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Confidential

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

29 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 39)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 SEPTEMBER 1971

Moscow (3142 items)

Brezhnev in Yugoslavia	(1%)	20%
Indochina	(4%)	7%
[DRV National Assembly Delegation in USSR	(--)	3%]
UNGA Session	(1%)	5%
[Gromyko Arrival Statement	(--)	3%]
Brandt-Brezhnev Talks	(6%)	5%
China	(7%)	4%
International Trade Union Conference in Moscow	(1%)	3%

Peking (1429 items)

Domestic Issues	(40%)	32%
Indochina	(23%)	29%
[Bombing of DRV	(--)	10%]
[Penn Nouth in Northwest China	(10%)	7%]
[Li Hsien-nien Economic Delegation in DRV	(--)	5%]
PRC Seat in UN	(1%)	9%
40th Anniversary of Japan Action in Manchuria	(3%)	4%
Mali National Day	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The dispatch of the Li Hsien-nien economic delegation to conclude the annual aid agreement in Hanoi rather than in Peking, where it has always been signed in the past, seems clearly a part of the PRC's effort to reassure and mollify the DRV in the wake of plans for President Nixon's trip to China. PRC concern to offer such reassurance was strikingly demonstrated when Li Hsien-nien, at a banquet on the 24th, seemed to respond directly to the implications in recent DRV statements--including those by Defense Minister Giap and Premier Dong last month--that China was departing from a proletarian internationalist path. Li dramatized the importance of adherence to such a policy when, after avowing Peking's intention to continue to assist Vietnam, he declared that "if one fails to do so, he is not a proletarian internationalist and not a communist."

Hanoi followed up the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the preceding day's heavy U.S. air strikes against the North with radio and press comment saying these strikes again exposed U.S. hypocrisy and intent to continue the war. A NHAN DAN article on the 23d is notable for a personal attack on the President: It says that the latest U.S. action "has bared more clearly the true face of Nixon--a very dishonest and wicked man, a reactionary who is extremely warlike and perfidious, and a life-or-death enemy of our people." This vitriolic language--reminiscent of some of the attacks on the President following the 15 July announcement of his plans to visit China--is not repeated in other current comment, however.

Peking and Pyongyang also issued foreign ministry statements protesting the air strikes against the DRV on the 21st. And official statements were similarly issued by spokesmen for the Sihanouk government's foreign ministry (RGNU) and for the NLHS Central Committee. Comparable formal protests came from all of these sources at the time of the heavy strikes last November, but only Pyongyang supported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement in March of this year with a statement of its own.

Moscow has issued no high-level protest, although the air strikes against the DRV are condemned in some statements by Soviet public organizations and in press and radio comment. Gromyko in his UNGA speech, as reported by TASS on the 28th, referred to "recently stepped-up" air strikes against the North in the course of asking a series of rhetorical questions on why the United States had not responded to the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal.

PRC DELEGATION FOR AID ACCORD SHOWS CONCERN TO REASSURE DRV

The conclusion of the annual PRC-DRV aid agreements in Hanoi for the first time is particularly intriguing against the background

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of the DRV's cessation in late August of the attacks on the Chinese which had gone on for some six weeks following the 15 July announcement of President Nixon's projected visit to China. It appears that the halt in Hanoi's polemics coincided with preliminary consultations on the agreement, since an "experts delegation" arrived in Peking on 28 August headed by Ly Ban, a vice minister of foreign trade and regularly a member of the DRV delegation in talks on the annual aid agreement. There were no reports of any talks in Peking, however, and there had been no hint that negotiations would be held in Hanoi this year prior to the 24 September announcement that the Li Hsien-nien delegation had arrived to conclude the agreement on military and economic aid for 1972. Ly Ban was among those reportedly welcoming the Chinese delegation, but he was in Peking at least as late as 16 September, when he greeted PRG Foreign Minister Binh upon her arrival in Peking en route home from Paris.

It is, of course, impossible to know which side took the initiative regarding the unprecedented conclusion of the agreement in Hanoi.* But it seems that along with Peking's concern to reassure the North Vietnamese about its policies, the imminent visit to the DRV by Soviet Chairman Podgornyy may also have been a factor. The Podgornyy visit to the DRV "in early October" was first announced on 30 August by Moscow and Hanoi, and TASS on 23 September said he would be arriving in India on 1 October en route to Hanoi. It is conceivable that the annual Soviet-DRV aid agreement could be signed while he is there.**

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* The aid agreement for 1971 was signed in Peking on 6 October 1970 by Li Hsien-nien and DRV delegation head Vice Premier Nguyen Con. And from 1965 through 1969, DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi headed the delegation which concluded the agreements annually in Peking. The timing of the negotiation on the aid agreements has varied from year to year; for example, the 1969 agreement with the PRC was signed in September and the 1968 accord in July.

** While the annual Soviet-DRV aid agreement, like the agreement with China, is usually signed by vice premiers, there is a precedent for signing at a higher level: Pham Van Dong and Kosygin signed the annual agreement in October 1969 when the DRV premier was visiting the USSR.

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DELEGATION ACTIVITIES For the most part, propaganda surrounding the PRC delegation's 24-28 September visit was standard fare, with ceremonial activities closely paralleling those in Peking in previous years. The aid agreement was signed on 27 September by PRC Vice Premier and Politburo member Li Hsien-nien and DRV Vice Premier and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi at a ceremony attended by Premier Pham Van Dong. This accords with the practice in Peking, where Chou En-lai has attended the signing ceremonies. Peking media describe the accord as "the 1972 agreement on China's economic, military, and material assistance," but VNA adds the qualification that it is "nonrefund" aid. It has been the general pattern for Hanoi but not Peking to describe the annual aid agreements as "nonrefundable," although the NCNA report on a protocol on supplementary military aid signed on 4 July followed Hanoi's lead in referring to a "gratuitous" supply of equipment.

The Li Hsien-nien delegation was feted at a banquet given by Le Thanh Nghi on the 24th; on the 26th the group was received by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, who also hosted a banquet that evening. This parallels the treatment last year in Peking of the Nguyen Con delegation, which was received by Mao and Lin Piao as well as by Chou En-lai. On 27 September DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap received military members of the PRC delegation--Yen Chung-chuan, deputy chief of staff, and Lu Kuei, deputy head of the PLA armaments department. Also on the 27th, Li Hsien-nien gave a farewell banquet at the Chinese embassy at which Pham Van Dong and Giap were the ranking DRV guests.

DRV statements during the visit for the most part contained standard evaluations of PRC aid and of the relations between the two countries. For example, Le Thanh Nghi at the banquet on the 24th voiced sentiments similar to Nguyen Con's at a banquet welcoming his delegation to Peking last year. Thus, Nghi affirmed that Vietnam has "always enjoyed strong support and great and effective assistance" from China and expressed gratitude for Chinese aid--particularly noting assistance to overcome damage from the recent floods. Also in essentially standard terms, he said that the DRV is "determined to make an all-out effort for the further consolidation and development of the friendship and militant solidarity between the Vietnamese and Chinese people." And he went on to assert that the current Chinese visit and talks "represent a new, vivid manifestation of the militant solidarity and fraternal, friendly relations between our two parties, governments, and peoples."

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SINO-DRV RELATIONS

Despite Li Hsien-nien's direct overtures in assuring the DRV that Peking is committed to a policy based on proletarian internationalism, Hanoi did not respond in kind and its propaganda notably failed to allude to the concept as the basis for Sino-DRV relations. Speaking after Le Thanh Nghi at the banquet on the 24th, Li Hsien-nien, in stressing the Chinese commitment to aid Vietnam, paraphrased an instruction from Mao and in the process provided a negative definition of a proletarian internationalist. He declared that if one failed to aid Vietnam "he is not a proletarian internationalist and not a communist; this will mean betrayal of the revolution." The Mao instruction, introduced by Chou En-lai during his March 1971 visit to Hanoi, had advised that "if anyone among us should say that we cannot help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, that means betrayal, betrayal of the revolution."*

The question of proletarian internationalism was again raised by Li Hsien-nien in his 27 September speech at the farewell banquet. He claimed pointedly that the visit had shown that "Sino-Vietnamese friendship based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is being consolidated and developed with each passing day and that it is deep-rooted and no one can undermine it." This statement accords with banquet speeches in Peking last year by both Li and Nguyen Con. Le Thanh Nghi's failure to respond in kind this year suggests that Li's remarks on the 24th did not satisfy the North Vietnamese.

DRV implications last month that Peking was in fact departing from a proletarian internationalist path were conveyed in Defense Minister Giap's message on the 1 August anniversary of the Chinese army and in Pham Van Dong's 31 August DRV National Day address. Giap for the first time failed to characterize Chinese assistance as being in the spirit of "proletarian internationalism,"** and Pham Van Dong pointedly referred to

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* It is possible that Peking first advanced this formulation last March--just prior to moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations--in order to give advance assurance to Hanoi that Peking's support for its struggle would not falter. Since March the Mao instruction has been recalled on only two occasions: by Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at a 5 June reception on the PRG anniversary and by Fang I, minister for economic relations with foreign countries, at a banquet welcoming a Vietnamese study group.

** See the 4 August TRENDS, page 2, for a discussion of the Giap message.

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the proletarian internationalism of the Vietnamese people but made no such characterization of other communist countries.

PRC WILLINGNESS TO "SACRIFICE"

In his promise of support for Vietnam at the 24 September banquet, Li Hsien-nien used a formulation which Chou En-lai had revived on 6 March during his trip to Hanoi but which has not appeared in high-level statements since then: Li said the Chinese "will not flinch from the greatest national sacrifices" in aiding Vietnam. Willingness to sustain great sacrifices is first known to have been vowed by Peng Chen in his 1 October 1965 PRC National Day address; it was not mentioned again until a 22 July 1966 speech by Liu Shao-chi. Peking media continued to repeat this pledge during the summer of 1966, and Lin Piao voiced it in his national day address that year. The pledge was labeled an "instruction" from Lin Piao in some subsequent propaganda. Prior to Chou's revival of it, the statement had last appeared in Peking propaganda in late 1967.

