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Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040053-3

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**Confidential**

# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

29 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 52)

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040053-3

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 DECEMBER 1971

Moscow (2800 items)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| China | (5%) | 5%* |
| Indochina | (7%) | 9% |
| [Solidarity Week, NFLSV Anniversary | (5%) | 7%] |
| Cuban President Dorticos in USSR | (--) | 5% |
| India-Pakistan Conflict | (15%) | 5%* |
| Mars 2 & 3 Probes | (11%) | 3% |
| European Security | (3%) | 3% |
| Kosygin Congratulations to UN Secretary General Waldheim | (--) | 3% |

Peking (1286 items)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Domestic Issues | (22%) | 36% |
| India-Pakistan Conflict | (37%) | 21% |
| Indochina | (12%) | 21% |
| [NFLSV Anniversary | (2%) | 11%] |
| [U.S. Air Strikes | (--) | 3%] |
| [VPA Anniversary | (0.2%) | 3%] |
| PRC Delegation Return from UN | (--) | 3% |
| Sudanese Government Delegation in PRC | (3%) | 3% |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are counted in the figure on India-Pakistan and amount to roughly one-fourth of the total on the conflict last week and one-half this week.



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# INDOCHINA

The sustained, heavy U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam which began on 26 December brought a prompt DRV Foreign Ministry statement that day which echoed the 18 December foreign ministry statement in calling the strikes by "many" aircraft "extremely serious acts of war." The statement thus obscured the different nature of the current action from that on the 18th--concentrated bombing of DRV territory instead of alleged intrusions into DRV air space by U.S. planes engaged in action in Laos. Subsequent lower-level protests by the foreign ministry spokesman on the 27th and 28th also obscured the intensity of the continuing strikes. But acknowledgment of the more serious nature of U.S. action came on the 29th in another statement issued at the level of the DRV Foreign Ministry. It differed markedly in tone from the foreign ministry statement on the 26th and contained elements present in earlier protests of U.S. escalated actions. Moreover, also on the 29th, Hanoi publicized a VPA High Command order on vigilance, the first such order since one issued last December in the wake of the massive U.S. air strikes and the abortive prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay near Hanoi.

Peking officially condemned the air strikes against the DRV with a PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 29th which is similar to one protesting the heavy strikes last September. While calling the renewed bombing hypocritical, it is devoid of personal attack on the President. Moscow has reacted to the bombings with only routine-level comment and statements by solidarity and friendship organizations.

The current spate of DRV statements fails to repeat the warning in past protests that air provocations against the North threaten the work of the Paris talks--perhaps because of their current suspension. Vietnamese communist media on the 23d had publicized statements that their delegates would be present at the session on the 30th following the suspension of the previous two sessions at U.S. request. But a Hanoi domestic broadcast on the 28th reported that the DRV had proposed that the 30 December session be postponed until 6 January in view of U.S. "serious war acts" against the DRV on the 26th and 27th. Hanoi ignored the fact that a joint U.S.-GVN statement on the 28th announced their decision not to meet on the 30th.

## SUSTAINED AIR STRIKES PROMPT DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENTS

Following the pattern of the 18 December DRV Foreign Ministry protest, the foreign ministry statement on the 26th was broadcast



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some two hours after a Hanoi radio item had charged that the United States that day had "recklessly sent many waves of aircraft to strike many populated areas of Quang Binh and Thanh Hoa provinces and to encroach on the airspace of Nghe An Province." The foreign ministry statement echoed this initial announcement in charging that the targets were populated areas and included a hospital on the outskirts of the provincial capital of Thanh Hoa, and in claiming that five planes were downed and a "number" of pilots captured--the statement said "killed or captured."

Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking at a banquet on the evening of the 26th for the visiting Bulgarian party-government delegation, made a passing reference to the strikes. As broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 27th, Dong expressed appreciation for socialist aid and said that in the spirit of maintaining and consolidating Vietnam as the "inviolable outpost of the socialist camp in Southeast Asia," the DRV armed forces "strongly resisted many waves of attacks by the U.S. air force from Quang Binh to Thanh Hoa, downing five aircraft and capturing pilots."

Despite the dissimilarity of the actions, the statement on the 26th echoed the protest on the 18th in calling the strikes "extremely serious acts of war," but it did add the additional negative assessment that the U.S. "imperialists" are encroaching on the DRV's sovereignty "in an extremely gross manner." The statement also echoed that on the 18th--and earlier foreign ministry statements on air strikes against the DRV--in saying that U.S. actions violate the U.S. pledge to cease bombing of the North. And this standard charge is repeated in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 29th as well as in the statement by the foreign ministry spokesman on the 27th--protesting strikes that day "in many waves at populated areas, a school and the outskirts of Dong Hoi," capital of Quang Binh Province, and the foreign ministry spokesman's statement on the 28th, which protested repeated bombings that day against populated areas in Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces.

Although the protest on the 28th was issued at the spokesman's level, it escalated the description of the strikes when it called them "extremely serious and criminal acts of war." (This accords with the language used in the 22 September 1971 DRV Foreign Ministry statement, the protest over the last previous massive air attacks.) The statement on the 28th was longer and more detailed than those usually issued at the



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spokesman's level, and it seemed concerned to stress the civilian nature of the targets. Recalling the bombings of 18, 26 and 27 December, it says that on the 28th a "large number" of U.S. planes "repeatedly bombed and strafed populated areas" of Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces, "including the Dong Hoi hospital and the Le Minh agricultural farm" in Le Thuy district, Quang Binh Province. The protest adds that in the past few days, the United States has "mobilized a large force of the U.S. air force to launch repeated attacks against many populated areas including hospitals, schools, agricultural farms, . . . which are situated deep inside" DRV territory. It charges that a large number of civilians including women, children and hospital patients have been killed or wounded.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTEST OF 29 DECEMBER

The foreign ministry statement issued on the 29th differed markedly in tone and content from that of the 26th. It refers to action on 17, 18, 26, 27, 28 and 29 December--thus again implying a similarity in the action last weekend--but it differs from the protests of the past three days in not citing any specific new action. Shortly before the statement on the 29th was broadcast, Hanoi radio claimed that on the 29th four more planes were downed over Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces, bringing the total since the 26th to 11 and bringing Hanoi's grand total to 3,419. But the statement refers only to "many" downed planes and a "number" of captured pilots. As had the earlier protests this week and supporting propaganda, the statement stresses that populated areas, including a hospital and school, have been hit with resultant civilian casualties.

In sharpened language, the statement calls U.S. actions "an extremely serious escalation of the war" and "an extremely savage crime of the U.S. aggressors." And it adds that along with the "expanding of aggression" in Laos,

> this frantic and criminal escalation of the war by the United States against the DRV exposes all the more clearly the aggressive, extremely stubborn, and warlike nature of the Nixon Administration. It also lays bare the deceitful allegations of President Nixon that the United States has ended its combat role in Vietnam and that it is ending the war in Indochina.

In addition to the standard assertion that the U.S. action is a "challenge" to American and world public opinion, the statement interjects an assertion similar to a passage in the 21 September 1971 foreign ministry statement when it appeals to the

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governments and peoples of "fraternal nations and various peace- and justice-loving nations" to struggle to stay the hands of the U.S. "aggressors."* It also interjects an unusual element when it pointedly notes that the DRV "is a socialist country" and a sovereign and independent nation. This brings to mind--even though it stops short of--a passage in a 3 March 1971 foreign ministry statement at the time of the Laos incursion and when Hanoi seemed to be displaying particular concern. That statement said that U.S. acts against the DRV constituted "an impudent challenge to the socialist countries" and others.

