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APPENDIX B

SELECTED ACTIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE EXCLUSIVE OF  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

20 October 1950 - 10 August 1954

(UNDER SEPARATE COVER)

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APPENDIX C

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND

BASIC DIRECTIVES

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STATUTORY AUTHORITY

(The National Security Act of 1947, as Amended; UNCLASSIFIED)

TITLE I -- COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

\* \* \*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life: Provided, however, That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director, or Deputy Director, then --

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director, or Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not lower than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be, including personal money allowance) payable to

a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency. He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation established for such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer, shall, during the period in which such commissioned officer occupies the office of Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the armed service of which he is a member.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (34 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council —

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.

(Note: The National Security Act of 1947 may be cited as 61 Stat. 496, 50 U.S.C. 401, et. seq., approved July 26, 1947, as amended by the Act of August 10, 1949, 63 Stat. 579 and the Act of April 4, 1953, 67 Stat. 19.)

TAB

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

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1  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1**

**DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

(Revised 3/28/52; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be chairman thereof, the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the respective intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever matters within the purview of his agency are to be discussed.

2. To the extent authorized by Section 102 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence material of the various Federal departments and agencies relating to the national security as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and to make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.

3. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed primarily to strengthen the over-all governmental intelligence structure. Primary departmental requirements shall be recognized and shall receive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency.

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council pertaining to the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies, transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the Department of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council.

b. Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as Council Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. The respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelligence organizations.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

c. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Security Council to insure full and proper implementation of Council directives by issuing such supplementary DCI directives as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented within the departments and agencies as provided in paragraph b. Where disagreement arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and one or more members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee over such directives, the proposed directive, together with statements of non-concurrence, shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as provided in paragraph a.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence. Insofar as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various departments and agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes. For definitions see NSCID No. 3.

5. a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security Council, to the intelligence chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and to such governmental departments and agencies as the National Security Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the intelligence agencies or shall carry a statement of substantially differing opinions.

b. Unless otherwise provided by law or NSC Directive, the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to disseminate National Intelligence on a strictly controlled basis to foreign governments and international bodies upon determination by the Director of Central Intelligence, concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, that such action would substantially promote the security of the United States; provided that any disclosure of classified military information included in such national intelligence is in accordance with the policies laid down in the U.S. National Disclosure Policy (MIC 206/29)\*, such determination to be made by the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and provided further that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information will be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination.

6. Whenever any member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee obtains information that indicates an impending crisis situation, such as the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, or a condition which affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision on the part of the President or the National Security Council seems to be required, he shall immediately furnish the information to the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as well as to other officials or agencies as may be indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligence

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shall immediately convene the Intelligence Advisory Committee. After receiving the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee members, the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly prepare and disseminate the national intelligence estimate in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

7. When security regulations of the originating agency permit, the Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other departments or agencies intelligence or intelligence information which he may possess when he deems such dissemination appropriate to their functions relating to the national security.

8. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such services of common concern to these Agencies as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

9. The intelligence organizations in each of the departments and agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with each other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a continuing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence available to them.

10. The intelligence files in each intelligence organization, including the CIA, shall be made available under security regulations of the department or agency concerned to the others for consultation.

11. The intelligence organizations within the limits of their capabilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be requested by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other departments or agencies.

12. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrangements with the respective departments and agencies to assign to the Central Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers and members as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel procedures of each department.

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2**

**COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD**

(Approved 1/13/48; CONFIDENTIAL)

The following over-all policies and objectives are established by the National Security Council for the interdepartmental coordination of foreign intelligence collection activities, so that measures may be taken promptly to effect sound and efficient utilization of the various departmental collecting and reporting facilities abroad:

1. There shall be an allocation within certain broad categories of agency responsibility for collection abroad, as follows:

Cultural .....	Department of State
Political .....	Department of State
Sociological .....	Department of State
Military .....	Department of the Army
Naval .....	Department of the Navy
Air .....	Department of the Air Force
Economic	} ..... Each agency in accordance with its respective needs *
Scientific	
Technological	

2. All available intelligence information, no matter by whom collected, shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may also send copies to or otherwise inform his own agency.

3. The senior U.S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign post shall, within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein, be responsible for the coordination of all normal collection activities in his area.

4. The collecting and reporting facilities of each of the agencies shall be utilized so as to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap and to insure within budgetary limitations that full flow of intelligence information which is the major need of all departments and agencies for the accomplishment of their respective missions.

5. Full utilization shall be made of the individual initiative and favorable contacts of agency representatives.

6. No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objectives shall negate the basic principle that all departmental representatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to their departments of all intelligence information pertinent to their departmental missions.

7. There shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental exchange of intelligence information to meet the recognized secondary needs of each department and agency for intelligence usually obtained or prepared by other departments or agencies.

\* See NSCID Nos. 10 and 15 below.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 3**

**COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION**

(Approved 1/13/48; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following over-all policies and objectives are established for the coordination of the production of intelligence:

1. In order that all facilities of the Government may be utilized to their capacity and the responsibilities of each agency may be clearly defined in accordance with its mission, dominant interest, and capabilities, the whole field of intelligence production is divided into the following categories, and responsibilities are allocated as indicated:

*a. Basic Intelligence*

(1) Basic intelligence is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.

(2) An outline of all basic intelligence required by the Government shall be prepared by the CIA in collaboration with the appropriate agencies. This outline shall be broken down into chapters, sections, and sub-sections which shall be allocated as production and maintenance responsibilities to CIA and those agencies of the Government which are best qualified by reason of their intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interest to assume the production and maintenance responsibility.

