[redacted] #18-72 STATSPEC TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA 1 OF 1

3 MAY 1972 CONF

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Confidential

FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC

[redacted]

Confidential

3 May 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 18)

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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 24 - 30 APRIL 1972

Moscow (3086 items)

May Day	(5%)	10%
Indochina	(20%)	10%
[Strikes on DRV & Escalation of War	(17%)	6%]
[Resumption of Paris Talks	(--)	1%]
FRG Political Crisis & Treaties With East	(3%)	8%
[FRG Ambassador's Credentials Ceremony	(--)	5%]
Lenin's Birth Anniversary	(13%)	4%
Egyptian President Sadat in USSR	(--)	4%
European Security	(1%)	3%
Brezhnev at Armed Forces Meeting	(--)	2%
China	(3%)	2%

Peking (1639 items)

Indochina	(24%)	33%
[2d Anniversary of Indochina Summit Conference	(--)	15%]
[Paris Talks	(1%)	5%]
[Nixon TV Speech	(--)	5%]
[Strikes on DRV	(20%)	3%]
Domestic Issues	(31%)	29%
DPRK Army Day	(0.5%)	17%
[PRC Military Delegation in DPRK	(0.4%)	4%]
UN Trade & Development Conference, Chile	(7%)	3%
Romanian Military Delegation in PRC	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The communist assault in Quang Tri Province was virtually ignored by Hanoi and Front media for five days, until Liberation Radio on 2 May announced the "liberation" of the "entire" province by the "southern armed forces and people" and recounted the fighting there since 27 April. Comment on the "victory," including editorials in the Hanoi press on 3 May, hails the "annihilation or capture" of nearly 10,000 ARVN troops and maintains that the fighting demonstrates the failure of the Vietnamization policy. "Even greater victories" are predicted; Hoang Quoc Viet, speaking at the annual May Day rally in Hanoi, had asserted that the war "has developed at a great speed, rarely seen, in the past few weeks and is advancing toward complete victory."

Hanoi and the Front have sharply attacked President Nixon's 26 April TV speech in which he condemned the communist offensive and announced that 20,000 more U.S. ground troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam by 1 July. The DRV and PRG issued foreign ministry statements, on 29 and 30 April respectively, and Le Duc Tho labeled the speech "high-flown rhetoric" in remarks on his arrival on the 30th to resume his role as adviser at the Paris talks. Propaganda has ridiculed the President's charge that the DRV invaded the South and thereby violated the 1954 Geneva agreements. While crediting the southern armed forces with the offensive, Hanoi insists that Vietnam is one country and that every Vietnamese has a right to defend it.

Peking reacted in standard fashion to President Nixon's 26 April address with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 30th preceded by an NCNA report the day before. While in effect justifying the DRV's role in the offensive in South Vietnam and accusing the President of a "naked war threat" against the Vietnamese, Peking exhibited the restraint that has marked its response to Vietnam developments and reaffirmed its support for the war effort in routine terms.

Soviet reaction to the President's speech has been minimal, in keeping with Moscow's continuing effort to strike a balance between the dictates of support for Hanoi and the constraints imposed by its relations with Washington. Evident efforts were made to softpedal CPSU Secretary Katushev's 26-29 April "unofficial" visit to Hanoi, presumably made in order to reassure the Vietnamese in the wake of Kissinger's trip to Moscow.

DRV, PRG HAIL QUANG TRI "LIBERATION": "CHIEN THANG" COMMENTS

Liberation Radio's 2 May report claiming the "liberation" of Quang Tri Province, rebroadcast by Hanoi's domestic service minutes later,

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was the first specific acknowledgment by Vietnamese communist media of the offensive launched on 27 April against the remaining allied positions in the province. On 1 May, Liberation Radio had broadcast a Tri-Thien PLAF command appeal for ARVN defections which claimed that the government's defense line had been crushed but offered no details. Vietnamese communist media had similarly waited four days before announcing the launching of the initial offensive in Quang Tri on 30 March. The radio report on the fighting was promptly followed by radio commentaries on the 2d and editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 3d. Also on the 3d, Hanoi broadcast an article by the military commentator "Chien Thang" which welcomed the results of the Quang Tri offensive and reviewed the military situation in the South in optimistic terms.