VPA ORDER, COMMENT ON VIGILANCE

Calls for increased vigilance and combat readiness in propaganda on the air strikes culminate in a 28 December VPA High Command order to military and security forces which is publicized on the 29th. The last such order publicized by Hanoi was that of 10 December last year which urged implementation of the unprecedented joint VWP-Government appeal for vigilance issued after the massive November 1971 U.S. air strikes and abortive prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay. The current order is similar to the one last year in many of its basic appeals. Thus, it calls for the defense of property and lives, insurance of security and order, and maintenance of unity and coordination, as well as for the downing of "many enemy aircraft on the spot and the capture of many" pilots.**

The 29 December Hanoi radio report of the downing of four more U.S. planes that day, after praising the downings as evidence of high combat readiness, urges the armed forces to "further heighten vigilance and combat readiness, fight better, and strictly implement the VPA High Command's order."

In calling for the downing of aircraft and the capture of pilots, the 29 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial is unique in adding that "enemy tricks aimed at rescuing the downed pilots" must be frustrated. There has been no other known mention of U.S. attempts to rescue downed pilots. The editorial also points to the need for "devoting time and manpower to

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* The September statement, as well as statements in February 1971 during the Laos incursion, appealed to "socialist" countries.

** The order last December had additionally called on the military to "wipe out commandos and infantry" and keep communications and transport open "in all circumstances." See the TRENDS of 16 December 1970, pages 1-4.

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repairing or building trenches and shelters." Exhortations to repair or build shelters appeared sporadically following the joint party-government appeal and VPA High Command order last December. But since then such appeals have appeared only infrequently.

While the propaganda refers generally to the "armed forces and people," the VPA High Command order, of course, specifies particular services and there are other occasional references to the air force. Thus, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 27th singles out the air force, just as an earlier article in the army paper had done on the 19th. Hanoi radio broadcasts and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 29th also do so, with the radio saying that air defense and air force units "are intensively training and are taking many positive steps to satisfactorily implement the slogan 'detect the enemy as soon as he appears and annihilate him as soon as he comes.'" It describes one group as "conducting many coordinated training flights at night over all terrain conditions and under all weather conditions in order to create conditions for the pilots to train themselves in coping with all eventualities." It later adds that the infantry, people's armed security and self-defense militia units "have complemented their plans to counter the enemy's surprise raids and commando and reconnaissance activities." A Hanoi radio commentary on the 26th in listing tasks includes the wiping out or capturing of "all enemy commando groups," just as a radio commentary had done on the 18th.

PLANE DOWNINGS, CASUALTIES

Of the initial five downings claimed on 26 December, Hanoi media have basically exploited only one of the downings in Thanh Hoa Province--said to be the 100th by the armed forces and people of Ham Rong. That incident prompted a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 27th describing the details of the raid and the downing. It also prompted a letter of congratulations--dated 28 December and publicized on the 29th--to the people and armed forces in the Ham Rong bridge area from President Ton Duc Thang. Congratulating the armed forces of the area, Thang scored the United States for remaining "stubborn," predicted it would "embark on new adventures" and urged that everyone "promote unity, heighten vigilance and stand ready to fight . . . ."

Hanoi on the 28th briefly reported that a plane had been downed in action on the 27th over Quang Binh and on the 29th



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that another plane had been downed over Quang Binh on the 28th. Later on the 29th, Hanoi radio reported that four more U.S. planes were downed over Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces, two in each province.

Hanoi radio on the 29th broadcast a report of a press conference held in Thanh Hoa on the 27th by the Thanh Hoa provincial military command and the provincial committee for investigating U.S. "war crimes" to denounce crimes committed when U.S. planes struck a number of populated areas in the province and hail the downing of two planes on the 26th. The report says that both Vietnamese and foreign newsmen attended. According to the deputy head of the provincial war crimes committee, Pham Van Tuong, U.S. planes on the 26th attacked four different areas in Thanh Hoa, including a village and Thanh Hoa provincial hospital. He charged that the planes "dropped 24 250-pound steel-pellet bombs" killing 24 people--"mostly women and children"--and injuring 47 others--including the elderly--in addition to "inflicting many losses on the people's property." (VNA on the 27th, in reporting the bombing of Thanh Hoa hospital, claimed that four patients were killed and several others wounded. It also said that several members of the medical staff and their families were killed.)

The radio report on the press conference also notes that newsmen had the opportunity to inspect and photograph equipment taken from the plane reported downed in Ham Rong area, as well as the identification cards of the two dead airmen. (Hanoi radio on the 27th had reported the death of the two men in that crash. Hanoi media have remained vague on other deaths or captures of U.S. airmen.)

ATTACKS ON LAIRD In addition to the general attacks on the Nixon Administration's "aggressive" policy, Hanoi levels particular criticism at Secretary Laird. Both the foreign ministry spokesman on the 28th and the foreign ministry statement on the 29th complain without elaboration that he charged that North Vietnam "has violated understandings." Neither statement takes direct note of his detailed explanation, at his press conference on the 27th, of the grounds for the U.S. air strikes.

Laird's press conference statement had been noted promptly in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 28th. It did not, of course, acknowledge that he specified shelling of cities in South Vietnam,


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violations of the demilitarized zone, including the building of a road through it, failure to engage in substantial negotiations at Paris, and firing on unarmed U.S. reconnaissance planes over North Vietnam. The commentary similarly ignored Laird's implication that the strikes were in part retaliation for Hanoi's downing of U.S. planes on 17-18 December. Hanoi said that the Secretary's "allegations" about an understanding and carrying out strikes to protect troops in the South have long been rejected by public opinion and that in fact U.S. actions "brazenly violate" the U.S. commitment concerning a total bombing halt. However, it did not--as Hanoi has done in the past--directly argue that the DRV was not a party to any "understanding" in connection with the bombing halt.


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## PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ASSAILS U.S. ATTACKS

Peking condemned the U.S. air strikes against the DRV with a 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement citing the DRV Foreign Ministry statements of 18 and 26 December. Earlier, Peking had supported the 18 December DRV statement on air intrusions that day with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 24th. On the occasion of the last previous heavy U.S. air raids on North Vietnam, on 21 September, Peking had issued a foreign ministry statement and a Commentator article three days after the bombing and two days after a DRV Foreign Ministry statement.

Much like the Chinese statement in September, the current one takes the United States to task for failing to respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal, adding the complaint that the United States has also "irrationally obstructed" the Paris talks. The statement charges that the United States, while talking about ending the war, has stubbornly pursued its plans of "Vietnamization," "Laotianization," and "Khmerization," supporting puppet regimes, and prolonging the war.

Making a point contained in the 24 November 1970 PRC statement on U.S. air strikes that month but not mentioned in last September's statement, the current statement claims that the renewed bombing exposes Washington's hypocrisy in the light of the 1968 decision to end the bombing of the North. But while charging that Washington has not kept its promise, the current statement does not draw the conclusion made in the November 1970 statement that the words "particularly" of the Nixon Administration "have never counted."*

The statement interprets the renewal of the U.S. air strikes as demonstrating that the United States is "desperately struggling after suffering disastrous defeat" on the Indochina battlefield. After referring to "exciting victories" in South Vietnam, along Cambodian Route 6, and on the Plain of Jars in Laos, the statement offers the assurance that in raiding North Vietnam the United States appears ferocious but in fact is "extremely feeble."

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* The November 1970 statement had mocked the President's call for an era of negotiation to replace an era of confrontation as an attempt to "cover up aggression under the camouflage of negotiation."