Li Hsien-nien did not stress Chinese support in his final speech on the 27th and, in fact, implicitly played down the need for assistance by characterizing the war situation as "unprecedentedly fine"--an evaluation that has marked Peking's assessment since Operation Lam Son 719 in southern Laos.

DRV REFERENCES TO SOVIET AID

Both Le Thanh Nghi, in his 24 September speech and the 29 September NHAN DAN editorial on the new PRC aid agreement gratuitously mentioned assistance given the DRV by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Hanoi comment on aid agreements with China has not normally referred to Soviet aid, although aid from "socialist countries" has sometimes been cited. It is not clear whether the references to the Soviets at this time are a further indication of Hanoi's continuing pique with China in the wake of Sino-U.S. developments or whether they were included in anticipation of Soviet President Podgornyy's forthcoming visit. Hanoi's long-standing effort to maintain a balance in its treatment of the Soviets and Chinese was well illustrated in the VNA press review on the 29th: The review noted the prominent attention given the Chinese aid agreement, but it added later that "in view of the coming visit of a Soviet party and government delegation to Vietnam" and of the PRC's national day, the papers carried reports on economic developments in the USSR and China.

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DRV references to Soviet aid at meetings with the Chinese are not without precedent, and it is possible that the North Vietnamese leaders feel less reluctant to make such references in Hanoi than when they are guests of the PRC. Thus, while Nguyen Con did not cite Soviet aid in his speech in Peking last year, Pham Van Dong did mention it in his 6 March speech welcoming Chou En-lai to Hanoi. NCNA duly carried the full texts of both Dong's speech in March and Nghi's 24 September speech, along with their references to the Soviets.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTEST OVER AIR STRIKES ENDORSED BY PRG

The assertion in the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement that the heavy U.S. air strikes against the North on the 21st "threaten" the Paris talks is echoed in a supporting PRG Foreign Ministry protest on the 23d as well as in a NHAN DAN commentary that day. The statements by the communist delegates in Paris serving notice that in protest they would postpone the weekly session of the talks until the 30th have been duly reported by Hanoi and Front media, but no point is made of the postponement in comment on the strikes.

U.S. air strikes against the North since the heavy ones on the 21st prompted a standard protest at the lower level of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 27 September. The spokesman said that following "the extremely serious acts of war" on the 21st, the United States sent planes including B-52's and "used artillery from south of the demilitarized zone and warships in the open sea to continuously strafe Huong Lap, Vinh Giang, Vinh Son, and Vinh Thach villages in the Vinh Linh area" from 22-25 September. He charged further that U.S. planes "strafed a number of localities in the western part of Quang Binh Province."

The ministry statement on the 22d was followed the next day by articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as well as radio comment. NHAN DAN's article is at variance with the other propaganda in its vicious personal attack on the President. It says that "the new military adventure has bared more clearly the true face of Nixon--a very dishonest and wicked man, a reactionary who is extremely warlike and perfidious, and a life-or-death enemy of our people." This attack is reminiscent of a passage in the 22 July NHAN DAN editorial that displayed Hanoi's disquiet over the President's planned trip to Peking. The editorial called the President "the worst anticommunist,

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bellicose, and reactionary element" and added that "in more than 20 years as senator and vice president, he always proved to be a frenzied anticommunist, advocating settling international problems by force . . . ." The current NHAN DAN article is also atypical in calling the President a "military adventurer" and in stating that for this reason the army and people of North Vietnam "must remain vigilant day and night." Other comment on the strikes makes more pro forma references to DRV readiness to deal with the "aggressor."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article does not attack the President personally, but it does go beyond the foreign ministry statement in another regard. While the statement called the air strikes "an insolent challenge to peace- and justice-loving public opinion in the world and the United States," the army paper says the latest "act of war" is a "brazen act of provocation against the socialist countries and progressive worldwide public opinion." (The 3 March foreign ministry statement, issued at the time the DRV was expressing concern about the Laos operation, also claimed that U.S. acts against the DRV constituted "an impudent challenge to the socialist countries, peace- and justice-loving countries, U.S. people, and people the world over." The same assertion appeared in other propaganda at that time, including remarks by Defense Minister Giap at a reception marking Soviet Armed Forces Day on 23 February.)

Both the press articles as well as radio comment take issue with U.S. statements that the strikes on the 21st were part of the policy of "protective reaction." For example, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN says that to "shamelessly" defend the strikes, the U.S. spokesman in Saigon repeated the "old arguments of self-defense reactions which on many occasions have been rejected by worldwide public opinion." A Hanoi radio broadcast in Mandarin on the 24th called the U.S. labeling of the strikes as "a security measure" to protect U.S. troops "false reasoning" that exposes the United States' "extremely obstinate and bellicose nature."

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d titled "Nixon's Hawkish Nature Has Not Changed" goes further than other comment in linking the strikes with U.S. "opposition" to a negotiated settlement. Like the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 21st--the first substantial Hanoi comment on negotiations since a 25 July NHAN DAN Commentator article--Hanoi radio says that the replacement of Ambassador Bruce by Ambassador Porter does not appear to have changed the "obstructionist" U.S. attitude.

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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY, PEOPLE'S DAILY SCORE AIR RAIDS ON DRV

The PRC Foreign Ministry statement and the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 24 September, reacting to the large-scale U.S. bombing of the DRV's Quang Binh Province on the 21st, express "great indignation at this criminal act of U.S. imperialism." Peking's reaction to the strikes seems in tune with the general effort to reassure the DRV. Chinese media carried the text of the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement and summaries of the 23 September PRG Foreign Ministry statement, as well as of the statements issued by the DRV and PRG delegations to the Paris conference. The PRC statement is similar in tone and substance to the 24 November 1970 PRC Foreign Ministry statement protesting U.S. bombing raids against North Vietnam on 21 November. U.S. bombing missions against North Vietnamese targets in March 1971 did not evoke a PRC Foreign Ministry statement, although Peking media reported the DRV Foreign Ministry protest at the time.*

Condemning the "wanton bombing raids" and expressing "firm support" for the DRV stand as represented by its statement on the 22d, the PRC Foreign Ministry statement--and the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, which simply rephrased the principal points of the statement--took the "Nixon government" to task for talking about ending the war in Vietnam while "in fact constantly intensifying" it. The foreign ministry specifically charged the U.S. Administration with refusing to answer the PRG's seven-point proposal of 1 July and to fix a time limit "for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam," with "propping up" the Thieu government and directing the "farce of 'presidential elections'" in South Vietnam, and with arming South Vietnamese troops through the "Vietnamizing" plan. In a similar context, the 24 November 1970 PRC Foreign Ministry statement had accused "the Nixon government" of "continuously expanding the war" while "glibly talking" about seeking peace in Indochina and respecting the Geneva agreements. (That statement had been preceded by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 22d.)

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* Events connected with the Laotian incursion early this year brought foreign-ministry-level statements on 25 January and 4 and 8 February and a PRC Government statement on 12 February. Those statements portrayed a more serious threat directed toward China itself and used stronger language than did either the current foreign ministry statement or that of 24 November 1970.

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The current statement, like the one last November, did not raise the notion of a threat to China. But both reaffirmed that the Vietnamese people's struggle is "our struggle," that the Chinese government "has been closely watching the moves in the U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam," and that as long as that aggression continues the Chinese people will "go all out in giving support and assistance" to the Vietnamese comrades "until complete victory."

MOSCOW RADIO, PRESS CONDEMN STRIKES AGAINST DRV, PROMISE AID

Moscow has denounced the 21 September bombings of the DRV with routine-level press and radio comment and some protest statements by public organizations. It had similarly condemned the 21-22 March 1971 raids with only routine-level comment, although a TASS statement had scored the bombings of 21 November 1970. Criticism of the 1-2 May 1970 bombings was included in the 4 May USSR Government statement--read by Kosygin at a Moscow press conference--which was directed chiefly at the U.S. operation in Cambodia.

Soviet commentators assert that the bombing does not square with the President's promises to scale down the war and undermines the commitments undertaken by the United States in 1968 to end the bombing. On 24 September TASS and Moscow radio reported that White House spokesman Ziegler that day said President Nixon personally took part in the decision on the bombing. The reports repeated the line that the bombing violates commitments undertaken by the United States in 1968, and TASS quoted Ziegler as saying the raids do not mean that the United States has altered its decision to end the bombing.

Moscow has reported the Vietnamese communist reaction, including the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements and the statements by the two communist delegations at the Paris talks. Moscow comment has not brought up the cancellation of the Paris session on the 23d in protest against the bombings, but on 22 September TASS did cite the New York TIMES as saying that "the resumption of full-scale air war against North Vietnam destroys all the existing chances at the talks in Paris." An IZVESTIYA article by Ilyinskiy, reported by TASS on the 28th, says the bombings "inflict an undoubted blow on the real possibilities of a political settlement of the Vietnam problem" and indicate new U.S. attempts "to hold up progress" at Paris.

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A 25 September PRAVDA article by Kuznetsov says the bombing shows U.S. unwillingness to respond to the PRG's seven-point plan and determination to adhere to its "old stand" on troop withdrawal. Aleksey Leontyev in RED STAR on the 26th, denouncing the "lie" that the purpose of the bombing is to protect American troops in South Vietnam, once again suggests that the simplest way to protect the troops would be to withdraw them. The "crux" of the matter, Leontyev adds, is that the United States still hopes for a military victory.

SOVIET AID Some of the propaganda on the bombings, including the statements by public organizations, reaffirms that the USSR will continue to give the Vietnamese support and assistance. Other publicity for Soviet aid includes reports by TASS on 24 September and PRAVDA on the 25th of a message from the VWP Central Committee, the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, and the DRV Government, thanking the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers for their "kind message and timely assistance" in connection with the recent floods in the DRV. This Soviet message had been sent on 30 August. On 17 and 18 September TASS and PRAVDA had similarly reported a message from Le Duan thanking Brezhnev for a sympathy message of 2 September and for the relief aid sent by the USSR.*

ANTI-CHINA POLEMICS Low-level attacks on Peking's Indochina policies continued in Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts in Mandarin on 25 September. Pegged to the latest bombing of the DRV, the commentaries once again charged that Peking's splittist stand had encouraged U.S. aggressive action. One broadcast said the United States felt sure that the bombing would have no "undesirable effects" on the President's projected visit to Peking because of "the change in Peking's stand" on the question of U.S. aggression in Indochina and on troop withdrawal. The commentary said that demands for U.S.

