated to the IAC members by the NSC Secretariat on 8 June.

2. Mr. Dulles proposes to discuss at the IAC meeting of 15 June procedures and actions to be taken in response to this request. IAC members are requested to initiate immediate agency consideration of the basic IIC-ICIS report.

[Redacted Signature]

Secretary

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