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Like the statement in September, the current one warns that the Chinese Government and people are "closely watching the aggressive moves of U.S. imperialism in Indochina" and will support the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in their war until complete victory. Unlike in September, however, the current statement does not preface this pledge with the observation that Vietnam is China's close neighbor.

Like the September statement and in contrast to the November 1970 statement's repeated attacks on the President, the current statement mentions the Nixon Administration by name only once, citing recent unspecified declarations that the United States was prepared to intensify its bombing actions and to take other action to cope with the military situation. Similarly, the 24 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article avoided the personal attacks on the President characteristic of Hanoi's statements. Commentator did not mention the President by name in charging that with the air incursions "U.S. imperialism" had "once again torn away its masks of so-called 'peace,' 'negotiations,' 'cease-fire,' and 'troop withdrawal.'" While expressing "intense indignation" over the U.S. incursions into DRV airspace, Commentator professed marked optimism about the situation in Indochina, exulting that "the entire Indochina battlefield rings with the song of victory and the situation is excellent." Commentator forecast "new and greater victories in battles in this dry season." There was no mention of Chinese support or assistance.

Peking's circumspect treatment of the President was also apparent in other recent propaganda. Thus, while a DRV military attache, speaking at a celebration of the VPA's anniversary sponsored by the PRC Defense Ministry on the 21st, called the President "obdurate, cunning, and bellicose," the Chinese speaker did not mention the President.

Divergences between Peking and Hanoi caused by the former's invitation to President Nixon were reflected in NCNA's account of DRV Defense Minister Giap's speech at the 18 December Hanoi meeting marking the anniversaries of Resistance Day and of the VPA. NCNA omitted a remark by Giap which could be read as an allusion to the President's summitry plans. Pointing out that the United States is "running here and there in an attempt to seek a way out of its fix, to seek a so-called position of strength," Giap declared that such "perfidious maneuvers are mad illusions."



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ROUTINE MOSCOW COMMENT SCORES BOMBINGS, ATTACKS PEKING

Moscow thus far has reacted to the series of bombings of the DRV beginning on the 26th with only routine level press and radio comment and statements by solidarity organizations. The most authoritative commentary was a PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy which, as briefly summarized by TASS on the 28th, said that the raids show the falseness of Washington's assertions concerning a "curtailment" of American air operations in Indochina and are violations of the U.S. "commitment" to completely end the bombing of the DRV. The 18 December intrusions similarly had prompted only routine comment although Kosygin, at a 22 December banquet for visiting Cuban President Dorticos, did condemn in passing the recent "savage bombing" of the DRV and reiterate that an expansion of aggression can only meet with "an intensified rebuff and growing support to the Vietnamese people from its friends."

Moscow has not customarily supported DRV Foreign Ministry statements on heavy or sustained air strikes with statements of its own at that level. The raids of September and March 1971 received only routine comment or, at most, statements by Soviet public organizations. A TASS statement was issued on the raids of November 1970. A May 1970 government statement, read by Kosygin at a press conference, condemned both the air raids and the incursion into Cambodia.

Propaganda on the current raids cited foreign press reports that they are the heaviest since President Johnson's announcement of the bombing halt in November 1968, and cited reports from Saigon that some 350 planes daily were involved. A commentary by Kozyakov, broadcast in English to North America on the 27th, echoed Hanoi's claim that "population centers and hospitals" were hit on the 26th. TASS on the 27th cited the New York TIMES as quoting a "high-placed representative in Washington" as saying that the raids are only a "prelude" to new escalation of the air war in Indochina. On the same day another TASS report very briefly acknowledged Secretary Laird's press conference that day, noting that he "made threats" about intensifying the air war, saying that the United States will bomb the DRV when "necessary."

The most substantial comment thus far is a 27 December Kharkov commentary carried by TASS which said that the raids were "sanctioned by President Nixon himself" and are "provocative



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and adventuristic" actions. Vaguely acknowledging U.S. motivation for the bombings, it said that the U.S. military command is trying to present the "piracy" as a "defensive measure" to "prevent enemy activity" which "jeopardizes the reduction of American troops in South Vietnam." Another Kharkov commentary carried by TASS on the 28th dismissed as "untenable" the U.S. argument that the current raids are not a "resumption" of bombings but "only some protective reaction."

On the 27th Kharkov said that the present aggression--including the raids on the DRV, military actions elsewhere in Indochina, and "sabotage" of the Paris talks--shows that Washington has not given up its attempts to solve the Indochina problem by armed force and shows the "hypocrisy" of U.S. leaders' statements that they are "curtailing" the war. Other comment charged that the United States is "sabotaging" a discussion of the PRG proposals at the Paris talks. In his commentary on the 28th Kharkov blamed the Americans for the three-week hiatus in the meetings at Paris and said that the "piratical actions" of the United States air force against the DRV no doubt "are striking a telling blow at the Paris talks too."

The only reference to the issue of U.S. POWs in available Moscow comment came in the 27 December Kozyakov commentary which, in saying that there is "but one solution" to the Vietnam problem, pointed out that the PRG and the DRV have proposed that a deadline be fixed for two "simultaneous" actions: the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, and the "release of all U.S. airmen taken prisoner in the course of the war."

ATTACKS ON PEKING

Some comment on the bombings, reiterating charges that Peking's policies have encouraged the United States to escalate the war, pointedly noted that the current air raids have come at a time when Sino-U.S. relations have warmed. The Kharkov TASS commentary on the 28th asserted that Peking has maintained silence on the latest raids because it does not wish to disturb the atmosphere for President Nixon's forthcoming visit. A foreign-language commentary on the 29th also complained that Peking is a "silent spectator" to U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia, launching propaganda attacks against the USSR and other socialist countries which aid the DRV, rather than against U.S. imperialism. A Mandarin-language commentary on the 28th, condemning Peking's "compromising policy," recalled Peking's alleged assurances in 1964 that it would not interfere if the United States bombed the DRV, and reiterated that Peking's invitation to President Nixon permitted him to avoid answering the PRG's seven points.



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The commentaries on the bombings echoed the line put forward authoritatively in a 22 December Mayevskiy article in PRAVDA broadly attacking Peking's "betrayal" of the national liberation movement throughout the world. Mayevskiy had included the assertion that Peking's alinement of its policies elsewhere with those of the United States gave Washington a "green light" for unleashing aggression in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. He added that the Western press sometimes speculates on the possibility of an "exchange" of Taiwan for Indochina--that is, the United States would somehow recognize the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and Peking would, in turn, help "pacify" Vietnam.


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## NORTH VIETNAM ARMY ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY PEKING, MOSCOW

PEKING Peking's observance of the 22 December VPA anniversary this year reflected the recent leadership purge which resulted in the fall of Defense Minister Lin Piao and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng. The usual greetings message--in previous years from Lin Piao to DRV Defense Minister Giap--was not reported this year, and the DRV military attache's reception, attended by Huang Yung-sheng last year, had as its ranking guest Li Te-sheng, the director of the PLA's General Political Department. The customary PRC Defense Ministry meeting was attended, like last year, by Li Te-sheng and addressed by a deputy chief of staff.

MOSCOW Moscow observed the VPA anniversary in the customary manner with a greetings message from Soviet Defense Minister Grechko to Giap, routine comment, and reports of the Hanoi meeting. Some radio comment called attention to Soviet military aid but Grechko's message, unlike last year's did not point to Soviet measures to render "comprehensive aid."