Lauding the "great victory" of the "southern armed forces and people," the 2 May radio report on the Quang Tri fighting claimed that massive losses were inflicted on the South Vietnamese government forces. It said that, from 27 April to 1 May, nearly 10,000 troops were "annihilated or captured,"* with the communist forces having "put out of action" the ARVN 3d Division, "decimated" a marine division, "annihilated" the 2d and 57th regiments of the 3d Division and the 4th and 5th ranger groups, "destroyed" the 11th, 17th, 18th, and 20th armored regiments, and "badly mauled" the 369th, 258th, and 147th brigades and the 1st Ranger Group. Liberation Radio claimed that "thousands" of ARVN officers and men surrendered in the face of the communist assault and noted that fleeing infantry and armored units had been "pursued and violently intercepted." The report also claimed that there were considerable allied material losses, saying that liberation forces seized or destroyed nearly 100 heavy guns and about 1,000 military vehicles, including more than 200 tanks and armored cars. In addition, according to the report, 46 aircraft were downed or damaged.

Recounting the Quang Tri fighting in the preceding days, the report said that "concerted attacks" were launched against major allied positions on the 27th and that Dong Ha township was

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* The Front's 3 April roundup of alleged successes in the 30 March-3 April offensive in northern Quang Tri claimed that nearly 5,500 allied troops were "wiped out." The 3 April battle claims are discussed in the TRENDS of 5 April 1972, page 2.

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"liberated" on the 28th. It said that on the 30th Ai Tu base was occupied and units in Trieu Phong military subsector and district capital were "annihilated or disintegrated." Finally on the 1st, according to the report, liberation forces attacked Hai Lang military base and district capital and occupied La Vang base and other positions in Quang Tri city. Quang Tri city, the radio stated, "has been liberated."

CONTROL OF POPULATION

The radio account called attention to alleged communist control of the population as well as military feats, asserting that the newly "liberated" province has a population of nearly 300,000. Just as the communists had claimed that a popular uprising accompanied the initial 30 March-3 April assault in the northern districts of Quang Tri, the radio account of the fighting since the 27th alleged that "hundreds of thousands" of people in Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts--the southernmost districts of Quang Tri--"staged strong uprisings to win the mastership right, joined the liberation troops and local forces in attacking the enemy, and called on enemy troops to surrender."

The 3 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, welcoming the alleged uprisings in Quang Tri, sought to discount the notion that the population has evacuated the province. It maintained that "except for the few chieftains of the local puppet administration and the die-hard agents of the pacification teams who tried to escape, almost all the people of all strata in the provincial town and in the countryside stayed back to join the fight beside the PLAF."

Alleged allied "crimes" against civilians in "newly liberated provincial capitals and townships" were scored on the 3d in a statement from the South Vietnam war crimes committee. The statement charged that the United States on 1 May sent B-52's and 10 warships to bomb and strafe Quang Tri city, "killing many civilians." It also decried "saturation bombings" and shellings in other urban areas and charged that "the devastation of the provincial capitals and townships newly liberated by the liberation armed forces is an extremely brutal act of the warmongers in the White House and the Pentagon in the face of their imminent total failure."

FAILURE OF VIETNAMIZATION

Hanoi and Front comment on the fighting in Quang Tri uniformly calls attention to the breakdown of the South Vietnamese military forces and claims that the action is further evidence of the irreversible collapse of the U.S. Vietnamization policy. Thus, for example, a

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2 May Hanoi radio commentary claimed that the "glorious victory" had "dealt a thunderous blow to the Vietnamization strategy and smashed the Nixon clique's illusion of using the U.S. air force and navy to save the puppet army from danger and to recoup its losses."