(3) When completed, this outline and tentative allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be submitted for NSC approval and issued as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected that as the result of constant consultation with the agencies by the Director of Central Intelligence, both the outline and the allocations will be revised from time to time to insure the production of the basic intelligence required by the agencies and the fullest possible use of current agency capabilities. Changes in the outline or allocations shall be effected by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned.

(4) This basic intelligence shall be compiled and continuously maintained in National Intelligence Surveys to cover foreign countries, areas, or broad special subjects as appropriate. The National Intelligence Surveys will be disseminated in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned.

(5) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for accomplishing the editing, publication, and dissemination of these National In-

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

telligence Surveys and shall make such requests on the agencies as are necessary for their proper development and maintenance.

(6) Departments or agencies to be called on for contributions to this undertaking may include agencies other than those represented permanently in the IAC.

*b. Current Intelligence*

(1) Current intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

(2) The CIA and the several agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or external responsibilities.

(3) Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be based on interagency agreement including NSC Intelligence Directive No. 1 and the principle of informing all who need to know.

*c. Staff Intelligence*

(1) Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities.

(2) Each intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility for the preparation of such staff intelligence as its own department shall require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of the departments must be broader in scope than any allocation of collection responsibility or recognition of dominant interest might indicate. In fact, the full foreign intelligence picture is of interest in varying degrees at different times to each of the departments.

(3) Any intelligence agency, either through the Director of Central Intelligence or directly, may call upon other appropriate agencies for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. Such requests shall be made upon the agencies in accordance with their production capabilities and dominant interest.

(4) As a part of the coordination program, the Director of Central Intelligence will seek the assistance of the IAC intelligence agencies in minimizing the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence in fields outside its dominant interests.

(5) The CIA and the agencies shall, for purposes of coordination, exchange information on projects and plans for the production of staff intelligence.

(6) It shall be normal practice that staff intelligence of one agency is available to the other intelligence agencies permanently represented on the IAC.

*d. Departmental Intelligence*

(1) Departmental intelligence is that intelligence including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

independent Agency of the Federal Government, and the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities.

*e. National Intelligence*

(1) National intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency or the Military Establishment.

(2) The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and disseminate national intelligence.

(3) The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the IAC Agencies in order that he may obtain from them within the limits of their capabilities the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the production of national intelligence.

(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies, request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually.

2. The research facilities required by any agency to process its own current and staff intelligence shall be adequate to satisfy its individual needs after taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies. Each agency shall endeavor to maintain adequate research facilities, not only to accomplish the intelligence production tasks allocated to it directly under the foregoing provisions but also to provide such additional intelligence reports or estimates within its field of dominant interest as may be necessary to satisfy the requirements of the other agencies under such allocations.

3. For the purposes of intelligence production, the following division of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests:

Political, Cultural,  
Sociological Intelligence . . . . Department of State  
Military Intelligence . . . . . Department of the Army  
Naval Intelligence . . . . . Department of the Navy  
Air Intelligence . . . . . Department of the Air Force  
Economic, Scientific, and      Each agency in accordance  
Technological Intelligence . . . with its respective needs \*

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\* See NSCID Nos. 10 and 15 below.

**SECRET**

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4**

**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES**

**(Approved 12/12/47; CONFIDENTIAL)**

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947 and for the purpose of providing intelligence support for the preparation of studies required by the National Security Council in the fulfillment of its duties, it is directed that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the other agencies concerned, shall prepare a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objectives applicable to foreign countries and areas to serve as a guide for the coordinated collection and production of National Intelligence:

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the other agencies concerned, and under the guidance of the NSC Staff\* shall select from time to time and on a current basis sections and items of such outline which have a priority interest. These selections will be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to supply the desired priority guidance for the production of National Intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency and for the contributions to such production by other agencies concerned.

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\* For this purpose, the NSC Staff shall consist of the Executive Secretary and the Departmental representatives designated by Council members to advise and assist the Executive Secretary. Any cases of disagreement within this group will be referred to the National Security Council for decision.

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**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5**

**(OMITTED FOR SECURITY REASONS.)**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security, except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal counterespionage operations outside the United States and its possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authority shall not be construed to preclude the counter-intelligence activities of any army, navy or air command or installation and certain agreed activities by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities.
4. When casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by an IAC Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity, the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate their activities with the organized covert activities.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such intelligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have an authorized interest therein.
6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or implementing supplements shall be construed to apply solely to overt intelligence activities unless otherwise specified.

NSCID 5  
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August 28, 1951

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7. In an occupied area, the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence will coordinate espionage and counterespionage operations in or from the area with the senior U. S. Representative and keep the Senior U. S. Military Commander informed in general of the clandestine collection activities conducted by DCI in or from such area.

8. In an area other than theaters of war or occupied areas, the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence will keep the senior U. S. Representative appropriately advised of the espionage and counterespionage operations in or from the area.

9. When CIA requires Service support for espionage and counter-espionage projects, such support as may be authorized by the Department of Defense will be planned jointly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. In time of war or when the President directs, the Director of Central Intelligence will coordinate espionage and counterespionage operations in or from a theater of active military operations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war, where American forces are engaged, representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence conducting espionage and counterespionage operations in or from the theater shall be under the direct command of the United States theater commander.