## HANOI AND PATHET LAO ACCLAIM FOUR-DAY OFFENSIVE IN LAOS

Alleged achievements in the communists' four-day offensive in northern Laos were tabulated in a 25 December communique from the "command of the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA) in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khoang military sector." The communique, publicized on the 27th by Pathet Lao and Hanoi media, claims that, in the fighting from 18 through 21 December, the army and people in the sector killed or wounded 3,100 troops, captured over 200 Lao and Thai troops, put out of action 11 battalions, inflicted heavy casualties on nine other battalions, captured or destroyed 34 artillery pieces and 20 armored cars and trucks, shot down 17 aircraft, and "made a big haul of weapons of various kinds and military equipment." Applauding the LPLA's success in "recovering the whole of the liberated area in the Plain of Jars and Muong Soui," the communique maintains that this is a "victory of great strategic importance, especially on the political and military plane." Although initial propaganda on the offensive did not acknowledge the communists' use of tanks, the communique does note that armored units took part in the coordinated attack.



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The communique concludes with a call for the army and people to press their attacks "continually," deal "powerful and accurate blows," and "win many and yet bigger victories." A "combat order" from the LPLA command, also released on the 27th, similarly urges persistent attacks. It stresses the "important significance and heavy task of this dry-season action" and calls on the armed forces to "make deep thrusts to divide the enemy forces, encircle them, and completely wipe them out."

Hanoi commented on the Laos fighting in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on 28 December which held that the LPLA's "victory" has further undermined the United States' "new formula" of using Thai and Vang Pao troops supported by U.S. planes and that it has exposed the "impotence" of the U.S. air force. The army paper claimed that "the Americans and their lackeys" are now in a critical situation, with their defense network extensively breached revealing many vulnerable points, and with many of their important bases being threatened. NHAN DAN maintained that the recent achievements in Laos constituted "a great success of strategic significance that has changed the balance of forces in Laos in favor of the Lao revolution."

Like the LPLA communique, NHAN DAN charged that encroachments by the "lackey" forces into the Plain of Jars during the past rainy season were not only aimed at bolstering the position of the Vang Pao forces but also at "threatening" the DRV. A similar charge was made by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in his 18 December speech marking the anniversaries of Army Day and Resistance Day.*

## DRV REPORTS FATHERLAND FRONT CONGRESS, TRUONG CHINH SPEECH

Hanoi radio's account of the closing session of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) Third Congress, on 17 December, reported that the congress elected a new VFF Central Committee, with 134 members, which in turn appointed a 34-man Presidium, again headed by DRV President Ton Duc Thang.** A nine-member

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* For a discussion of Giap's remark and initial propaganda on the communist offensive in Laos, see the 22 December TRENDS, page five.

** For a discussion of the opening of the congress on 14 December, see the 15 December TRENDS, pages 13-15.


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Secretariat was also named. The broadcast on the 18th also said that the congress adopted a resolution on future tasks and issued an appeal calling for strengthened solidarity and efforts to score new achievements in the war and building socialism. The congress drafted a letter addressed to South Vietnam promising that the North would "fear no sacrifices and hardships" in fighting the United States. Truong Chinh addressed the concluding session of the congress, but Hanoi did not report any of the substance of his remarks until the 21st.

The congress also heard reports by Vice Premier Nguyen Con on socialist construction in the North and by Le Quang Dao, deputy head of the army's General Political Department, on the war. Brief accounts of these speeches were released, with Hanoi radio on the 16th, for example, noting that Dao reported on the "good prospect" of the war and proposed that the congress "strongly urge the armed forces and people . . . to heighten their fighting will, exert greater efforts, and heighten determination." Speeches were also made by representatives of various branches of the Front; excerpts from the statement of the army delegate, Chu Van Tan, were broadcast on the 17th.

The "success" of the congress was immediately hailed at a large meeting held by Hanoi citizens on the evening of the 17th and in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 18th and an LPA editorial on the 21st. Comment uniformly noted that the congress demonstrated the "unity" of the Vietnamese people.

TRUONG CHINH SPEECH The Truong Chinh speech, delivered at the closing session of the VFF congress on the 17th, was not publicized until 21 December when excerpts of his "important talk" were carried by the Hanoi press and radio. According to the radio report, Truong Chinh analyzed the United States' global strategy and scored the Nixon Doctrine as an "extremely cruel, perfidious scheme." Perhaps reflecting Hanoi's apprehension about the possible repercussions of the Nixon Administration's moves to better relations with Peking, Truong Chinh urged that in the face of "such a cruel, dangerous enemy" as the United States, it is "necessary to promote unity and to motivate all forces in the struggle in the military, political, and diplomatic fields." He went on to call for the establishment of a three-fold "anti-U.S. imperialist united front"--the national united



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front, the Indochinese people's united front, and the world people's front--"to unify action in the struggle against the U.S. imperialists." He added that "if we succeed in forming this three-fold front, we will certainly isolate the U.S. aggressors more seriously, will catch them in the people's steel net, and will surely lead them to complete defeat."

While underscoring the need for solidarity domestically, Truong Chinh acknowledged that there were contradictions within the Fatherland Front and differences of views that had to be worked out. He offered some criticism, among other things condemning the "erroneous idea" held in some quarters that the role of the VFF had been lessened. He noted that the war is the "prime duty" at present and called on the VFF to help heighten vigilance, organize an all-people's defense, achieve combat readiness, fulfill the troop-recruiting task, and "strictly implement the laws, regulations, and policies on military service." Truong Chinh urged the mobilization of manpower and material resources "in order to send aid to the frontline," and also called for the consolidation of the North so that the rear would be in a position to supply this aid.

On the Front's role in socialist reform and construction in the North, Chinh reportedly urged concentration on the civilian proselyting task. He asked the localities "to overcome all erroneous thought regarding the Front task," stating that on the one hand "the party echelons and administrative levels have disregarded the civilian proselyting and Front tasks and, on the other hand, the civilian proselyting and Front organs have nurtured an inferiority complex, failed to realize their responsibilities and adopted a passive, negative attitude."


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## CAMBODIAN VISIT TO DPRK PROMOTES ASIAN "REVOLUTIONARY" UNITY

Ieng Sary, "special envoy of the interior part" of the pro-Sihanouk Cambodian movement, led a delegation of Sihanouk's front and government on a "goodwill visit" to the DPRK from 10 to 19 December.* He thus continued to play a prominent coordinating role for the Sihanouk forces, having arrived in Peking in August "directly from the front lines" in Cambodia and having led a delegation to Hanoi in mid-November. He was accorded high-level treatment in Pyongyang, being received by Kim Il-song for a "friendly and cordial" talks and hosted by President Choe Yong-kon, First Vice Premier Kim Il, and Second Vice Premier Pak Song-chol.

According to the joint communique on the DPRK visit, the two sides held talks on "the new situation created in the international arena at present and the struggle of the people of the two countries proceeding from this, on strengthening and developing the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Korean and Cambodian peoples and other questions of common concern." The communique registers "complete unanimity of views" on "all" questions discussed.

Unanimity had similarly been claimed in the 11 August communique on Sihanouk's most recent visit to the DPRK, as well as in the 20 October and 16 November communique on Pak Song-chol's and Ieng Sary's visits to the DRV. In the latter two cases, however, the characterization seemed to have been included at the visitors' behest, having been avoided by DRV speakers during the visits even while the guests so characterized the talks. There was no such reluctance shown by the North Koreans during Ieng Sary's visit.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO PRC

There was no direct reference to President Nixon's planned trip to the PRC in propaganda on the visit, but the communique's assertion that the sides discussed "the new situation created in the international arena at present" indicates that Sino-U.S. developments were among the subjects. The hardline positions of the Koreans and Cambodians, with overtones of disquiet over the changed situation in Asia, were reflected in concern expressed in the communique over Washington's current policies. Both sides,

* The delegation's arrival and initial activities are discussed in the TRENDS of 15 December, pages 16-17.