The 3 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claimed that the communist success in Quang Tri has shaken the entire defense system in South Vietnam and "eloquently demonstrated the PLAF's capability of defeating the 'Vietnamized' war militarily right in the places where the enemy is the strongest." Stressing that the allied forces in Quang Tri broke after only five days of fighting, the editorial maintained that the engagement demonstrated the failure of the allied tactic of concentrating their forces and was a defeat for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and B-52's. "This hard fact," the editorial added, "proves that no military force, no strategic measures, no U.S. combat tactic can save the 'Vietnamization' strategy from complete failure."

"CHIEN THANG" ON OFFENSIVE

The North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor), in his 3 May article entitled "The Changes in the War Situation," analyzes the course of the offensive in South Vietnam and draws optimistic conclusions about the communists' position.* His article, by relating communist military action over the past year to the current offensive and speaking in terms of a capability for fighting "protractedly," seems to suggest that the current communist offensive had been prepared for over a considerable period of time and will not be concluded in the near future.

Chien Thang relates the ability of liberation forces to launch large-scale attacks in Quang Tri to the experience these forces gained in "dealing large-scale annihilating blows" at the time of Lam Son 719 last year. He similarly draws a connection between attacks in the highlands last year and the current

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* Hanoi's 3 May broadcast of the Chien Thang article indicated that it was published in the party paper, NHAN DAN. His articles usually appear in the army paper, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, and this one may have appeared there too since the VNA press review on the 3d indicated that it was published in the "press." Chien Thang's last article, published in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 24 March, is discussed in the 29 March TRENDS, pages 8-10, and the 12 April TRENDS, page 13.

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engagements there and between the "southern armed forces'" coordination with the Cambodian forces in "annihilating battles" at Snuol and Krek last spring and the current action in Binh Long Province. Chien Thang asserts that "realities prove that the southern liberation combatants' ability to engage in large-scale annihilating battles is the result of a completely logical and steadfast development."

A similar progression of attacks is pointed up in Chien Thang's review of the recent fighting. Claiming that "glorious victories" on the battlefields have proven the correctness of the guidance of the war, Chien Thang asserts that "each step prepared for the next, each battle was a springboard for the next." He explains, for example, that "only after smashing the enemy's network of bases on Highway 9 could the Tri-Thien combatants rush forward to completely disintegrate the enemy in the Dong Ha-Quang Tri area."

Chien Thang contends that the communists "can fight protractedly and on a large scale," thus returning to a point he pressed in a series of articles last December.* At that time he had argued that the communists were gaining strength while the allies were becoming weaker and, in this context, he had noted that "we are in a strong position and can deal strong blows or fight protractedly." In his current article, Chien Thang cryptically cites the "latent, inexhaustable strength of the revolutionary war" as the factor insuring the communists' ability to fight protractedly and on a large scale. Elsewhere he seems to spell out his reasoning by underlining the importance of the extension of communist control over additional territory and people. He notes that "the enlarged liberated areas are serving as extended offensive springboards" and adds that "the revolutionary forces are in a strong offensive position and are fully holding the initiative, the source of our strength has been extended, whereas the enemy's replenishment sources have been increasingly limited." Similarly, in his concluding passages, Chien Thang observes that "the efficiency of our offensive has increased, as well as our sources for replenishment of men and materials."

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* QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 11 to 17 December published a series of articles by Chien Thang discussing the war situation. The articles are discussed in the 12 January TRENDS, pages 14-15.

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The notion that newly "liberated" areas will provide "springboards" for further offensives has been raised repeatedly in communist comment on the fighting in the South. A 20 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, for example, made this point and, like Chien Thang, held that the offensive was guided by "the law of resistance of our people which consists of fighting protractedly and more and more powerfully."*

Chien Thang, in the course of his analysis of the offensive, ridicules allied military strategists and their efforts to redeploy forces to meet the communist threat. Thus, for example, he claims that "many U.S. military commentators" had "ballyhooed that the offensives in Tri-Thien were checked and that because of a strategic error the enemy's offensives on the northern battlefield had slowed down and seemed to have ended." He goes on to note that "hardly had this ray of hope brightened" than "the second violent offensive wave" began on this battlefield. Chien Thang suggests, as has other communist comment, that the communists had not planned to launch a coordinated offensive throughout the South at one time but, rather, had chosen to launch the attacks in sequence so as to repeatedly draw allied forces away from intended targets.

