[redacted] #34-71 STATSPEC TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA 1 OF 1

25 AUG 1971

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

CONF

00875R000300040035-3

Doc/SER

Confidential

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

25 AUGUST 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 34)

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Rele

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

00040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

Hanoi Says U.S. Uses PRC "Oppportunism" to Divide Communists . 1
DRV Anniversary: Stress on "Correct" Independent Policies . . . 4
Front Anniversary Message Soft-pedals Party Ties with DRV . . . 5
DRV, PRG Endorse Peking Position on UN Representation 7
DRV Delegation Stops in Peking, Moscow En Route to Europe . . . 8
Moscow Publicizes Supplementary Aid to DRV, Attacks Peking . . 9
Paris Delegates Assail U.S. Policy; Media Note Economic Moves . 11
Minh, Ky Withdrawal Said to Expose Saigon Election "Farce" . . 13
DRV, PRG Spokesmen Score U.S. Strikes in DMZ, at North 15

ROMANIA-USSR-PRC

Ceausescu Flaunts Domestic Support for Maverick Policies . . . 16
Soviet Leaders, Commentators Remind Romania of Debt to USSR . . 18
Peking Plays up Ties with Bucharest, Warns of Pressures 20
Moscow's Allies Discourse on Chinese Maneuvers in Balkans . . . 21

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRAVDA Article Attacks Peking's "Collusion with Imperialism" . 25

CHINA UN SEAT

Peking Rules Out Two-Chinas Formula for UN Representation . . . 28
USSR Reports Developments, Reaffirms Support for PRC Seat . . . 30

MIDDLE EAST

Soviet Media Mark Time on Mideast Issue, Arab Developments . . 32

BOLIVIA

Havana Views Bolivian "Setback" as Predictable but Reversible . 36
Reassertion of Cuban Role in Hemisphere-wide Confrontation . . 38

KOREA

DPRK Hopes Red Cross Contacts Will Pave Way for Unification . . 40

(Continued)

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

CONTENTS (Continued)

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

New Party Committees Announced for Szechwan and Tibet 43
RED FLAG Signals an End to Dearth of Reading Materials 45

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 16 - 22 AUGUST 1971

Moscow (2757 items)

U.S. Economic Measures	(--)	9%
Indochina	(4%)	8%
China	(6%)	6%
Soviet Aviation Day	(--)	5%
CEMA Council Session	(14%)	4%
USSR-Indian Treaty	(12%)	3%
Middle East	(2%)	2%

Peking (1488 items)

Domestic Issues	(32%)	21%
Indochina	(25%)	16%
PRC Military Delegation in East Europe	(--)	10%
PRC UN Seat	(2%)	8%
[Foreign Ministry Statement	(--)	4%]
PRC-Iran Diplomatic Relations	(--)	5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

INDOCHINA

Hanoi's continuing polemical propaganda in the wake of Peking's moves to improve relations with the United States includes a 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article entitled "Nixon--The Man and His Doctrine," which reaches a new level of fury and venom against China when in the course of assailing U.S. splitting tactics it says: "A very perfidious move of the President's is to spray the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunist heads in a bid to play off socialist countries against one another and sow schism among the communist and workers' parties." Hanoi's concern over Peking's attitude toward the United States is also reflected, less directly, in propaganda marking the 26th anniversary of the August Revolution. Editorials in both the party organ NHAN DAN and the party paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN give marked stress to the "independence" and "correctness" of the Vietnam Workers Party's policies and state firmly that the United States is the "number one enemy."

At the same time, Hanoi has moved quickly to applaud a Peking position with which it is in sympathy: A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 23d says that the Vietnamese fully support the Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of the 20th which rejected the U.S. move for representation of both the PRC and ROC in the United Nations.

Peking has continued to ignore Hanoi's polemicizing, and publicity for the DRV National Assembly delegation's stopover in Peking en route to Europe stresses close relations. NCNA lauds the "revolutionary friendship" between the two peoples and reports that toasts were exchanged at a banquet at which the two sides said their peoples "would always unite, fight, and win victory together." VNA's cryptic reports of the stopover say nothing of this, although VNA does say that Chou En-lai "received and had a cordial talk" with delegation head Hoang Van Hoan.

Routine Soviet propaganda continues to charge that the President, by his planned trip to Peking, hopes to take advantage of Peking's "splittist" attitude and settle the issue "behind the back of the Vietnamese people." And Moscow continues its reports of polemical Hanoi material with radio broadcasts--including broadcasts in Mandarin and Vietnamese--of the August HOC TAP editorial.

HANOI SAYS U.S. USES PRC "OPPORTUNISM" TO DIVIDE COMMUNISTS

The 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article, as reviewed by VNA that day, goes beyond other propaganda in making it clear that

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Hanoi feels the Chinese are allowing their nationalism to lead them to policies which undermine the unity of socialist countries. While Hanoi propaganda in recent weeks has repeatedly stressed the main thesis of the article--that the Nixon Doctrine seeks to divide revolutionary forces--Commentator offers the most venemous characterization of China to date when he refers to the President's ploy of "spraying the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunist heads" in order to sow disunity among communists.

There is no indication of the length of the article as published in NHAN DAN; this is the only polemical article that has not been broadcast by Hanoi's domestic radio except for the 3 August NHAN DAN article by "Chien Thang" which VNA belatedly excerpted on the 11th.* However, evidence that VNA truncated Commentator's attack on the President comes in Hanoi's broadcast in Mandarin on the 25th** of what it called "the first half" of the article, containing passages not included in VNA's account. At the same time, the broadcast on the 25th did not contain the most caustic references to China that appear in the VNA account; it remains to be seen whether these references will appear in a broadcast of the second half of the article.

The version in Mandarin, in the course of tracing the President's career for the past 25 years, observes that in his "global strategy" he has made many trips around the world. Beginning by saying that shortly after he was elected to Congress in 1947 he went to Europe, the broadcast version proceeds to trace his travels, saying among other things that shortly after his assumption of the Presidency "he set out for Europe before he could propose any effective measures for dealing with the domestic situation. He then crossed the Pacific and came to Asia." It also mentions his travels to Africa and Latin America, but although it says that since 1947 he has "treated Europe as the most formidable rival to the United States," it does not mention his visit to the Soviet Union or his subsequent trips to Romania and Yugoslavia after he became President.

---

* See the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 1-4.

** FBIS did not begin monitoring the Hanoi Mandarin programs until the 19th; hence there is no way of knowing whether they may have carried some version of the Chieng Thang article.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

The broadcast's installment of the article refers only cryptically to the President's having talked about "the division of the socialist camp and the communist movement," and it remains to be seen whether the next installment will include the extensive discussion in the VNA version. According to VNA, Commentator, after charging the President with exploiting "opportunists," claims that the United States aims at undermining communist cohesion through the use of "nationalism" and adds pointedly that the President "disclosed that this was an important starting point leading to new undertakings in the U.S. foreign policy in Asia."* Judging from VNA, the article fails to state that the unity of communist countries cannot be sabotaged, but it does conclude that no "force or devilish maneuver" can break the unity of "the revolutionary forces" and of the people of the world.

* A NHAN DAN Commentator article on 1 August had less obliquely referred to moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations when it said: "Recently, the U.S. ruling circles have occasionally spoken of reassessing the China danger."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

DRV ANNIVERSARY: STRESS ON "CORRECT" INDEPENDENT POLICIES

The 19 August NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials marking the 26th anniversary of the August Revolution both dwell on the development of Vietnam's "correct" and "independent" policies and strategies--a subject which was also a central concern of the earlier HOC TAP editorial pegged to the August Revolution anniversary and DRV National Day.* Hanoi's continuing assertions about the correctness of its stand are undoubtedly prompted in part by concern over Sino-U.S. relations. But it is possible that this preoccupation also reflects a debate in Hanoi over future policies. Questions of strategy were discussed in the 19 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial last year, but this issue was not broached in last year's NHAN DAN anniversary editorial or in recent HOC TAP anniversary editorials.

Both the NHAN DAN and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials, in the course of lauding Vietnamese strategies, express high praise for the party's leadership. Asserting that correct leadership is a "basic condition" for success, NHAN DAN goes on to claim that the Vietnamese party has "correctly solved the problems of strategy and tactics and problems related to the methods and form of revolutionary struggle." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial similarly stresses the role of the party's leadership; it holds that a revolution cannot succeed without creative leadership and that the party's creativeness in the August Revolution was a manifestation of its independence, acute political vision, and great organizational capabilities. The editorial observes that the present resistance struggle is also "an irrefutable proof of the invincible strength of our party's correct lines toward independence and sovereignty." It lauds the southern people's "proper" revolutionary lines, "versatile" methods, and "excellent military art," and it also notes that "the strategic methods and ideology that have guided the fighting in the revolutionary war in the South have undergone changes through new discoveries."

NHAN DAN refers only in general terms to victories in defeating Vietnamization; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN goes beyond this, seeming to refer to Lam Son 719 and the fighting in

---

* See 18 August TRENDS, pages 4-7, for a discussion of the HOC TAP editorial.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Cambodia when it makes passing mention of "strong blows by the main force troops" at the beginning of the year. But like the HOC TAP anniversary editorial, it fails to describe these actions as "strategic victories." On the other hand, both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN echo the atypical theme--played earlier in the 5 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident--that the worst part of the struggle is over. Thus, NHAN DAN claims that the Vietnamese revolution is facing basic advantages and that "the biggest difficulties and trials have been overcome." And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, noting progress over the past 26 years, observes that "the darkest hours are things of the past."