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according to the communique, stressed that it is necessary to "further strengthen mutual support and solidarity" among anti-imperialist forces at a time when the United States is attempting to "disorganize" these forces. Saying all events in the international arena today show that "U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious and shameless aggressor," the communique warns that Washington is clinging to "the double-dealing tactics of open 'policy of strength' and 'peace strategy.'" The communique also contains a reference to "the notorious 'new Asia policy' of U.S. imperialism" in the course of an attack on Japanese militarism.

The Koreans offered support to the Cambodians on a point of special concern--the possibility of a compromise settlement on Indochina falling short of Sihanouk's goals. The communique cites support for the Cambodian struggle waged "without compromise or retreat" and denounces all attempts to impose a policy of compromise or "a splitting policy" on Cambodia by means of an international conference or otherwise.

During Sihanouk's visit to the DPRK last summer, presumably a mission to convey Peking's assurances that the invitation to President Nixon would not affect its support for its allies, both Sihanouk and Kim Il-song endorsed the invitation as a victory for the PRC and the world revolutionary forces. However, the Cambodians subsequently expressed concern over the implications of the visit. Speaking at a 9 November Peking meeting marking Cambodian National Day--on the eve of his departure for the DRV--Ieng Sary warned that "though U.S. imperialism is compelled to come to China with a white flag" (an image first used by Kim Il-song on 6 August), it continues its "vicious intrigues" of denying the rights of weak and small countries and is resorting to "new trickery" to deceive public opinion. A 10 November AKI commentary timed for Ieng Sary's trip to the DRV made similar remarks.

ASIAN UNITY The theme of Asian unity recurred in propaganda throughout the visit. A 10 December NODONG SINMUN editorial greeting the arrival of the delegation cited Kim Il-song's statement that "the people of Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia" and "all other revolutionary countries in Asia" should consolidate their "anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. united front" and deal a "collective counterblow" to U.S. aggression in Asia. The Korean speaker at a Pyongyang



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rally similarly quoted Kim Il-song. For his part, Ieng Sary asserted at the rally that the Cambodian people are joining in "concerted efforts" for the strengthening of "militant solidarity" along with the peoples of Korea, China, Vietnam, and Laos and "other revolutionary peoples of Asia and the world people."

While avoiding the more forceful formulations on Asian unity, the joint communique registers the two sides' determination to "wage a joint struggle to check and frustrate the aggressive schemes against Korea, China, and the three Indochinese countries" pursued by Japan, and it says that "when the peoples of Asian countries making revolution and all other revolutionary peoples of the world join efforts" U.S. imperialism will be finally defeated.

The 11 August communique on Sihanouk's visit to the DPRK had emphatically praised the "anti-U.S. common front of the people of Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and other Asian revolutionary countries." However, in accordance with Hanoi's evident reluctance to associate itself with such formulations--which might be read as having anti-Soviet implications--the 16 November communique on Ieng Sary's visit to the DRV had omitted any reference to Asian unity, as had the 29 October communique on Pak Song-chol's visit to the DRV.



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# INDIA-PAKISTAN

While Peking and Moscow continue to maneuver for support within the third world, the Chinese have sustained their pressure on India by issuing a second protest against alleged incursions across the Tibetan border and charging that the Indians are seeking to remain in East Pakistan indefinitely in violation of UN resolutions. The Chinese have also sought to maintain their position in Pakistan with pledges of continuing support. A message from Chou En-lai to new President Bhutto on the 22d combined such a pledge with an expression of confidence that the people of Pakistan will "certainly be able to overcome temporary difficulties" if they "uphold unity and persist in struggle." The Chinese have not suggested, however, that this struggle should take the form of renewed hostilities or that its object be the recovery of East Bengal.

In addition to its persisting polemical campaign against the Chinese as traitors to the national liberation movement, Moscow has proceeded with laying the propaganda groundwork for eventual recognition of Bangla Desh. TASS dispatches from Dacca have been reporting the activities of Bangla Desh authorities, including statements by the new regime's leaders thanking the Soviet Union for its support. One dispatch quoted someone identified as the general secretary of the Communist Party of Bangla Desh, who called for unity of "democratic and patriotic forces" and condemned the stands taken by the United States and Peking.

## PEKING ISSUES SECOND PROTEST AGAINST INDIAN BORDER INTRUSION

A PRC Foreign Ministry note on 27 December registered a second "strong protest" with India over a "grave encroachment" of Chinese territory. The alleged intrusions, by eight armed Indian personnel across a pass along the Sikkim-Tibet border and an aircraft across the Indo-Tibetan border, took place on 15 December. On the 16th a previous protest note had charged that Indian personnel crossed the Sikkim-Tibet border six days earlier. Where the earlier note demanded that India "immediately stop its activities of intrusion," the 27 December note "demands that the Indian Government immediately take effective measures against the recurrence of similar incidents in the future."



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Along with the new protest note, with its implicit warning of Chinese pressure on the border, Peking has also sought to mobilize pressure within the international community against the Indian presence in East Pakistan. Speaking at a banquet in honor of an Iraqi delegation on 26 December, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien charged that "the Indian aggressor forces and the East Pakistan rebels under their command" are "barbarously massacring and cruelly persecuting innocent Pakistan people" in East Pakistan. Li demanded that India "immediately and unconditionally withdraw its aggressor forces from East Pakistan and all the other places it has occupied"--a demand for troop withdrawals that would not be contingent on a political settlement or a redemarcation of the Kashmir cease-fire line. As in earlier reports of Chinese leaders' statements on such occasions, NCNA disseminated Li's remarks on the Indian-Pakistani conflict ahead of its account of the banquet and Li's speech as a whole.

On the 27th Peking followed up Li's denunciation of atrocities in East Pakistan by releasing a message from the Red Cross Society of China to the International Committee of the Red Cross describing East Pakistan as being in "the grip of terror of carnage." The message appealed to the international committee and humanitarian organizations "of various countries" to condemn "the Indian forces for their sanguinary atrocities."

SOVIET ROLE In its current comment Peking is not portraying Moscow's geopolitical interests in South Asia in terms of the Sino-Soviet confrontation as such. The emphasis is on Moscow's "social imperialist" moves in the Indian Ocean and other regions as part of its "contention with U.S. imperialism for hegemony." Reflecting sensitivity to Moscow's charges of Sino-U.S. collusion, Peking on the 29th ended its silence regarding the U.S. naval task force sent to the Bay of Bengal. An NCNA account of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean said that the United States made a show of force to the Soviet Union and India by dispatching the task force and that the Soviets countered by deploying warships of their Pacific Fleet to the Bay of Bengal.

Making a pitch for support from third world countries bordering the Indian Ocean, the NCNA account claimed that the naval activity of the two superpowers in that region has aroused strong opposition from "the medium and small countries of Asia and Africa." NCNA approvingly cited the Ceylon prime minister's proposal for a peace zone in the Indian Ocean.



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## MOSCOW PORTRAYS CHINESE PERFIDY IN SOUTH ASIA

Seeking to justify its role in the dismemberment of a country, Moscow has insistently recapitulated its explanation for the outbreak of the Indian-Pakistani conflict and pressed its polemics against Peking as a traitor to the national liberation movement. V. Mayevskiy's 22 December PRAVDA article, entitled "The Peking Leaders--Betrayers of the National Liberation Movement," was given worldwide dissemination by Radio Moscow. The article was particularly notable for its rebuke to Chou En-lai personally for his recent blistering attack on the Soviet role in the South Asian conflict. Chou's speech and Mayevskiy's rebuke underscore the intense animosity now complicating Sino-Soviet relations as a result of that conflict.