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**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 6**

**FOREIGN WIRELESS AND RADIO MONITORING**

(Approved 12/12/47; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all Federal monitoring of foreign propaganda and press broadcasts required for the collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of all departments and agencies in connection with the National Security.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such intelligence information to the various departments and agencies which have an authorized interest therein.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7**

**DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION**

(Approved 2/12/48; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purpose enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

2. To implement this undertaking, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

*a.* Determine the foreign intelligence potential of sources so that the best available may be selected expeditiously for exploitation upon the receipt of collection requests from the intelligence agencies. For this purpose, CIA will maintain a central index of non-governmental sources in the United States.

*b.* Establish uniform procedures and standards for security clearance of all contacts in this field, and arrange such clearances.

*c.* Establish uniform procedures to insure that the interests of organizations and individuals contacted will not be jeopardized.

*d.* Collect through the establishment of field offices within the United States, foreign intelligence information required in the interests of the national security or by the individual intelligence agencies.

*e.* Arrange for direct contact between intelligence agency representatives and non-governmental sources within the United States whenever conditions require such action or upon the request of a member agency to secure technical or other foreign intelligence information.

*f.* Obtain the agreement of responsible policy-making officials of American organizations having a foreign intelligence potential before establishing and maintaining contacts within that organization.

*g.* Inform the intelligence agencies of the prospective departure from or return to the United States of selected American citizens having a high foreign intelligence potential, so that the agencies may furnish requirements or provide specialists for briefing or interrogation.

*h.* Disseminate to the appropriate agencies all foreign intelligence information obtained through this program. Reports produced by the agencies shall be identified as such, unless the originating agency stipulates to the contrary.

3. Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agencies shall:

*a.* Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency field offices, if they so desire and within their capabilities, representatives to serve

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their interests under the direction of the CIA managers. Member agencies may, at their discretion, establish active working liaison between their regional offices and CIA field offices.

b. Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency for collection all their requests for foreign intelligence information to be obtained from non-governmental sources within the United States.

c. Transmit to the Central Intelligence Agency for appropriate dissemination full information and reports resulting from approved direct contacts by agency representatives with non-governmental sources, identifying such sources by CIA code number.

d. Obtain, to the maximum extent possible, from their departments and agencies the foreign intelligence information which the departments and agencies have received as a by-product of the normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States in connection with non-intelligence activities, and transmit to the maximum extent possible, the information to the Central Intelligence Agency for editing for source security and for appropriate dissemination.

e. Obtain, insofar as is practicable and within existing security regulations, from their departments and agencies information concerning business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States having foreign intelligence potential, which the department or agency possesses or subsequently acquires, and make the information available to the Central Intelligence Agency.

f. Nominate representatives to serve on a committee, under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, to meet periodically to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with this program.

4. Further to implement this undertaking, the National Security Resources Board and the components of the Military Establishment, other than the components represented on the IAC, shall furnish directly to the CIA, to the maximum extent possible, all foreign intelligence information which is received as a by-product of their normal relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States, in connection with non-intelligence activities.

5. Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the established relationship of the departments and agencies with business concerns, other non-governmental organizations, and individuals in the United States for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelligence information. Nor shall it affect the normal interchange of documents between libraries of the departments and other libraries, or the development of research projects with individuals or non-governmental institutions.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 8**

**BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON FOREIGN SCIENTIFIC  
AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERSONALITIES**

(Approved 5/25/48; **SECRET**)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and for the purpose enunciated in paragraph d(4) thereof, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of biographical data on foreign scientific and technological personalities is assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. To implement this undertaking, the following procedures are established:

a. Departmental intelligence agencies shall continue to collect, analyze, and abstract biographical data on foreign scientific and technological personalities in accordance with their needs.

b. Departmental intelligence agencies shall forward to the Central Intelligence Agency, in the manner most satisfactory to the Department concerned, all biographical data originating within their respective Departments, or complete documentary references thereto, on foreign scientific and technological personalities.

c. The Central Intelligence Agency shall codify and index all such data received, including such data as may be received from all sources, and shall incorporate the actual material received in its files.

d. All biographical data on foreign scientific and technological personalities maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency shall be readily available to the participating departments and agencies.

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 9**  
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SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 10**  
**COLLECTION OF FOREIGN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DATA**

(Approved 1/18/49; SECRET)

1. Since previous directives made no specific provision for supplying "scientific" and "technological" information other than that required by each IAC agency for its own use, it is, accordingly, determined that, in furtherance of the cooperative policies and procedures enunciated in NSCID No. 2 and any supplements thereto, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 and for the purpose of providing the U.S. Government and its agencies with the scientific and technological information required from foreign areas in the interests of national security:

a. The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for the collection abroad for all government agencies of information in the basic sciences. The Department of State will also collect information in such additional scientific and technical fields as is necessary to meet the requirements of government agencies other than the Department of Defense and, when requested, requirements of the Department of Defense. The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will collect scientific and technological information including basic research when necessary to meet the requirements of the Department of Defense, utilizing whenever practicable the facilities of the Department of State for collection in the basic sciences. Close collaboration and consultation will be maintained between all scientific representatives at U.S. missions abroad so that all scientific requirements can be satisfied with minimum duplication and maximum utilization of personnel. The scientific representatives of the Department of State shall be available to serve as scientific consultants to the military representatives.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with pertinent agencies, shall determine those countries which have informational potential in fields of basic and applied sciences, as related to the national security.

c. For the purpose of inducing exchanges with foreign countries, the Department of Defense shall provide the Department of State with available unclassified information pertaining to the basic sciences.

d. In order to provide for the collection of the data which is the responsibility of the Department of State, the Department of State shall take appropriate measures to obtain the necessary funds from the Congress or from the agencies served, other than the Department of Defense, and will appoint, as practicable, specially qualified scientific and technical personnel to selected United States Missions for this collection responsibility.

e. In order to provide for the collection of the data which is the responsibility of the Department of Defense, the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force shall take appropriate measures to obtain the necessary funds from the Congress and will assign as prac-

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

licable, specially qualified scientific and technical personnel to the staffs of their respective attaches at such United States Missions as may be required for this collection responsibility.