FRONT ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE SOFT-PEDALS PARTY TIES WITH DRV

The Front marked the August Revolution anniversary with a message from NFLSV Central Committee Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, an NFLSV "circular" calling for determination in the continued struggle, and editorial comment. Like Hanoi, the Front stressed the independence theme, saying that the spirit of the August Revolution which achieved the independence and freedom of the northern half of the country is still alive today in the South, which is determined to reach the same goals. An editorial published in a special issue of the Front organ GIAI PHONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 19th, says that each victory of the anti-U.S. struggle "has originated from the most important cause--our proper and creative revolutionary lines of independence and self-government."

GIAI PHONG also charges that President Nixon "still resorts to many deceitful, evasive moves" to avoid responding to the PRG's 1 July initiative. And a radio editorial broadcast on the 20th seems to allude to the President's China policy even more directly when it claims he "has resorted to many perfidious diplomatic maneuvers in the hope of deceiving public opinion about the so-called 'pressure' upon our people in order to avoid responding to the 1 July" PRG peace initiative. It adds that he "stupidly refuses to admit the powerful strength and endless capabilities of a small but independent people." An LPA editorial of the 19th comments in a similar vein.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Although the 18 August message of greetings is signed by Nguyen Huu Tho in his capacity as NFLSV Central Committee Chairman as well as by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, VWP First Secretary Le Duan is not among the addressees. The message is addressed only to DRV President Ton Duc Thang, National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh, and Premier Van Dong, where last year's joint NFLSV-PRG message--not sent until September--had been addressed to all four leaders.* Le Duan's name may have been dropped this year in order to avoid identifying the NFLSV with the communist party and to play up its character as a "front." The message asks that best wishes be conveyed to the people and army in the North, where last year's message had also extended greetings to the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party, the National Assembly and DRV Government, and the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front.

These departures from the norm follow another recent departure from past practice: The VWP slogans issued on 5 August for the anniversaries echoed earlier ones in praising the "valor and glorious victories of the heroic South Vietnam PLAF and people," but omitted the additional phrase "under the clearsighted leadership of the NFLSV and PRG."

* Two messages were sent in 1969, one from Phat addressed to Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, and an NFLSV message from Tho to Ho.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

DRV, PRG ENDORSE PEKING POSITION ON UN REPRESENTATION

Hanoi media on 23 August and Liberation Radio on the 24th, respectively, carried statements by the DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen endorsing the 20 August PRC Foreign Ministry statement outlining Peking's stand on the UN representation issue. (NCNA reported the DRV statement promptly on the 24th.) Both statements duly note the rejection of "two Chinas" and observe that Taiwan is an "inseparable" part of China.

Prior to the release of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, Hanoi's last known reference to the Taiwan-UN issue came in the 19 June joint DRV-Romanian communique concluding Ceausescu's visit. The communique said: "The two sides resolutely support the Chinese people's struggle for the liberation of Taiwan, an inalienable territory of the PRC, for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the liquidation of U.S. military bases in Taiwan; they demand restoration to the PRC of its rights in the United Nations and in other international organizations."

During Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi in March this year, Premier Pham Van Dong in two separate speeches also reiterated Vietnamese support of the Chinese "in their resolve to liberate Taiwan" and declared that "it is imperative that the PRC should have her rightful seat in the United Nations."

Hanoi media are not known to have explicitly discussed a two-Chinas policy since last fall, when there were articles in NHAN DAN.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

DRV DELEGATION STOPS IN PEKING, MOSCOW EN ROUTE TO EUROPE

The DRV National Assembly delegation led by Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, which Hanoi on 18 August announced would visit the USSR, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, arrived in Warsaw on 23 August after stopovers in Peking and Moscow. On the 24th VNA--but apparently not Moscow--briefly reported that the delegation had made a stopover on 22-23 August in the Soviet capital, where it was met at the airport and hosted at a banquet by Central Committee member and chairman of the Soviet of the Union Shitikov. VNA said that after visiting East Europe, the delegation would return to the USSR for an "official friendship visit." During its 27-30 June Moscow stopover last year, the DRV National Assembly delegation had been hosted by Chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group Spiridonov and had gone sightseeing in the capital.

The delegation's arrival in Peking on the 18th was promptly reported by NCNA, which noted that it was welcomed by Politburo member Chiu Hui-Tso; Kuo Mo-Jo, Central Committee member and vice chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee; and Keng Piao, head of the Central Committee's International Liaison Department. NCNA noted that the delegation was "on its way to Europe" and reported that officials of the Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Soviet embassies were present, without specifying that these are the countries it will visit.

On the 19th NCNA reported a meeting between the delegation and Chou En-lai at which there was "a very cordial and friendly conversation." Another NCNA item that day reported that Chiu Hui-Tso and Kuo Mo-Jo held a banquet that evening which "was permeated with an atmosphere of revolutionary friendship between the people of China and Vietnam, 'who are both comrades and brothers.'" In their toasts, according to NCNA, Chiu and Hoan said that the Chinese and Vietnamese people "would always unite, fight, and win victory together." On 22 August Peking reported the group's departure that day "for a visit to Europe," again noting that officials of the same four embassies were present at the airport and again failing to spell out the itinerary. The delegation was seen off by Chiu and Kuo Mo-Jo.

VNA has reported less detail than NCNA did about the Hoan delegation's stopover in Peking and has not echoed NCNA's warmest descriptions of the atmosphere of the visit. The DRV news agency noted briefly on 22 August that Chou had "received

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

and had a cordial talk" with Hoan and that the delegation was honored at a banquet. But it gave no details of the banquet and thus did not echo references by NCNA to "revolutionary friendship" and comradeship between the two peoples. Coming in the midst of Hanoi's polemic with Peking over Sino-U.S. relations, the relative coolness of Hanoi's reports on Hoan's reception in the Chinese capital does not seem accidental. It should be noted, however, that the DRV accounts of Hoan's stopover in Peking were also less effusive than the Chinese accounts last year--perhaps reflecting Hanoi's desire to maintain its balance between Peking and Moscow.

MOSCOW PUBLICIZES SUPPLEMENTARY AID TO DRV, ATTACKS PEKING

Further publicity for the recently signed USSR-DRV agreement "to strengthen the DRV defense potentialities," tersely reported by TASS on 18 August, sheds no further light on the officials involved or the precise date it was signed.* On the 20th VNA specified that the agreement was for "Soviet nonrefund supplementary military aid to Vietnam for 1971." Like TASS, it said Vice Premier Novikov "attended" the signing ceremony. Moscow radio and PRAVDA on 21 August, in reporting briefly that Novikov had received a vice chairman of the DRV State Planning Commission and a DRV deputy minister of foreign trade on the 20th for a discussion of the development of trade and economic cooperation, noted only that the aid agreement had been signed "earlier."

Followup Moscow comment gives no further information on the nature of the aid agreement but does review Soviet economic and military aid to the DRV over past years. Commentators stress DRV leaders' expressions of gratitude, and some once again take the opportunity to attack Peking's stand. A 20 August Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin contrasted the USSR's military aid to the DRV with Chinese verbal support. It renewed charges that the PRC not only failed to aid the Vietnamese but also obstructed the passage of Soviet aid through Chinese territory, recalling that the Chinese had even attacked and insulted Soviet experts who were on their way to aid the Vietnamese. On the same day as the

* The initial TASS announcement is discussed in the 18 August TRENDS, page 12.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

broadcast, a PRAVDA article by Tikhvinskiy reviewing a history of Sino-Soviet relations included a reference to Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam in a passage on Red Guard antics in the 1966-69 period of the Cultural Revolution. The Red Guards were said to have harassed crews of Soviet ships and aircraft transporting cargoes to Vietnam.*

Another Radio Peace and Progress Mandarin-language commentary on Soviet aid on the 22d reiterated that Peking is trying to discredit the USSR's "internationalist stand" and "sabotage" the friendly relations between the Indochinese and Soviet peoples. It said Peking's policies have "caused great losses" to the national liberation movements in Indochina and serve the interests of the imperialists and their puppets.

BROADCASTS OF HOC TAP

Continuing its pick-up of polemical Hanoi material, Moscow on 19 and 20 August broadcast summaries of the editorial in the August issue of the DRV party journal HOC TAP to domestic and foreign audiences. Accounts of the editorial in Vietnamese and Mandarin included its charges that the United States is the number one enemy and that the Nixon Administration is attempting to sow disunity among socialist countries. Notably, it did not include the editorial's strongest statements of Vietnamese independence--omitting, for example, its contention that the Vietnam problem is one between the Vietnamese and the United States and its assertion that "only those who are fighting the Americans can raise the decisive voice regarding the future of their own country."

The accounts also include HOC TAP's references to socialist aid and the importance of international unity to the Vietnam struggle. Moscow did not repeat the editorial's assertion that "many" parties have held that their attitude toward the Vietnamese resistance is a "touchstone of proletarian internationalism." This formula has been used in the past by Moscow in its attacks on Peking: For example, the 28 November 1965 PRAVDA editorial on communist unity maintained that "support rendered to the Vietnamese people's just struggle is the touchstone of how this or that communist party fulfills its international duty."

---

* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a discussion of this article.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

PARIS DELEGATES ASSAIL U.S. POLICY; MEDIA NOTE ECONOMIC MOVES

Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to provide only abbreviated coverage of the Paris talks, along with routine, low-key publicity for world support for the 1 July PRG peace proposal. At the 19 August Paris session, the DRV and PRG delegates again asserted that the seven-point proposal provides a way out for the United States. And both again levied the familiar charge that the Nixon Administration continues to seek a military victory in Vietnam in order to "'negotiate from strength.'" They stressed that as long as the Administration "clings" to Vietnamization, all its "professions of 'active negotiations' are only empty words." Both delegates denounced U.S. action throughout Indochina, including that against the DRV; DRV delegate Xuan Thuy--back at the talks after his absence last week--cited the 16 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement condemning "war crimes" against the North.

PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi, standing in for Mme. Binh, also pressed the persistent charges against the conduct of the elections in South Vietnam. VNA's account of the session said that he "unmasked" U.S. claims of neutrality in the elections and charged that "everyone knows" that the United States allows President Thieu "to use all measures to eliminate his opponents, terrorize voters, and repress leaders of anti-fraudulent election organizations."

The VNA account of the session failed to note PRG delegate Mme. Binh's absence this week, although it had mentioned Xuan Thuy's absence the previous week. In neither case is it clear whether or not the absence stemmed from the fact that there is no chief U.S. negotiator in Paris (the communist delegations still have not acknowledged the appointment of Ambassador Porter, who is to assume his duties as head of the delegation on 30 August). Asked about Mme. Binh's absence, the PRG press spokesman at the post-session press briefing explained that she "needs a rest." But two days after the session she addressed a U.S. anti-war national convention in Michigan by telephone, according to VNA on the 25th, which reported that she "exposed" the Administration's Vietnamization policy, "developed in detail" the seven-point peace initiative, and "called on the participants to take actions" to urge the Administration to respond seriously to the proposals.

For the third straight week VNA dismissed the allies' statements in one sentence, claiming that the U.S. and GVN delegates "again exerted themselves to plead for their policy of prolonging

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

and intensifying the war." Thus the account made no mention of U.S. Ambassador Habib's charge that the communist forces, not the United States, are the cause of the recent step-up of military action near the DMZ, and VNA also failed to record his reiteration of the call for a cease-fire.

NIXON MEASURES ON U.S. ECONOMY

Both the communist delegates made passing references to the "economic difficulties" of the United States. Xuan Thuy, in a remark VNA did not report, charged that the war is the "major cause of the serious U.S. economic and monetary crisis and of the growing difficulties the American people have to face in their daily life." Thi said that U.S. defeats in Indochina in addition to the "increasing difficulties encountered by the U.S. economy and finance . . . represent concrete proof of U.S. failure."

Hanoi media responded to the President's 15 August announcement of economic measures with a flurry of propaganda which highlights their discrimination against the working man. In citing the international implications, Hanoi points out the cavalier U.S. attitude toward its allies and trading partners. There has been little effort to date to connect the economic measures with U.S. Vietnam war policy. However, an article in NHAN DAN on 21 August by Nguyen Huu Chinh* does say that the President in his speech "tacitly admitted" that the war "is still weighing heavily" on the economy, but tried "to make his listeners think that the many present economic and financial difficulties stemmed from the fact that the United States is ending the war." The article, which is broadcast on the 22d by Hanoi radio in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, scores this as one of the President's "commonly used deceitful tricks." Chinh, who has written articles on the 1968 presidential election and the President's role in the 1970 congressional election, charges that the President's measures were made with an eye toward the 1972 elections.

---

* Nguyen Huu Chinh has been identified in the past as "an editor" of NHAN DAN.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

MEDIA SAY MINH, KY WITHDRAWALS EXPOSE SAIGON ELECTION "FARCE"

Vietnamese communist media, sustaining their close attention to the South Vietnamese elections,* duly reported and commented on the major political events of the week: Duong Van Minh's 20 August announcement of his withdrawal from the presidential race, the 21 August reversal by the Supreme Court in approving Vice President Ky's candidacy, and Ky's 23 August announcement that he will not participate in the presidential election campaign.

The most authoritative communist reaction was a 23 August statement by the spokesman for the PRG delegation in Paris, reported by LPA on the 24th and by VNA on the 25th. The statement maintained that "happenings in recent days have fully unmasked the stage-setting and crude maneuvers of the Nixon Administration" and have exposed as "brazen and odious lies" the President's "allegations" about respect for the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people, nonintervention in their internal affairs, and a neutral position in the elections. Like other comment, the statement said the elections are aimed at "maintaining the bellicose Thieu clique as a tool to realize" Vietnamization.

Minh's announcement on 20 August that he was withdrawing from the presidential race prompted a Hanoi radio commentary that day claiming that his action more clearly exposed the "deceitful and perfidious" nature of the elections. A 21 August NHAN DAN commentary went further to assert that his withdrawal represented a "slap on Nixon's face." It charged that the United States had given "covert blessing and sympathy" to Thieu's "brazen and fraudulent tricks" which had caused Minh to withdraw. The article's attack on President Nixon included a seeming reference to Sino-U.S. developments when it charged that the President's "insidious intent" to use the Saigon government's power apparatus for Vietnamization "was revealed even more clearly by the fact that Nixon deliberately carried out crafty diplomatic maneuvers to avoid responding" to the PRG's seven-point proposal.

---

* Hanoi's domestic service in the past two weeks devoted about 15 percent of its news and comment to the South Vietnam elections; about one-fourth of Liberation Radio's broadcasts during this period dealt with the elections.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

The South Vietnamese Supreme Court's 21 August decision to accept Ky's candidacy in the presidential election was dismissed by a Hanoi broadcast on the same day as "a new trick by Bunker and Thieu in their attempt to save the puppet presidential election . . . from becoming an extremely ridiculous and shameless farce with Thieu as the only candidate." The radio said Thieu only wished to use Ky as a "stepping stone" to his own reelection. The possibility that Ky might not run was noted, for example, in a 22 August Hanoi broadcast to the South which commented: "Surely Ky will realize more than anyone else that Nixon and Bunker only want him to play a subordinate role in the coming elections." A Hanoi broadcast on the 23d characterized Ky's withdrawal announcement that day as "another setback for the Americans and Thieu in their attempt to make arrangements so that the election farce may have two presidential candidates" in order to "daub a layer of fake democracy" on it.

Comment on Ky's action so far has not mentioned his proposal that both he and President Thieu resign and that the election be held in three months, with the president of the South Vietnamese Senate acting as head of government in the interim.

LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS

Liberation Radio commentaries on 20 and 22 August echoed earlier communist comment on South Vietnam's 29 August elections to the lower house when they charged that the voting will be rigged but called on the people to try to use the election to oust Thieu's supporters in the assembly.* The commentary on the 20th also repeated the communist view that a minority among the deputies favors the people's interests while the majority is controlled by President Thieu.

The 22 August Liberation Radio commentary went into unusual detail on methods of identifying good candidates and exposing Thieu's supporters among contestants for lower house seats. It told listeners to investigate the candidates' backgrounds and observe their attitudes toward the Thieu administration, and it spelled out the criteria: "Thieu's opponents are those who have refused to join the Thieu clique and who, in one way or another, have supported and struggled for peace, independence, and national concord," have joined or supported the urban people's

---

* See the 18 August TRENDS, page 15, for earlier comment along these lines.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

struggle, and "have been subjected to repression and terrorism." The broadcast predicted that "our compatriots," once they have been "forced" to vote, will "resolutely try to gain complete mastership over their ballots." It concluded that "if Thieu's servants are again elected to the Saigon lower house, it will be entirely because of the Nixon-Bunker-Thieu clique's election frauds and absolutely not because of the consent of various strata of the people in urban areas and in areas under temporary enemy control."

DRV, PRG SPOKESMEN SCORE U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ, AT NORTH

The only hint in Vietnamese communist propaganda of increased U.S. bombing activity in and near the demilitarized zone comes in the release of a 19 August PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. While the Front statement largely echoes the 16 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest,* it goes on to charge that the United States is bombing the southern part of the DMZ as well as the northern portion. PRG protests at the spokesman's level against U.S. activity in the DMZ and the DRV are unusual, although PRG Foreign Ministry statements have been issued in the past in response to major military action against the North. The PRG protest makes no mention of the 16 August protest from the DRV, but repeats its assertion that the U.S. Command in Saigon "has tried with utterly arrogant arguments to plead for such serious acts of war."

For its part, the DRV Foreign Ministry on 23 August issued another in its series of routine spokesman's protests which "sternly condemns" the United States for attacking Quang Binh Province and Vinh Linh areas. The spokesman said that on 16 and 17 August, U.S. aircraft struck a number of places in Quang Binh Province and that on 18-20 August U.S. aircraft, including B-52s, bombed Huong Lap village. In addition, he charged that from 16 to 21 August U.S. artillery guns installed south of the DMZ and aboard ships shelled the villages of Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, Vinh Son, and Huong Lap, described as being north of the 17th parallel and inside the DMZ. The statement says that these strikes "inflicted extensive human and material losses on the local people" and it "vehemently denounced and sternly condemned" them, demanding that the United States immediately and permanently end all encroachments upon DRV sovereignty and security.

---

* See the 18 August TRENDS, pages 17-18.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

ROMANIA-USSR-PRC

Romania's tactical approach coupling a display of national unity with defiance in the face of Soviet bloc pressures was sharply in evidence in publicity for the "unanimous" endorsement of Ceausescu's independent foreign policy course at a joint meeting of top party and government bodies on 19 August, followed the next day by a militantly patriotic speech in which the Romanian leader rejected the concept of any "center" in the communist movement and defended his country's right to develop relations--including military--outside the framework of the Soviet bloc.

Ceausescu's defiant speech came against the background of continuing expressions of suspicion and distrust of Chinese maneuvering in the Balkans as well as pointed warnings to the Romanians from Moscow's hardcore allies. The agitation from these quarters coincided with the visit of a high-level Chinese military delegation to Tirana and Bucharest, where it arrived on 22 August for an "official visit."

Soviet-Romanian tensions were reflected in a terse Bucharest radio report on the 18th of Ceausescu's meeting with Soviet Ambassador Drozenko that day "at the latter's request." The report telegraphed the apparently unsatisfactory results in noting that the talks took place in "a comradely atmosphere." It was on the following day that the unheralded party-government meeting took place to endorse Ceausescu's policies, including his June visit to the PRC. PRAVDA, briefly reporting the joint session on the 21st, noted only that the session had approved the new CEMA program.