The theme of Chinese perfidy dominates G. Yakubov's account in PRAVDA on 28 December of how the Indian-Pakistani war came about. While blaming the United States for "conniving" with the policy of repression in East Pakistan and failing to use its influence in behalf of a political settlement, the article concentrates its attack on the Chinese for having long pursued a policy of hostility toward India. In this connection the article pointed out that Peking has raised the border question with India on several occasions, including recently, and has interfered in Indian internal affairs by supporting extremist elements. After recounting Peking's role in the development of the Indian-Pakistani conflict this year, the article concluded that "the Maoists" have once again shown that they will betray the national liberation movement "if they find that their selfish nationalistic interests dictate a deal with reaction." Further, the conflict "has demonstrated that the Peking leaders are pursuing a great-power social chauvinist course which often unites them with American imperialism."

BANGLA DESH Reports in Soviet media of the activities of Bangla Desh authorities have been laying the groundwork for an eventual recognition of the new regime. On 23 December the Soviet consul in Dacca visited the Awami League headquarters to convey congratulations on the liberation of Bangla Desh, as reported by Delhi and--with outrage--by NCNA but not by Moscow. Various Soviet reports have told of statements and decisions by Bangla Desh officials, including expressions of gratitude for Soviet support. Moscow has also publicized appeals in West Pakistan for President Bhutto to undertake negotiations with Mujibur Rahman on a political settlement.



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Reportage in IZVESTIYA on 27 December depicted a growing normalization of life in "the Bangla Desh capital" of Dacca. According to the paper's account, the recent arrival of "members of the Bangla Desh Government" is regarded as "proof of the beginning of improvement of the situation" after a period of terror.

Apart from the question of formal recognition, Soviet interest in the political composition and stability of the Bangla Desh regime was reflected in a TASS dispatch on the 25th citing an article by the general secretary of the Communist Party of Bangla Desh which appeared in the pro-Soviet Indian communist journal NEW AGE. According to the TASS account, the Bangla Desh communist appealed for "unity of democratic and patriotic forces" as "the supreme call of the times" in the face of a difficult struggle. The article may represent an effort by the pro-Soviet communists to gain a place in the Bangla Desh Government. In view of its reference to the importance of unity to withstand "intrigues" attributed to the Chinese, the article may also be an attempt to close ranks against Maoist and other extremist elements among the Bengalis.


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# DISARMAMENT

## USSR, PRC CLASH AT UNGA OVER WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

With the entry of Peking into the United Nations in November, the just-concluded session of the General Assembly provided a forum for the PRC and USSR to renew face-to-face polemics and to press their respective proposals on disarmament. The Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference--which Moscow had suggested be put on the agenda in a letter to the Secretary General in early September--was the focal point of the confrontation. Peking propaganda assailed the proposal as an effort to "camouflage arms expansion" and pressed instead for the long-standing Chinese proposal for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. The debate also spilled over into other areas--notably the problem of a total ban of nuclear tests.

Peking's propaganda on the disarmament polemic has for the most part been confined to the accounts of various Chinese speeches in the General Assembly and in that body's First Committee, although a 23 December People's Daily editorial reviewing the session assailed the Soviet position. Moscow for its part has initiated more press and radio comment, predictably broadcasting a sizeable proportion of its propaganda in its Mandarin-language programs, including the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress.

Gromyko introduced a draft resolution underscoring the urgency of a world disarmament conference in his Assembly speech on 28 September--before the admission of the PRC. He stressed the desirability of agreement on the date and agenda for such a conference before the end of 1972 and suggested that the conference could be made "a permanent forum or . . . a forum operating over a long period of time. Its sessions may be called periodically, say once in two or three years."

PRC delegation head Chiao Kuan-hua in his maiden address to the Assembly on 15 November did not mention the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference but pressed familiar Chinese



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positions, including the longstanding Chinese proposal for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament and, as a first step, an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons.*

Chiao first dealt with the Soviet proposal in a lengthy speech before the Assembly on 24 November, arguing that the USSR's draft resolution not be put to a vote at this session of the General Assembly. He said the conference proposed by the USSR had no clear aim and "would inevitably become a permament club for endless discussions that solve no substantive problems." Chiao again called for the convening of a world summit conference on nuclear disarmament, conceding, however, that the PRC is ready to hear and consider the opinions of others on the level of the conference. In the vein of his 15 November address, he challenged the United States and the USSR to commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to dismantle all nuclear bases in foreign countries, and to withdraw nuclear weapons from abroad.

A Moscow Mandarin-language broadcast on the 25th reported that chief Soviet delegate Malik, in exercising his right to reply on the 24th, pointed to the "clear U.S.-China duet" on a world disarmament conference, and asserted that the Chinese in their opposition "have performed a service for the imperialist forces." The TASS account of the exchange on the 24th--which was also published in the press--noted more cryptically that Malik emphasized that only the Chinese and U.S. delegations have taken a negative stand on the Soviet proposal.

Returning to the rostrum on the 27th, Chiao said that Malik's charge of a U.S.-PRC duet was "cheap and demagogic . . . not worth refuting" and that his speech was in fact "splendid self-exposure." Among other charges, Chiao assailed the USSR for colluding with U.S. imperialism in attempting to surround the PRC with military bases. And he observed that China's opposition to the Soviet disarmament proposal was not "anti-Sovietism" but rather opposition to the USSR's "great-power chauvinism and . . . social-imperialism." He concluded that if the USSR insisted on putting its resolution to a vote, the PRC would not participate in the voting and would assume no obligation as to the results of the voting.

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* Chiao's speech is discussed in detail in the FBIS TRENDS for 17 November 1971, pages 30-31.



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The attack on the Soviet proposal was sustained by the vice chairman of the PRC delegation, Huang Hua, in remarks to the Assembly on 16 December. On that occasion, he noted the Chinese decision to vote for the substitute resolution on a world disarmament conference put forward by Mexico, Romania, and 25 other nations.* He added, however, that in order for a conference to be fruitful, two "prerequisites" were essential--the declaration by the "two superpowers" not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and the dismantling of their overseas nuclear bases and the withdrawal of their nuclear weapons from abroad. The NCNA account of the 16 December UNGA session said that the Mexican-Romanian resolution was approved "amid ovation," and concluded that this wound up the debate "on 'the Soviet proposal for convening a world disarmament conference.'"

Moscow for its part widely acclaimed the Assembly's 16 December vote on a world disarmament conference resolution. Acknowledging that the resolution voted on was that sponsored by Romania and Mexico and 25 other nations, not that placed on the agenda by the USSR, propaganda has nonetheless concluded that "the Soviet initiative has been positively assessed by the overwhelming majority of states in the world." A NEW TIMES article, summarized by Moscow radio in a broadcast in English to South Asia on the 27th, said that the developing countries and socialist nations cosponsored a resolution on a world disarmament conference and that the Assembly, despite Chinese efforts, "endorsed the Soviet proposal."

Soviet propaganda grudgingly acknowledged the affirmative Chinese vote on the Mexican-Romanian resolution but asserted, in a broadcast in Mandarin on the 18th, that the Chinese set "prerequisites" which are "actually a form of opposition" to a world disarmament conference, also opposed by "the imperialists." Spelling out the "prerequisites," the broadcast noted that the PRC has challenged the nuclear powers to pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to remove nuclear bases from foreign countries, demands which "the United States and other imperialist countries are unwilling to fulfill."

