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27 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed N.I.A. Meeting

- References: a. N.I.A. 6, Subject "Coordination of Intelligence Activities Related to Foreign Atomic Energy Developments and Potentialities"
- b. Minutes N.I.A. 6th Meeting

At its 6th meeting on the 21st of August 1946, the National Intelligence Authority agreed to recommend that the President approve the Enclosure to N.I.A. 6, as amended, with an understanding that any action taken by the N.I.A. will be without prejudice to future change that might be desired by the Atomic Energy Commission. The President, however, wished to defer taking action on this matter pending the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In view of the subsequent establishment of this Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence suggests that the National Intelligence Authority consider whether further action should be taken on this subject at this time.

It is, therefore, respectfully requested that the Secretary, N.I.A., be advised whether it is agreeable to hold a meeting of the National Intelligence Authority on Monday, 6 January 1947, at 10:30 a.m. in Room 211, Department of State Building, to consider further action on N.I.A. 6.

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Secretary, N.I.A.

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21 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. ROBERT L. DENNISON, U.S.N.

Subject: Coordination of Intelligence Activities
Related to Foreign Atomic Energy
Developments and Potentialities

Enclosure: N.I.A. 6, Copy No. 29

The enclosed paper is the item which the Acting Secretary of State wishes to discuss at an N.I.A. meeting at 1100 today in the Secretary of State's office.

The Secretary of the Navy has already informally approved the enclosed paper but returned his copy of the paper to this office with his approval memorandum. The enclosure is therefore transmitted for your use in preparing for the meeting.

The Secretary of War has also approved this paper and Admiral Leahy has indicated that he approves subject to minor editorial revisions.

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Secretary, N.I.A.

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INTELLIGENCE RECORDS

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
FLEET ADMIRAL LEAHY

Subject: N.I.A. 6

1. The subject paper has the unanimous concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. The National Intelligence Authority at its 9th meeting on 12 February 1947 agreed "to the transfer of the personnel mentioned in N.I.A. 6." This transfer was completed on 18 February 1947.

3. It is, therefore, requested that approval be granted to publish the enclosure to N.I.A. 6 less paragraph 2, since the action indicated in that paragraph has already been accomplished.

101
[Redacted]
Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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Distribution:
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Date: 5 Sept 91	[Redacted]

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1. In lieu of the proposal contained in N.I.A. 6, I suggest that the National Intelligence Authority and the Atomic Energy Commission enter into the attached agreement.

2. The provisions of this agreement are prompted by two considerations. Primarily, the State, War and Navy Departments must be responsible for the security of the country, including security from attack by atomic weapons. In so far as intelligence activities relating to atomic energy in foreign nations are concerned, technical and industrial capabilities and intentions are the critical items of interest to these three departments. Secondly, however, the situation regarding source materials is such that the United States is obtaining large quantities of foreign supplies by means of a number of international arrangements. These arrangements include a survey of world source materials, acquisition of such material, and preclusive operations. This program, currently conducted through the Manhattan Project, is on a large scale and operating efficiently. In view of the foregoing, I deem it inadvisable to divorce this essential function from the Atomic Energy Commission and, consequently, suggest the delineation of responsibility contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the attachment.

3. Because of conditions in certain areas (e.g., Russia and Russian dominated countries), it may be found that the Central Intelligence Group, with the advice and assistance of the Atomic Energy Commission, may be in the best position to perform certain source material operations. Conversely, the situation in certain other areas (e.g., Canada and the United Kingdom) may be such that the Atomic Energy Commission may be better prepared to provide the Government with intelligence relating to atomic energy developments in those areas. Consequently, the attachment permits, in paragraph 3 thereof, upon a mutually agreeable basis, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Atomic Energy Commission to suballocate to each other, by subjects or geographical areas, portions of their primary responsibilities.

4. Paragraph 4 of the attachment provides that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence will render to each other such assistance as may be appropriate to their responsibilities. Such assistance would, of course, include the loan of personnel, the transfer of files, and the exchange of information as appropriate.

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The Atomic Energy Commission and the National Intelligence Authority hereby agree to the following allocations of responsibility in the field of foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities which may affect the national security:

1. The Atomic Energy Commission will be primarily responsible for the collection of all intelligence information related to source materials (uranium, thorium, and any other material peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable materials) in nations other than the United States, and the correlation, evaluation and appropriate dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the direction and control of the N.I.A., will be primarily responsible for the collection of all intelligence information regarding all foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities which may affect the national security other than that specified in paragraph 1 above, and the correlation, evaluation and appropriate dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

3. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence may, upon a mutually agreeable basis, suballocate, by subjects or geographical areas, performance of the functions specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. In order to enable the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Intelligence Authority to discharge their respective functions, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence will render to each other such assistance as may be appropriate to their responsibilities, including the exchange of necessary facilities, personnel, information and intelligence.