While Moscow has relied on its proxy spokesmen in East Europe to bring open propaganda pressure to bear on the Romanians, its own greetings to Romania on the 23 August anniversary of its liberation from the Nazis was markedly cooler in tone than on past anniversaries. An insistent stress on Romania's debt to the USSR had not been present in last year's message.

CEAUSESCU FLAUNTS DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR MAVERICK POLICIES

United, popular support for Ceausescu's policies was underscored in Bucharest's publicity for the 19 August meeting of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee, the State Council, the Council of Ministers, and other party and government bodies--down to the level of chief editors of the central press.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

The national unity theme was expressed in resolutions passed "unanimously" by the meeting supporting the Romanian delegation's activity at the July CEMA Council meeting and Ceausescu's Asian tour. The first resolution described the delegation's stand at the CEMA meeting as "fully in keeping with the political line established by the 10th party congress" for the development of economic relations both in CEMA and with "all the socialist states," a point underscored in Romania's earlier propaganda expressing satisfaction at the compromise program adopted at the meeting. The second resolution hailed Ceausescu's trip to Asia as a contribution not only to bilateral interests but to the interests of the peoples of "all the socialist countries."

Ceausescu used a military occasion, the ceremony conferring officers' ranks on military school graduates, and an anniversary carrying a patriotic national thrust, the 150th anniversary of the 1821 uprising against the Ottoman empire, to deliver his blatantly nationalistic speech on the 20th. Stressing the need for military preparedness, he invoked Romania's revolutionary traditions in calling upon youth and "the broad people's masses"--in a speech broadcast live by Radio Bucharest--to be ready to "defend their revolutionary conquests" in the event of "imperialist aggression."

The Romanian leader followed a pro forma, obligatory pledge to strengthen cooperation within the Warsaw Pact with a restatement of Romania's resolve to develop "cooperation and friendship with the armies of all socialist countries," underscoring the specific assertion of intent to broaden military contacts outside the Pact: "The development of cooperation with all socialist states as set forth by the 10th congress," he added, "involves all economic and social bodies, and the army as well." This policy was flaunted in practice by Romania's cordial reception of the Chinese military delegation led by Li Te-sheng, an alternate Politburo member and chief of the PLA's political department, on its 15 August stopover en route to Tirana and upon its return a week later for an "official visit of friendship" to Romania at the defense minister's invitation.

Setting forth Romania's view of "proletarian internationalism," Ceausescu described tendencies toward "isolation or national narrowmindedness as alien to our party, to the Marxist-Leninist policy of developing ties with all socialist countries, . . . which is the profoundly internationalist spirit inspiring our party." Dwelling on the need for the autonomy of parties, he

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

stated that the dissolution of the Comintern had shown that "the communist movement cannot be led any more from any center, that it is necessary for each party to act independently, and that the communist movement does not need any center in any part of the world."*

Bucharest's special relationship with Yugoslavia was clearly the main point of Ceausescu's avowal that Romania is striving to develop good relations with its neighbors, "the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary"--placing nonalined Yugoslavia on a par with the USSR and two of its loyal allies. In the same vein, Ceausescu added--this time with Bucharest-Peking cordiality the main point--that the Romanians do not for one moment forget that "the socialist system comprises 14 countries in Europe, Asia, and America, and thus it is our international duty to the cause of socialism and our own people to develop cooperation and friendship with all the socialist countries." In another passage he replayed a version of a pervasive Peking propaganda theme in noting the historical lesson that "the small and medium-sized countries" have always been victimized by imperialist power politics: "That is why we believe that these countries must act firmly, together with all the anti-imperialist forces, for the defense of their national sovereignty, the right to develop freely and independently." Ceausescu has pointed in the past to the important role of the smaller countries, in pressing for the abolition of blocs and criticizing policies of imperialist "diktat." But his references to the "small and medium-size countries"--whose ranks Peking has sought to rally in opposition to the two "superpowers"--has a particularly provocative ring at this juncture and in this context.

SOVIET LEADERS, COMMENTATORS REMIND ROMANIA OF DEBT TO USSR

The message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Ceausescu and Maurer on the 27th anniversary of Romania's liberation from the Nazis, published in PRAVDA on 23 August, is notable for a reminder--not present in last year's message--that the defeat of the Nazis "by the Soviet army" and the armed uprising "carried out under these conditions" in Romania "created the

* Monitors noted that Ceausescu emphasized this passage by reading it in a particularly forceful manner.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

necessary preconditions for the transition to fundamental revolutionary reforms." The same theme dominated Moscow radio comment to Romania on the anniversary. Where last year's message referred to the Romanian people's "selfless labor" under the tutelage of their communist party "and in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries," the current one emphasizes that the Romanians had achieved successes "by relying on all-round cooperation with the socialist community countries and making use of their experiences." This theme, too, has been prominent in Moscow's comment in Romanian.

Last year's message, in a relatively euphoric period following the conclusion of the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty, vowed that the Soviet party and government would continue to exert all efforts to consolidate "the relations of fraternal friendship" with socialist Romania and to promote the development of "comradely cooperation" within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, with a view to "even closer cohesion" of the socialist community. This year the Soviets merely promise "to pursue the line of strengthening friendship" (it is no longer "fraternal") and does not characterize Romanian-Soviet cooperation. And it delivers what is in effect a lecture to the Romanians, to the effect that the deepening of cooperation in the Pact and CEMA--which "were reflected" in the treaty signed last year--"constitute a stable foundation for the development of Soviet-Romanian relations."

Where last year's message wished the Romanians new successes in building socialism "and in the struggle for peace and friendship between the peoples," this one wishes them success only in building socialism.

In line with Moscow's avoidance of direct polemical attacks on the Romanians, its comment on the liberation anniversary presents an ostensible picture of harmonious relations. But by playing up the Soviet role in the liberation and by issuing more pointed reminders than usual of the Romanians' close treaty ties to the Soviet bloc, Moscow has in effect reasserted its right to monitor the status of socialism in Romania. PRAVDA reported on the 21st that CPSU Central Committee Secretary Katushev, in charge of relations with ruling communist parties, attended a Romanian-Soviet friendship meeting marking the anniversary. The Soviet speaker at the meeting, deputy chairman of the friendship society, delivered what amounted to a lecture on the major Soviet role in Romania's liberation and on the impor-

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

tance now of "fraternal cooperation" and "united efforts in the struggle for common aims" in the successful building of socialism and in "defense of the working people's gains."

An article in RED STAR on 23 August recalled the price the Soviets had paid in blood for Romania's liberation and the role the presence of Soviet troops on Romanian soil had played in helping the Romanian party attain and consolidate its leadership. Underscoring the point that Romania's future lies in close cooperation with the Soviet bloc, the article stressed that Bucharest's economic successes have been achieved through the labor of the Romanian people and the "cooperation with the socialist countries" in CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. A Radio Moscow broadcast to Romania on the 19th emphasized the contribution made by the presence of Soviet troops on Romanian soil "to the development of the revolution and the prevention of civil war" during the period following the Nazi defeat.

An East Berlin radio commentary on the Romanian anniversary on the 23d spelled out the message to the Romanians more sharply. Noting that speakers at the Bucharest anniversary celebrations had referred to Romania's expanding relations with the PRC as well as cooperation with Moscow, the commentator went on to state that "Romania's future and its safe prospects ultimately are based on cooperation" with the Soviet Union, "from which it obtained its full sovereignty through the sacrificial and liberating deed of the Soviets."

PEKING PLAYS UP TIES WITH BUCHAREST, WARNS OF PRESSURES

Peking has used the occasion of Romania's liberation anniversary to express support for the Romanians and to call attention to Soviet pressures against the maverick Balkan communist countries. An anniversary message signed by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai praises the Romanians for their "firm opposition to power politics and threats of aggression and for bravely defending their national independence and state sovereignty." In the struggle to build their respective countries and oppose imperialism, the message adds, "the Chinese and Romanian people will, as always, sympathize with, help, and support each other." Last year's message, also signed by Mao, Lin, and Chou, pledged that the Chinese people "will, as always, resolutely support the just struggle of the Romanian people."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

NCNA reported that Chou and other high-level Chinese officials participated in an anniversary celebration hosted by the Romanian ambassador on the 23d. In remarks at the gathering, Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei praised Romania for "persisting on its road of independence and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance." He added, in an allusion to the Soviets, that "of late, those who pursue a policy of hegemony are again creating tension in the Balkans; they have repeatedly carried out military maneuvers, making a show of force and bringing pressure to bear on other countries, in a wild attempt to achieve their ulterior aims." Taking note of the Chinese military delegation now in Bucharest, Chi called it another expression of Sino-Romanian friendship and added: "Our Romanian comrades may rest assured that in their case of building and defending their motherland, the Chinese people . . . will forever remain their reliable friends and firmly support their just struggle."

BACKGROUND Chinese pledges of support for Romania date back to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At a Romanian embassy reception in Peking on 23 August 1968, Chou En-lai wounded up a bitter condemnation of the Warsaw Five's action with the remark that Romania "is now facing the danger of foreign intervention and aggression." Noting that the Romanian Government was mobilizing its people to defend the country's indepdence, he added: "The Chinese people support you." Chou and other Chinese officials have since made similar pledges. At a Peking rally honoring the Ceausescu delegation during its recent Asian tour, Chou promised that "the Chinese people will forever remain your reliable friends in your struggle against imperialist interference and aggression and in defense of national independence and state sovereignty and in your cause of building socialism. We firmly support your just struggle."