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* On 23 September NCNA reported a similar message from Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong to Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai thanking them for their "timely aid" to the flood-stricken Vietnamese people. This was Peking's only mention of relief aid since PRC leaders' message of 2 September. However, on 19 September VNA had announced the arrival of both Chinese and Soviet relief shipments.

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withdrawal have gradually disappeared from Chinese leaders' speeches, and it noted a CPUSA comment that the question of troop withdrawal assumed "only minor importance" compared with other issues discussed by Chou En-lai in his interview with the New York TIMES' James Reston. Another Radio Peace and Progress commentary that day said routinely in the context of the bombings that if Peking had accepted the Soviet proposal for a united front to support Vietnam, the Vietnamese people's struggle would have been more effective.

More generalized calls for unity appear in the joint communique on the Japanese Communist Party delegation's 19-26 September visit to Moscow, as reported in the Moscow domestic service on the 27th.* The communique does not specify socialist unity when it calls for a stepped-up international movement to aid and support the peoples of Indochina, adding that this requires a "broad international front" and "international cohesion of anti-imperialist and democratic forces." However, it does call for "joint actions" of the "fraternal parties" against the "forces of aggression and war, primarily against American imperialism," saying this is possible "despite the differences of opinion between individual parties on these and other questions."

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* See the Japan CP section of this TRENDS for a discussion of the JCP visit.

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SIHANOUK, RGNU MEMBERS ATTACK USSR ON AID, SETTLEMENT ISSUES

Dissatisfaction on the part of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) with the results of the 1-10 September visit to the USSR of a delegation of Sihanouk's Front (FUNK) seems to be reflected in pointed remarks made by RGNU Premier Penn Nouth and RGNU "special envoy" Ieng Sary during a recent tour of northwest China.* In a 22 September speech in Yenan reported by NCNA, Ieng Sary condemned the "design of certain big powers to control Cambodia under the pretext of extending aid." He complained that "they want us to negotiate with the enemy, to compromise with and capitulate to the enemy, and give up our struggle," and he went on to affirm that "we will resolutely refuse such aid."

Commenting at a banquet in Yenan on 22 September, according to NCNA, Penn Nouth said that the Cambodian people are willing to accept "unconditional, sincere aid," both material and moral, but that "the highest and most important aid" is the recognition of the RGNU. He went on to assert that the Cambodian people "resolutely oppose the scheme of U.S. imperialism to work in collusion with one or two big powers to bring about a compromise, hatch a peace-talks fraud and split Cambodia's territory." The Cambodians are determined, he said, to decide their own destiny; "big powers absolutely are not allowed to manipulate Cambodia's destiny."

Earlier, in a 12 September speech in Urumchi, reported by NCNA, Penn Nouth accused "some countries" of "seriously harming" the Cambodian people's struggle by refusing to recognize the RGNU on the pretext that it is a "government in exile" or somehow divided from the "government at home." This "subversion and interference" in the country's internal affairs is "intolerable," he said. Speaking in Lanchow on the 18th, he charged that U.S. imperialism has been "working in collusion with certain powers which call themselves friends of the Cambodian people" to "make a bargain through negotiations to solve the Cambodian question by means of compromise." He added that the United States and its "big-power collaborators" are also resorting to "subversion"

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* The USSR visit by the delegation led by Gen. Duong Sam Ol, Front Politburo member and RGNU Minister of Military Equipment and Armament, is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 September, pages 11-13, and of 15 September, pages 11-13. Ieng Sary, a "special envoy of the interior part" of Sihanouk's government, arrived in Peking from the "frontlines" in Cambodia in mid-August to demonstrate the unity of the Khmer patriots at home and abroad; see the TRENDS of 1 September, pages 8-10.

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to "split our National United Front from the inside," trying to "dispatch enemy agents and plant them in our Front both in our country and abroad so as to create contradictions and confusion."

Prior to these speeches in northwest China, the periodic RGNU rejections of the idea of a conference had apparently made no polemical references to "big-power collaborators." The RGNU animadversions were directed against the United States and its Phnom Penh "lackeys," or against those Western or Asian states that had made proposals for a conference. A 10 October 1970 PRC Government statement denouncing the formation of the Khmer Republic in Phnom Penh had scored the efforts "of U.S. imperialism and its collaborator" to sabotage the Cambodian people's struggle through the United Nations or other means, but Sihanouk did not echo such remarks in his denunciations at the time of U.S. efforts to make sure the Lon Nol government represented Cambodia in the UN.

SIHANOUK'S 27TH MESSAGE

In his 27th "message to the Khmer nation," carried by NCNA on 24 September, Sihanouk once again rejected the notion of a new Geneva conference or any other international conference on Cambodia. Peking supports this stand and the legitimacy of the RGNU, he stressed, in contrast to "certain European powers" who propose a compromise solution. He denounced Sirik Matak for having said, while visiting Washington in mid-August, that Cambodia must be included in any Indochina settlement and that Peking would soon drop its support of Sihanouk. Stressing continued PRC support, Sihanouk quoted the 10 October 1970 PRC Government statement's expression of opposition to the efforts "of U.S. imperialism and its collaborator" to sabotage the Cambodian people's struggle.

As he had done in a previous message (his 24th), Sihanouk asserted that President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking will not cause the PRC to change its position on Cambodia. He recalled that Chou En-lai, in his interview with James Reston, had reiterated Chinese opposition to a new Geneva conference and pointed out that Sihanouk had rejected such a conference in his 24th message. "Categorically refusing" any international conference once again in the current message, Sihanouk said that peace can be realized in Cambodia only by the installation in Phnom Penh of the legitimate RGNU, and he scored those "rightists" who "jump at the promise of a 'third solution' to the Khmer problem by certain European powers, accomplices of U.S. imperialism."

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HUNGARY AND KOREA

HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT WARNS DPRK AGAINST SOCIALIST "DISSENSION"

Against the background of intensified Soviet bloc efforts to counter Chinese diplomatic initiatives and concern over Peking's invitation to President Nixon to visit the PRC, Hungarian President Pal Losonczi used his 15-21 September "official friendship visit" to the DPRK to warn the North Koreans about the dangers of attempts to foment "dissension" among the socialist countries. His warning came in the wake of Kim Il-song's characterization of the President's projected visit as a victory for the PRC in a speech at a 6 August rally for the visiting Prince Sihanouk.* An indication that Losonczi may have been playing a surrogate role for Moscow in warning of divisive activity was reinforced by reports that the Hungarian president stopped off in the Soviet Union on his way to and from the DPRK, meeting with Podgornyy in Moscow on his way home on 22 September.

In a banquet speech on the 20th Losonczi, according to MTI, the Hungarian news agency, said that the visit had been "successful" and that a communique had been prepared that "faithfully reflects the agreements of our aims." Yet no communique on the visit has been made public, which may indicate that the results were less than satisfactory. And although KCNA's brief reports of Losonczi's talks with Kim Il-song and Choe Yong-kon characterized them as being "friendly," they did not mention comradeship or fraternity. KCNA also supplied only summaries of Losonczi's speeches--which MTI carried in full--omitting his polemical remarks, and the Korean speakers themselves similarly avoided polemics.

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* The sequence of events during Sihanouk's 22 July to 11 August visit to the DPRK suggested that the Prince's trip had been designed, at least in part, to convey Peking's reassurances to Pyongyang in the wake of the invitation to President Nixon. Sihanouk, in his 24th "message to the Khmer nation" issued on 30 July in North Korea, made the first move in explaining that the invitation did not mean any wavering of Peking's support for its allies. See the TRENDS of 11 August, pages 13-15.

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In his first toast at a banquet on the 15th, as reported by MTI, Losonczi implied that the forthcoming talks would be difficult: "We should have an exchange on views on all problems regarding the unity of action of the world's anti-imperialist forces. The idea of proletarian internationalism and our common struggle make it imperative for us to exchange ideas and make our stands clear."

Speaking in Hamhung on the 18th, according to MTI, Losonczi said that socialist unity is "particularly necessary now" when "international reaction led by U.S. imperialism is doing everything to weaken socialism and the forces fighting for national liberation and to foment dissension, thus trying to reverse the wheel of history." He added that "the most striking example of all this" is U.S. aggression in Indochina. KCNA's summary blandly noted that Losonczi said that "we attach very great importance to the unity and mutual cooperation among the socialist countries based on the lofty principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," and that he "expressed support" of the Indochinese peoples' struggle against U.S. aggression.

At a Pyongyang rally on the 20th, according to MTI, Losonczi noted that the Korean and Hungarian people are fighting shoulder to shoulder against imperialism, and pointedly added that in this struggle "a particularly important role is played by the first and strongest socialist power in the world, the Soviet Union." Referring to the need for socialist unity, he said that "our party does everything in its power to attain this goal and opposes every disrupting attempt which weakens our anti-imperialist struggle." He reiterated that Indochina is now one of the "principal theaters" of the anti-imperialist struggle and remarked that Hungary and the DPRK are united by the fact that they "both are doing their utmost to support" the Indochinese people. KCNA reported his assertion that the Korean and Hungarian peoples are fighting shoulder to shoulder against imperialism, but predictably omitted his reference to the Soviet Union as well as his warning against "disrupting attempts." It did report his assertion that Indochina is the "main arena" of the struggle against imperialism and that Hungary and the DPRK are united in supporting the peoples of Indochina.

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MTI reported that at a Pyongyang banquet on the 20th Losonczi pointedly brought Korea's own security interests into the picture, saying that the importance of strengthening socialist unity "is underlined by the fact that not too far from your homeland, in Indochina," U.S. aggression is in full swing. KCNA reported only that Losconzi "underscored the importance of strengthening the unity of all the anti-imperialist forces."

