[redacted] #25-71 STATSPEC TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA 1 OF 1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-1

23 JUNE 1971 CONF

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Confidential

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC

Confidential

23 JUNE 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 25)

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

DRV, Front Report Furore Over Publication of Pentagon Study . . 1
References to Pentagon Study at Paris Ignored by Hanoi Media . 5
Moscow Carries Extensive Comment on U.S. Documents "Scandal" . 6
Soviet, Vietnamese Media Note Oslo War Crimes Session 13

OKINAWA AGREEMENT

Terms of Reversion Sharply Condemned in Communist Media 15

ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

USSR Formalizes Brezhnev Proposal for 5-Power Nuclear Talks . . 19
Comment on Proposal For Naval Talks Focuses on Mediterranean . 20

DPRK AND ROMANIA

Ceausescu Visit Underscores Two Sides' Independent Lines . . . 23

SED CONGRESS

Honecker Report Stresses "Collectivity," Slurs Ulbricht 26
Socialist Camp Discords Softpedalled at Congress 27

YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR

IZVESTIYA and POLITIKA Argue Over Emigres' Activity in USSR . . 29

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KGB Officials Named, Tsinev's Ties to Brezhnev Revealed 31

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLE'S DAILY Recommends "Taching Model" for Industry 33

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 JUNE 1971

Moscow (2656 items)

8th SED Congress	(--)	15%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	6%]
Soyuz XI & Salyut	(27%)	11%
Soviet Elections	(23%)	11%
[Brezhnev Speech	(10%)	6%]
Indochina	(2%)	7%
[U.S. Press Revelation of U.S. Secret Report	(--)	5%]
30th Anniversary Nazi Invasion of USSR	(--)	3%
King of Nepal in USSR	(--)	2%
China	(2%)	2%
USSR-UAR Treaty	(--)	2%
Middle East	(3%)	2%

Peking (1478 items)

Domestic Issues	(30%)	37%
Indochina	(21%)	17%
[DRV National Assembly Session	(3%)	6%]
[Lin Piao Message to New Cambodian NPLAF Chief	(--)	3%]
[VWP Delegation in PRC	(--)	3%]
Ceausescu in DRV	(--)	4%
Peruvian Trade/Fishery Delegation in PRC	(2%)	8%
Okinawa Reversion Agreement	(--)	3%
Yugoslav Foreign Minister in PRC	(4%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

INDOCHINA

The publication in the New York TIMES, and other papers, of extracts from a secret 1968 Pentagon study on the history of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war prompted only a modest volume of low-level propaganda from Hanoi and the Front. Revelations in the study and the appended U.S. documents are seen as confirmation of long-standing Vietnamese communist charges of U.S. deception about its "aggression" in Indochina. The media do not acknowledge that the subject came up at the 17 June Paris session or that the communists gave journalists copies of a DRV White Book on the war released in July 1965.

Moscow has devoted extensive attention to continuing developments in the controversy over publication of the Pentagon study. And, unlike Hanoi, both the radio and press carry signed articles. Moscow says that the government's concern over the publication stems from the fact that the Nixon Administration has pursued previous administrations' policies of "deception."

Extracts of the study carried by Moscow media include references to the effect of the Sino-Soviet split on U.S. policy. And some Mandarin-language radio commentaries use this as a peg to again charge that Peking's "splittist" policy harms the Vietnamese struggle. Peking media have not mentioned the publication of the Pentagon study.

The 15-19 June visit to North Vietnam by a Romanian delegation headed by party chief Ceausescu provided the occasion for VWP First Secretary Le Duan to repeat standard demands for U.S. withdrawal and to express Hanoi's determination to continue the struggle. Reflecting mutual concern, the joint communique on the visit pledged that the two sides will strive to contribute to the restoration and consolidation of solidarity in the socialist world. Hanoi's persistent plea for unity was reiterated forcefully in NHAN DAN's editorial on the 21st which said that increasing the solidarity and the might of the "socialist camp" is an "imperative demand."

There is no major Hanoi and Front comment on current military action in South Vietnam but propaganda routinely reviews alleged communist achievements in countering pacification and argues that the ARVN forces are seriously deteriorating in the wake of "defeats" in southern Laos and Cambodia.

DRV, FRONT REPORT FURORE OVER PUBLICATION OF PENTAGON STUDY

Vietnamese communist reaction to publication in the U.S. press of the Pentagon study on the Vietnam war is confined mainly to routine radio broadcasts which cite foreign sources in reporting developments

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

in the United States. Hanoi radio first mentioned the subject on the 16th and since then has broadcast items, both in English and Vietnamese, every day. And on the 22d a Hanoi Vietnamese-language broadcast carried extracts of Neil Sheehan's article which accompanied the first installment of documents. Both the party paper NHAN DAN and the army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN have carried reports of developments but there is no known press comment. The Front reacted on the 17th, the day after Hanoi, with both an LPA item and a Liberation Radio broadcast in Vietnamese. Subsequent Front attention, however, is confined largely to pickups of Hanoi items in Liberation Radio's English-language broadcasts.

The initial Hanoi broadcast told the North Vietnamese audience that the New York TIMES on 13 June carried excerpts from a Defense Department "secret report" which had been requested by former Defense Secretary McNamara. The broadcast said that the report of "40 volumes" contained evidence that the United States had begun to be involved in Indochina before the French withdrawal and that plans to bomb the North had been prepared about five months before the Gulf of Tonkin incident. It went on to report Senator McGovern's charge that the Pentagon study contains "proof" that President Johnson had deceived the American people and Congress, and to observe that the report has caused the Nixon Government "extreme embarrassment." It noted in conclusion that the Justice Department had asked the New York TIMES to stop publishing the report and return it to the Defense Department but that the newspaper rejected the request "in the interests of the American people."

A later Hanoi broadcast on the same day--in English to U.S. servicemen--reported that the TIMES had published the second installment of the article on the 14th. It said that "shocked by the disclosure," Senator Symington had called for a "full congressional investigation" into the war.

A Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 17th noted some details of the report, observing that the United States had been waging a "secret war" against the DRV, and that 10 weeks before the Tonkin Gulf incident the Administration drafted a resolution for Congress to adopt "that would have authorized it to take any necessary measures, including the use of armed forces in South Vietnam." It also referred to the carrying out of commando raids in North Vietnam. Noting that the third part of the TIMES' series dealt with the introduction of

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

"massive" U.S. troops into South Vietnam, the broadcast said that on 1 April 1965 the President decided to use U.S. troops in South Vietnam "because the U.S. Administration realized that bombings in North Vietnam could not prevent defeat in South Vietnam but the President ordered that this fact be kept secret."

The only available substantial account of Hanoi press attention to the Pentagon study is in a Hanoi English-language broadcast to Southeast Asia on the 17th. It reported that NHAN DAN that day, "quoting the gist" of the Pentagon study, noted that the "truth expressed" in the document "shed more light on the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and . . . exposed the truth on the futile allegations used by the U.S. authorities to white-wash the war." The paper said that "these odious actions" committed by the U.S. imperialists have been denounced long since by the Vietnamese people and that the publication of the study "helped the Americans and others in the world to see more clearly the U.S. imperialists' policy of barbaric aggression and its futile tricks concerning the Vietnam problem." The paper also reportedly said that U.S. public opinion "has been aroused to hot discussions" about the study. The VNA press reviews noted on four occasions that NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN were carrying reports of the publication controversy--on 20 and 22 June and 18 and 23 June, respectively. But no details of these reports have been broadcast.

A Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 18th observed that Congress had "reacted vigorously" to the Justice Department's attempts to prohibit the TIMES from continuing to publish the document. It noted that 62 Congressmen, mostly Democrats, had sent a letter of protest to Secretaries Mitchell and Laird and that they demanded that the Defense Department make copies of the classified document available to Congress. Another domestic broadcast on the 18th said that U.S. rulers "are bewildered and confused" by the publishing of the document and that according to the U.S. press FBI agents had begun an investigation on "why and where copies" of the documents were given to the New York TIMES. And it also noted "strong criticism" of the decision to force the TIMES to temporarily cease publication of the report, quoting such Senators as Church, McGovern, Mansfield and Kennedy in this regard.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Hanoi broadcasts on the 21st and 22d also cited congressional reaction, including Senator Fulbright's comment that the document's publication was in the national interest. Senator Muskie was quoted as saying that the Administration's prohibition on publishing the documents exemplifies the "serious credibility crisis" of 1971, and that "it is necessary to call former President Johnson to testify" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

A Hanoi Vietnamese-language broadcast to the South on the 20th reported that on the 18th, the Washington POST had carried the first of a series of articles on the study. And a domestic broadcast on the same day acknowledged some of the substance of the POST article on U.S. attempts to prevent general elections in Vietnam in 1954. It also reported that the POST on the 19th printed documents which disclosed that the Johnson Administration's decision to temporarily stop the bombings of the DRV "was not aimed at having peaceful talks, but was aimed at appeasing public opinion and justifying the U.S. war escalation in Vietnam."

On the 22d, Hanoi said that, according to foreign sources, despite the fact that the "Nixon Administration has strangled the freedom of the press and banned the New York TIMES from continuing to publish" further Pentagon documents, "many papers in Washington and other cities have endeavored to exploit the excerpts of the reports published" in the TIMES. It added that "these papers have advanced new facts to lay bare the systematic U.S. policy of aggression while disclosing some facts in the last part of the report, which were banned from publication by the Nixon Administration, in order to expose Nixon's role" in the U.S. "aggression" in Indochina.

Liberation Radio on the 22d, noting that the U.S. press has continued to publish the Pentagon study despite the Administration's efforts to ban publication, noted that the Boston GLOBE on 22 June was the third paper to publish portions of the document. Also on the 22d, Liberation Radio and LPA, in their reportage of the second Conference of the International Commission to Investigate U.S. War Crimes which opened in Oslo on the 20th, noted that the general secretary of the commission, Hans Goran Frank, claimed that the recent disclosure of the Pentagon's secret documents "had denounced in part the U.S. acts of war in Indochina."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

REFERENCES TO PENTAGON STUDY AT PARIS IGNORED BY HANOI MEDIA

There was no explicit mention of the Pentagon papers by either of the communist delegates in their prepared statements at the 17 June session of the Paris talks. PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh did bring up the New York TIMES articles in the rebuttal period, but, consistent with standard practice, the VNA account does not report the details: VNA at the end of its account says cryptically that in the rebuttal period Mme. Binh and Xuan Thuy "gave concrete evidences showing that the United States is the aggressor, and that the Nixon Administration is pursuing and expanding its war of aggression."

Also consistent with standard practice, Hanoi media do not publicize the post-session briefing* at which PRG spokesman Duong Dinh Thao read Mme. Binh's additional remarks claiming that the secret Pentagon study published by the New York TIMES confirms an "obvious truth which we have pointed out at this conference--that the United States, in the scheme of establishing its neocolonialist domination in South Vietnam, has had plans to gradually provoke and widen the war of aggression." She had prefaced this by saying that

> for the past few years, the Nixon Administration has unceasingly justified U.S. aggression and has tried by all means to change white into black about the origins of the war to oppose a correct solution to the South Vietnam problem. However, the recent publication in the New York TIMES of a secret U.S. Defense Department document is further proof of the U.S. Administration's lies during the past decades.

DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le at his press briefing on the session indicated that some passages in Xuan Thuy's prepared statement apparently had been intended as an allusion to the controversy over the Pentagon study. Le reported that after Ambassador Bruce made his "additional remarks"--in which he responded to Mme. Binh's remarks on the New York TIMES

---

* The transcripts of the briefings are regularly transmitted to Hanoi on VNA's service channel; this was monitored from Paris VNA in Vietnamese to VNA Hanoi at 0955 GMT 18 June.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

publications by saying that there was no profit in debating the origins of the war--Xuan Thuy reread passages in his prepared statement that "from the beginning of this conference we have pointed out that the U.S. aggression over the past decades was the root and immediate cause of the present serious situation in Vietnam and Indochina . . ." and that "the Nixon Administration has done its best to deceive public opinion . . . ." (These passages were not included in the VNA account of the session, however.)

When Le was asked whether he thought the Pentagon report as published by the New York TIMES proved U.S. violation of the Geneva agreements, he responded by observing that the delegation had copies for the reporters of a DRV White Book issued in 1965.* In detailing the "stages" of U.S. intervention, Le said the fifth stage began with President Nixon's assumption of office; Le said that "Nixon has prolonged the aggression" and that in attempting to stop the New York TIMES from publishing the rest of the Pentagon report "he tried to conceal the fact that he has directly participated in and stepped up the war of aggression in Vietnam during the last decades."

MOSCOW CARRIES EXTENSIVE COMMENT ON U.S. DOCUMENTS "SCANDAL"

Moscow propaganda on publication of portions of the Pentagon study includes signed press articles--Ratiani in PRAVDA and Matveyev in IZVESTIYA--as well as voluminous TASS reportage of developments and radio comment.** Summaries and extracts of the documents themselves have been carried in PRAVDA and by TASS and Radio Moscow. Reporting continuing developments in the case, TASS covers the temporary restraining orders imposed on both the New York TIMES and the Washington POST and the FBI's search for the source of the "leak."

---

* VNA on 16 July 1965 transmitted an English text of the White Book which was dated May 1965. See the FBIS Far East Daily Report of 21 July 1965, pages jjj 19-34.

** Moscow Radio devotes seven percent of its total weekly propaganda comment this week to Indochina, and five of the seven percent is on the Pentagon documents.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

TASS has reported statements by various Congressmen criticizing the government's "deceit" and the decisions by the courts to impose the injunctions. Demands by Senators Symington and Mansfield for special hearings on the origins of the war are also noted. On the 22d TASS and the Moscow domestic service promptly reported Secretary Laird's announcement that he had ordered a review of the study in order to declassify as much as possible. But the items cite "political observers" for the belief that documents revealing the "real background of U.S. aggression" will not be declassified.

TASS' editorialized reports charge that the government has "clamped down" on the press and that the pressure has aroused public "indignation," as shown by statements by antiwar leaders and Congressmen. In this connection, commentators ridicule the "free press," U.S. Constitutional guarantees, and the American political system in general. They claim that the "myth" of democracy and of freedom of expression in America is "breaking down." Writing in IZVESTIYA on the 19th, Matveyev compares the New York TIMES to the youthful antiwar demonstrators when he says that the U.S. Government, in enjoining publication of the documents, is now attacking "well-to-do respectable America" as well as the young people for opposing the war. He says that in recent years a number of "eminent U.S. figures who at first supported" the intervention now oppose it, and the "sobering process" has now even affected the New York TIMES, "a big bourgeois press organ."