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NIA 6

P - Topic is AE - Position is despite Ex Order NIA + implementing, Mr. Underg has small dir to get info on for act in atomic field - Seems to me several, none them isolated w/o connection or relation to CIG - Talked grasses - Seems carrying out Pres. order only if transferred not case where ^{CIG-2} - This order transfers to CIG - Nothing to do with MI proper - Nothing! Comm - Even if did, still comes under Pres. order - Int is lost now, not available

Q - Not deny use to Comm?

P - Nothing to do w/ ideas improve comm - Where so far ahead

A - Doubt - Spoke to Pres. - Not familiar - Comm almost entirely dependent on few sources of uranium - Understand ^{ILLEGIB} act of group find where uranium, how at



... to let rest until Comm est ^{ILLEGIB}
... people were told - solely to understand ^{ILLEGIB}



J - Nothing to do w/ get of own - In I unit
Favorably impressed - Did not sign w/ hurry
- No sign of the ^{ILLEGIB} to hurry
- still feel better wait

7 - ~~Other side~~ ^{should be done} - No intent ~~to~~ ^{to} Comm.
P - Agree - Comm has big job - This small request - Can't be far flung because few people - O+N open to obj. - A E new thing - This going on treat as if didn't exist, know nothing abt it - Feel subj. to cut not taking this on

V - Hate to have think that CIG mat. withheld from any govt outfit needs it - That's CIG mission - If NIA says give to Comm, yes - Do it more eff. - Use all fac. that Groves or Carden cannot - It again not coop. because 1 way st. - Best source of info by Groves is SSD which replaced by CIG (SS) - If know, must use all sources - If NIA OK's, ~~for~~ ^{for} entire org.

P - Suppose G. had info Russ prepared to use at bombs ^{NIA} that know

A - Not clear of abt facts - Insofar as find out what they could doing, under

V - If find out where uranium is, of vital interest to Comm.

P - G. completely alone - Hostile to spirit & prob.

P - Under completely separate unit of G - If don't act,

L - ^{Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000700100003-0} conceivable that G might build up I org. of itself - If decide need, If

- A - Think mistake to do anything in wk or 10 days before Comm apptd - understand that Pres. wish
- F - See no great harm done - Reluctant let this lie over
- P - Can't do it then because under Comm - Can now - If Comm, ask for all G. has, take up imp. post, freeze all people - Have to ask perm
- A - Strongest reason not doing now
- F - Intent of NIA draw together all this - Can't have one unit sep. & isolated - If perm sound
- P - Pt. this only mil. info - Whole sig. mil. & will be unless UN perfected & inter-a controls effected - Extremely duplicit if don't frame natl policy along lines of what other countries doing
- L - Comm get info better from this than any they set up for long time
- F - Can't imagine V. dangerous
- L - NIA authority to direct
- A - All do what Pres. wants - If L clear w/ Pres
- L - Diff. clear w/ Pres this time
- P - Not obj. taking up w/ Pres but so clearly in directive
- L - L. clear w/ Pres - Possible to reverse after Comm test.

- A - Thing bothers abt doing things hurriedly - Working sounds all right - If sim working in fire, wouldn't do because familiar would be taking away from Treasury
- F - If keep away, pt. better strength
- A - Tell feel Comm - Let's voice Comm, give them chance to see their say
- V - Int. pers. getting organ - not getting - Let get set up - If Comm asks NIA for it, give it won't be disturbed will propose be intact
- F - NIA turn over, you keep in pos. to turn over Comm if subsequently decided
- P - Taken view re other M units should be kept intact for Comm - But this ~~para~~ unit int. & within terms Pres. letter
- V - His int & ours - Where man is & where goes but not from viewpoint getting it for US
- L - Why not CIG do it just
- V - Get 2 agents in f'd on same, one expose

Int. produced shall be made available as directed by NIA ~~reported~~ to Comm

This dir will be reviewed w/ Comm when est.