MOSCOW'S ALLIES DISCOURSE ON CHINESE MANEUVERS IN BALKANS

Moscow's proxy spokesmen in Eastern Europe have issued further pointed warnings against alleged Bucharest efforts to abet Chinese maneuvers in the Balkans. One such commentary, from NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, was picked up in the Soviet weekly ZA RUBEZHOM, signed to the press on 18 August and issued on the 20th. Entitled "Peking Maneuvers," the commentary stated that "the splittist policy of the Chinese leaders must be decisively

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

rejected" and added that "the struggle against all forms of opportunism and against anti-Sovietism and nationalism remains an important condition for the further advance of socialism."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA For the second time in a week, the Slovak youth paper SMENA on 17 August directly accused Romania of adopting a pro-Peking stance in its foreign policy, charging that the Romanian party-government delegation's Asian trip in June "suited the foreign policy plans of the Chinese leadership." SMENA explained that if Romania were fully won over to Peking's policy, the PRC would be able "to intensify its attacks against the unity of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA," of which Romania "is still a member"; such a gain in Europe would provide the PRC "with a new starting point in Europe of far greater significance than the one held by the presently isolated Albania."

SMENA charged that Romania has already shifted its policy to the "Chinese platform on several questions," citing as evidence the communique issued at the conclusion of the Romanian delegation's visit to Peking and "the course of the visit itself." Equating such a shift to "a deviation from the principle of proletarian internationalism as it was interpreted and underlined" at the 1969 international communist conference in Moscow, SMENA remarked that "it is scarcely possible to avoid the question of the realism of such a course."

Endorsing the conclusions reached at the 2 August Crimea meeting, the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium on the 20th went a step beyond the Crimea communique in warning specifically against the sin of "nationalism"--a warning unequivocally aimed at Romania. According to a Prague radio report, the Presidium affirmed that "present world developments bear witness to the absolute correctness of the evaluations and conclusions" of the 1969 international communist conference and "confirm that, in the interest of the unified procedure of the forces of world communism and the entire anti-imperialist front, it is necessary to wage a determined struggle against the manifestations of right- and leftwing opportunism, against nationalism and anti-Sovietism." The Crimea communique had called only for a struggle against right and left opportunism.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

GDR, HUNGARY Echoing the warning first leveled in the 13 August Budapest government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP about formation of a Peking-inspired "anti-Soviet axis" in the Balkans, East Berlin's second largest daily BERLINER ZEITUNG, charged on the 20th that "the recent activities of the PRC serve the goal of forging in the Balkans a bloc against the socialist countries and its center, the Soviet Union." BERLINER ZEITUNG took a swipe at Ceausescu in remarking on the "unpleasant spectacle of people who year after year have been talking glibly of independence and sovereignty but who are obviously incapable of recognizing how they have become dependent upon Peking's politics."

Arguing that it was only after the liberation of the Balkans by the Soviets in World War II that the Balkan peoples received their full sovereignty, BERLINER ZEITUNG also lectured unnamed Balkan leaders who would be prepared to assume before their peoples "the responsibility for pushing them into a contradiction with their liberators, helpers, and friends, into an anti-Soviet position . . . ." In a similar vein, an East Berlin radio correspondent's account of the Bucharest liberation anniversary celebrations on the 23d pointed to two factors Romania must take into account if it is to continue celebrating its advancement under socialism: 1) it is possible to remain free of imperialist aggression only by attaching oneself closely to the USSR, and 2) "all development takes place under complex conditions of a severe international class struggle," which makes unity of the socialist community both "logical and necessary."

Picking up the theme of international class struggle, the Hungarian trade union organ NEPSZAVA on the 21st rejected the "bourgeois and nonbourgeois" idea of an "independent bloc" of small countries in a broadside against theses expounded variously by Peking, Bucharest, and Belgrade. "Those who preach "the solidarity of small countries' without any consideration of the class view and class interest," it said, "are only trying to cover up their real intention" to lessen the class struggle and do not "realistically" understand the international role of small countries. Noting that attempts to develop a separate platform for small countries reflect a great-power policy or an ambition for extreme national isolation, NEPSZAVA went on to assert that "those who insist on an 'autonomous and independent role' for small countries" are in fact speaking up against these countries, not for them.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

BULGARIA Sofia's contribution to the concerted propaganda campaign includes a 22 August article in the party organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO assailing Chinese divisive tactics and those who abet them. Drawing on the Crimea communique, the paper charged that the enemies of communist unity and cohesion are helped in their "subversive activity by the 'leftist' and rightist opportunists, especially in countries where they are in power." The article remarked that "emissaries of imperialism and revisionism travel all over the world, play the middleman, attempt to disunite the socialist states, hatch conspiracies with the most reactionary circle of imperialism, and slander the socialist states and mainly the Soviet Union..., [attempting] to separate the socialist countries from their mother protector, the Soviet Union."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRAVDA ARTICLE ATTACKS PEKING'S "COLLUSION WITH IMPERIALISM"

Having previously offered an authoritative assessment of the implications for Soviet-U.S. relations of President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC, Moscow has sought to put recent developments affecting the triangular relationship in a long-term perspective of Sino-Soviet relations. A 20 August PRAVDA article by S. Tikhvinskiy, an original member of the Soviet negotiating team at the Peking border talks, explains how a reduction in China's ties with the Soviet Union has historically led to "collusion with imperialism" and betrayal of Chinese national interests. Using a favorite device for Soviet comment discrediting Peking in the wake of its invitation to the President, Tikhvinskiy's article is ostensibly a review of a book by O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov on the past 25 years of Sino-Soviet relations.

While not addressed directly to recent Sino-U.S. developments, the article seems to complement the 10 August PRAVDA article by G. Arbatov which viewed President Nixon's plan to visit Peking in the context of Soviet-U.S. relations. Arbatov, like Tikhvinskiy an academician with access to the party daily for significant comment on major issues, is a specialist on the United States. Tikhvinskiy, a sinologist, has long been concerned with Chinese affairs. On 15 February 1970, at a time when Moscow was expressing concern over the development of the border talks, Tikhvinskiy authored a PRAVDA article which discussed Sino-Soviet relations in terms of the triangular relationship, taking special note of suggestions to Peking to turn to the United States as a counterweight to the Soviets.

The current Tikhvinskiy article is notable for its several references to the sensitive subject of Sino-Soviet border troubles--a subject which had been treated delicately in conciliatory Soviet comment on the occasion of the CCP's 50th anniversary on 1 July, before the announcement on Peking's invitation to President Nixon. In addition to citing various periods of border troubles, including the incidents in 1969, the article contains a passage on the PRC's expenditure of "enormous" funds on "total

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

militarization," one aspect of which has been "the erection of fortifications along the whole length of the border" with the USSR. Citing Chou En-lai's recent interview with James Reston of the New York TIMES as showing that Peking has taken up "U.S. propaganda" on a Soviet threat to China, the article claims that this anti-Soviet view serves the Chinese leaders' purpose of "justifying their flirtation with the imperialist powers." At another point, marking 1960 as the beginning of Peking's "great-power, chauvinist" approach, the article says the Chinese began border provocations and advanced territorial claims against the USSR that summer in order to prepare a turnabout in foreign affairs toward "close cooperation with the imperialist powers."

The appearance of a new article by Tikhvinskiy, in view of his past association with the border talks and his February 1970 article on the triangular dimensions of the China problem, suggests a toughening of Moscow's approach to Sino-Soviet relations following the announcement on President Nixon's visit to the PRC. A major PRAVDA article marking the CCP's 50th anniversary on 1 July, carried over the authoritative signature of I. Aleksandrov,* took a notably conciliatory line in putting on record for the first time a Soviet willingness to negotiate a comprehensive new border treaty with the Chinese and in blunting the edges of Moscow's thrusts against Peking. Regarding border tensions, for example, the Aleksandrov article limited itself to an implicit historical parallel in recalling that Chiang Kai-shek had developed an anti-Soviet campaign accompanied by armed provocations along the border. The 20 August Tikhvinskiy article, in contrast, is explicit in bringing up the border troubles of two years ago as "continuing the inglorious traditions of the Chinese militarists" in the period before the establishment of the PRC.

At the same time, the Tikhvinskiy article reaffirms Moscow's line, as enunciated at the 24th CPSU Congress, calling for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. The article seems designed to serve Moscow's current campaign of discrediting Peking in the international community; as such, it appears aimed at isolating Peking rather than signaling a major shift in Moscow's line on bilateral relations.

---

* The Aleksandrov article is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 July 1971, pages 16-21.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Thus, it places complete responsibility for the present state of these relations on "Mao Tse-tung and his circle," citing in this connection "numerous letters" from Chinese expressing their friendship for the Soviet Union despite the anti-Soviet atmosphere in China. It also attempts to capitalize on the strained relations between Hanoi and Peking in the wake of the announcement on President Nixon's visit. In a passage on the 1966-69 period of the cultural revolution, the article resurrects the charge of Red Guard hostility directed against crews of Soviet ships and aircraft "transporting vitally important cargoes to fighting Vietnam."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

CHINA UN SEAT

PEKING RULES OUT TWO-CHINAS FORMULA FOR UN REPRESENTATION

Peking has officially put on record its firm rejection of any dual representation formula for seating the PRC in the United Nations without expelling the ROC. Reacting to U.S. Ambassador Bush's formal request on 17 August for inclusion of an item on China's representation on the agenda for the coming General Assembly session, a 20 August PRC Foreign Ministry statement declares categorically that the PRC "will absolutely have nothing to do with the United Nations" unless Chiang Kai-shek's representatives are expelled. In thus reaffirming its long-standing opposition to dual representation, Peking has served notice on the international community that it is not agreeable to a compromise on this issue and that its recent diplomatic flexibility does not indicate any relaxation of its claim to Taiwan.

The foreign ministry statement and a companion NCNA report on the 20th are confined to the narrow issue of UN representation, limiting comment on the Nixon Administration's policies to its "scheme of creating 'two Chinas' in the United Nations." The only comment appearing in PRC media on broader issues affecting Sino-U.S. relations is contained in supporting statements from its allies.