SOURCE OF LEAK

Both radio and press commentators link the publication of the documents to a top-level political struggle in Washington--a line first advanced in a domestic service commentary by Zorin on the 15th. Panelists in Moscow radio's roundtable program on the 20th discussed whether the publication was inspired by the Republicans or the Democrats. One participant noted that the documents appeared in the New York TIMES, a paper which "usually reflects the mood of the Democratic Party." Another panelist speculated that the publication was "secretly inspired" by the present Administration to discredit its predecessor, and another cited Pierre Salinger as having said that publication of the documents could only help Nixon. One of the panelists said that Ellsberg, suspected of leaking the documents, "is very close to the Nixon entourage." But he went on to cite still another line of speculation to the

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

effect that the publication was directed by "powerful financial circles" who do not wish to protract the war because it is becoming burdensome to the U.S. economy.

Commenting on the difficulty in determining whether it was a supporter of the Democrats or of the Republicans who leaked the documents, a panelist pointed out that members of the Johnson Administration have refused to comment on the publication of the Pentagon report. He noted that former President Johnson said he has not commented on anything since his retirement, that former Secretary Rusk also refused comment, and that former Secretary McNamara avoided answering, falling back on the "excuse" that he is now an international civil servant.

A Borovik article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the 19th also cited Pierre Salinger's remark regarding the documents helping Nixon, as well as New York TIMES' publisher Sulzberger's comment that he did not see what harm the publication could do to the present Administration.

NIXON POLICY Soviet commentators argue that the Nixon Administration cannot dissociate itself from the "deceits" revealed in the secret documents. In a PRAVDA article on the 19th, Ratiani says that history has continued along the same path since 1968; he said that while the incursions into Cambodia and Laos were new actions, there is "evidence" in the press that these operations were prepared by the previous Administration and "passed on." He also said that the present policy of Vietnamization, which is being passed off as an "innovation," is merely a repeat of a policy implemented several years ago which suffered "total failure," as indicated in Secretary McNamara's 21 December 1963 report to the President on the situation in South Vietnam. Ratiani added that for the forthcoming election campaign the Republicans are already resorting to the same tactics used by the Democrats in 1964, trying to "delude" the voters into believing that their main aim is peace while at the same time refusing to discuss a troop withdrawal deadline and threatening to resume massive raids on the DRV and otherwise escalate the war.

Matveyev in IZVESTIYA, also on the 19th, said that "those politicians in Washington who took over the baton of the dirty war in Indochina" are now uncomfortable and embarrassed

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

by the revelation of the Pentagon documents because although the "propaganda flourishes" of this Administration differ from those of its predecessor, the essence of policy is the same--the maintenance of U.S. military force in South Vietnam. But Matveyev added that the situation in the country has changed and that where before the propagandists managed to "get away with it" they are now receiving a "mass rebuff."

Dmitriy Volskiy in a NEW TIMES article summarized by the Moscow domestic service on 21 June similarly argued that the documents show that Republicans and Democrats change places, but that policy remains unchanged. The true holder of power in the United States, he said, is the "military-industrial complex" which is the force responsible for the Vietnam adventure. Declaring that the Nixon Administration is trying to imply that it has only an "unhappy legacy," Volskiy said that this is a "poor attempt to put a good face on things. The myth of the Republicans innocence has now been dissipated."

Documenting their charges that Democrats and Republicans alike have followed the same policy in Indochina, many commentators cite Senator Goldwater's statement that during the 1964 campaign he knew about the secret escalation plans but kept silent. Thus, say the commentators, both parties conspired in deceiving the electorate.

Pointing to the Administration's efforts to dissociate itself from the policies revealed in the documents, a panelist in the 20 June domestic service roundtable said that in his press conference on the 15th Secretary Rogers refused to discuss the documents, remarking that one should leave it to the historians to decide and expressing the hope that the present Administration would go down in history as the one which led the United States out of the war. The panelist called this a "verbal maneuver," charging that under the cover of Vietnamization the present Administration continues and steps up aggression in Southeast Asia.

ATTACKS ON PRC POLICY

Moscow's reports of extracts of the Pentagon documents include references to the Sino-Soviet split. For example, there is passing reference to General Taylor's 22 January 1964 memorandum which said that "economic and agricultural disappointments suffered by Communist

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

China, plus the current rift with the Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about undertaking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia." Moscow's extracts also include President Johnson's assertion, in his 20 March 1964 telegram to Ambassador Lodge, that he expected "a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties soon" and that it would be better to adopt action against the DRV after this rather than before.

Ratiani in his 19 June PRAVDA article cited President Johnson's telegram in commenting that it showed how Washington strategists were "particularly interested in Peking's policy aimed at exacerbating Soviet-Chinese relations." And several Mandarin-language broadcasts over Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress cite the documents in the course of routine attacks on Peking's refusal to join in united action to aid the Vietnamese. The broadcasts charge once again that the United States took the Chinese anti-Soviet attacks into account when planning its escalation of the war.

A Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 18th atypically resurrected explicit charges that Peking has obstructed Soviet aid to Vietnam. (Aside from a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on 5 June on the PRG anniversary which briefly said that the Chinese policy of "vilifying" the Soviet stand on Indochina had caused the people of Southeast Asia to "fail to receive Soviet assistance," the subject has not been raised in available propaganda for nearly a year.) The current broadcast charged that there were "many instances" in which Peking detained and stole Soviet arms and other goods being sent through China to Vietnam, and that it refused to allow a GDR plane loaded with medicine to pass through Chinese airspace. (The episode with the GDR plane had been reported by East Berlin on 12 September 1968, and mentioned by Moscow radio the next day.) The commentary concluded with the assertion that "it is difficult to imagine that the Chinese leaders are unaware of the burden to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of transporting these goods to the Vietnamese people by sea." The "burdens" of sending aid by sea have not been mentioned in Moscow propaganda in years, although in early 1967 there were scattered references to the "vulnerability" of the sea route in the face of the U.S. "sea blockade" of North Vietnam. In 1968 and 1969 Moscow propaganda occasionally referred to Chinese obstruction of Soviet ships carrying aid to Vietnam.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

A broadcast in Moscow radio's regular Mandarin-language service on the 22d said that the Pentagon documents provide further evidence that the United States follows the imperialist policy of "divide and rule." And it cautioned listeners to look for the real U.S. aims in attempting to improve U.S.-Chinese relations.

U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Some Moscow comment reported foreign governments' concern over the revelations in the Pentagon documents. TASS' initial account of Secretary Rogers' 15 June press conference cited his remark that the publication of the documents "would give a lot of trouble to the United States," but did not explain that he was speaking of relations with foreign governments. However, a Moscow radio broadcast in English to the United Kingdom on the 16th did note that Rogers "admitted" that the publication would "damage U.S. relations with its allies, since an obvious credibility gap is arising." Another broadcast to the same audience later that day cited Rogers' "admission" that "complaints have already been received from a number of countries." A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia on the 17th asserted that the U.S. Government had received "inquiries from certain foreign countries" and added that the State Department expects "a flood of demarches."

A PRAVDA article on the 20th said that the significance of the documents goes beyond U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia, and added that "many people in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now asking how far the U.S. leaders' words can be trusted." It asked if there is not perhaps another volume of documents formulating plans for "unprovoked military intervention in the affairs of Europe or other parts of the world." In this context it cited "U.S. propaganda's" efforts to deny American involvement in the coup in Greece and in a planned rightist coup in Italy in 1964. The article pointed out that the "Western press" is stressing that the publication of the documents is undermining trust in Washington's leaders and policies on the part of "the NATO allies and other countries friendly toward the United States."