*f.* The Department of State shall call upon agencies of the government which require scientific or technological information for advice and assistance as may be necessary in connection with the requirements of this directive.

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**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 11**  
**SECURITY OF INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE SOURCES**  
**AND METHODS**

(Approved 1/6/50; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 101 (b) (2) and 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, providing that the National Security Council shall consider policy on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security and shall make recommendations to the President in connection therewith, and that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The departments and agencies of the Government engaged in intelligence activities shall take steps to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information on United States intelligence sources and methods. Each agency will determine its own channel for authorization to release any such information. The delimiting phrase "intelligence sources and methods" includes information ostensibly overt which requires security protection because of its specific means of procurement or specific place of procurement, revelation of which would endanger intelligence sources and methods, but the phrase does not include intelligence as such, the dissemination of which is already covered by appropriate departmental and agency security regulations.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate policies concerning the protection of intelligence sources and methods, within the limits established by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, except where provision has already been made by the National Security Council.

3. In protecting intelligence sources and methods, the Director of Central Intelligence and the other intelligence directors shall be guided by the principle that covert or sensitive information, either unevaluated or as an intelligence product, shall go only to those whose official duties require such knowledge.

4. In order to protect intelligence sources and methods further, any reference to the Central Intelligence Agency should emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence, rather than its secret intelligence activities. No reference will be made to this agency whatsoever unless it is unavoidable, of course.

**SECRET**

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 12**  
**AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICITY CONCERNING THE INTELLIGENCE**  
**AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT**

(Approved 1/6/50; ~~RESTRICTED~~)

Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 101 and 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and in accordance with Section 7 of NSC 50, \* the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following policy be established, since any publicity, factual or fictional, concerning intelligence is potentially detrimental to the effectiveness of an intelligence activity and to the national security:

1. All departments and agencies represented by membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee shall take steps to prevent the unauthorized disclosure for written or oral publication of any information concerning intelligence or intelligence activities. The head of each department or agency will determine his channel for granting such authorization as may be necessary.

2. The sense of the above directive shall be communicated to all other executive departments and agencies as an expression of policy of the National Security Council. \*\*

3. In cases where the disclosure of classified information is sought from the Director of Central Intelligence, and he has doubt as to whether he should comply, the question will be referred to the National Security Council.

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\* Not reproduced herein.

\*\* See communication which follows.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 15**

**COORDINATION AND PRODUCTION OF FOREIGN  
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE**

(Approved 6/13/51; CONFIDENTIAL)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs the Central Intelligence Agency to perform the following functions with respect to foreign economic intelligence relating to the national security:

1. Maintain a continuing review of the requirements of the United States Government for foreign economic intelligence relating to the national security, and of the facilities and arrangements available to meet those requirements, making from time to time such recommendations to the National Security Council concerning improvements as may require National Security Council action.

2. Insure through regular procedures that the full economic knowledge and technical talent available in the Government is brought to bear on important issues involving national security, including issues on which assistance is requested by the National Security Council or members thereof.

3. Evaluate, through regular procedures, the pertinence, extent, and quality of the foreign economic data available bearing on national security issues, and develop ways in which quality could be improved and gaps could be filled.

4. Conduct, as a service of common concern, such foreign economic research and produce such foreign economic intelligence as may be required (a) to supplement that produced by other agencies either in the appropriate discharge of their regular departmental missions or in fulfillment of assigned intelligence responsibilities; (b) to fulfill requests of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

85

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 16

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS

(Approved 3/7/53; CONFIDENTIAL)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the coordination of the procurement of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, it being understood that captured documents are excepted from this provision.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide, as a primary responsibility, for the following services to the IAC agencies.

*a.* Preparing and disseminating English language excerpts, summaries, abstracts, and compilations from foreign language publications.

*b.* Developing and maintaining indexes, accession lists, and reference services regarding foreign language publications of intelligence interest.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the coordination of the above activities, as well as the coordination of translation services, with similar activities maintained by the intelligence agencies in accordance with their needs; such coordination shall not prejudice the maintenance of facilities necessary to meet departmental demands.

4. The intelligence agencies of the Government shall grant to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon request, access to foreign language publications in their possession.

5. An Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications shall be established to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the implementation of this directive. It shall be composed of the IAC agencies and other agencies of the Government will be invited to sit with the Committee on matters which concern them.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTIVES

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 2/1**  
**IMPLEMENTATION OF COORDINATION OF COLLECTION PLAN**

(10/25/48; CONFIDENTIAL)

Under the authority of the National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2, and for the purpose of supplying the necessary operating details for the guidance of the coordinating officials, the agencies, and their field representatives in their implementation of the policies and objectives established therein, the following procedures are established:

*1. Coordinating officials and their responsibilities:*

*a.* The senior U.S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign post shall, within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein, be responsible for the coordination of all normal collection activities in his area.

*b.* To implement this coordination, each such representative shall:

(1) Exert every effort to centralize all intelligence information for the use of all authorized personnel.