At the same time, while warning of the danger of socialist disunity in the face of imperialist aggression, particularly in Indochina, Losonczi took pains to defend the Soviet Union's moves toward a detente with the West. In his speeches in Hamhung and at the Pyongyang rally as carried by MTI he recalled that both world wars started in Europe and asserted that the Soviet and Polish treaties with West Germany and the recent four-power agreement on West Berlin are important in preventing another such war. He added that these treaties have also opened the way for convening a European security conference. KCNA's summaries omitted his references to the agreements on Germany and Berlin and reported that at the Pyongyang meeting he "referred to the problem of the convocation of a European security meeting," thus couching his remarks in negative terms.

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CHINA

PEKING REMAINS MUM ON REASON FOR NATIONAL DAY CHANGES

Through the evening of the 29th (Peking time), there had been no confirmation in official Chinese media of the statements by Foreign Ministry spokesmen to Western newsmen regarding the less elaborate celebration of National Day this year. Western press speculation that a Canton TV announcement of an upcoming Peking relay presaged important revelations proved false when the relay only transmitted a Chinese-Albanian gymnastics meet. Several military leaders who are Politburo members, and usually active, have still made no public appearances in the nearly three weeks since anomalies in Peking's usual behavior became evident.

A 28 September NCNA account of preparations for National Day in the city of Peking indicates that a festive holiday, with rejoicing celebrants, is still planned--which makes it most unlikely that any grave announcement concerning the health of Mao or Lin is to be expected. While the item makes no mention of the traditional parade, it does note that the Tienanmen rostrum has been newly painted and the usual collection of huge potraits of historical personalities from Marx to Mao is in place. Theatrical performances to be given will include not only the old revolutionary classics such as "The Red Lantern" but also several new operas and a new ballet.

MOSCOW'S REACTION

The anomalies in China drew no propaganda attention from Moscow until 24 September when a TASS dispatch seized on rumors published in the Japanese press to accuse the Chinese of again using the threat of a Soviet "attack on Chinese territory" to cover up "acute internal political problems." TASS said that the campaign is a new attempt to "inflame anti-Soviet feelings among the population" and part of a new "prepare yourself for war" drive in the PRC. The only hard evidence given for the allegation is an ASAHI report that leave for servicemen had been canceled. Soviet broadcasts to Southeast Asia and to China have also picked up the theme that the Chinese are using the Soviet threat to hide internal difficulties, but the Soviets have not initiated a major propaganda campaign around the issue.

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BROADCASTS TO CHUANG MINORITY RESUMED BY NANNING RADIO

Nanning radio, Kwangsi regional service, has announced that starting 1 October it will resume broadcasting in Chuang, with separate programs for the northern and southern dialects. The Chuang are a Tai-speaking tribal people numbering some nine million, the largest of China's minority groups but one strongly influenced by Chinese culture.

Nanning radio discontinued broadcasts in Chuang during the cultural revolution, apparently in late 1967 or 1968. Resumption of broadcasting at this time follows closely on Radio Peking's inauguration of broadcasts last May in Uighur and Kazakh, the principal minority languages of China's Northwest.

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BREZHNEV IN YUGOSLAVIA

Brezhnev's 22-25 September "unofficial, friendly" fence-mending visit to Belgrade produced what Tito, at the airport departure ceremony on the 25th, described as "a thorough review of our entire relations" and a joint statement registering both sides' desire to relegate their differences to the background in their mutual pragmatic interests. The joint statement puts on record the two sides' readiness to develop interstate and, more cautiously, interparty relations--severely strained by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and, more recently, by Soviet pressures on Romania and by what Belgrade has viewed as Soviet meddling in Yugoslav affairs.

On Moscow's side, the rapprochement goes hand in hand with a general effort to shore up relations with as many countries as possible in preparation for a European security conference; and the Soviet decision to grant ideological concessions, in form if not in substance, registers the depth of Moscow's concern over Chinese inroads in the Balkans. At the same time, Brezhnev's visit served to demonstrate to Peking and its allies that the USSR can still exert leverage in the area.

Belgrade gained a new--if watered down--assurance from Moscow that interparty cooperation must be based on equality, as well as a new--if qualified--Soviet reaffirmation of Yugoslavia's right to develop its own brand of socialism. The visit opened up for Tito the prospect of improved economic relations with Moscow, as well as a lessening of Yugoslav-Soviet tensions that could enhance domestic stability during the critical period of phaseout of his personal leadership.

BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT: THE 1955-56 DOCUMENTS AND AFTER

Yugoslavia has consistently held that the documents signed in Belgrade in 1955 and Moscow in 1956 encompass its basic minimal conditions for the development of state and party relations with the Soviet Union. Signed on 2 June 1955 by the then Soviet Premier Bulganin and President Tito, the Belgrade declaration represented the first major fruition of Khrushchev's effort to patch up the relations of open enmity that had followed Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. The document pledged "reciprocal respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and

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equality of the states in their relations with each other and with other states." It also called for "mutual respect and noninterference in one another's internal affairs for whatever reason, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, inasmuch as questions of internal organizations, difference of social systems and difference in the concrete forms of socialist development are exclusively the concern of the peoples of the respective countries."

The 1955 document made no mention of party relations, the basis for which was subsequently spelled out in the Moscow declaration signed by Tito and Khrushchev in their capacities as party leaders. The key passage of the 1956 declaration reads:

> Believing that the ways of socialist development vary in different countries and conditions, that the wealth of forms of the development of socialism contributes to its strength, and proceeding from the fact that either side holds alien any tendency to impose its views with regard to the ways and forms of socialist development, both sides have agreed that the aforesaid cooperation should be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of views on the contentious issues between our parties.

Dealt a sharp setback by the Hungarian upheavel in November 1956, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were again on the upturn in the early 1960's, when Khrushchev reaffirmed the policy of noninterference during a visit to Yugoslavia in 1962. The policy was reaffirmed in behalf of the post-Khrushchev leadership after an official Tito visit to Moscow from 18 June to 1 July 1965: Loyalty to principles of noninterference as enunciated in the 1955 declaration was repledged in a communique signed by Brezhnev as CPSU First Secretary, Mikoyan as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Tito as Yugoslav party secretary and president.

Three years later, relations plummeted to their lowest point since 1948 after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Four months before the Warsaw Five moved into Czechoslovakia, during a period of blatant Soviet pressures on the Czechoslovaks, a Tito visit to Moscow--en route home from Iran--produced no formal communique; TANYUG noted cryptically that "viewpoints" on party relations were exchanged. Yugoslav propagandists were vocal after the

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intervention in decrying what they, like the West, termed the "Brezhnev doctrine" of limited sovereignty enunciated as an ex post facto rationale for the invasion--the concept that the socialist community has the right to intervene when it sees socialism threatened in any socialist country. At the highest level, Tito commented at the 11-15 March 1969 Yugoslav party congress: "In the name of the alleged higher interests of socialism, attempts have been made to justify even the open violation of the sovereignty of a socialist country and to resort to military force to prevent its independent development." The USSR and all of its East European allies except Romania boycotted the Yugoslav congress, against the background of polemical exchanges between Moscow and Belgrade.

Moves to dispel the hostility began with a state visit to Yugoslavia by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in the fall of 1969 which produced a joint reaffirmation that the 1955 Belgrade document--on noninterference at the state level--was still valid. The then Yugoslav Premier Ribicic visited Moscow in June 1970, and a joint communique on that visit again endorsed the principles set forth in the Belgrade declaration. But the issue of party relations was still avoided.

Yugoslav propaganda over the past year has registered concern over Soviet pressures on the Romanians and in recent months has reacted sharply to what Belgrade viewed as Soviet moves to capitalize on the turmoil generated in Yugoslavia by Tito's governmental reorganization. In June of this year the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest against anti-Yugoslav activity by "Cominformist emigres" in the Soviet Union. A measure of restraint in the media of both sides--dating from Gromyko's 1969 visit--persisted through the period of such incidents. But the freewheeling unofficial press and radio organs in Yugoslavia, particularly Zagreb media, continued to air comment critical of Soviet bloc attitudes and behavior. Virtually on the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade, a Zagreb radio commentator sharply attacked an East German party Politburo report of 16 September, which warned Balkan communist countries against trafficking with the Chinese, as symptomatic of efforts by the Soviet "camp" to interfere in the Balkans.

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JOINT STATEMENT SETS CURRENT BASIS FOR PARTY, STATE TIES

The 25 September joint statement signed by Tito and Brezhnev caps the gradual, uneven progress toward a Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement in the wake of the Czechoslovak events with a qualified reassertion of principles of equality in party as well as state relations. But the new modus vivendi for the current period falls short of that outlined in the Moscow declaration of 1956.

The new document emerges as a compromise worked out in accommodation to post-Czechoslovakia realities. It defines as the basis for cooperation "the closeness of historic destinies, identity of the foundations of social order, proximity of approaches to many international problems, loyalty to principles of socialist internationalism, the general struggle for peace, independence, and equal international cooperation and the struggle against imperialism." The bow to "socialist internationalism"--a concession from the Yugoslav side; the term did not appear in the 1955-56 documents--is balanced from the Soviet side by an affirmation that the development of bilateral relations "is based on the principles set forth" in the 1956 document on party relations as well as in those of 1955 and 1965.

But the statement backs into the question of party equality by saying that the two governments and parties "strive for developing broad cooperation based on equality between countries and peoples," where the 1956 document had forthrightly endorsed the view that cooperation between the two parties should be based on "complete voluntariness and equality." And the new statement calls only for "exchanges of views and consultations" between the two parties on bilateral relations and foreign policy, where the 1956 document had provided expansively for "comradely exchange of views on contentious issues between parties and friendly criticism"--a proviso the Yugoslavs could cite as justifying their 1968 criticisms of the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia.