Some comment strives to implicate U.S. allies in the "policy of deceit." One of the English-language broadcasts to the United Kingdom on the 16th said that the label of "deceit" can also be applied to the British Government since it was, and is, the only big power officially supporting American

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

policy in Indochina. The commentary alleged that the British leaders were informed in confidence that the air raids were being prepared and that they thus must have known that the Tonkin Gulf incident was a "false pretext." TASS on the 17th reported that the Australian Government has begun an investigation into the dispatch of its troops to South Vietnam. It added that the London TIMES has published material proving that the Australian Government, too, misinformed the public about the circumstances linked with the escalation of the Indochina war, sending troops at the "demand" of Ambassador Lodge who visited Canberra in April 1965, rather than at the request of the South Vietnamese Government, as alleged by former Prime Minister Menzies. An English-language Moscow radio broadcast to Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania on the 19th similarly said that Australian troops, like the American, moved into Vietnam in accordance with a preplanned program of unprovoked aggression and that Australia's soldiers, like the Americans, have "died in vain."

Moscow avoids comment, however, on the fact that the Pentagon report revealed that Canadian ICC representative Seaborn delivered messages from the United States to the DRV on three occasions. The only acknowledgment appears in extracts from the documents printed on the 17th in PRAVDA, which noted without comment that immediately after Congress adopted the Tonkin Gulf resolution, the Administration sent Seaborn to Hanoi to warn the North Vietnamese that they would "suffer the consequences" if they continued to attempt to "develop subversive activities and strive to subjugate South Vietnam and Laos."

Moscow also briefly reported, without comment, that the documents revealed that the United States had devoted attention to the possible reaction of the USSR to the beginning of the bombing. Both PRAVDA on the 18th and Radio Peace and Progress on the 21st, in publicizing extracts of the documents, reported that a White House telegram to Ambassador Taylor on 13 February 1965 expressed determination to continue actions against the DRV regardless of UN Security Council deliberations, but at the same time considered a Security Council initiative after another strike to be essential "if we are to avoid being faced with really damaging initiatives by the USSR or perhaps by such powers as India, France, or even the United Nations." PRAVDA also cited National Security Council Memorandum 328 of 6 April 1965 which, among other things, pointed to the need to consider "complications" with regard to the Soviet Union if North Vietnamese ports were mined.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

SOVIET, VIETNAMESE MEDIA NOTE OSLO WAR CRIMES SESSION

MOSCOW Moscow reports the proceedings of the second session of the International Commission for the Investigation of U.S. War Crimes in Indochina,* covering in some detail the charges of U.S. atrocities made by various witnesses. Moscow observes that the session, which opened in Oslo on 20 June, is attended by "eminent jurists, public figures, politicians, and scientists" from "more than a score of countries" including the United States. The Soviet delegation is headed by L. V. Smirnov, chairman of both the Association of Soviet Jurists and the Soviet Committee to Support Vietnam; he was also Moscow's representative at the first session of the Commission.

Soviet publicity for the Commission's activities includes a PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy on the 15th reporting the results of his investigations while "recently" in the DRV as a member of a delegation representing the Commission. According to Moscow, the delegation's report is to be submitted at the current session.

HANOI AND THE FRONT Hanoi media to date have not played up the Oslo war crimes session; however Premier Pham Van Dong did send a message to the meeting on the 20th. Dong charged that, since the Commission's first session in October 1970, the Nixon Administration "has obstinately carried on the unjust and immoral war of aggression." Scoring such activities as "bombing campaigns and the continued use of toxic chemicals and war gases," he added that the United States has "brazenly" broken the commitment to unconditionally end the bombing and carried on "illegal air activities" against the DRV. He asserted that only by ending the war can an end be put to U.S. crimes against the Indochinese people. The 23 June VNA press review noted that the NHAN DAN paper of that day reported on the session and quoted the calls of various delegates for the United States to end the war and withdraw all its troops.

---

* The first session was held in Stockholm last October. See the 28 October TRENDS, page 6.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

On 21 June, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat also sent a message to the Commission pointing out the "precious and active support" which he claimed the session lent the Indochinese people. LPA and Liberation Radio on the 22d reported some of the activity at the session. The accounts noted that Nguyen Van Tien, NFLSV Central Committee member and deputy head of the PRG Paris talks delegation, headed the NFLSV delegation. The NFLSV delegation, as well as delegations from the DRV and Lao Patriotic Front, were said to have "brought with them victims and evidences" of U.S. war crimes.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

OKINAWA AGREEMENT

TERMS OF REVERSION SHARPLY CONDEMNED IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

The 17 June agreement formalizing reversion of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands to Japanese sovereignty has triggered predictable propaganda blasts from Moscow, Peking, and other Asian communist sources. Moscow scores the Okinawan agreement for failing to provide for a complete U.S. military withdrawal from the island. Two authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles reflect Peking's fears that the reversion agreement will speed the renewal of Japanese militarism. Hanoi alleges that the agreement creates conditions for the "Japanese militarists" to assume a more active role in implementing "the Nixon doctrine in Asia." A DPRK Foreign Ministry statement warns that reversion threatens "peace in Asia and the rest of the world." Japan CP media condemn the agreement and urge the formation of a united front to fight ratification of the treaty in the Diet this fall.

MOSCOW Radio Moscow on 17 June broadcast a report on the agreement which warned that, because the U.S. military presence on the island will continue after actual reversion takes place in 1972, "there is a danger that nuclear arms will be placed throughout Japan." Pointing to disclosures contained in the recent New York TIMES series on the secret Pentagon report, the broadcast charged the United States with forcing "other countries--Japan, to begin with," to accept "its adventurous policy." The present formula for returning Okinawa to Japan, the broadcast cautioned, "is fraught with new danger of dragging the Japanese people into war for the sake of benefits to U.S. and Japanese imperialists."

Developing this theme, TASS correspondent V. Chukseyev wrote on the 17th that since the agreement allows the U.S. to keep "88 bases" on the island, Okinawa will "continue to play the role of 'runway' for U.S. bombers making piratic raids to Southeast Asia." While acknowledging that "the United States has officially undertaken to abandon the deployment of nuclear weapons in the island," Chukseyev argued that under the terms of the agreement nuclear arms can be brought to Okinawa "upon consulting the Japanese government."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

TASS released a PRAVDA article signed by Tokyo correspondent A. Biryukov on 20 June which claimed that the agreement has elevated the role of Japan in the "system of U.S. military blocs in the Far East and in Southeast Asia." The Japanese public, Biryukov asserted, considers the agreement "as a fresh collusion between the ruling circles of the two countries that can draw Japan into U.S. aggressive ventures." Biryukov argued that under the provisions of the agreement Okinawa "is being turned into one of the most important nests of subversive activities of U.S. imperialists against socialist states."

IZVESTIYA on 15 June published an article by V. Kudryavtsev which asserted that little change would actually take place as a result of the agreement. Kudryavtsev claimed that the pact sought to cover up "attempts to turn the Okinawan problem into a new deal between the ruling circles of Japan and the United States for the benefit of their militarist schemes in the Pacific and in Asia."

PEKING On June 16, one day before the agreement was signed, NCNA released an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator's article which renewed Peking's polemical campaign against the dangers of a renewal of Japanese militarism. Sharpening the image of Japan as an expanding military threat, Commentator portrayed current defense planning in Japan as "a blueprint of the Japanese reactionaries to step up arms expansion and war preparations." Commentator argued that a war of aggression would provide relief for the Japanese economy--"plagued by overproduction"--as well as meet the needs of the "Japanese zaibatsu."