(2) Eliminate undesirable duplication of collection effort and reporting and assure the proper channeling of information.

(3) Insure that whenever one or more of the departmental intelligence agencies are not represented at a foreign post, reporting on the appropriate categories is delegated to the extent possible to other members of the staff.

*2. Collecting agents and their responsibilities:*

*a.* Representatives of Departments or Agencies who are charged with the collection of intelligence information in the field, will be responsible to their respective Departments or Agencies:

(1) To comply in the coordination measures prescribed by the responsible officer as set forth in paragraph 1 above.

(2) To forward promptly to their home office and enter in a central intelligence index or file when established all intelligence material from any source which falls within their departmental agency responsibilities.

(3) To bring promptly to the attention of the proper representatives of other Departments or Agencies any intelligence information of concern to them. Nothing in this directive prevents a representative from reporting any intelligence information to his own Department or Agency or maintaining a file of the material for his own official use.

(4) To make available to the senior U.S. representative and the field representatives of other agencies all collection directives and instructions received from their departments.

*b.* Nothing in this directive shall be interpreted as authorizing any officer to delay, suppress, or make substantive changes in any intelligence report without the concurrence of the officer submitting the report. Intelligence material, which may have no significance to field

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

representatives in a single area or which may appear to be at complete variance with the over-all trend, may have great significance and form a definite part of an estimate being developed by the individual department or by the Central Intelligence Agency. Any dissenting opinion or commentary may either be incorporated in the report or submitted separately.

c. No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objectives shall negate the basic principle that all departmental representatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to their departments of all intelligence information pertinent to their departmental missions.

**3. *The agencies and their responsibilities:***

a. Each intelligence agency shall be responsible for the collection of intelligence information within its own categories of dominant interest for its own needs and for those of any other intelligence agency requesting it directly or through the Central Intelligence Agency, it being recognized that other agencies may have secondary interests in and need for such intelligence material for the production of their own staff intelligence.

b. Departmental intelligence agencies will issue such directives to the field as will insure the implementation of this plan.

**R. H. HILLENKOETTER**  
Director of Central Intelligence

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7/1**  
**DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL INDIVIDUALS**  
**APPROACHING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES**

(10/1/53; **SECRET**)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID #7, and for the purpose of assuring effective exploitation of non-governmental individuals who offer the intelligence agencies foreign positive intelligence information, and for the purpose of protecting the intelligence community against undue disclosure of intelligence methods in accordance with NSCID #11, the following procedures are hereby established:

1. Each intelligence agency will establish a focal office in its Washington, D. C., headquarters for receiving non-governmental visitors and for discussing the information offered. The focal office in each agency will also be responsible for receiving written or verbal communications from non-governmental individuals offering intelligence information.

2. When an official in a focal office determines that a non-governmental individual is offering, or has given foreign positive intelligence information, the intelligence agency will advise the Contact Division, Office of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, which will be responsible for the visitor's exploitation, if appropriate, in accordance with NSCID #7.

3. The term "non-governmental individuals" is here employed to denote US citizens not employed by the Federal Government, aliens resident in the United States, and alien visitors who are not representing a foreign government.

4. Each agency will issue necessary instructions so that all pertinent components will be aware of the necessity for referring offers of intelligence information from non-governmental individuals to the agency focal office established hereunder.

**ALLEN W. DULLES**  
Director of Central Intelligence

(NOTE: The FBI concurs in the policy expressed in this directive, but will implement through existing internal procedures, rather than by the establishment of a focal office.)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/1**  
**PROCEDURES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

(3/5/48; CONFIDENTIAL)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1, and for the purpose of providing a guide and facilities for the activities of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the following procedures are hereby established:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, or his representative, shall serve as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The Central Intelligence Agency will furnish the Secretariat therefor.

2. The Intelligence Advisory Committee shall meet on the call of the Director of Central Intelligence, either upon his own initiative or upon the request of an Intelligence Advisory Committee member.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee secretariat shall prepare and circulate in duplicate all proposals appropriate for IAC consideration. Such papers, whether initiated by IAC members or the Director of Central Intelligence, shall bear an appropriate series number and all subsequent papers related thereto shall carry a sub-number.

4. Agenda will be prepared and circulated to IAC members so as to reach them at least three working days in advance of each IAC meeting. Only those matters will be brought up for discussion which members of the IAC have had the opportunity to study and where appropriate have had the opportunity to obtain the opinion of other members of their Departments. After each meeting copies of the minutes will be circulated.

5. Membership in the IAC does not preclude intelligence chiefs from having access to the National Security Council through regularly established departmental channels.

**R. H. HILLENKOETTER**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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(Note: Original paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, providing for a Standing Committee "to assist the IAC in the performance of its functions," were deleted by IAC action 2 April 1951. Present paragraph 5 was original paragraph 8. References: IAC-D-15; IAC-M-24.)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

84

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/2

TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE IAC  
(11 May 1954; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph 10,a,(1) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on 30 October 1953, the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the IAC are hereby established:

Preamble

The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a place and by methods of its own choosing, hostile action \* in such strength as to gravely threaten the security of the United States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action will be undertaken by the IAC agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and estimating functions.

A. Name

Watch Committee of the IAC

B. Mission

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.

C. Functions

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an intelligence plan for the levying upon IAC members, and the requesting from other U.S. agencies through appropriate channels, of the intelligence requirements necessary to provide the maximum degree of advance warning and for recommending the collection priorities of these requirements.

