

Pancoat

13 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Truscott

SUBJECT : Summary of NSCID No. 5 ^{REVISIONS} Made to Accommodate [] Proposals []

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Re. Para. 1a - None - We do not believe the addition of the words "usually through the use of agent personnel" serves any useful purpose, and they imply a limitation which is not compatible with the flexibility required in the field of espionage.

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Re. Para. 3 preamble - This paragraph has been revised to establish the primacy of CIA in the clandestine field but eliminate the "glorifying" words, "the national clandestine service."

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Re. Para. 3d - We believe that the designation of this function as a "service of common concern" for "the benefit of the intelligence community" is adequate assurance that this operation will not be a one-way street, and it has been revised to indicate a restriction on the type of material involved.

Re. Para. 5 - This paragraph has been revised as [] suggests. However, it should be understood that it relates primarily to action taken by departments and agencies other than CIA as the Agency does not normally serve requirements for clandestine collection on those other departments and agencies.

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Re. Para. 8 - This paragraph has been revised to incorporate the language suggested by [redacted] but it also makes appropriate reference to the "exceptional operations" provision and to the principle that CIA, in an active theater, will operate as a component force; preservation of this principle is no less important to CIA than is the assurance to the military that CIA will be under the direct command of the theater commander.

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Re. Para. 9b - This entire paragraph has been revised to provide that the IAC will do two things: (a) develop appropriate recommendations on the subject for consideration by the NSC, and (b) provide for necessary coordination on the basis of the recommendations made to and approved by the NSC. We believe that these provisions make full provision for any IAC member or invited agency concerned with the subject to propose any action he considers necessary. In such cases, normal IAC procedure will be followed.

Re. [redacted] comments on DCIDs related to NSCID No. 5
It is our view that the requirement to have all NSCIDs presented to the NSC in January will probably not allow sufficient time for the full development of completed DCIDs. However, it is believed that the Working Group could develop an outline of the points to be covered in such DCIDs by the IAC Meeting of 14 January 1958. NSCID No. 5 is a statement of basic policy and assignment of authority and responsibility which must go forward to the NSC in January, with exceptions if that be necessary. We do not believe it can be held up because its detailed implementation has not been worked out in final form.

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[redacted]

Asst. to the DD/C

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The General seems very clear that there are two principal things he wants to clearly cover in par. 9, viz:

- a. Development of IAC policy recommendations to the NBC -- the responsible body for establishing CI policies.
- b. Provide for DCI coordination of CI activities, including liaison.

Suggested rewording:

9.a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the participation of other interested Offices as indicated in paragraph 2.c., above, shall develop appropriate recommendations for NBC consideration in regard to U.S. counterintelligence activities outside the U.S. and its possessions.

b. The DCI in consultation with the members of the IAC and other interested Offices shall provide (1) for the coordination of U.S. counterintelligence activities abroad, and also (2) for the coordination of such activities with Departments and Agencies responsible for counterintelligence within the U.S. and its possessions to the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies enunciated by the National Security Council.

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