Reflecting Peking's anxieties concerning a renewal of Japanese militarism, Commentator then alleged that the "lopsided development and vicious swelling of the Japanese economy will inevitably lead to the militarization of its national economy and expansion abroad, and economic expansion is bound to lead to military expansion." After recounting Japan's past aggression against China, specifically noting the Manchurian Incident of 1931, Commentator concluded that the only difference "between today's Japanese militarism and that of pre-war days is that it is tied to the U.S. war chariot."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Picking up this theme, KCNA on 20 June released another PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator's article which specifically scored the Okinawan agreement. Commentator recited Peking's long-standing view that the reversion of Okinawa "is a stupendous fraud" and argued that the agreement "merely 'legalizes' the permanent U.S. occupation of Okinawa." Commentator asserted that the U.S. will continue to make use of Okinawa as an "advance base to suppress the revolutionary struggle of Asian people and to carry on its war of aggression in Indochina."

Seizing on the Sato government's pledge to make Okinawa free of nuclear weapons after reversion, Commentator argued that it is "common knowledge" that "large quantities of nuclear weapons are stored in Okinawa, which is the biggest U.S. nuclear base in the Far East." Alleging that the agreement "does not lay down clearly that the U.S. will withdraw its nuclear weapons or refrain from sending such weapons to Okinawa," Commentator warned that "the whole of Japan" will be turned "into a nuclear base which the U.S. imperialists can use freely." The article then speculated that the signing of the agreement "by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries" has brought "their military collusion to the new stage of building up a joint operational system in preparation for an aggressive war."

HANOI Radio Hanoi on 20 June reacted to the signing with the argument that the agreement "is actually a big swindle" aimed at gaining "political capital for the LDP in the elections for the House of Councillors on 27 June." Contrary to the aspirations of the Japanese people, the broadcast alleged, the agreement will "actually" allow the U.S. to continue to use Okinawa for its "aggression and war provocations in Asia."

PYONGYANG Reaction to the agreement came in the form of a Foreign Ministry statement, released by KCNA on 21 June, which denounced the pact as a "direct menace" to the DPRK. The statement declared that the agreement will allow the U.S. to "use freely most of the huge military bases on the island," which will enable the continuation of "subversive activities against our country and other Asian socialist countries."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Expressing support for the forces within Japan demanding an unconditional return of Okinawa, the statement warned that "if the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese militarists dare plunge themselves" into a war of aggression "there will be only the grave of final ruin for them."

JAPAN CP An AKAHATA editorial published on 17 June linked the terms of the agreement to the disclosures contained in the New York TIMES series on the Pentagon papers. Taking a slap at the Sato government, the editorial asserted that the Okinawan agreement will "increase the danger of Japan being involved in unforeseeable developments." AKAHATA argued that it is incorrect to view the TIMES case merely as a "fire on the other side of the ocean," because Japan "has been deeply incorporated into the U.S. military aggressive system" and "is in danger of being involved in any critical situation at any time under a U.S. machination." The editorial concluded that exposure of the secret papers in the TIMES has "proven once again" the need to end the U.S.-Japan security treaty and work for "a complete reversion of Okinawa instead of a slavish and aggressive one."

On 18 June AKAHATA released a statement by the JCP Central Committee which sharply denounced the "aggressive and humiliating tenor" of the agreement and called for a "nationwide united front for abrogation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty and a complete return of Okinawa." The statement argued that since Okinawa has been "wrongfully held under the military and colonial occupation of U.S. imperialism" it should now "be returned under a condition of all occupation forces being pulled out and all U.S. military bases removed, and damages suffered by the prefectural people during the occupation period fully compensated."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

USSR FORMALIZES BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR 5-POWER NUCLEAR TALKS

TASS and Radio Moscow on the 22d carry the text of a Soviet Government statement addressed to Washington, Peking, Paris, and London formally calling for the convening of a conference of the world's five nuclear powers to discuss questions of nuclear disarmament. The statement, handed to the host governments by Soviet ambassadors, points up the dangers stemming from the nuclear arms race and places responsibility for the halting of such a race on all the nuclear powers acting jointly. It says that a conference should be called "in the nearest future" and suggests an exchange of views through diplomatic channels on questions connected with its timing, site, agenda, and working procedure. The USSR would have no objection, the statement concludes, to the setting up of a conference preparatory committee.

Brezhnev in delivering the Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress on 30 March had included in his potpourri of disarmament measures a call for a conference of the five nuclear powers.* Subsequent to the report, propaganda treated the conference proposal routinely, most frequently citing it along with other proposals as an important element in the USSR's "peace program." Brezhnev himself brought it up in his 11 June pre-election speech, noting that the USSR and the world public are "awaiting an answer" to it and other proposals outlined in the 30 March report. Kosygin in his 9 June pre-election speech also mentioned the proposal in passing. In the same speech, during a discussion of Soviet-U.S. relations, Kosygin responded to Peking's charge--without directly mentioning the Chinese--that the two superpowers seek to settle international issues between themselves. Kosygin declared that this charge stems "either from a misunderstanding of the essence of Soviet foreign policy or is a malicious anti-Soviet fabrication."

---

* Moscow had first gone on record in support of such a proposal when in the 29 April 1965 communique on Gromyko's visit to France the Soviet Government endorsed "the proposal made by France to discuss the problem of nuclear disarmament at a conference of the five nuclear powers." Endorsement of the conference has since been a staple in joint Soviet-French communiques.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

A stronger sense of urgency was attached to the conference proposal in the communique on the 14-20 June visit to France of a delegation from the foreign affairs commissions of the two houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet, headed by Ponomarev. The communique said both sides favor the idea of convening a conference of the five nuclear powers and have "emphasized the growing necessity for carrying out this project." (French media reported that Soviet Ambassador Zorin had met with French President Pompidou on the 15th to discuss the conference proposal, but Moscow did not pick up these reports.)

Peking media continue to maintain silence on the conference proposal. Chou En-lai, however, in remarks to Western newsmen in Peking reported by the New York TIMES on the 23d, acknowledged that the Soviet proposal has been received but that the PRC Government has not yet discussed it. According to the TIMES' report, Chou took the occasion to reaffirm that the PRC, which is in the "experimental stage" of testing nuclear weapons, is not "a big nuclear power." Repledging that the PRC will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, he again proposed that "all countries of the world, regardless of their size, sit down together and agree on the complete prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons."

TASS on the 23d promptly picked up the TIMES report, noting that Chou was quoted as saying the PRC had received the Soviet proposal and "would discuss" it. The TASS account did not mention the TIMES correspondent's observation that Chou "indicated personal reservations" on the matter, nor did it cite Chou's other remarks on nuclear policy.

COMMENT ON PROPOSAL FOR NAVAL TALKS FOCUSES ON MEDITERRANEAN

Moscow has given only minimal propaganda attention to Brezhnev's proposal--surfaced in his 11 June pre-election speech--for talks on the problem of restricting the cruising areas of the large powers' navies. Followup comment has focused on the Mediterranean as the area demanding attention, although one item--a TASS dispatch on the 20th--cited the Indian press for its praise of the Brezhnev proposal and the USSR's support for a nuclear-free Indian Ocean.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

In the only available Soviet press comment, V. Yermakov, writing in PRAVDA on the 17th,* said that the proposal evoked interest "even in top NATO circles" and has been received favorably by Europeans, "both those who live on the shores of the Mediterranean and those who live far from it." Yermakov alleged that this favorable response to the proposal prompted Secretary Laird--in remarks on a TV interview on the 13th--to emphasize that the United States and its NATO partners would intensify military preparations in the Mediterranean. Yermakov observed that those influential circles in the United States who voice concern about the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean are not interested in easing tension there or in discussing problems concerned with "distant voyages and the permanent presence of navies far from their own territorial waters."