2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the IAC agencies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to indications of:

a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against

1 the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces abroad,

2 U.S. allies or their forces,

3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

\* Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals in support of military strategy.


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- b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize the security of the United States.
3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with significant indications, to the principals of the IAC and other appropriate recipients. In the event of an impending critical situation, IAC principals will be immediately advised after which the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 1, will apply.
4. To make recommendations to the IAC, or member agencies thereof, including such divergent views as may be recorded.
5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating IAC estimative functions.

#### D. Composition and Organization

1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each IAC member organization, one of whom will be designated by the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, as Chairman for a specified period. The Committee will be supported by an Indications Center, headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consisting of an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.



2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule as determined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by one or more of its members or their principals.

#### E. Duties and Responsibilities

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the Indications Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities.

1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission.
2. Arrange through the IAC or the appropriate member thereof for exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and

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**SECRET**

intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission; and, among other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives of IAC field intelligence activities confer with the IAC and the Watch Committee in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field intelligence activities with the activities of the Watch Committee.

3. Arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening of all information and intelligence received by them by any means for the purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the Indications Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in addition to the action called for in paragraph 6 of NSCID No. 1); an agency evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with their respective parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that all pertinent information and intelligence is being made available to the Indications Center.

5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence received from all IAC agencies for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission.

6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indication in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.

7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee in regular and special meetings.

8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to assist in its deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.

9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of approved Watch Committee reports.

10. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all available information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission.

11. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting graphically the current and cumulative indications.

12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside assistance if desirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the problem on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in assisting effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its mission.

13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the IAC in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

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**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 4/1**

**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES**

(2/5/48; SECRET)

Under the authority of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, and for the purpose of providing further guidance for the collection of information, and for production of national intelligence in amplification of NSCID Nos. 2, 3, and 5:

1. By virtue of their relevance to the national security and to the formulation of national policies, National Intelligence Objectives, generally applicable to all foreign areas, shall be the determination of:

*a.* The intentions, current activities and probable future activities of the USSR with regard to the area under consideration.

*b.* The intentions, current activities and probable future activities of the government or governments in the area with regard to domestic affairs, including the basic human freedoms, governmental controls, and domestic propaganda.

*c.* Internal or external forces affecting the stability of the present government or governments in the area, including party strengths and main current political issues, and probable future developments.

*d.* The important foreign policies of the area, its current objectives and probable future relations with the UN, the U.S., the USSR, and with other countries.

*e.* The susceptibility of the area to political or economic influence by such other countries.

*f.* The current and anticipated themes and trends in the area's foreign propaganda.

*g.* The present and anticipated military capabilities of the area, particularly as to the distribution and allocation of its manpower, and its industrial and logistic efforts as they relate to its ground, or sea, or air forces.

*h.* Current trends in the developments of new weapons in the area and of new organizations both within and without the armed forces.

*i.* The war potential and grand strategy now and in the foreseeable future in the area, including present and future mobilization capabilities and the morale of its armed forces.

*j.* The current and anticipated status of the foreign trade of the area as may be seen particularly in its trade agreements, trade balances, and trade channeling.

*k.* The present and anticipated economic stability of the area and the extent to which it depends on outside economic assistance.

*l.* The current and anticipated status of the transportation and communication facilities of the area, of its food supply, of its financial situation, and of its reserves of natural resources.

*m.* Any significant relocations of the labor population or any new industrial methods or techniques in the area which might indicate scientific activities having a bearing on our national security.

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- n.* The present status of scientific activities in the area and their probable developments in the foreseeable future.
  - o.* Plans and objectives of the area for carrying out sabotage, espionage and subversion which might adversely affect the security of the United States.
2. The National Intelligence Objectives stated above are established to preclude the necessity of preparing and issuing individual National Intelligence Requirements, as such, for each country or area.
  3. The Central Intelligence Agency, in collaboration with other agencies concerned, shall establish and maintain on a current basis priority listings of National Intelligence Objectives, by country and/or subject.
  4. Approved priority listings prepared in accordance with paragraph 3 above, shall be appropriately disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

**R. H. HILLENKOETTER**  
Director of Central Intelligence

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**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 3/4**  
**PRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE**

(8/14/52; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3, and for the purpose of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence structure for the production of scientific and technical intelligence, the following policies and operating procedures are hereby established:

**1. Policies**

In discharging allocated responsibilities and effecting integration of intelligence, the interested departments and agencies will apply the following basic principles:

a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible or necessarily desirable in scientific and technical intelligence activities.

b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information and finished intelligence between all agencies concerned is essential.

c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority in any field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies and dissents recorded.

d. Any agency may make such studies as it believes necessary to supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order to fulfill its agency functions, but such studies should not normally be disseminated outside the producing agency without advance consultation with the agency having primary responsibility for the subject-matter involved.

e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a particular field will develop special competence in that field and will normally carry out all or most of the research in that field.

f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate the intelligence activities of its Technical Services and its other facilities having intelligence production capabilities with the work of the IAC intelligence agencies and to make available to those agencies the intelligence produced by such Services and facilities.

**2. Procedures:**

a. *Delineation of Dominant Interests.* The general field of scientific and technical intelligence production is subdivided into three basic major areas, and allocation of primary production responsibilities therein is made as follows:

(1) Intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military material and techniques: primary production responsibility of the departments of the Department of Defense, as exemplified in Annex A.