Peking on the 20th disseminated the full texts of a 15 July letter to U Thant from Albania, Algeria, and 16 other UN members, an explanatory memorandum from these same nations, and their draft resolution "for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations." On 17 July, Peking had begun its publicity for documents relating to the China representation question by first carrying the draft resolution of Albania and Algeria. The PRC statement and the related documents have been given wide international dissemination by Peking; the texts of U.S. documents--Secretary Rogers' 2 August statement and Ambassador Bush's 17 August letter and memorandum to U Thant--have been carried only in NCNA's domestic service, on 4 and 20 August respectively.

The PRC statement reaffirms the fundamentals of Peking's position on the China representation question, insisting that "restoration of the legitimate rights" of the PRC in the United

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Nations and expulsion of the ROC are "two inseparable aspects of the same question." Declaring that the PRC's position is "unshakable," the statement indicates that Peking is prepared to take the long view by expressing confidence that the demands advanced in the Albanian-Algerian resolution "will eventually be victorious."

Without commenting on the question of the Chinese seat in the Security Council, the statement takes note briefly of the passage in the 15 July draft resolution calling the PRC "one of the five permanent members" of that body. Until recently, explicit references to a Security Council seat for the PRC have been rare in authoritative Peking propaganda, although reportage on last year's General Assembly debate on the representation issue had noted that both the French and Algerian delegates mentioned permanent membership of the Chinese in the Security Council.

In apparent anticipation of the introduction of a passage on the Security Council in the 15 July draft resolution,* the 9 June communique between the PRC and Romania--one of the cosponsors of the resolution--noted that the Romanian side reaffirmed its support for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations, the Security Council, and other international organizations. Subsequent references to a Security Council seat appeared on 2 July, in the communique of the China-Japan Friendship Association and a visiting delegation of the opposition Komeito Party of Japan, and in the 1 August communique following the visit of a high-level Algerian delegation to the PRC.

FOREIGN SUPPORT Peking has followed up its statement with supporting comment from such allies as Albania, the DPRK, the DRV,** and Sihanouk's government. An editorial in the Albanian party paper ZERI I POPULLIT on 24 August, disseminated by NCNA internationally, is notable for its discussion of the UN representation question in the broader context of Peking's rivalry with the United States and the Soviet Union. Going far beyond what Peking has been willing

---

* The Albanian resolution in 1970 had contained no passage characterizing the PRC as one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

** For a report on a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the PRC statement, see the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

to say in its own name, the editorial claims that the Nixon Administration's policy on the representation question is rooted in "the counterrevolutionary global strategy of U.S. imperialism," which has "incessantly hatched all kinds of plots" and committed "a series of provocations" against China. The editorial also claims that seating of the PRC in the United Nations would be an important step toward "the liberation of this organization from the domination of the two imperialist superpowers."

The explanatory memorandum introducing the 15 July Albanian-Algerian draft resolution is noteworthy for its characterization of the PRC as "a great nuclear and space power" which cannot be excluded from decisions on important international problems. Peking has long sought to dissociate itself from the ranks of the "superpowers." In this vein, the 30 July PRC Government statement--released on 7 August--rejecting the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear conference had asserted that Chinese nuclear weapons are still in the "experimental" stage and declared that the PRC will never be "a 'nuclear superpower' practicing the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats, and nuclear blackmail."

USSR REPORTS DEVELOPMENTS, REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR PRC SEAT

Having reaffirmed its support for the seating of the PRC in the United Nations in a 13 July letter to U Thant,* Moscow has given low-keyed propaganda attention to the representation issue over the past month. TASS dispatches have briefly reported Secretary Rogers' 2 August statement and Ambassador Bush's 17 August letter to U Thant. TASS also promptly reported NCNA's 4 August criticism of the Rogers statement and the PRC Foreign Ministry statement of 20 August. While these dispatches have underscored Peking's public rejection of a two-Chinas policy, the one reporting NCNA's criticism of the Rogers statement noted a New York TIMES observation that "behind the cover of tough polemics and propaganda" on the membership issue, "the Chinese leaders are formulating a flexible policy for their meeting with President Nixon."

---

* For a report on the letter and background on Moscow's position, see the FBIS TRENDS of 21 July 1971, page 27.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 19 August cited the Bush letter to U Thant as evidence that Washington is still pursuing a two-Chinas policy. Since Washington and Peking are drawing closer to each other, the commentary added, the Nixon Administration "has agreed to vote for the seating of the PRC in the United Nations in an attempt to use this concession to the Chinese leaders in exchange for a Chinese concession which will benefit the United States." The commentary concluded that the USSR, for its part, has consistently opposed a two-Chinas policy and stands for the restoration to the PRC of its "legitimate rights" in the world body and expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek delegation.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

MIDDLE EAST

SOVIET MEDIA MARK TIME ON MIDEAST ISSUE, ARAB DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet media have paid little attention to recent Middle East developments affecting inter-Arab and Arab-Soviet relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow's limited comment on the Arab scene comes against the background of the strained Soviet-Sudanese relations in the wake of the Sudanese coup and countercoup that led to the executions of local communists, as well as the inter-Arab tensions generated by Jordan's moves to control the fedayeen and the related Syrian rupture of diplomatic ties with Jordan. On the Arab-Israeli front, Moscow played Assistant Secretary Sisco's late July-early August talks in Israel in low key, routinely predicting negative results. Moscow may well be awaiting the fall session of the UN General Assembly before mounting any appreciable new propaganda efforts with respect to the Middle East problem.

MIDEAST CONFLICT

Sisco's visit drew predictably disparaging Moscow comment which again decried U.S. efforts to act as peacemaker and insisted that U.S. arms deliveries to Israel demonstrate Washington's "hypocrisy" in claiming to play a disinterested role and its unwillingness to pressure the Israelis. But while denouncing U.S. attempts to act as "mediator," Moscow gives no clue as to any initiatives it might be contemplating at the UNGA session. Only once in the past several months has Moscow even broached the problems encountered in the continuing Big Four talks in New York, which Primakov in an early May Arabic-language interview had called the "main effort" being made in connection with the Mideast problem. This isolated complaint about the U.S. stance in the talks came in a Kolesnichenko PRAVDA dispatch on 31 July which charged that U.S. Ambassador Bush, "contrary to common sense," was insisting on "discussions of 'peace guarantees'" in the Middle East which, without Israeli withdrawal, would amount to continuation of the occupation. Normally, TASS briefly reports the fact that a four-power session was held; the most recent such item, on 27 July, noted that the next meeting was scheduled for 19 August. The last Soviet propaganda complaint spelling out Washington's "negative stand" in the talks was an IZVESTIYA dispatch in mid-March.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Broadly, the Soviet position continues to be that the USSR is ready to participate with the other permanent members of the Security Council in creating "international guarantees" for a Middle East political settlement. This idea, advanced at the elite level by Brezhnev in his 30 March CPSU Congress report,* was reiterated in Gromyko's 13 July letter to U Thant which recapitulated a broad range of Soviet policy positions. Moscow did not mention the Egyptian interpretation of Soviet readiness to participate in an "international force," rather than "international guarantees." The Cairo AL-AHRAM on 22 July, reporting that Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov had informed UAR Foreign Minister Riyad about the Gromyko letter, said that it "expressed the Soviet Union's readiness to participate . . . in an international force" to safeguard international security. Earlier, AL-AHRAM editor Haykal in a 25 June article had claimed that Riyad had been informed by Gromyko in December 1970 of the USSR's readiness to participate in an "international force to guarantee" a Middle East settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242. Soviet proposals on a Mideast settlement have suggested the stationing of "UN troops" at various points, but have not dealt with their composition.

RELATIONS WITH SUDAN, SYRIA

Moscow's protest campaign against the persecution of communists in Sudan wound down on 10 August, and Soviet media have since been silent on the status of USSR-Sudan relations and events in Khartoum. There has been no suggestion that Moscow either sought or accepted any Arab mediation. Soviet media thus ignored the fact that a Syrian delegation, after an unheralded 10-11 August visit to Moscow, went directly to Khartoum for talks on the 11th and 12th. For its part, Sudan has rejected mediation: Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri declared, according to a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report on the 12th, that the Syrians' discussions in Khartoum could not be regarded as mediation between the Sudan and the USSR, and Sudanese Defense Minister 'Abbas said on the 24th that the Soviet Union must take the initiative to correct its mistake, for Sudan "would never be a party" to mediation.

Soviet media gave virtually no publicity to the two-day visit of the Syrian delegation, composed of Vice President al-Ayyubi and Foreign Minister Khaddam, reporting neither its

---

* See the FBIS TRENDS of 31 March, page 23.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

arrival nor its departure. According to a MENA dispatch on the 12th attributed to "reliable sources in Khartoum," the Syrian visit to Moscow took place after consultations between the Soviet ambassador and his government following the ambassador's several meetings with senior Syrian officials "at the beginning of the week." TASS on the 11th both announced and summed up the visit in a report--also carried by Damascus radio, which described it as a "press statement"--noting that the Syrians had talks "in an atmosphere of friendship and frankness" with Mazurov, Ponomarev, and Kuznetsov on bilateral relations and "the Middle East situation." A 12 August Arabic-language commentary on the visit blandly described such contacts as a "good tradition" in Syrian-Soviet relations and went on to underscore the mutual benefits accruing from the two countries' economic cooperation. An Arabic-language report two days later did obliquely link the Syrians with Soviet-Sudanese relations in observing that Syrian President al-Asad in a speech in southern Syria had "firmly rejected" the idea that there had been "any Soviet intervention in recent events in Sudan."