In a tortuous passage straddling the line between Moscow's rigid ideology and Belgrade's more flexible approach, the document affirms that "the LCY and the CPSU proceed from the fact that only the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, applied creatively and developed in consonance with the distinctive characteristics of each country, can be the indispensable foundation, both now and in the future, for the policy of the communist and workers'

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parties . . . ." Where the 1956 Moscow Declaration referred to "the wealth of forms of socialist development," this one states in more measured language that "the methods [not "forms"] used in constructing socialism, which reflect the experience and the specific aspects in the development of individual countries, are a matter for the peoples and working classes in individual countries and need not contradict each other."

Both sides register their desire to develop cooperation in the economic, scientific, and cultural fields. Both also register their desire to develop relations "on a reciprocal basis" in the fields of press, radio, television, and culture--an earnest of intent to remove a major irritant in bilateral relations.

FOREIGN POLICY Capitalizing on long-standing areas of agreement on foreign policy, the statement supports the struggles of the Arab peoples against "Israeli aggression" and condemns U.S. "aggression" in Indochina. It also registers both sides' support for a European security conference and for "lasting peace and security in the Balkans, an important element of which would be the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the area." Soviet support for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans dates back to 1959. On 30 May 1959, Khrushchev stated in a speech in Tirana that the USSR "and all socialist countries believe it is from here, from the Balkans, that the peoples must start a struggle with a view to preventing the establishment of rocket bases and the siting of atomic weapons on Balkan soil and in the Mediterranean basin."* Elite and routine Soviet propaganda has continued to endorse the idea, but with decreasing frequency in recent years. Prior to the Soviet-Yugoslav statement, the last high-level USSR endorsement of a nuclear-free Balkans appeared in an 8 September 1969 message from the Soviet leadership on Bulgarian National Day. The last joint Soviet-Yugoslav document to endorse the proposal was the 30 June 1965 communique on Tito's visit to Moscow, which said both sides favored nuclear-free zones in central Europe and the Balkans and--like the current statement--supported the idea of a European security conference.

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* Romania has also long been on record as supporting a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, as part of a package of measures to make the Balkans an "area of peace and cooperation."

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Glossing over areas of discord on foreign policy issues, the joint statement resorts to a stock Soviet formula on nonalinement: "The Soviet side supports the anti-imperialist orientation of the policy of nonalined countries . . . and positively assesses their role in the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism." This is the theme Moscow customarily plays in its comment on nonalined summit meetings, while in comment on the behavior incumbent on socialist states it argues that there can be no neutrality in the class struggle. Beyond an expression of support for restoring the PRC's rights in the United Nations, there is predictably no mention of China, with which Yugoslavia has recently developed cordial state relations.

TITO, BREZHNEV SPEECHES REFLECT FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES

Differences between the two countries were acknowledged and their differing concepts of socialist relations were brought into particularly sharp relief in an exchange of toasts between Tito and Brezhnev at a dinner on the 22d.

TITO The Yugoslav President reiterated Belgrade's desire for "friendly, all-round and permanently stable relations" with the Soviet Union despite past "misunderstandings and differences," but he made it clear that such relations could not be at the expense of Yugoslav's sovereignty or nonalinement. Noting that there are possibilities for developing economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation--pointedly leaving out "political," which Brezhnev just as pointedly said "could be more substantial and regular"--he said these relations could develop "above all on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs..., principles embodied in the UN Charter...and deeply embedded in Yugoslavia's entity as an independent and nonalined country."

In effect rejecting the Soviet view of "socialist internationalism," Tito remarked that the current "ferment" in international relations points up "the untenability of monopolistic positions, outdated forms of economic and political relations." With Romanian as well as Yugoslav interests clearly in mind, he went on call on the socialist countries to "set an example" in international relations through actions "in which the use of force, pressure, and interference in internal affairs will be eliminated, while the free development

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of peoples and countries and their participation on an equal basis in the activities of the wider international community will be made possible." He added pointedly: "International cooperation cannot make progress if based on any monopoly or negation of the legitimate interests and rights of individual countries," and he lectured that "all countries should take part in the affairs of the international community, irrespective of their strength or size, since this is their inalienable right . . . ."

Reaffirming the Yugoslav and Romanian view of European security, Tito declared: "It goes without saying that lasting peace and security in Europe presuppose a system of relations which insure for all European countries full independence and inviolability of frontiers and protection against aggression, the use of force, pressure or the threat of force." In this context, he went on to reaffirm Yugoslav support for a European security conference in which "all European countries should take part on an equal footing."

Turning to the domestic scene, Tito assured his guest that Yugoslavia's self-management brand of socialism has been strengthened by the recent constitutional changes and that the party is in firm control in implementing them. During the period of political turmoil preceding the governmental reorganization last summer, Brezhnev had told the 24th CPSU congress in March that "the Soviet people wanted to see socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened and her ties with the socialist community grow stronger."

BREZHNEV The Soviet leader remarked in his answering toast that "we would not be realists if we did not see that the heritage of the years when Soviet-Yugoslav relations were seriously clouded continues to affect certain things today" and that "the tasks facing us are not simple." Alleging that unnamed "forces" were trying to exacerbate Yugoslav-Soviet differences, Brezhnev sought to counter the idea that the Soviet Union harbors aggressive intentions in the Balkans. In line with earlier Soviet leadership statements, he said it was these unnamed forces that "circulated the fable about a so-called doctrine of limited sovereignty and spread rumors about Soviet armies allegedly being prepared to move into the Balkans and many other tales."

Insistence that the Soviet Union adheres to a policy of noninterference has from the outset gone hand in hand with enunciation of what has come to be known in the West as the

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doctrine of limited sovereignty. Advancing the concept in a speech to the fifth Polish party congress on 12 November 1968, Brezhnev declared that the socialist states stand for "strict respect for sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs," and then went on to argue that "military aid to a fraternal country" is justified because "when a threat to the cause of socialism" in that country occurs, "it is no longer only a problem for the people of that country but also a common concern for all the socialist states." Foreign Minister Gromyko engaged in similar semantic sleight of hand in his speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet on 10 July 1969: Decrying the "slander" that the socialist states "advocate some kind of limited sovereignty," he went on to argue that "the content of the term sovereignty" is fully expressed in "the people's right to lean on the support of their friends who are faithful to their international duty." The most recent denial by a Soviet leader came from Kosygin in a preelection speech on 10 June 1970, when he denounced "the inventions concocted by the bourgeois press and radio . . . about a rejection of other socialist countries' sovereignty."

Brezhnev thus drew on a long-standing background of Soviet leader statements--echoed in routine propaganda--in his denial in Yugoslavia that the Soviet Union puts limits on sovereignty. Citing the same unnamed "forces" which he said had circulated the "fable" about the limited-sovereignty doctrine, he derided the view "that Yugoslavia is some sort of grey zone and that it is 'going over to the West,'" stopping short of calling Yugoslavia "socialist." He declared: "I do not think it is worth wasting time refuting all these slanderous concoctions; however, they remind us that the cause of Soviet-Yugoslav friendship needs to be defended . . . time and time again." He reaffirmed that "Soviet-Yugoslav" relations are based on the 1955 and 1956 joint documents, but he in effect qualified his support for the substance of the documents by stating that "what matters now is how these principles, under present conditions, can be implemented in a fuller and broader way." He did not generalize on the principles that should govern relations among all socialist states--the point of Tito's remarks in the toast to which he was replying.

Addressing Yugoslav workers at a factory on 23 September, Brezhnev made a stronger affirmation of party equality than was agreed to in the joint statement, declaring that cooperation between the Soviet and Yugoslav states and parties is based on "full equality and mutual respect." And on the sensitive issue

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of differing types of socialism, he acknowledged in that speech that the Yugoslav variety "does not appear acceptable to the Soviet communists . . . because we have our own traditions and experience, and they suit both our concept of socialism and our conditions." He went on in effect to qualify the formula on different approaches to socialism in the joint statement, referring to the "general laws" governing the building of socialism without which "there can be no socialism."*

Granting that "the selection of concrete forms of organization of social life is, however, an internal affair of each communist party and people," Brezhnev assured the Yugoslav workers that the Soviet Union opposes anyone's effort to "impose his own concrete methods of development on others." But elsewhere in the speech he came close to reasserting the right to monitor socialism that is at the heart of the doctrine he denied existed: Stating that the Soviet Union's foreign political line is clear, he said "we firmly protect the interests of socialism against all its enemies."

In concluding remarks at the airport on the 25th, Brezhnev said "we have done some good and useful work" and pronounced the visit "a success." The Yugoslav leader remarked less categorically that the talks had "cleared up many things," that "the documents adopted reflect the talks we held and much more," and that "we have reached a united view as to what we still must do . . . ." A brief communique on the visit issued simultaneously with the joint statement says Tito accepted an invitation to visit Moscow at an unspecified future date.

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* He had gone on to enumerate the "laws" in addressing the Polish party congress on 12 November 1968. Asserting the right of socialist countries to correct deviations from "the common laws governing socialism" wherever they may occur, he explained that socialism can only be victorious "if the communist party, as the guilding force of society, firmly carries through a Marxist-Leninist policy in the development of all spheres of public life; only if the party indefatigably strengthens the defense of the country, the defense of its revolutionary gains; if it maintains itself and propagates amidst the people vigilance with regard to the class enemy, irreconcilability to bourgeois ideology; only if the principle of socialist internationalism is being sacredly observed and the unity and fraternal solidarity with other socialist countries is being strengthened."

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AFTERMATH OF THE VISIT: REASSURANCE TO MOSCOW'S BLOC ALLIES

Brezhnev made unheralded stopovers in Budapest on 25-26 September and in Sofia on the 26th and 27th en route home from Belgrade, apparently to fill in his bloc allies on the Soviet interpretation of the new Belgrade statement and the discussions with Tito. Communiques issued after both visits were predictably vague on the substance of the talks, recording "full identity" of views on "international" questions and unspecified questions relating to the world communist movement.