(2) Intelligence on fundamental research in the basic sciences, on scientific resources, and on medicine (other than military medicine) plus intelligence on pertinent applied research and develop-

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

ment: — primary production responsibility of Central Intelligence Agency, as exemplified in Annex B.

(3) Intelligence on Atomic Energy — production responsibility of all interested agencies.

b. It is recognized that despite the above-mentioned specific allocations of primary production responsibilities to the Military Services and CIA, the Military Services will also require intelligence indicating trends from fundamental research in basic sciences, which they normally will obtain from CIA. Conversely, CIA will also require intelligence on applied research relating to weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, and the technical characteristics of existing equipment, which it normally will obtain from the Military Services. Accordingly, there continue to exist areas of common or overlapping interest which require continuing inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

*c. Coordinating Mechanisms*

(1) The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is hereby reconstituted as a permanent interdepartmental committee with the same structure and functions as before.

(2) Subject to the foregoing, there is hereby established the Scientific Estimates Committee, a permanent interdepartmental committee, to integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when required, for the production of national intelligence, to stimulate and guide inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate, and to coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS.

(3) The Scientific Estimates Committee shall be composed of designated representatives as members from CIA, the Joint Staff, the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and such other ad hoc representatives as may be determined necessary by the regular committee members. In order to maintain continuity and stability, each department and agency mentioned above will designate a regular member and, if desired, an alternate by transmitting names and titles to the Director of Central Intelligence. This action will not preclude the designation of such additional persons as may be technically and otherwise qualified to discuss or report on a particular subject under consideration by the Committee. The Chairman will be elected annually. The Committee will establish its methods of procedure. The Central Intelligence Agency shall provide an executive secretary and secretariat as required.

(4) It is recommended that the SEC concentrate on the integration of intelligence opinion (other than that for which the JAEIC is responsible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence, and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other intelligence in scientific and technical fields. The principal occasion for activity on the part of the committee will arise when contributions are required for national intelligence purposes. The Committee's activities will be directed to synthesizing

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

departmental intelligence, and while so doing to bring to light any inconsistencies resulting from the production activities of the respective departments and agencies, each operating within its assigned sphere of responsibility, and to resolve conflicting conclusions, or have appropriate dissenting views registered for the benefit of the national intelligence production organization.

(5) The SEC can best assist in the coordination of production of intelligence in scientific and technical fields by stimulating and guiding inter-agency liaison and working-level conferences.

3. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/3\* is herewith rescinded.

**WALTER B. SMITH**  
Director of Central Intelligence

**ANNEX A**

Responsibilities of the departments of the Department of Defense for intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military material and techniques, including for example:

- a. Aircraft and equipment, military, and civil
- b. Vessels and equipment
- c. Military motorized equipment
- d. Ordnance
- e. Military engineering equipment
- f. Railroad equipment (military types)
- g. Guided missiles
- h. Military electronic systems and equipment
  - (1) Radar equipment
  - (2) Electronic reconnaissance devices
  - (3) Electronic countermeasures
  - (4) Electronic navigational devices
  - (5) Telecommunications equipment
- i. Chemical warfare
- j. Biological warfare
- k. Military medicine, including
  - (1) Medical aspects of civil defense in the USSR.
  - (2) Medical vulnerabilities of man and animals to BW agents, and capabilities for medical defense of man and animals against BW agents.

**ANNEX B**

Responsibilities of CIA/OSI for Intelligence on Fundamental Research in the Basic Sciences, Basic Scientific Resources, and Medicine (excluding Military Medicine), plus Intelligence on Pertinent Applied Research and Development, including, for example:

1. Basic Sciences
  - a. Biological and Medical sciences

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\* (Note: DCI 3/3, "Scientific Intelligence," was issued 28 October 1949.)

**SECRET**

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SECURITY INFORMATION

- b. Chemistry
  - c. Metallurgy
  - d. Physics and Geophysics
  - e. Mechanics
  - f. Electromagnetic wave propagation and ionospherics
  - g. Cosmic radiation and particles
  - h. Thermodynamics, including low-temperature Physics
  - i. Terrestrial Magnetism
  - j. Meteorology
  - k. Mathematics
  - l. Astronomy
2. Basic Scientific Resources
- a. Magnitude and scale of scientific effort and achievement, including dependence on foreign science
  - b. Scientific education and training
  - c. The organization of science, academics, etc.
  - d. The operation, administration, and control of science, including scientific and technical planning and financing, and the exchange of information through publications and contacts
  - e. Scientific manpower, its volume and composition
  - f. Scientific laboratories and equipment, its quality and availability
  - g. History and philosophy of science
3. Medicine (for Medical Research, see paragraph 1 a)
- a. Medical organization and administration medical activities of important foreign countries
  - b. Organization and administration of veterinary medicine in important foreign countries
  - c. Medical supply situation (particularly in the Soviet orbit)
  - d. Use of blood and blood substitutes in the Soviet orbit.

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**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 3/4**  
**PRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE**

(8/14/52; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3, and for the purpose of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence structure for the production of scientific and technical intelligence, the following policies and operating procedures are hereby established:

**1. Policies**

In discharging allocated responsibilities and effecting integration of intelligence, the interested departments and agencies will apply the following basic principles:

- a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible or necessarily desirable in scientific and technical intelligence activities.
- b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information and finished intelligence between all agencies concerned is essential.
- c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority in any field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies and dissents recorded.
- d. Any agency may make such studies as it believes necessary to supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order to fulfill its agency functions, but such studies should not normally be disseminated outside the producing agency without advance consultation with the agency having primary responsibility for the subject-matter involved.
- e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a particular field will develop special competence in that field and will normally carry out all or most of the research in that field.
- f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate the intelligence activities of its Technical Services and its other facilities having intelligence production capabilities with the work of the IAC intelligence agencies and to make available to those agencies the intelligence produced by such Services and facilities.