ARAB FEDERATION, JORDANIAN ISSUES

Moscow has given meager publicity to the 18-20 August meeting in Damascus of UAR and Syrian Presidents as-Sadat and al-Asad and Libyan Chairman al-Qadhdhafi. TASS merely noted that they would discuss questions connected with the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) established last April as well as "other problems."* TASS also reported the signing on the 20th of the FAR draft constitution and a joint declaration, and later briefly summed up the constitution, pointing out among other things that the federation is open to other Arab states if they agree with its principles and strive for Arab unity and the establishment of an Arab socialist society. But there has been no Soviet account of the substance of the declaration, which repeated the "no's" of the 17 April Benghazi declaration on establishment of the FAR: no conciliation and no negotiations with the "Zionist enemy," no relinquishment of an inch of occupied Arab territory, and no bargaining over the Palestinian issue.**

---

* According to Cairo's AL-JUMHURIYAH on the 12th, the Syrian-Soviet talks in Moscow would be on the agenda, and AL-AHRAM on the 15th said Jordanian relations with the fedayeen and with Syria would be a topic of discussion.

** See the FBIS TRENDS of 21 April, pages 20-22, for a discussion of Soviet propaganda treatment of earlier federation moves.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Seemingly having in mind Jordanian relations with the fedayeen and with Syria, a Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 20th, pegged to the Damascus conference, made the customary charges of imperialist attempts to disrupt Arab unity by exacerbating "any misunderstanding which may arise" between Arab countries and by endeavoring, in Jordan and Lebanon, to "separate the fedayeen from the masses." Similarly, a Yermakov international review in PRAVDA on the 22d included Jordanian operations against the fedayeen as a factor in the "more acute" situation, along with the standard "imperialist intrigues" and Israeli policy. TASS had briefly noted clashes on the Jordanian-Syrian border and Syria's 12 August rupture of diplomatic relations with Jordan--explained by Damascus, TASS added, as due to the Jordanian authorities' disregard of Arab efforts aimed at mobilization of all forces against Israel.

Moscow failed to mention the arrival of a Soviet military delegation in Syria on the heels of the break in Syrian-Jordanian relations. According to Damascus radio on the 17th, the Soviet delegation and a visiting UAR military delegation joined President al-Asad in observing "the largest army exercises since the establishment of the Syrian army," held in southern Syria.

Moscow has taken note of Saudi-Egyptian efforts to settle the Jordanian-fedayeen dispute. TASS on the 12th said that their draft memorandum, handed to both sides, called for observing last fall's Cairo and Amman agreements defining relations between the sides. But Moscow has given no emphasis to as-Sadat's 21 August consultations in Jidda and Khartoum, TASS brushing them off in a brief report on the 22d that the Egyptian president had returned to Cairo from Saudi Arabia and Sudan where he had "conducted talks with the leaders of those countries."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

BOLIVIA

While Soviet media have typically devoted negligible attention to the 19-22 August coup in Bolivia that ousted leftist President Gen. Juan Jose Torres, Havana has been vocal from the outset in expressing support for the Bolivian "people" against the "counterrevolutionary" plotters. In an interview in Santiago, Chile on the 21st, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa saw the events in La Paz as "an American battle, not exclusively Bolivia's." Havana propaganda has pictured the coup in these terms, charging that the Bolivian "reactionaries" had backing from the United States, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina and quoting Chilean and Peruvian spokesmen on the need to defend their gains against "reaction" and "counterrevolution."

By the 24th, authoritative Cuban comment was drawing doctrinal morals from the Bolivian experience, picturing it in the context of a continent-wide struggle in which the balance is being weighted increasingly on the side of revolution. In militant passages carrying echoes of Cuban propaganda in the early 1960's, an editorial in the party organ GRANMA pronounced it the "duty" of all Latin American revolutionaries to "help the Bolivian people regain their revolutionary posture" and assured the Bolivians of Cuba's "material" as well as moral support.

HAVANA VIEWS BOLIVIAN "SETBACK" AS PREDICTABLE BUT REVERSIBLE

The notion that any Latin American regime moving in a revolutionary direction faces the constant threat of a coup from the right has long been a staple of Cuban propaganda, as part and parcel of the dictum that armed struggle is the only sure route to revolutionary power. Against this background, Havana now calls the Bolivian coup "expected" and "inevitable" but views it as a temporary "setback" and holds it up as an object lesson for revolutionaries throughout the hemisphere. In line with Castro's portrayal of a growing revolutionary trend in Latin America, a Havana radio talk on 23 August saw the three days of "bloody battle" in La Paz as proof that it is becoming "increasingly difficult for the fascist military to stage a bloodless coup." And GRANMA's 24 August editorial spelled out the doctrinal lesson: The Bolivian people's experience has demonstrated "the possibilities

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

of armed action, not only in the rural areas but also in the cities, when all methods of struggle are combined intelligently and firmly."

GRANMA depicted the revolutionary trend as inexorable and bound to reassert itself with greater force. It praised the Bolivian people for having "written a heroic page in the book of Latin American history"--a new round in a continuous revolutionary struggle of which Che Guevara's abortive guerrilla venture had been the first major battle, foredoomed as Guevara's guerrillas were by overwhelming military odds against it.

GRANMA's explanation that the forces of the people were defeated by their "overwhelming disadvantage in weaponry" was developed after the fact, as a rationale for the failure of a resistance movement Havana media had portrayed in optimistic terms during the period of the coup. On 20 August, for example, Havana spoke of a "battle for liberation" being waged heroically by "the people," the peasants, students, miners, workers of the Labor Central (COB), noncommissioned military officers, and the La Paz Colorados regiment commanded by Maj. Ruben Sanchez, described as "strongly revolutionary" with "strong connections to the popular sectors." Havana broadcasts publicized messages of solidarity with the Bolivian "people" from Cuban mass organizations as well as from Chilean political and labor groups, and Foreign Minister Roa recalled in his interview in Chile on the 21st that the Cuban Government had more than once expressed "its strongest solidarity and support for the revolutionary movement" in Bolivia.

Castro had been moving cautiously toward endorsement of the Torres government in the months preceding the coup, discerning on 26 July "a profound radicalization of the Bolivian people" and "proper conditions for a revolution" but making support for Torres conditional on his revolutionary actions.* While the coup was in progress PRENSA LATINA quoted

---

* Castro's remarks on the revolutionary situation in Bolivia are reviewed in the TRENDS of 21 April, pages 25-26, and 28 July, pages 27-29.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

the Chilean CP organ PURO CHILE as remarking that a victory of the "fascists," if it materialized, "would be the consequence of vacillations," although in reporting a Bolivian COB communique it left out the more direct charge that the plotters were able to use part of the state's resources because of "General Torres government's indecision and swaying from right to left."

The perpetrators of the coup were identified as the "fascists" of the Bolivian Socialist Falange and the National Revolutionary Movement along with their "servants" within the armed forces. Havana's initial reaction to the new regime, headed by Col. Hugo Banzer Suarez, was to depict a curfew and martial law decree as the first step in a "violent repression" which the junta might "unleash at any moment." On the 24th, the GRANMA editorial said a reign of "terror and revenge" had begun, with "armed rightist commandos attacking the headquarters of the leftist parties and the offices of labor unions and progressive newspapers." GRANMA said there had never before in Bolivia's history been a regime "more illegitimate, more antipeople, more antinational," but saw grounds in its internal disunity and absence of popular backing for the judgment that it cannot last.

REASSERTION OF CUBAN ROLE IN HEMISPHERE-WIDE CONFRONTATION

Charges that the coupists enjoyed "backing from abroad" were present in Cuban propaganda from the outset. A broadcast on the 19th cited a La Paz EL DIARIO report that the U.S. embassy had alerted its staff to a possible coup "that would occur at any moment," and PRENSA LATINA recalled the reported alert on the 23d to conclude that there was "no doubt about U.S. involvement." On the 21st PRENSA LATINA alleged that 8,000 men trained in Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil were fighting the pro-regime forces in Bolivia. Havana radio predicted the next day that there would be "an intervention by the Brazilian and Paraguayan regimes supported by the United States"; and subsequent comment focused on Brazilian military aspirations to get rid of the "too leftist" Torres and to separate the oil-rich department of Santa Cruz from Bolivia "as a first step toward its absorption by Brazil."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

GRANMA's 24 August editorial drew the threads of this comment together in ascribing the success of the "bloodbath" against the Bolivian people to a "triple counterrevolutionary alliance" consisting of internal reaction and the Brazilian and Paraguayan "gorilla" regimes, masterminded by the United States. "Plotted by the imperialists and executed by the CIA," GRANMA said, the coup was part of an overall strategy designed to isolate Cuba, Chile, and Peru and to "discourage peoples which, as in Uruguay, are seriously threatening to sweep the representatives of oligarchy and imperialism from power."

Thus underscoring Castro's portrayal of a burgeoning revolutionary situation in which Cuba is no longer isolated, the editorial played the theme of Cuban-Bolivian affinity rooted in Guevara's guerrilla adventure and noted that some Bolivian labor leaders who had been in Cuba for the 26 July observance were now victims of the fighting. It held up a pledge of "Cuba's solidarity, her firm moral and material support, resolute and determined," for the Bolivian "struggle for liberation" as exemplary for all revolutionaries confronting "fascism and imperialism" in Latin America.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

KOREA

DPRK HOPES RED CROSS CONTACTS WILL PAVE WAY FOR UNIFICATION

Expressions of good will and professions of optimism about the prospects for Korean unification mark North Korean coverage of the 20 August Panmunjom meeting of representatives of the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations to exchange documents containing their respective proposals on contacts among families separated by the division of the country. The meeting stemmed from an exchange earlier in the month in which the North Korean society, on the 14th, had responded to a 12 August proposal by its South Korean counterpart that a "movement" to locate separated family members be initiated. The North Koreans proposed that discussions also be held on questions of free travel, mutual visits, and free correspondence among separated family members, relatives, and friends.* The seven-point demand on U.S. withdrawal from South Korea, which included the demand that the United States stop preventing civilian travel across the military demarcation line, was first put forward by the DPRK representative at the 29 July meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC); it was repeated at the 25 August MAC meeting, according to a Pyongyang domestic service report that day.