Against the background of the strains in Belgrade-Sofia relations over the perennial question of Macedonia, which has recently resurfaced in the media of both countries, the communique on the Sofia visit refers twice to "complete unity" between the Soviet and Bulgarian parties. It also contains what seems a gratuitous assurance, in view of Sofia's closeness to Moscow, that relations between the two parties are marked by "profound trust." There is no reference to Brezhnev's Belgrade visit in either the Sofia or the Budapest communique.

MOSCOW COMMENT Followup Soviet comment on the Brezhnev visit to Yugoslavia has been restrained, pointing to the existence of past differences and forecasting a more "stable" basis now for the development of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation. The term most frequently used to characterize the visit is "useful." A low-keyed PRAVDA editorial on the visit on the 27th avoided the sensitive question of "limited sovereignty," rather stressing Moscow's dedication to "socialist internationalism" and cautiously describing the USSR and Yugoslavia as "two sovereign states" belonging to "a single sociopolitical formation." Other Soviet comment echoed Brezhnev's 23 September remark that "the principal thing is that our countries belong to the same socio-economic formation"; a 27 September domestic service report on a Moscow meeting of the Soviet-Yugoslav commission for scientific and technical cooperation saw enhanced prospects for cooperation "in the CEMA framework" arising from the Soviet-Yugoslav joint statement.

In routine-level radio comment, Moscow has repeated for the domestic audience Brezhnev's remarks on the 23d about "general laws" governing the building of socialism and has reiterated to domestic and foreign audiences--including the Romanians--denials of "cock-and-bull stories" about the limited-sovereignty doctrine and Soviet readiness to move troops into the Balkans. Moscow has been at pains to highlight Romania's favorable reaction

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to the visit, noting SCINTEIA's "satisfaction" and quoting ROMANIA LIBERA to the effect that the visit will "make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of European and international security."

EAST EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES

Hungary and East Germany, the two countries whose media have been the chief purveyors of warnings to Balkan communist countries about trafficking with the Chinese, have been vocal in denouncing inventions about "the so-called doctrine of limited sovereignty." One Budapest broadcast on the 23d, to Western Europe, said that in stressing the validity of the 1955 and 1956 Soviet-Yugoslav declarations, "Brezhnev with a single gesture swept away the favorite fabrication" of "imperialist propaganda" limited sovereignty.

East German propaganda includes attacks on the West Germans as authors of "fairy tales" about limited sovereignty. An East German commentary by a correspondent in Belgrade on the 24th observed that the USSR's "correct attitude" on the question of sovereignty "has been appreciated from the Yugoslav side, and it is to be hoped that this objective assessment will be generally communicated." The commentary went beyond PRAVDA and Brezhnev in observing that "Yugoslavia has its natural hinterland in the socialist community" and that "this is objectively independent of the degree to which the thinking of the Yugoslav leadership goes in this direction." Echoing Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU congress, the commentator concluded with a reference to Moscow's desire "to strengthen socialism" in Yugoslavia.

Sofia's comment on the Soviet leader's Belgrade visit has been limited. Comment from Prague and Warsaw has skirted the issue of limited sovereignty, indulging largely in platitudes about the failure of hostile elements to sow seeds of dissension in the Balkans.

ROMANIAN REACTION

The major available comment on the visit from Bucharest media was contained in an international review by foreign affairs commentator Caplescu in SCINTEIA on the 25th, largely devoted to the UN General Assembly session. The article restructured the emphasis in Brezhnev's factory speech of the 23d, reporting that "the Soviet leader pointed out that taking into account the existence of general laws" of socialism "is an internal question of each

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communist party, of each people, declaring himself . . . against the imposition from the outside of concrete development methods." It registered Romanian "satisfaction" with the visit as in keeping with Bucharest's advocacy of leader-to-leader discussion of differences on a basis of equality and "regardless of the diversity of stands." As reported by AGERPRES, the article did not relate Brezhnev's visit directly to the situation in the Balkans but said it will serve "the general cause of peace."

Romanian coverage reflected concern not to seem to overplay the visit. AGERPRES' review of the Romanian press on the 27th mentioned only at the end of a long list of topics that "the newspapers carry passages from the Yugoslav-Soviet statement and report on Leonid Ilich Brezhnev's visits to Hungary and Bulgaria."

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GERMANY

GDR, USSR SUSTAIN CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO FINNISH PROPOSAL

Very limited East German and Soviet comment on the 10 September Finnish Government proposal to establish full diplomatic relations with both German states continues to reflect caution. East Berlin and Moscow both still avoid any reference to the call in the proposal for negotiations on settlement of damages caused by German troops in Finland in 1944-45, and both continue to ignore Helsinki's stipulation that its treaties with the two German states must come into force simultaneously.* In keeping with the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of receptivity to the proposal on 11 September, asserting East German readiness to enter into negotiations without mentioning the FRG, both have also ignored Bonn's "provisional" reply on the 27th that the Federal Government will continue to study the proposal.

Moscow has publicized the GDR reaction but has avoided committing itself. A favorable official Soviet attitude was made known only indirectly in a 17 September Helsinki radio interview with Finnish Defense Minister Gestrin after his return from a five-day visit to the USSR, during which he met with Podgornyy. Asked if they had discussed the proposal, Gestrin replied: "This matter was also discussed; President Podgornyy expressed his appreciation for this initiative and mentioned that the Soviet Government takes a very positive stand on this." Moscow media gave no details on the substance of the Podgornyy-Gestrin talk.

An approach that would apparently be congenial to Moscow and East Berlin was enunciated at an 18-19 September plenary meeting of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) Central Committee which, according to the Helsinki radio, called on the Finnish Government not to make normalization of relations with the GDR dependent on the stand Bonn takes toward the Finnish proposal and urged that each German state be dealt with separately. Moscow's reluctance to get into any details of the Finnish Government proposal was manifest in its coverage of the party plenum: Soviet reports highlighted the SKP stand on a European security conference and its pro-Soviet stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute, mentioning other international issues but leaving out the question of the Finnish proposal entirely.

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* See the TRENDS of 15 September, page 21.

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Two authoritative PRAVDA commentators, Yuriy Zhukov on the 14th and Viktor Mayevskiy on the 24th, referred to the Finnish proposal without indicating the issues involved. In a discussion of prospects for European detente and East-West cooperation following the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, Zhukov merely said "a widespread response" had been aroused by the proposal to establish diplomatic relations between "Finland and the two German states--the FRG and the GDR--and to reach agreement on a number of other questions." In a discussion of the Brezhnev-Brandt talks in the Crimea, Mayevskiy remarked in a similar vein that the Finnish "readiness to normalize fully relations with the GDR and FRG has had widespread repercussions" and that the GDR has agreed to begin such negotiations. Only in two routine Moscow radio broadcasts--both in Finnish--has Moscow offered any actual comment: One radio commentator on the 15th told Finnish listeners the proposal was a "very important event" corresponding to the reality of two German states; another on the 23d said Helsinki had made another "contribution" to the improvement of European relations in offering to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR.

OFFICIAL GDR REPLY Following up the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 11th, the GDR Council of Ministers on the 15th officially "welcomed" the Finnish decision "to enter into negotiations with the GDR Government on regulating relations between the two states" and said it had "decided to inform" the Finnish Government of the GDR Government's "official consent" to such negotiations. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 16th buried this report at the end of an ADN dispatch publicizing GDR endorsement of the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference; the report was not [redacted] monitored ADN transmissions. On the 20th, however, ADN reported that the acting head of the GDR trade mission in Helsinki had passed on East Berlin's answer to the Finnish Government. In his report to the SED Central Committee plenum on the 16th, Politburo member Hermann Axen simply stated that the GDR had "welcomed" the Finnish initiative and declared its readiness to open talks. In the only available GDR commentary on the proposal, the East Berlin daily NATIONAL ZEITUNG on the 17th maintained, in the course of a discussion of the German phase of the Berlin negotiations, that it represented another recognition of the postwar "territorial changes."

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FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HUSAK REPEATS STAND ON MUNICH; THIRD EXPLORATORY TALKS HELD

CPCZ General Secretary Husak repeated the basic, long-standing Czechoslovak stand on the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio at a joint meeting of the CPCZ Central Committee and the CSSR National Front on 17 September--in a speech containing his first endorsement of the four-power Berlin accord signed on the 3d and his first public discussion of FRG-Czechoslovak relations since the signing. His formulation on Munich was in keeping with the pattern followed since the release of the 2 August communique on the Soviet bloc summit talks in the Crimea, which modified the Czechoslovak call for West German recognition of "the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio and all the consequences arising therefrom" by dropping the underlined phrase. A spate of Czechoslovak press articles since the signing of the Berlin agreement had either modified the formulation on the pattern of the Crimea communique or omitted any reference to the Munich agreement in discussing FRG-Czechoslovak relations.*

Welcoming the "agreement on West Berlin" and the effect it may have on ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, on a European security conference, and on relations between the FRG and the socialist countries, Husak said on the 17th: "We believe these circumstances could also favorably influence our talks with the FRG, which will be continued in Prague at the end of this month. However, the normalization of our relations with the FRG requires that the FRG Government adopt an unequivocal attitude with regard to the nonvalidity ab initio of the shameful Munich diktat." (Curiously, a TASS summary of Husak's speech, delivered while Brandt was meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea, failed to mention the remarks on Munich and the Prague-Bonn talks, although it reported the other details of Husak's foreign policy comments.)

In keeping with Husak's avoidance of the Munich agreement issue in his several previous speeches following the 3 September signing of the Berlin agreement, Strougal also ignored the issue in an 11 September speech in which he suggested that

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* See the TRENDS of 9 September, pages 25-26.

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the agreement had brought an improved atmosphere for the development of FRG-Czechoslovak relations. Noting that the talks with Bonn "on normalization of mutual relations" would resume at the end of September, Strougal added: "We hope that the relatively hopeful attitude which has prevailed in Europe in the past few months will favorably influence the course of these negotiations as well."