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* The Mexican-Romanian resolution invites all states to communicate to the Secretary General, before 31 August 1972, their views and suggestions on questions relating to a world disarmament conference, including agenda, site, and date for such a conference, and provides for the inclusion on the provisional agenda for next year's Assembly session an item entitled "Convening of a World Disarmament Conference."

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Soviet propaganda belabors the theme of U.S.-PRC collusion which Malik raised in his 24 November speech. Thus, an article in IZVESTIYA on 25 December, reviewed by TASS, observed that the PRC's negative position on the proposal for a world disarmament conference--as well as its stand on a Middle East settlement and the conflict on the Hindustan peninsula--"exposed the true face of Peking's policy, which in many questions actually coincides with Washington's course."

In defending the proposal for a conference, Moscow shows sensitivity to Chiao's charges that the USSR undercuts the national liberation forces. Chiao on 24 November resurrected this classic argument when he said it is not proper "indiscriminately to demand disarmament by all countries alike." Pointing to the struggles of the peoples of Indochina, the Arab world, and Africa, Chiao observed that the question of "paramount importance" is not disarmament, but "the defense of national independence and sovereignty and the winning of the right to national existence." While available Moscow propaganda does not directly acknowledge that Chiao pressed such an argument, a passage in an article by V. Rybakov in NEW TIMES (dated 10 December) seemed clearly aimed at countering it. According to Rybakov, no one in the Soviet Union "has ever raised the question of disarming the Vietnamese people and the peoples of the Arab countries who are struggling against an aggressor, or of the detachments of the national liberation movement who are defending their rights to independence with weapons." And other propaganda routinely points to the advantages of disarmament, stressing that the savings thus realized could be rechanneled to the development of economically backward countries.

TEST BAN, OTHER ISSUES

Chinese delegation member Chen Chu spoke to the test-ban question on 9 December at a meeting of the Assembly's First Committee. He echoed Chiao's remarks of 24 November in stressing the self-defense nature of Chinese weaponry and in pledging that the PRC will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. In a rehash of the known Chinese position, Chen said the halting of nuclear tests will only serve to consolidate the monopoly of these weapons by the "two superpowers" and deprive other countries of their "just rights" to develop nuclear weaponry. While some countries have favored a test ban "out of good intentions," Chen added, other countries will turn it into a means for lulling and deceiving the people of the world. He concluded that for these reasons the Chinese delegation will oppose a draft resolution on the "so-called prohibition of nuclear tests."

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While Moscow is not known to have acknowledged that the USSR abstained on the three resolutions before the Assembly on ending nuclear tests, it has not hesitated to take the Chinese to task for their negative votes. Thus an article in IZVESTIYA on 15 December by S. Yurkov and an article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 22 December by Prof. M. Ukraintsev noted that China and Albania were the only states to vote against the three resolutions, citing the negative votes as further evidence of Peking's "militarization" of China. The same Ukraintsev--long on record as an authoritative propagandist critical of China's policies--in a lengthy domestic service talk on 14 December reviewing the PRC's first month in the United Nations, had noted that the PRC heralded its entry into the world body "by exploding an atomic bomb."

Speaking in the First Committee on the 10th, Chen Chu indicated that the PRC would not take part in the vote on a protocol to be added to the existing treaty on a Latin American nuclear-free zone. Noting that China has no soldiers stationed abroad, no military bases on foreign soil, and that it has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Chen said that this principled stand--which contrasts with the stand of the "superpowers"--is the "best support to the good wishes of many countries for the establishment of nuclear-free zones and peace zones."

Chen argued in a similar fashion in addressing himself to the Ceylonese proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean, asserting before the First Committee on the 10th that the "obligations China has undertaken far exceed what the draft resolution calls upon the countries concerned to do." He said that the resolution is "defective" in not holding the United States, Britain, the USSR, and India to obligations, adding that without obligations "the root cause of aggression and threat to the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent will still remain and the peace and security in this area will have no guarantee at all." But after voicing these "reservations," according to NCNA, Chen voted in favor of the draft resolution. Moscow, which has not mentioned the proposal despite its criticism of U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean during the India-Pakistan crisis, abstained on the vote along with the other major powers.



Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040053-3

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# GERMANY AND BERLIN

## HONECKER REVIEWS STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GDR AND FRG

East German party head Honecker, in a concluding speech to the fourth plenum of the SED Central Committee on 17 December, extensively examined the course of relations between East and West Germany in the aftermath of the agreements reached by the two states following the Big Four accord on Berlin. He repeatedly reassured the plenum, convened to approve the 1972 economic plan and the draft of the GDR's new five-year-plan, that the agreements signify that the postwar status quo has now been confirmed by the West: GDR sovereignty has been preserved, and the Western powers and Bonn have been forced for the first time in the postwar period to conclude agreements that recognize the existence, sovereign rights, and inviolable borders of the GDR as well as the status of "Berlin" as its capital. These various facets have been the stock themes of East Berlin propaganda since the signing of the quadripartite accord.

In an unusual step for an East German spokesman, Honecker complimented the Brandt government for the "positive" side of its foreign policy in "taking the real situation into account" by recognizing the existence of the GDR. Asserting that European cooperation is dependent upon "efforts at accommodation by both sides, East and West," Honecker noted that those "West German foreign policy circles" who also accept this premise for European cooperation "have become stronger." But Honecker did take Bonn to task for its "Scheel doctrine," the thesis that third-party countries should not establish relations with the GDR until a modus vivendi has been reached between the FRG and the GDR in the form of a general treaty. Completely discounting any possibility that such a thesis might prove effective, Honecker said the GDR must plan for the establishment of new GDR embassies abroad and for foreign embassies at home over the next five years.

Repudiating at length the concept that "special inter-German relations" exist between the two German states, Honecker emphatically reiterated the stock East German line that relations between the two must be established according to the norms of international law, with recognition that one state



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belongs to the socialist bloc and the other to the capitalist. He referred sarcastically to Brandt's view of two German states within one German nation: "We have always known that relations between two countries have nothing to do with whether one has an aunt or an uncle abroad--for instance, in Switzerland, the Federal Republic, Austria, France, or the United States."

TRANSIT AGREEMENT, SENAT-GDR ACCORDS

Discussing the recently signed German accords--the 17 December FRG-GDR transit agreement and the 20 December West Berlin Senat-GDR accords on visits and travel arrangements and land exchanges--negotiated under the umbrella of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, Honecker argued that the FRG "has been compelled to accept the borders with the GDR under international law" three times "in a short period." First, in signing the Moscow treaty Bonn recognized the GDR borders and accepted them as inviolable. Second, with the signing of the GDR-FRG transit agreement Bonn "for the first time" reached an agreement "binding under international law directly with the GDR Government," recognizing the GDR borders in the process. Third, in the quadripartite agreement the Big Three "for the first time signed an agreement valid under international law under which the GDR is respected as a sovereign state, its territory and borders as undisputed facts."

Honecker then immediately went on to say that the "Four Powers have concluded an agreement on West Berlin" and introduced new terminology to define West Berlin: The agreement "expresses the fact that West Berlin exists as an entity within its existing borders and is surrounded by the GDR including its capital. Accordingly, the accords between the GDR Government and the West Berlin Senat take into account the fact that Berlin is the capital of the GDR." In another effort to underscore the point that GDR sovereignty was respected in the German negotiations, Honecker declared that "the specter, active only recently, of a 'corridor' through the GDR controlled by the West has dissolved into thin air" with the signing of the GDR-FRG agreement, which "makes it possible to handle transit traffic between the FRG and the western sectors of Berlin through the territory of the GDR in accordance with internationally valid norms" and which serves to "compel" the FRG to accept the GDR borders.