KCNA's prompt account of the 20 August meeting was followed up with reportage accompanied by comment in NODONG SINMUN the next day. KCNA reported that the messengers at Panmunjom "met each other with gladness, firmly shaking hands with warm feelings and compatriotic love," and expressed the hope that the meeting will "mark an important occasion" in demolishing barriers between North and South and "pave the way" for negotiations and ultimate unification of the country. NODONG SINMUN's report, while also noting that the meeting took place in "a warm atmosphere of compatriotic love," included some criticism of the South Korean side. It claimed that the South Korean journalists covering the Panmunjom meeting was forbidden to appear until the very last moment because the "South Korean rulers" feared their contact with North Korean correspondents.

---

* See the 18 August TRENDS, pages 27-32, for a discussion of this exchange. Earlier North Korean proposals regarding North-South contacts are discussed in the 11 August TRENDS, pages 16-19.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

It also took the occasion to criticize the "South Korean puppet clique" for having previously rejected all the DPRK's "fair and reasonable" proposals on North-South contacts. But the paper went on to praise this initial contact as a "good and glad thing," the first fruition of North Korea's "sincere efforts" to bring about North-South contacts.

KCNA on 20 August carried a statement by the North Korean Red Cross chairman praising the exchange and expressing the hope that this first contact will help open the way toward peaceful unification. On the 23d Pyongyang reported a statement by a spokesman of the DPRK Red Cross announcing that it will send messengers to Panmunjom on the 26th to receive the South Korean reply to North Korea's 14 August proposal.

KOREANS IN JAPAN Pyongyang continues to publicize activities of the DPRK-sponsored General Association of Korean Residents in Japan in connection with the North-South contacts. On 22 August KCNA carried a statement by the chairman of the association supporting the Panmunjom meeting; KCNA reported on the 20th that members of the ROK-sponsored Korean Residents Union in Japan had also praised the meeting. On the 19th, KCNA reported a letter from the chairman of the DPRK-sponsored organization to the head of the ROK-sponsored group proposing meetings of Koreans in Japan to support the North-South talks. It proposed meetings in Tokyo, Osaka, and other cities under the joint auspices of the two organizations, formation of a preparatory committee to plan these meetings, and the initiation of "day-to-day contact" regarding these matters.

The DPRK-sponsored organization had previously involved itself in the recent attention to the subject of North-South contacts. On 18 August KCNA had reported a statement by the association's chairman offering to send representatives to a third-country conference of overseas Koreans for reunification. The DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland had agreed to such a conference in an 11 August letter to Ko Pyong-chol, president of the United Front for Korean Democracy in New York. On the 14th KCNA had reported that the DPRK-sponsored organization in Japan had proposed to its counterpart that they jointly celebrate the Korean liberation anniversary and promote a struggle for Korean unification.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

MOSCOW, PEKING Both Moscow and Peking briefly reported the 20 August Panmunjom meeting, but neither has been heard to comment thus far. Press conferences in the two capitals by the DPRK envoys to publicize the North Korean Red Cross' 14 August letter were reported by Moscow and Peking respectively. The DPRK charge d'affaires in Peking, according to both NCNA and KCNA, reviewed the DPRK's stand on unification and recalled, among other things, Kim Il-song's 6 August expression of readiness to contact all political parties in South Korea, including the ruling Democratic Republican Party.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

NEW PARTY COMMITTEES ANNOUNCED FOR SZECHWAN AND TIBET

Following a three-month gap in the reporting of new provincial-level party committees, NCNA on 24 August announced that party committees have been established for Szechwan, China's most populous province, and Tibet, a vast and thinly populated autonomous region. As expected, the namelists for both committees reveal yet another victory for the alliance of military men and "rehabilitated" cadres which has dominated the leadership of the previously formed provincial party committees. Only Heilungkiang and Ningsia now remain without new party structures.

SZECHWAN Chang Kuo-hua, a seasoned PLA commander and long-time leader in Tibet before his cultural revolution transfer to Szechwan, was named first secretary. Chang, who is also chairman of the revolutionary committee and political commissar of the Chengtu Military Region (MR), ended a 10-month eclipse from public view on 10 August when he reappeared in Chengtu, identified as a member of the provincial CCP core group.

Chang's political survival has clearly been at the expense of the leftist forces within the province. In mid-March 1968 Chang was criticized by Chiang Ching for allowing conservative attacks on Liu Chieh-ting and Chang Hsi-ting, vice-chairmen of the provincial revolutionary committee, who were aligned with radical Red Guard forces within Szechwan. Significantly, neither Liu nor Chang was named to the new committee; neither has appeared publicly since May 1970.

Most of Chang's deputies on the new committee have served under him in Szechwan throughout the cultural revolution. Liang Hsing-chu, a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee and commander of the Chengtu MR, was named second secretary. Li Ta-chang, who served as governor of Szechwan immediately prior to the cultural revolution, has been a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee since its inception. Hsieh Chia-hsiang is a deputy political commissar of the Chengtu MR and a standing committee member of the revolutionary committee. Tuan Chun-yi, a newcomer to the Szechwan power structure, has presumably been rehabilitated following his

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

cultural revolution fall from his post as chief of the First Ministry of Machine Building. His career has been primarily that of a technical manager, and he may supply skills needed in the Szechwan leadership. Hsieh Cheng-jung and Ho Yun-feng hold military responsibilities within the province. Hsu Chih is a long-time vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee, perhaps also formerly a leading government cadre in Peking.

Reflecting the political troubles which have long plagued Szechwan, NCNA praised "the people of the province" for uniting with the PLA and warding off "the interference from the 'left' and the 'right'" through "sharp class battles." Szechwan's provincial radio, which had been limited to relaying Radio Peking since 19 November 1969, resumed local news originations on 3 August.

The new party committee, consisting of 106 full and 44 alternate members, is more numerous by far than that for any other province; Shantung's the next largest, consists of 115 members and alternates. A total of 1,477 delegates attended the congress (only Shantung's was larger) in Chengtu from 12 to 16 August.

TIBET The formation of the new Tibetan committee has provided final confirmation of the political demise of Revolutionary Committee Chairman Tseng Yung-ya, who has not appeared publicly since National Day 1970 and was apparently demoted because of his support of the radical "Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" group during the cultural revolution. Jen Jung, who supported the conservative "Great Alliance Headquarters" during the cultural revolution, was named first secretary. Jen, who has been first political commissar in Tibet since October 1968, had been named acting chairman of the revolutionary committee in a 12 June NCNA report on a local activist congress.

Six secretaries were named. Chen Ming-yi, a vice-chairman, was recently named PLA commander in Tibet. Kao Sheng-hsuan and Feng Ko-ta are newcombers to the province. Kao was identified last April as PLA deputy commander in Tibet; no identification is available for Feng. In an apparent effort to highlight the position of minorities in the PRC, NCNA specifies that three of the secretaries are native Tibetans: Yang Tung-sheng, Pa Sang and Tien Pao. All have

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

been vice-chairmen of the revolutionary committee since its formation. Tien Pao is also a political commissar and probably the only one of the native Tibetans with any real power.

The 56 full and 16 alternate members on the committee were selected at a party congress held in Lhasa from 7 to 12 August. Jen's remarks to the congress, in line with keynote addresses given in other border provinces, stressed the need to strengthen frontier defenses against "imperialism, social-imperialism and Indian expansionism." Jen also took the opportunity to lash out at "the counterrevolutionary crimes of the Dalai-Panchen traitorous clique."

RED FLAG SIGNALS AN END TO DEARTH OF READING MATERIALS

Breaking anew with cultural revolution practice, an article in RED FLAG No. 9 has called on writers and publishing houses to produce "popular reading material" on a variety of subjects. Implicitly acknowledging that recent years have seen a surfeit of "popular political literature"--writings by and about Mao--the article indicates that the time has come to produce reading materials "on literature and art, science and technology, history, geography, international events, and so forth."

The easing of cultural revolution strictures in regard to literature had been indicated earlier when several provincial radio broadcasts observed that old books could be utilized, albeit critically, in schools. Also, Peking observers recently reported that a novel was being sold in the city's bookstores for the first time since the start of the cultural revolution.

The RED FLAG article pulls few punches in noting the problems that will be encountered in reviving Chinese literature. It even indicates that one reason for the current revival is that if revolutionary books are not produced, particularly of the popular types "urgently demanded," then "bad books will poison the masses and youth." Opposition to creating new materials is said to come from those who believe that creation of popular literature should be low in priority as well as from class enemies seeking to poison the minds of youth. Also, "some comrades" obviously still fear that harm will come

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3

from turning out new and original works: "They have held that publishing reading material on knowledge is wrong, and they have not dared to compile books in this respect." Such muddled ideas are of course not at all in conformity with Mao's teachings, RED FLAG asserts.

It is suggested that the new works be produced by three-in-one creative groups of cadres, worker-peasant-soldier writers, and professional personnel. This sharing of responsibility may be designed to ease the fears of intellectuals wary of authoring original works. In the same vein, the article admits that "at the outset some works may be imprudent or even contain certain mistakes, but if their themes are correct we should render active assistance in making them better." The article also observes, however, that there is no need to worry even "if poisonous weeds appear" because the masses "will change them into fertilizer"--possibly too vivid a metaphor for the more timorous authors.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3