STANDARD FORM NO. 64 Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170020-5

# *Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

STAT TO : [redacted] DATE: 22 Apr 57

STAT FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: Revision of NSCID #5

I worked with Rupe from 9.15 to 1230 and we got through to the end of para. 5. The changes they suggest are noted in ink and their explanation is:

1. Addition of the word "personnel" in the definition is obvious.

2. There change makes para. 2.d. apply to all with reference to non-official cover and makes 5.c. apply to all with ref. to official cover - all meaning CIA and depts. and other agencies.

3. Adding the word "intelligence" to para. 3.a. just makes the sentence a little more clear but not much.

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4. Believe the word "clandestine" should be added to para. 3.b. as

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CIA is not primarily responsible for all counterintelligence including its non-clandestin aspects and the definition used is a broad one to take into account many things we put under the heading of "security" but the services class under counterintelligence.

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6. On para. 4 the Army wants to add "activities" to cover all areas needing security and then change the sub-paras so that they can, subject to para. 2, do all phases of liaison in connection with the clandestine activities they are authorized to conduct - you will note that they make no change in the DCI's authority to coordinate all liaison concerning clandestine activities or with clandestine services. Both Rupe and Col. Williams said that both DA and the commands in the field were prepared to do battle on this point.

7. They want to change para. 5 to make it apply to all Depts. and Agencies includin CIA, first, for clarity and, second, to pin down the point that CIA too will contribute to the central index they are going to run as a service of common concern.

It was further understood in our discussion that these changes, especially with respect to liaison, would be based on a firm agreement that the DCID's would spell out in detail the liaison problem both from its positive side of benefit to the U.S. but also its defensive side of protecting us from being given the business by foreign services because we are not coordinated among ourselves.

Frankly, I believe we could readily live with the Army changes on the basis that the DCID's would set forth the problems and procedures in real detail. I doubt if there will be any real problem with the remaining paras. of the paper but I plan to see Rupe again to-morrow.

Pls return to my office

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