A Radio Moscow commentary by Shlenov broadcast in French on the 18th, assailing the "double standard" of the United States with regard to the Western and Soviet navies in the Mediterranean, said that the "main purpose" of the Brezhnev proposal for naval talks is "to turn the Mediterranean into a region where peace and cooperation prevail, to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in that area." Defending the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, Shlenov repeated--as he had done in an April 1969 commentary--the long-standing argument that the USSR is a country "with shores on the Black Sea and is therefore a Mediterranean power," and again reiterated the not uncommon warning that the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in the vicinity of its southern borders."

The Secretary General of the Italian Peace Committee, in an interview with TASS carried on the 22d, mentioned "Brezhnev's proposal to reach an understanding on the simultaneous withdrawal of the naval forces from the Mediterranean." Alleging that the West was taken by

---

* The same author, in a PRAVDA article in November 1968 on the Mediterranean, had argued the Soviet Union's full right to use that sea from "historical, political, economic, and geographical points of view."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

surprise by the proposal, the official claimed that it had evoked wide support in Italy and was further proof of the Soviet desire to turn the Mediterranean into a sea of peace.

On the heels of Brezhnev's proposal on naval talks, Moscow has publicized the 12-13 June visit of Defense Minister Grechko to the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. Among other items, a dispatch in IZVESTIYA on the 15th, also broadcast in foreign languages by Radio Moscow, briefly traced the Russian naval presence in the Black and Mediterranean Seas "defending Russia's state interests," and concluded that the Russians are "not newcomers" to the area. The dispatch complained about the U.S. Navy's alleged patrolling activities against Grechko's flagship, and sounded the standard alarm that the U.S. Sixth Fleet fulfills the "role of gendarme" and "encourages the Israeli aggressors."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

DPRK AND ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU VISIT UNDERSCORES TWO SIDES' INDEPENDENT LINES

The Romanian party-government delegation led by Ceausescu, which visited the DPRK from 9 to 15 June after visiting the PRC and before going on to the DRV and MPR, was accorded high honors comparable to the treatment it received in Peking.* Kim Il-song hosted the Romanians in Pyongyang and accompanied them on a side-trip to Hamhung, thus following the example set by Chou En-lai in the PRC. In the joint communique the North Koreans announced their acceptance of an invitation to Kim to reciprocate the visit at a date to be determined later. (The Chinese had accepted a similar invitation extended to a party-government delegation without specifying any individuals.)

The Koreans and the Romanians used the visit as an opportunity to underscore their mutual interests in self-reliance and independence from domination by their big communist neighbors. Inclusion of Pyongyang, Hanoi, and Ulan Bator on the itinerary enabled the Romanians to avoid overly dramatizing the Peking leg of the tour and to practice their ecumenical line in the communist movement. During the visit to the DPRK the Romanians and their hosts demonstrated their interest in remaining neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and in enhancing their autonomy by developing relations with other independent-minded countries.

Throughout the visit both sides praised the strengthening of their friendship on the basis of "respect for national independence and sovereignty, equality, and noninterference." The communique registered the two sides' intent to develop "political, economic, scientific, technical, cultural, and other relations," calling for increasing exchanges between the parties, governments, and public organizations. There was no explicit reference to military cooperation, although Romania has been seeking to develop military contacts with other socialist countries outside the Warsaw Pact.**

---

* See the 9 June TRENDS, pages 16-21.

** In the past year the two countries have exchanged military delegations. Romanian Defense Minister Ionita paid a "friendship" visit to Pyongyang in July 1970, and the North Korean chief of staff went to Romania in April 1971.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

According to the communique, the talks were held in a "friendly, sincere, and comradely atmosphere," a formulation suggesting a close convergence of views falling short of unanimity. At a 14 June Pyongyang rally Ceausescu observed that "a complete unanimity of views" was reached on "all the important questions" discussed, but differences of emphasis were apparent in the speeches and the communique bore evidence of compromise. In the communique "U.S. imperialism" was explicitly assailed on a number of international issues, reflecting Pyongyang's hardline anti-American stance. Romania normally attacks the United States directly only on the Indochina issue, and in his speeches in North Korea Ceausescu criticized the United States only for its roles in Indochina and South Korea.

In the Pyongyang communique the Romanians went further on the Taiwan issue than they did with the Chinese, endorsing the "liberation" of Taiwan as well as the dismantling of U.S. bases there. But while the communique said the Koreans welcomed the Romanian stand calling for the seating of the PRC in the United Nations, there was no demand for expulsion of the ROC. The Koreans joined with their guests in supporting policies espoused by Bucharest, including disarmament and the removal of foreign bases and troops, and both sides "stressed the importance of achieving security in Europe." But the communique did not mention the proposal for a European security conference, supported by the Warsaw Pact and pressed by Romania, which Ceausescu cited in several speeches in Korea. Disagreement on the Middle East was reflected in the communique's statement that the two sides "clarified their stands" regarding the Middle East situation while expressing solidarity with the Arabs' struggle "against imperialism and for national independence and social progress."

Throughout Ceausescu's stay both sides emphasized that they viewed the visit as contributing to the strengthening of communist unity on their preferred terms of independence and equality. In keeping with their neutral positions regarding the Sino-Soviet rivalry, there was no criticism directed at Moscow or Peking, though Ceausescu in a speech on the 14th and the joint communique alluded to the Sino-Soviet conflict in pointing to a need "to overcome the present difficulties in the international communist movement." Ceausescu had called for an end to fraternal strife in his speeches in the PRC, but the Romanians were unable to get this point into the Sino-Romanian joint communique. Ceausescu repeated the statement he had made in Peking that there is no "center" in the international communist movement, a point on

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

which the Koreans joined the Romanians in their joint communique. Pyongyang had pressed this point--in an anti-Chinese context--at the Korean party conference in October 1966, but it was not mentioned at the party congress last November.

The determination to demonstrate neutrality in the communist movement was reflected in a ceremony on the 11th in which Ceausescu laid wreaths at three monuments in Pyongyang in memory of fallen Korean soldiers, Soviet soldiers who died in World War II, and Chinese volunteers who gave their lives in the Korean War. Peking's report of the ceremony did not acknowledge that one of the monuments was in memory of Soviet soldiers, although it named the one memorializing the Chinese volunteers. Moscow, which has given Ceausescu's travels minimal attention, is not known to have mentioned the ceremony.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

SED CONGRESS

HONECKER REPORT STRESSES "COLLECTIVITY," SLURS ULBRICHT

Polite tributes to the absent Walter Ulbricht by Honecker and Brezhnev at the 15-19 June congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) were offset by Honecker's transparent criticism of his predecessor, who had stepped down as First Secretary at a Central Committee plenum on 3 May. Although Ulbricht was scheduled far in advance to make the opening speech to the congress, prior to the First Secretary's main report, ADN on the 15th reported that Politburo member Axen "read the speech by Walter Ulbricht, who for reasons of ill health is unable to attend the opening meeting." The day before, ADN had reported Ulbricht was part of the delegation welcoming Brezhnev at East Berlin airport. Not until the 17th did ADN report that Ulbricht "fell ill with an acute circulatory disturbance in the late evening of 14 June," a report promptly carried also by TASS.

In his address on the 15th to an audience which included all the Warsaw Five first secretaries and Czechoslovakia's Husak, Honecker said the party wanted to "reiterate the gratitude" to Ulbricht it had expressed at the 3 May plenum and went on to wish the former leader strength for his work "in the collective leadership" of the party and as State Council Chairman. The new leader made his point amply clear in the portion of his report dealing with internal party affairs, declaring that the SED "resolutely applies the principle of collectivity as the highest principle of the work of all elected leaders" and that "only collectivity, which includes personal responsibility, makes correct and scientifically exact decisions possible." Further strengthening Western conjectures that Ulbricht was forced out of the top post for transgressing rules of collectivity, Honecker continued: "It is through collectivity in the work of all leaderships that we most effectively counter manifestations of subjectivism, dogmatic argumentation, embellishments, and disregard for the collective."