Following the Brezhnev-Brandt talks in the Crimea, the Czechoslovak press has repeatedly expressed hope that the Crimea talks would help create "better conditions" for the exploratory talks with Bonn. The Bratislava PRAVDA on the 20th hoped for a demonstration of West German "realism" in the Prague talks on the lines of Brandt's approach in his meetings with Brezhnev. MLADA FRONTA on the 22d looked forward to the next round in the exploratory talks "with a certain degree of optimism." Only the Prague trade union daily PRACE on the 25th brought up the Munich issue: It remarked that West German elements opposing ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties--neglecting to mention that Brandt is holding up ratification pending implementation of the Berlin accord--are in the "front ranks of the defenders of Munich." It argued that to recognize the Munich agreement as legal and valid under law, if only "at the moment of the signing," is to acknowledge that Czechoslovakia was "legally and validly smashed" and that the suffering endured by the Czechoslovaks at the hands of the Nazis was also legal and valid under law. Maintaining that "a politician who wants to be regarded as realistic cannot demand such a thing," PRACE went on to say that Brandt "has repeatedly shown recently that he wants to be regarded as a realistic politician," as demonstrated by his trip to the Crimea.

THIRD SESSION OF EXPLORATORY TALKS

The CTK report on the third session of the FRG-Czechoslovak "exploratory talks," held in Prague on 27-28 September between FRG State Secretary Frank and--participating for the first time--Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Jiri Gotz, said the meeting was held in "an open, businesslike atmosphere." It noted both sides "affirmed their readiness to conclude a treaty on normalization of relations between the two countries," adding that a date will be set later for the next round. The West German DPA reported on the 28th that Frank told newsmen the next meeting would "probably" be held in Bonn at the beginning of November. He also said the two sides had not found "a common formula" on the Munich agreement, although there was "a certain meeting of the minds."

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UNITED NATIONS

GROMYKO DRAWS ON STOCK THEMES IN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

In his annual foreign policy review before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 28 September draws on stock propaganda themes in stressing the peaceful orientation of the USSR's "Leninist" foreign policy. (While text of the speech is not yet available, it has been summarized and excerpted by TASS.) Gromyko observes that the general line of Soviet policy was most recently affirmed at the 24th CPSU Congress last spring when "a broad program of peace and international cooperation, dealing with all the major facets of the task of preserving peace," was outlined. He pays the usual obeisance to the policy of peaceful coexistence; at a later point in his address he stresses the importance of preventing a new world war, noting that this task is dependent on the state of relations among nations of all regions of the world. And he points to the urgency of sustaining the struggle for disarmament and against the burgeoning arms race which is resulting in massive expenditures.

On U.S.-Soviet relations, Gromyko says that the USSR is ready to develop contacts and to seek mutually acceptable solutions, but will not adapt its fundamental line in the international arena or its "firm policy of peace to various considerations of a temporary nature." And he deplores the efforts of "powerful states to impose their will upon those whom they consider weaker," concluding that such actions are responsible for the events in Indochina and the Middle East.

DISARMAMENT Gromyko follows up his letter of 6 September to U Thant, in which he requested that the issue of a world disarmament conference be placed on the UNGA agenda, by introducing a draft resolution stressing the urgency of such a conference. The draft document and Gromyko in his introductory remarks note the desirability of agreement on the date and the agenda for the conference before the end of 1972. (In his 24 September 1965 UNGA address Gromyko said that such a conference should be convened "in the middle of 1966.") Going beyond his letter to U Thant, Gromyko suggests that the conference could be made "a permament forum or . . . a forum operating over a long period of time. Its sessions may be called periodically, say once in two or three years." He urges

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that the conference be held outside the framework of the United Nations to assure its universality. As routine propaganda has done over the past three weeks, Gromyko assures his audience that the convocation of the conference "should in no way diminish the significance of the forums and channels for disarmament negotiations which are now being used," including the 26-nation Geneva disarmament talks.

In addition to his remarks on a world disarmament conference, Gromyko recalls the Soviet proposal formalized last June for a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. He notes that France supported the Soviet initiative but that "another nuclear power" took a negative position and the other two powers contended that under these circumstances the question of a five-power conference was academic. Gromyko does not identify the PRC as the nuclear power taking the negative position although Soviet propaganda has not been reticent on this matter since release of the formal Chinese rejection of the proposal in early August.

Gromyko mentions past arms control agreements, including the nonproliferation treaty and the partial test-ban treaty, observing that it would be wrong to believe that nothing has been done to curb the arms race. He goes on to touch on partial disarmament measures which have been advanced by the USSR, citing specifically the call for a ban on underground nuclear tests, the creation of nuclear-free zones "in various regions of the world," the closing of foreign military bases, and the banning of bacteriological and chemical weapons. Pointing to growing recognition of the need to take measures to prevent accidental or deliberately provoked incidents involving nuclear weapons, Gromyko notes that this goal "is served by a corresponding accord recently achieved between the USSR and the United States."

While Gromyko does not acknowledge that the U.S.-Soviet agreement concerning incidents in which nuclear weapons are involved was reached at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Helsinki, he follows his remarks on this agreement with a brief discussion of SALT, now in recess until 15 November.*

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* For a review of Gromyko's remarks as well as of Soviet treatment of the wind-up of the fifth session of SALT on 24 September, see the SALT section of this TRENDS.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

In his rundown of developments in Europe, Gromyko welcomes the 3 September signing of the four-power agreement on "West Berlin," the conclusion by Bonn of treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, and the developing understanding between France and the USSR. But he goes on state that what has been achieved in Europe and what is being done, while substantial, by no means solve all the problems. Questions remain which should be solved by joint efforts and for this reason, he observes, the time is ripe for the calling of a European security conference, as proposed by the socialist states. As he had done in his speech before the Assembly last year, he affirms that the United States and Canada could participate.

Gromyko says convening of a conference would serve to hasten the disbanding of military blocs in Europe. And he repeats the longstanding Soviet pledge of readiness to agree "without delay" to the liquidation of military blocs or, as a first step, "at least their military organizations." Gromyko had affirmed this pledge just over two months ago in a 13 July letter to U Thant; and Brezhnev had stated it in his 30 March report at the 24th CPSU Congress.

Gromyko briefly mentions the Soviet proposal -- surfaced by Brezhnev in his 30 March report -- for the opening of talks on troop and arms reductions in Europe, noting that "many agree" to this proposal. Consistent with routine and elite propaganda since March, he does not cite the proposal as an agenda item at a European security conference, thus leaving the question of a forum open.

MIDDLE EAST

Gromyko treats the Middle East situation in largely routine fashion and in far less detail than in last year's address. He levels the customary attack against Israel and its "patrons" who stand in opposition to the "legitimate rights" of the Arab states and the return of the "forcibly seized" territories. He charges that Israel is interested only in an "annexationist peace" and notes that it has gone "too far in baring its plans for the seizure of occupied territories to obtain support in the international arena." And he declares that Israel has paralyzed the Jarring mission.

Gromyko says that the United Nations is still in a position to make a contribution to a Middle East settlement "provided it does not limit itself to the adoption of yet another resolution

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expressing good desires without reinforcing them with effective measures, and provided it utilizes the full scope of its capacities" in accordance with its Charter. On the question of assuring Israel that its security would not be endangered by withdrawal from all occupied territories, Gromyko says that "appropriate guarantees, including guarantees by the Security Council, can be provided . . . . These are the strongest guarantees conceivable in the modern world." While Gromyko stops short of reaffirming Moscow's readiness to participate in such guarantees, routine propaganda has noted the USSR's willingness to take part.

MEMBERSHIP ISSUE In line with current routine propaganda, Gromyko reaffirms Soviet support for Peking's representation in the United Nations. According to him, the USSR has opposed "unlawful actions with regard to the Chinese island of Taiwan," the denial of China's "lawful rights" in the United Nations, and the "so-called two China's concept and any concepts of 'double representation of China.'" This is "a position of principle," he says, and the USSR will follow it at the UNGA session.* Gromyko had called for the restoration of the PRC's rights in the United Nations in his speech last year and in all previous years except 1969.

In addition to his call for PRC representation in the world body, Gromyko routinely repeats the long-standing call for the admission of both the GDR and the FRG.

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* Extensive Peking propaganda on the Chinese representation issue focuses currently on the U.S. "maneuvering" to retain a seat for Taiwan. The propaganda fanfare is highlighted by a widely publicized PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 25 September. Taking up the theme of the 20 August PRC Government statement on the representation issue, it says flatly that the PRC "will absolutely have nothing to do with the United Nations if a situation of 'two Chinas,' 'one China, one Taiwan,' 'the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined,' or any other similar situation should occur."

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KOREA Judging by the TASS summary, Gromyko passed over the Korean issue briefly. Calling for an end to interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people, he said the United Nations should stop serving as a "screen to cover up the foreign occupation of South Korea." His failure to make the usual demand for the withdrawal of "all foreign troops in South Korea" and the disbanding of UNCURK stems apparently from the fact that this year, in a departure from past practice, the item on the "Korean question" has been deleted from the UNGA agenda.

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

USSR REPORTS HELSINKI ACCORDS, GROMYKO STRESSES ABM PROBLEM

In keeping with its low-keyed treatment of the negotiations over the past two months, Moscow has devoted limited propaganda to the wind-up of the fifth round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) on 24 September. Soviet media on the 24th promptly transmitted the text of the joint communique announcing that U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki, in accordance with the 20 May agreement,* studied the possibility of reaching an accord on ABM's as well as questions concerned with limiting offensive strategic weaponry. The communique also stated that "other related questions" were studied and that the latest round of talks, which began on 8 July, resulted in a clearer understanding of questions to be solved when the negotiations resume in Vienna on 15 November.

A brief TASS dispatch on the 24th, some six hours after the release of the communique, noted without comment that the talks in Helsinki resulted in two understandings: one concerning adoption by the two sides of measures to prevent accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons under their control, and the other concerning measures to improve the U.S.-Soviet hotline through the use of earth satellites. These agreements, TASS said, will be signed on 30 September when Foreign Minister Gromyko meets Secretary Rogers in Washington. A domestic service commentary on the 27th, reviewing the USSR's "peace program" outlined at the 24th CPSU Congress last spring, took brief note of the agreement aimed at preventing accidental use of nuclear weapons but said nothing about the one on the hotline. Soviet propaganda had ignored a 13 September New York TIMES report that U.S. and Soviet experts at SALT had reached agreement on the handling of nuclear accidents and the improvement of the hotline.