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CHRISTMAS VISITS Again seeking to place the blame on the West Berlin Senat for the failure to initial the Senat-GDR accords on 4 December (they were finally initialed on the 11th along with the FRG-GDR transit agreement), Honecker repeated the East German argument that "West Berlin is not part of the FRG and must not be governed by it." He went on to explain why it was not possible for West Berliners to visit East Berlin during the current holiday season: "If it has been impossible for unilateral gestures of good will on the part of the GDR vis-a-vis the West Berliners to have come into effect already this year, the inhabitants of West Berlin must thank those who tried up to the last minute to obstruct the accords that had already been concluded." Following the 4 December failure to initial the Senat-GDR accords, East Berlin propaganda has repeatedly stressed that if "technical" preparations were to have been completed in time to allow West Berliners to visit "the GDR capital" between 20 December and 20 January the Senat accords had to be initialed on the 4th.



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# CHINA

## PEKING CLAIMS RECORD GRAIN YIELD DESPITE NATURAL DISASTERS

According to NCNA on 23 December, China has achieved a record grain harvest for 1971, overcoming natural disasters that affected a total area three times larger than last year. But there are indications that this year's increase is rather small.

One indicator is the fact that so far there have been no percentage claims for the 1971 year; last year several provinces claimed that grain yields were up as much as 30 percent. An NCNA report on 26 December did single out the southwest provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan as having exceeded last year's harvests, and it was said that Kweichow and Yunnan have now become basically self-sufficient in grain. Traditional grain-importing provinces in North China--Hopei, Honan and Shantung--were reported to have achieved basic self-sufficiency last year, and this year they are again said to have achieved "good" harvests; a Tsinan radio report on 18 December claimed a new Shantung record.

In Northeast China, where Kirin and Liaoning provinces each claimed 30 percent grain increases last year, there appears to have been no further increase. The Liaoning provincial radio on 19 December indicated that the crop this year was about the same as last, and Heilungkiang merely claimed a "bumper" crop without reference to prior records.

## MODERATE POLICIES IN AGRICULTURE URGED BY RED FLAG

Two articles in RED FLAG No. 13, both by writing groups in Hunan province, indicate that agricultural policies designed to provide work incentives for the peasantry will continue to hold sway. One of the items is an investigation report on a commune, broadcast by Peking radio on 20 December. It stresses the need for continual vigilance against capitalist revivals, warning that attacks will stem from both the right and the left. The policy of allowing sideline production is elucidated in order to show that the middle road must be maintained--sidelines must not be allowed to interfere with major agricultural tasks, but neither should they be rejected completely under the pretext of "avoiding the rise of capitalism."



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The second RED FLAG article, broadcast by Hunan radio on 18 December, pays more attention to general policies, targeting especially the notion that "left is better than right." The article states that the interests of the middle peasants must be considered, because "if the people modify the party's policies arbitrarily . . . the consolidation and development of the collective economy will be affected." The article devotes special attention to leftist deviations which followed the cultural revolution; at that time, it said, there were some who felt that party policies stood in the way of completing "requirements for stepping up socialist rural construction," and thus various communes went their own way and "changed the party policies at will." (The reference appears to be to the period when, according to Hong Kong reports, some communes were seizing private plots and restricting the prerogatives of production teams.)

The article sets forth several reasons, all based on material considerations, why the advance to communism must be slowed at this stage. It warns that "we cannot . . . disregard objective conditions, alter the objective possibility of historical development, and confuse different stages." When the masses' ideological awareness is heightened and productive forces developed, policies can be changed, but "the party's policies should be comparatively steady at one stage and at one period." The article seems to skirt rather closely the often-denounced theories of "productive forces" and "mechanization before collectivization." It makes the specific point that "the level of rural mechanization is still not high enough" to proceed to a new stage.

CONFERENCE ON MECHANIZATION

Inner Mongolia chief Yu Tai-chung, in a 24 November speech released by the regional radio on 11 December, referred to a national conference on agricultural mechanization convened by the State Council. There was no media report of such a conference at the time, but it apparently called for new local efforts, including "going in for semimechanization as well as mechanization" when the former is more practical.

The conference also may have given local areas the task of drawing up 10-year plans for mechanization. A Kiangsi broadcast on 18 December reported that a recent provincial conference heard a report on the national meeting and then worked out plans "for basically mechanizing the province's



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agriculture by 1980." The broadcast notes that the current area under mechanization is about 10 percent of the total, up from three percent in 1965; the magnitude of the task is thus considerable. Priority for the first five years is to be given to developing machinery for tillage, drainage and irrigation. For 1972, special attention is to be paid to tillage machinery, tractors in particular.

PRICING POLICIES

Pricing policies have also clearly been designed to furnish the peasant with incentives. An NCNA article on 27 December focused on the rise in rural bank deposits since the cultural revolution, claiming that the increase is the result of state policies; over the past few years prices paid for the peasants' agricultural goods have gone up while state taxes and prices for fertilizers and insecticides have been reduced. The article also points out that consumer prices for food have remained constant during this period.

A second NCNA article on the same day listed several products for which the state price paid the peasants has been raised this year while the charge to consumers has remained unchanged. These cuts may reflect improved efficiency in processing, but in most cases they probably represent an effort to encourage the production of needed materials. Total incentives of this type offered this year, including reductions in prices of agricultural manufactured products, is claimed to run to a billion yuan ($400 million).



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# USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## BREZHNEV'S 65TH IGNORED IN USSR, MARKED IN EAST EUROPE

Brezhnev's 65th birthday passed unmentioned in the Soviet press, following the usual Soviet practice of ignoring 65th anniversaries. The leading dailies of Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia carried photos of Brezhnev on the front page on 18 or 19 December, while Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG on 19 December carried Kadar's message of congratulations on page three. Honecker praised Brezhnev as an "outstanding fighter" (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 December), Kadar hailed him as an "outstanding" leader of the international communist movement, and a lengthy, effusive RUDE PRAVO article on 18 December spoke warmly of Brezhnev's role in liberating Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Bulgarian press has not yet mentioned the birthday.

The treatment of Brezhnev's birthday is similar to that of other recent 65th birthdays of Politburo members. Kirilenko's 65th birthday on 8 September 1971 was warmly noted by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND but not in the other satellites nor in the Soviet press. Kosygin's 65th on 21 February 1969 was marked by flattery and a large photo in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND: it was also noted in Poland and Hungary, and Bulgaria sent greetings--three weeks late, on 11 March--but Soviet media did not mention it.

## PAPERS DIFFER IN TREATMENT OF TVARDOVSKIY OBITUARY

On his death, former NOVY MIR editor Aleksandr Tvardovskiy was accorded normal official honors--including a large photo in PRAVDA and a long obituary signed by all the Politburo and writers union leaders--although some newspapers that had been especially antagonistic toward him neglected to publish his obituary. Following his death on 18 December, PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVIET RUSSIA, TRUD and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carried a uniform picture and obituary, but RURAL LIFE, RED STAR and SOCIALIST INDUSTRY published only the original succinct announcement of his demise. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA differed in granting slightly more favorable treatment than PRAVDA. Below the obituary, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published an article by Tvardovskiy's friend, liberal writer Konstantin Simonov, who wrote emotionally of his merits and hailed him as "a man of huge talent and high courage."


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Again on 22 December, in connection with the reporting of Tvardovskiy's funeral, the same pattern prevailed. Only RURAL LIFE, RED STAR and SOCIALIST INDUSTRY totally ignored the funeral, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA printed the longest and by far the most laudatory account.

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