The formulation of the tribute to Ulbricht by Brezhnev, in his speech on the 16th, was slighting to the former SED leader: Brezhnev began his speech with praise for Honecker's report and then recalled only Pieck and Grotewohl as the principals in the 1946 amalgamation of the East German KPD and SPD to form the SED--an event with which Ulbricht has heretofore been regularly connected in the propaganda. Only after discussing

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

further aspects of German communist history and other past leaders such as Luxemburg, Liebknecht, and Thaelmann, did Brezhnev add a brief passage of tribute to "Comrade Walter Ulbricht, who has devoted all his energy, all his immense political experience to the cause of the German working people, to the cause of socialism" and "has won the deep respect and gratitude of the working people of the GDR and all its friends." ADN on the 19th, the congress' last day, reported that Brezhnev had called that day on Ulbricht, "who is receiving medical treatment," and had a "cordial, friendly" talk with him.

The other visiting spokesmen of ruling parties, many of which had felicitated both Ulbricht and Honecker after the 3 May leadership change, generally refrained from any tribute to Ulbricht in their SED congress speeches. Faint praise came only from Husak and Kadar: The former praised "Ernst Thaelmann, Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl, Walter Ulbricht, and many others," and the latter paid passing tribute to "veteran members of your party, including the veteran fighter of the German and international communist movement, Comrade Walter Ulbricht."

In the post-congress propaganda, Ulbricht's unrealistic economic goals were implied in a 22 June NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial. On the new five-year plan goals, adopted at the congress, the editorial said "these are realistic aims as long as we keep to the directives and as long as we do not ask of our national economy 'miracles outside the plan,' as Erich Honecker said." It added a barb to the effect that "the logic of economy cannot be outwitted." The editorial's importance was underscored by its transmission in full by ADN on the day of its publication.

SOCIALIST CAMP DISCORDS SOFTPEDALLED AT CONGRESS

The major recent deviations in the socialist camp--the Czechoslovak and the Chinese--were routinely dealt with by Honecker's main report but were treated only obliquely by Brezhnev and most of the other ruling party spokesmen. Only the MPR's Tsedenbal echoed Honecker's attack on the Chinese leaders, and only Husak joined in a direct reference to the 1968-69 Czechoslovak deviation. Neither Honecker nor Husak, however, mentioned the August 1968 Warsaw Five intervention, for which Husak had thanked Brezhnev "personally" at the CPCZ congress in May.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

01-JUL-1998 12:47 ScreenScan

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Honecker pointedly and at length stressed the "perfect unanimity" of the East German and Soviet parties and governments, exemplified in "the coordination of foreign policy" within the framework of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.* On the subject of the Warsaw Pact as a barrier to "counterrevolution," Honecker recalled that at the May CPCZ congress "we expressed our full agreement with our Czechoslovak comrades, who have defeated the enemies of socialism after an involved struggle and have set the further course for the construction of socialism in their country." Stressing the "international importance" of the Czechoslovak "lesson," he added that "together we will also in the future prevent the imperialist opponent from attacking socialism in Europe, either by military pressure or by open or covert counterrevolution."

Honecker declared also that "the policy of the Chinese leadership still remains a serious obstacle" to communist unity and added a characteristically sharp attack on "the chauvinist great-power and anti-Soviet policy of the Mao group in Peking." He added routinely that the SED, "just as the CPSU and the other fraternal parties," advocates "normalization of interstate relations" with Peking.

In his SED congress speech on the 16th, Brezhnev included only vague references to "difficulties" and "extensive and very complex problems" in the construction of socialism. In only a muted restatement of the Brezhnev doctrine, he warned--in the context of the FRG-Soviet treaty--that "the inviolability of the borders of the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the other fraternal countries is insured quite independently of the existence of this sort of treaty; it is insured by the united might of the states of the Warsaw Pact."

---

* See the 16 June TRENDS for a discussion of congress statements by Honecker and Brezhnev on Germany and Berlin.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR

IZVESTIYA AND POLITIKA ARGUE OVER EMIGRES' ACTIVITY IN USSR

Moscow's belated reaction to the Belgrade daily POLITIKA's charges that "Cominform emigres" have been giving lectures in the USSR slandering Yugoslavia and President Tito personally came in a Volgin article in IZVESTIYA on 17 June. POLITIKA's Moscow correspondent, Marovic, had surfaced the charges in a dispatch carried in the paper on 9 June, and the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat spokesman at his press conference the next day stated that a protest had been lodged with the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade over the matter. As broadcast by Radio Moscow, the IZVESTIYA article, entitled "Dangerous Insinuations," denounced Marovic's charges as "fabrications" and "slanders," but vaguely acknowledged that a Yugoslav emigre did give an unofficial talk to Moscow students on Yugoslavia.

The Volgin article is the sharpest press comment concerning Yugoslavia to appear in Soviet media since the fall of 1969 when Moscow and Belgrade agreed to curb open polemics during Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Belgrade. The purpose of the article appears to be to counter the wide Western publicity given to POLITIKA's charges, while at the same time seeking to avoid letting the dispute unduly exacerbate Soviet-Yugoslav state relations. Thus Volgin's rebuttal in IZVESTIYA is broadcast to many of Radio Moscow's foreign audiences, but it is not carried on the domestic service. Moreover, the article in the Soviet Government organ does not mention the protest by the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat, but instead centers its attack on Marovic's "slanders" and on POLITIKA's editors for publishing them.

The IZVESTIYA commentator flatly denied Marovic's first allegation--that an emigre named Elez gave an anti-Yugoslav lecture in Moscow--and he obscured the Yugoslav journalist's second allegation that a Yugoslav emigre and lieutenant colonel of the Soviet army, Blazo Raspopovic, had slandered Yugoslavia and President Tito at a talk for a group of Moscow students. IZVESTIYA merely conceded that a research worker named "Raspopovic, who participated in the Yugoslav liberation struggle," gave a talk on his experiences in Yugoslavia to a group of Moscow students. Disclaiming any official sanction for the talk, Volgin defensively added that the meeting was "organized by the lecturer

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

at the school on his own initiative." The Soviet commentator went on to assail Marovic's "risky generalizations" that such activity was "allegedly dictated by certain CPSU needs," but he did not address himself to the question of why Raspopovic, whom the Yugoslavs identify as a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet army, was lecturing Moscow students on Yugoslav history.

Concluding on a note of pained innocence and conciliation, Volgin said that to make such assertions about Soviet intentions "one must stubbornly refuse to understand USSR policy toward Yugoslavia--a policy aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples."

POLITIKA responded to the IZVESTIYA attack in an editorial note following a summary of the Volgin article on the 19th and in an editorial on the 20th. Taking a swipe at the standard of journalism in the USSR, the note commented that the Soviet paper's manner of response--"without refuting the facts published by POLITIKA"--eloquently testifies as to "how the IZVESTIYA editors view the basic obligations of a journalist to inform his readers objectively and comprehensively on the country in which he works." Similarly, the next day POLITIKA noted that IZVESTIYA "did not support its sharp attack with any well-argued and sound rebuttal of these facts, which we still maintain are true." The paper added that its editorial office as well as its Moscow correspondent checked the correctness of its facts before publication.