Gromyko, in his 28 September speech before the United Nations General Assembly, took note of a "recent" U.S.-Soviet agreement concerning measures to prevent accidental or deliberately provoked incidents involving nuclear weapons, but he did not

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* Unlike the current communique, which was issued in Helsinki by the U.S. and Soviet delegations, the 20 May agreement in Vienna was read by President Nixon to a national radio and TV audience. The USSR routinely carried the agreement in its newscasts, and only on the following day did it acknowledge that the President had announced the accord.

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acknowledge that the accord was reached at SALT. He did, however, promptly follow these remarks with a brief discussion of SALT, the first elite reference to the negotiations since Brezhnev's 11 June pre-election speech. He said the negotiators are concentrating on an agreement on ABM's, warning that if an extension of this defensive system is not stopped now, a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive weapons will "inevitably" be triggered off. As elite spokesmen have done in the past, Gromyko concluded that the talks must be conducted on the basis of "equal security."

Chief Soviet negotiator Semenov, in his departure statement in Helsinki on the 26th reported by TASS, failed to mention either of the two agreements reached at SALT, confining himself to the general observation that "useful work" has been carried on and the negotiations are of "growing importance."

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JAPAN CP

JCP ENDS MOSCOW VISIT AS QUARREL WITH CCP INTENSIFIES

A joint CPSU-JCP communique, published on 28 September in PRAVDA and AKAHATA, marked the end of a week's discussions between delegations of the two parties. The Moscow visit was the last leg of a six-week official trip which had already taken the JCP delegation, led by Chairman Kenji Miyamoto, to Romania, Italy and North Vietnam in an apparent effort to lessen the JCP's isolation from major communist parties amid continuing deterioration of official relations with the CCP.

Talks between Miyamoto and Politburo member Suslov were held from 19-26 September; Brezhnev met with the JCP delegation on 20 September. The communique stated that the talks were held in a "frank and comradely atmosphere," the same phraseology used to describe talks held between the two parties last March when the JCP decided to attend the 24th CPSU Congress in Moscow.

In keeping with the tone of recently issued joint statements with the Romanian, Italian and Spanish communist parties, the communique with the CPSU stresses the need for "independence, equality of rights and noninterference in each others internal affairs." It also calls for "joint actions against the forces of aggression and war, and primarily against American imperialism"--which will in turn, it is argued, serve to strengthen "the unity of the international communist movement." (As reported in the TRENDS last week, the communique on the talks between the JCP and the Vietnam Workers Party failed to mention the issue of communist unity.)

SPLIT BETWEEN CCP AND JCP

Just before the JCP delegation left Tokyo on 19 August, AKAHATA stepped up its attacks on the CCP. On 16 August, for example, AKAHATA complained of continuing "great-power chauvinist intervention in the democratic movement in Japan by a certain group in the CCP." On the 18th AKAHATA responded to the "slanderous" charges made against the JCP by Chou En-lai in his 10 August New York TIMES interview with James Reston and firmly argued against Chou's assertation that the JCP was the only Japanese opposition party refusing to recognize the danger of a revival of militarism in Japan.

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Just one day before the JCP delegation arrived in Hanoi, AKAHATA, on 9 September, published a lengthy treatise, setting forth the thesis that full responsibility for the deterioriation of interparty relations rests with the CCP. The article reviewed the beginning of the quarrel with the CCP in the spring of 1966 when PRC media began portraying the JCP as "antirevolutionary" and a "revisionist gang" after Miyamoto refused to support a Chinese call for a "united anti-American, anti-Soviet front" made during talks held in February and March 1966. The CCP's demand that "Japan's revolutionary movement take the armed insurrectionary line and accept Mao Tse-tung's deification" also contributed to the ideological gap which now separates the two parties, the article declared. Not surprisingly, the article couples its refutation of CCP charges with a vigorous defense of the JCP's use of parliamentary means to achieve national power and buttresses its argument by pointing to the new Allende government in Chile.

One of the issues raised in the 9 September AKAHATA article--Peking's support for the JCP (Left)--was underscored on 20 September when a JCP (Left) delegaiton, led by party Chairman Masayoshi Fukuda, was feted at a Peking banquet attended by Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, all full politburo members.*

Reacting to this sensitive issue, AKAHATA on 23 September published a statement released by Ichiro Sunama, JCP Presidium member, which denounced Chou by name for meeting with "Japanese antiparty elements, self-styling themselves the JCP (Left)." Sunama blasted the "Fukuda faction" as a band of "blind antiparty followers of a foreign power engaging in subversive activities under Mao Tse-tung Thought against the Communist Party of Japan." Sunama concluded that "it is unpardonable big-power chauvisionistic interference toward the JCP for Chou En-lai to invite the antiparty band of the Fukuda faction to China."

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* After ties between the CCP and JCP began to weaken in 1966, disatisfied pro-Maoists within the Yamaguchi Prefecture branch of the JCP organized a splinter group--the National Council of the JCP (Left)--in 1968. AKAHATA charged this group with "mechanistically applying Maoism to a Japanese revolution" in an article reporting its assumption of the name JCP (Left) in December 1969.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

YOUNG KAZAKH POET PROTESTS AGAINST CONFORMIST ATMOSPHERE

In a speech delivered to the Kazakh writers congress last May, but not published until last month, a young Kazakh poet of some renown has criticized the current atmosphere of complete suppression of controversy in the literary field--something the Soviet regime has worked long and hard to achieve. Rather like Yevtushenko, who at the USSR writers congress challenged the control of the older, conservative authors, poet Olzhas Suleymenov decried the efforts to censor young writers and squelch all debate, and he called on the leaders of the writers union "to create an atmosphere of free criticism."

Suleymenov's speech is one of only three Kazakh writers congress speeches selected for publication in the August issue of the unorthodox Kazakh literary journal PROSTOR--the other two being the main report by the writers union first secretary, Anuar Alimzhanov, and the speech of PROSTOR's liberal editor Ivan Shukhov. Shukhov, himself a critic of dullness and conformity, evidently singled out the speech of Suleymenov from among the rank-and-file congress speakers in order to save his controversial message from being silenced by the censorship. (The Kazakh press coverage of the 26-27 May writers congress had reduced Suleymenov's speech to two innocuous paragraphs.)

Suleymenov makes clear his preference for the period of the early and mid-1960's before the authorities had managed to clamp on the lid. He praises the previous heated debates over young poets Yevtushenko, Voznesenskiy and Rozhdestvenskiy--both the criticism and the rebuttals--as helpful to poetry, and he declares that literature, especially poetry, "cannot exist in quietness." "I sincerely regret that in recent years no decadent or formalist [author] has appeared in Kazakh literature," he continues; "it is too positive and quiet," which is "harmful" and leads to "atrophy."

Recalling that some young Kazakh literary critics had tried to imitate Russian critics and open sharp debates, Suleymenov says that they were attacked so harshly that they quit literary criticism altogether. "All it took was for a young critic to offend some authoritative person, and he was declared a formalist . . . and they stopped publishing him." The elders'

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power to destroy young writers has left "the mark of this fear on all our young criticism and, consequently, on literature," and as a result "everything here is quiet, everything is on an even keel, everything is excellent, even the dullness." Suleymenov also criticizes the writers' dependence on the authorities, complaining that authors are writing not for the reader but mainly for the "bureaucrat on whom the fate of your book depends."

One of the best-known of current Kazakh poets, Suleymenov is no stranger to controversy. As Alimzhanov stated in his opening report, "His every book evokes lively debate both in our local press and in the central press." Alimzhanov expressed, nonetheless, his personal support for Suleymenov: "For my part, I am an admirer of his creative work, which is always searching" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 May).

PROSTOR's version of first secretary Alimzhanov's report also contains interesting revelations about "unhealthy phenomena" within the Kazakh union. Proclaiming that he is not afraid to wash dirty linen in public, Alimzhanov complained that Kazakh writers have been circulating anonymous letters containing gossip and threats in order to settle literary feuds.

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TOPICS IN BRIEF

BREZHNEV VISIT TO CUBA

Neither Soviet nor Cuban media have confirmed speculation on a planned Brezhnev visit to Cuba in December, prompted by Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda's remark--in an interview published in the 21 September issue of the Chilean paper ULTIMA HORA--that a long-rumored Castro visit to Chile "must take place before December, since Brezhnev's visit to Cuba has been announced for that date." PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent transmitted the text of the interview to Havana on 21 September, but PRENSA LATINA has not distributed any report on it.

Moscow media have ignored the speculation, while Havana has mentioned the "rumors" in a single broadcast in the domestic service on 25 September. In his feature program built around the device of a "letter from Freddy"--purportedly an itinerant journalist--Havana commentator Guido Garcia Inclan quoted "Freddy" as writing from Miami: "The rumors we hear here have it that Fidel will go to Chile in November and that Brezhnev will visit Cuba in December."

UK SPY CHARGES

Available Moscow media reports and comment on the British Government's decision to expel a large number of Soviet diplomats for spying and espionage activities have not mentioned the 25 September remarks made by Secretary Rogers to newsmen at the United Nations to the effect that Soviet espionage activities will be a "factor" in NATO's decision on whether to agree to a European security conference. Several East European sources immediately picked up the remarks made by the Secretary to suggest that the United States was involved in a well-coordinated plan with the British Government to impose another "obstacle" in the way of convening a European security conference now that the NATO "condition" of a satisfactory settlement on Berlin has been reached.

Soviet media have charged, without referring to Rogers' remarks, that London is seeking with its "malicious anti-Soviet provocation" to increase tension in Europe and thus hamper the convening of a European conference. This is an apparent response to the UK charge in its aide-memoire of the 24th that there is a contradiction between the level of Soviet operations against UK security and the Soviet call for a conference on European security.

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