**2. Procedures:**

a. *Delineation of Dominant Interests.* The general field of scientific and technical intelligence production is subdivided into three basic major areas, and allocation of primary production responsibilities therein is made as follows:

(1) Intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military material and techniques: primary production responsibility of the departments of the Department of Defense, as exemplified in Annex A.

(2) Intelligence on fundamental research in the basic sciences, on scientific resources, and on medicine (other than military medicine) plus intelligence on pertinent applied research and develop-

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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

ment: — primary production responsibility of Central Intelligence Agency, as exemplified in Annex B.

(3) Intelligence on Atomic Energy — production responsibility of all interested agencies.

b. It is recognized that despite the above-mentioned specific allocations of primary production responsibilities to the Military Services and CIA, the Military Services will also require intelligence indicating trends from fundamental research in basic sciences, which they normally will obtain from CIA. Conversely, CIA will also require intelligence on applied research relating to weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, and the technical characteristics of existing equipment, which it normally will obtain from the Military Services. Accordingly, there continue to exist areas of common or overlapping interest which require continuing inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

c. *Coordinating Mechanisms*

(1) The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is hereby reconstituted as a permanent interdepartmental committee with the same structure and functions as before.

(2) Subject to the foregoing, there is hereby established the Scientific Estimates Committee, a permanent interdepartmental committee, to integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when required, for the production of national intelligence, to stimulate and guide inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate, and to coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS.

(3) The Scientific Estimates Committee shall be composed of designated representatives as members from CIA, the Joint Staff, the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and such other ad hoc representatives as may be determined necessary by the regular committee members. In order to maintain continuity and stability, each department and agency mentioned above will designate a regular member and, if desired, an alternate by transmitting names and titles to the Director of Central Intelligence. This action will not preclude the designation of such additional persons as may be technically and otherwise qualified to discuss or report on a particular subject under consideration by the Committee. The Chairman will be elected annually. The Committee will establish its methods of procedure. The Central Intelligence Agency shall provide an executive secretary and secretariat as required.

(4) It is recommended that the SEC concentrate on the integration of intelligence opinion (other than that for which the JAEIC is responsible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence, and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other intelligence in scientific and technical fields. The principal occasion for activity on the part of the committee will arise when contributions are required for national intelligence purposes. The Committee's activities will be directed to synthesizing

SECRET

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

departmental intelligence, and while so doing to bring to light any inconsistencies resulting from the production activities of the respective departments and agencies, each operating within its assigned sphere of responsibility, and to resolve conflicting conclusions, or have appropriate dissenting views registered for the benefit of the national intelligence production organization.

(5) The SEC can best assist in the coordination of production of intelligence in scientific and technical fields by stimulating and guiding inter-agency liaison and working-level conferences.

3. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/3\* is herewith rescinded.

**WALTER B. SMITH**  
Director of Central Intelligence

**ANNEX A**

Responsibilities of the departments of the Department of Defense for intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military material and techniques, including for example:

- a. Aircraft and equipment, military, and civil
- b. Vessels and equipment
- c. Military motorized equipment
- d. Ordnance
- e. Military engineering equipment
- f. Railroad equipment (military types)
- g. Guided missiles
- h. Military electronic systems and equipment
  - (1) Radar equipment
  - (2) Electronic reconnaissance devices
  - (3) Electronic countermeasures
  - (4) Electronic navigational devices
  - (5) Telecommunications equipment
- i. Chemical warfare
- j. Biological warfare
- k. Military medicine, including
  - (1) Medical aspects of civil defense in the USSR.
  - (2) Medical vulnerabilities of man and animals to BW agents, and capabilities for medical defense of man and animals against BW agents.

**ANNEX B**

Responsibilities of CIA/OSI for Intelligence on Fundamental Research in the Basic Sciences, Basic Scientific Resources, and Medicine (excluding Military Medicine), plus Intelligence on Pertinent Applied Research and Development, including, for example:

1. Basic Sciences
  - a. Biological and Medical sciences

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\* (Note: DCI 3/3, "Scientific Intelligence," was issued 28 October 1949.)

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**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

- b. Chemistry
  - c. Metallurgy
  - d. Physics and Geophysics
  - e. Mechanics
  - f. Electromagnetic wave propagation and ionospherics
  - g. Cosmic radiation and particles
  - h. Thermodynamics, including low-temperature Physics
  - i. Terrestrial Magnetism
  - j. Meteorology
  - k. Mathematics
  - l. Astronomy
2. Basic Scientific Resources
- a. Magnitude and scale of scientific effort and achievement, including dependence on foreign science
  - b. Scientific education and training
  - c. The organization of science, academics, etc.
  - d. The operation, administration, and control of science, including scientific and technical planning and financing, and the exchange of information through publications and contacts
  - e. Scientific manpower, its volume and composition
  - f. Scientific laboratories and equipment, its quality and availability
  - g. History and philosophy of science
3. Medicine (for Medical Research, see paragraph 1 a)
- a. Medical organization and administration medical activities of important foreign countries
  - b. Organization and administration of veterinary medicine in important foreign countries
  - c. Medical supply situation (particularly in the Soviet orbit)
  - d. Use of blood and blood substitutes in the Soviet orbit.

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