- L - NIA direct CIG to get info & eval + eval. Don't get people now
- V - People are pers. staff - Have been brought in ~~in~~ ~~to~~ ~~talk~~ ~~people~~ ~~to~~ collect w/o telling info - If V sets up, must

tell people

A - Doing dangerous thing to sit & work time

P - Have power to send G-2 out away - Can't to CIA

L - Let G-2 tell Comm

7 - ^{want prof. info} Comm created, do not want evil people
to know except w/ app. before
denied this info

V - Pos. to date

L - Phase order & send tel to Pres. - NIA approves
if meets w/ his approval.

P - I. Org under Comm must be geared to V
anyway

w/o prej. to future dis. of Comm or to any
changes by

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY AUTHORITY:

Subject: N.I.A. 6

1. It is requested that each member of the National Intelligence Authority indicate his action on the subject paper by returning the attached memorandum to the Secretary, after making appropriate entry in the space provided.

[Empty rectangular box for signature]

Secretary, N.I.A.

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Subject: N.I.A. 6

1. The subject paper is:

- a. Approved without change ✓
- b. Approved, subject to the minor amendments set out below _____
- c. Disapproved. Request meeting of N.I.A. to consider paper _____

2. Suggestions or amendments: *

[Empty rectangular box for signature]

(Signature)

14 AUG 1946

(Date)

STAT

Return to: Room 2165
New War Dept. Bldg.

* Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require security classification of paper.

Col. Eddy

Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000700100003-0

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Auth.: HR 70-3	
Date: 5 Sept 91	

Comment on NIA , Control and Supervision
of Intelligence Activities Related to Foreign
Atomic Energy Developments and Potentialities

1. I had understood the immediate problem to be the transfer of the ~~research~~ group (concerned with intelligence about foreign research into atomic energy) from the Manhattan District to the Central Intelligence Group, to preserve the value of this work and prevent the dispersion of the team. This proposal as described in Paragraph 2 of Enclosure "A" is approved by me.

2. I do not have the knowledge nor the authority to give equal approval to Paragraph 1, according to which "the Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the direction and control of this Authority, is hereby authorized and directed to coordinate the collection of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities..." There is no doubt that the Central Intelligence Group is the logical place for intelligence on atomic energy insofar as the Departments represented on the National Intelligence Authority are concerned. However, the top secret nature of the atomic projects may well include plans for intelligence work which are not known by other Departments of the Government. I shall, therefore, require time and opportunity to receive instructions from the Department of State before indicating approval of Paragraph 1 of the enclosed draft.

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COPY NO. _____

DRAFT

I.A.

August 1946

Superseded
[Signature]

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
COORDINATION
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY
DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIALITIES

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence
Advisory Board

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Date: *5 Sept 51*

Foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities constitute a paramount field of intelligence related to the national security. As such, the National Intelligence Authority is responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating Federal foreign intelligence activities in this field.

To date, the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the office of Major General Leslie R. Groves, the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, has been the agency performing functions of collecting and evaluating intelligence related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities. This Branch has operated under the personal direction of General Groves, who is in turn responsible, by Presidential directive, to the Secretary of War.

The newly created Atomic Energy Commission will be concerned with the entire field of atomic energy in the United States, including commercial as well as military aspects. The Commission will, upon Presidential directive, take over the responsibilities of the Manhattan Engineer District. It is considered appropriate at this time that the National Intelligence Authority should authorize and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate the collection of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security, and to accomplish the correlation, evaluation and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence. This should include control and supervision of the activities of the Foreign Intelligence Branch

by agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination

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operated by General Groves. It should also be possible, when deemed expedient by the Secretary of War and the Director of Central Intelligence, to transfer the personnel and working files of this Branch to the Central Intelligence Group.

The enclosed draft N.I.A. Directive is designed to carry out the conclusions contained in the above paragraph. This Directive has been unanimously concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, which in this case included the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District.

It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A".

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE
COORDINATION
~~CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF INTELLIGENCE~~
ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY
DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIALITIES

Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946, designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to Federal intelligence activities in the field of foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security are announced:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the direction and control of this Authority, is hereby authorized and directed to coordinate the collection ^{by agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination} of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security, and to accomplish the correlation, evaluation and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence is further authorized to arrange with other intelligence agencies of the Government to utilize their collection facilities in this field.

2. To accomplish the function assigned in paragraph 1, the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District have authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to assume the control and supervision of the Foreign Intelligence Branch operated by the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District. The personnel and working files of this Branch may be transferred from the Manhattan Engineer District to the Central Intelligence Group at any time agreed to by the Secretary of War and the Director of Central Intelligence.

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Enclosure "A"