Pointing out that at times the press "throws light on some unpleasant consequences," the Yugoslav journal noted that "the press cannot be blamed for the causes of those consequences." The editorial went on to add that neither POLITIKA "nor any other Yugoslav newspaper can yield the right of editing and decision-making or the right of pressure to anyone outside and least of all to someone abroad, because acceptance of this kind of norm would represent the most direct interference in our country's internal affairs."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KGB OFFICIALS NAMED, TSINEV'S TIES TO BREZHNEV REVEALED

Publicity for the recent RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections has as a byproduct revealed further changes in the leadership of the KGB (Committee for State Security) as well as new evidence of Brezhnev's close ties to that leadership. Brezhnev's association with two KGB deputy chairmen appointed shortly after Semichastnyy's dismissal as chairman in 1967 was already clear; these are S.K. Tsvigun, former subordinate of Brezhnev in Moldavia, and V.M. Chebrikov, former second secretary of Dnepropetrovsk obkom. Brezhnev's ties to a third deputy chairman, G.K. Tsinev, have been revealed in a newspaper account of a local meeting that nominated Tsinev for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 11 May 1971).

The account of Tsinev's career contained in this report makes it clear that he worked closely with Brezhnev as well as with the present head of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), N.A. Shchelokov, in Dnepropetrovsk during the 1930's. Tsinev and Shchelokov graduated from the Dnepropetrovsk metallurgical institute in 1934 and 1933, respectively, while Brezhnev graduated from the metallurgical institute in the neighboring town of Dneprodzerzhinsk in 1935. The three men worked as engineers in Dnepropetrovsk metallurgical plants after graduation, and in 1939 Brezhnev became a secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk obkom, Shchelokov became chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk city executive committee, and Tsinev became a Dnepropetrovsk city secretary. All three men remained in these posts until 1941 when they went into the army.

Tsinev stayed in the army after the war, becoming deputy high commissioner in Austria. His first identification with the KGB came after the 1967 shakeup; identified only as a colonel general, he wrote the 20 December 1967 SOVIET RUSSIA article on the 50th anniversary of the KGB. Earlier in 1967, on 8 June, he had apparently been in the military; on that date he signed the RED STAR obituary of the air force chief political officer along with dozens of generals, but no KGB leaders.

Although as a colonel general Tsinev surely ranked high in the KGB hierarchy, apparently he did not become KGB deputy chairman until late 1970. He did not sign a Ukrainian KGB leader's

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

obituary on 6 June 1970, although four other USSR KGB deputy chairmen did, including those less identified with the Ukraine than Tsinev. He was finally identified as KGB deputy chairman in the 3 December 1970 PRAVDA. Apart from KGB Chairman and Politburo candidate member Andropov, only four security officials were named to the central organs elected by the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971: the three from Dnepropetrovsk, Shchelokov, Chebrikov, and Tsinev, plus Brezhnev's former subordinate in Moldavia, Tsvigun, who also came originally from the Ukraine.

The press has recently identified several more new KGB officials, although the dates of their appointments are unknown. The list of new RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputies published in the 17 June 1971 SOVIET RUSSIA identifies a new KGB deputy chairman, V.P. Pirozhkov. Pirozhkov, former cadre section chief of the Altay kraykom (SOVIET RUSSIA, 1 July 1965), apparently held the KGB post already in March 1971 when he was elected a delegate to the 24th congress from Moscow city (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 13 March 1971). He was elected a RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputy from the Altay.

A new Moscow KGB chief, Lt. Gen. V.I. Alidin (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 8 May), and a new Leningrad KGB chief, D.P. Nosyrev (LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 January); and deputy chief, V.N. Bleyer (LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 26 May), have also been identified this year.

CURRENTLY IDENTIFIED KGB LEADERS

Chairman	:	Yu. D. Andropov
First Deputy Chairman	:	S.K. Tsvigun
Deputy Chairmen	:	V.M. Chebrikov
		G.K. Tsinev
		V.P. Pirozhkov
		A.M. Malygin
		L.I. Pankratov

All have been identified in their posts this year, except for Malygin and Pankratov, who were last identified in 1970.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLE'S DAILY RECOMMENDS "TACHING MODEL" FOR INDUSTRY

A 20 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial makes a new call for industry to learn from the experiences of the Taching oilfield. As with the Tachai agricultural model, Taching emulation is more a matter of spirit than an exact copying of methods. Enterprises must follow certain ideological lines such as "placing revolutionization in command of mechanization," self-reliance, and learning from the PLA. The masses must participate in decisions, and all decisions are to be made in compliance with Mao's teachings.

Although the current editorial reiterates these traditional themes, its primary emphasis is on the need for labor to be disciplined and utilized to the fullest possible extent. Instructions to the PLA on army building must be taken by industry "as applying to us." Leadership must be centralized in the context of mass movements, and revolutionary spirit must be combined "with a strict scientific approach." The editorial summarizes the lessons to be learned from the late "iron man" of Taching, Wang Chin-hsi, as the need for "strict standards, a serious attitude, close-knit organization, and firm and clear labor discipline."

The Taching example underwent a measure of eclipse during the later stages of the cultural revolution, and the editorial notes that during this period the "class enemy" tried to undermine Taching with tactics that seemed leftist and that "some of our comrades . . . played into his hands." Increasing references to Taching in recent months have indicated its full rehabilitation as the prime industrial model, but there have been some shifts in emphasis. During the earlier period, articles left unclear the extent to which distinctive features of Taching were to be followed by other established enterprises, and much attention was devoted to Taching's combination of industry and agriculture.

The current PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial takes into account Taching's differences--mainly, its establishment in a remote and previously unsettled area--and advises that only "where conditions permit" should workers engage in agriculture and side-occupations, and that only "where conditions are similar to Taching" should they "build a new type of socialist industrial and mining center which integrates workers and peasants." (There have been prior indications that not all workers and their families were pleased at being partially reconverted to farm laborers.)

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3

It is increasingly obvious that the current fourth five-year plan does indeed make provision for a variety of economic and practical concessions to specific segments of society. The technicians--who suffered a considerable loss of status during the cultural revolution--seem to be enjoying a new round of attention; articles are published that recognize the importance of training technicians, and other articles stress the need to make full use even of those trained during periods of revisionist ascendancy. An article broadcast by Radio Peking on 7 June noted that "engineering and technical personnel are an important force that cannot be ignored" and that the "overwhelming majority" are good. The article even calls the participation of engineers and technicians "indispensable" in designing industrial products.

In another area, the peasantry has for some time been given assurances that at this stage of development private plots will continue and sideline occupations in various fields will be allowed. There have been numerous criticisms of local units which have gone too far in a seemingly "leftist" direction. A Canton broadcast on 16 June sounded the warning that "some communes and brigades limited the development of the peasants' legitimate domestic sideline production." While units correctly played up the importance of grain and deemphasized money, they fell into the error of "absolute egalitarianism," which "affected the peasants' enthusiasm for socialist production."

A more general measure affecting the entire working class is seen in a new emphasis on light industrial consumer goods, first proclaimed in an article by the Ministry of Light Industry broadcast on 29 May.* A 12 June broadcast indicated how far in this area Peking is now willing to deviate from cultural revolution practice. The item noted that "minor" commodities are "very important" inasmuch as shortages "can cause great inconvenience to the people's livelihood and to social production." Not only must cooking utensils, sporting goods, tools, and bicycles be supplied to fit the demand, but the question was posed, in regard to such items as women's hairpins, "Are the specifications and design to their liking?"

---

* See FBIS TRENDS, 9 June 1971, page 36.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040026-3