As would be expected, Chien Thang reiterates his view that the balance of forces on the battlefield is shifting in favor of the revolution. This was the main point of his 24 March article, published just six days before the communists launched the initial offensive into Quang Tri. Chien Thang maintains that "the liberation regular armed forces on all battlefronts are able to deal the enemy large-scale annihilating blows and to annihilate combined enemy infantry and armored concentrations, from regimental and battle-group level to division level." He also claims that local "people's warfare" has developed and that "in some areas people's warfare has been capable of crushing the enemy's strength in a military subsector, in one or two districts, and annihilating entire puppet battalions and many civil guard units and armored companies."

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* The 20 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial is discussed in the 26 April TRENDS, pages 2-3.

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DRV STATEMENT, LE DUC THO SAY PRESIDENT NIXON "SLANDERS" HANOI

The President's TV speech on the 26th in which he deplored the communist offensive in South Vietnam but said that the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops would continue was promptly scored on the 27th by both the DRV and PRG delegates at the resumed Paris session, as well as in routine VNA and radio comment. The President's announcement that 20,000 more troops will be withdrawn in the next two months as well as the U.S. agreement to resume the Paris talks are credited to the pressure of public opinion. Propagandists say the President's true intentions are evidenced by his pursuit of Vietnamization and his declaration that air and naval attacks against the DRV will continue. As reported by VNA, DRV chief delegate Xuan Thuy and PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris session ridiculed the President's assertion that the North Vietnamese had invaded the South and countercharged that the President's Vietnamization policy is merely a way to continue the war and to maintain the Thieu administration. The VNA account said that Ambassador Porter repeated almost the whole of Nixon's statement and "rehashed his shopworn allegation about the so-called 'North Vietnam invasion of South Vietnam.'"

Hanoi assailed the speech in press comment on the 29th, including a NHAN DAN Commentator article and in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement--vehicles frequently used to respond to Presidential pronouncements.* On the 30th, the PRG issued a foreign ministry statement which expressed "unanimous" approval of the DRV stand as outlined in its statement. Le Duc Tho in his 30 April arrival statement in Paris--carried by VNA on 1 May--castigated the President for indulging in "high-flown rhetoric" when he said he wanted to achieve peace with honor and peace for generations to come. Tho then set out to document his charge that the President has "unceasingly intensified and expanded the war" beyond anything the Johnson Administration had done.

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* The DRV's most recent foreign ministry statement in response to the President was that of 28 March following his 24 March press conference, in which he said he had personally ordered Ambassador Porter's move in suspending participation in the Paris talks. The President's last three previous troop withdrawal announcements (on 13 January 1972, 12 November 1971, and 7 April 1971) had not prompted foreign ministry statements, although the DRV had responded in this fashion to earlier announcements in 1969 and 1970.

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REBUTTAL OF DRV INVASION CHARGE

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement dealt with the President's "slander" to the effect that the DRV is carrying out aggression against the South and that it has violated the 1954 Geneva agreements and the 1968 "understanding." It echoed the 11 April DRV Government statement--on the President's ordering intensified strikes at the North--when it ridiculed the notion that the DRV had invaded the South. And it argued that the Vietnamese have the right to fight the enemy in "whatever part of their land is subject to aggression."

The foreign ministry statement said cryptically that the 1954 Geneva agreements "affirmed the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights to independence, national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity." But the NHAN DAN Commentator article explicitly took issue with the President's charge that North Vietnam had crossed an international border to invade its neighbor. The article asked rhetorically "what neighbor, what border? On what international document did he base his statement that North and South Vietnam are two countries?" It went on to observe that Articles 2, 7, 11, and 12 of the Geneva agreements provide for international recognition of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam; it added that article 6 of the final declaration of 21 July 1954 said that the basic aim of the agreement was to settle military problems and that "the provisional demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary."

Le Duc Tho, in his 30 April statement in Paris, also said that the President "has made black white" by "cooking up the story" of North Vietnamese violation of the 1954 Geneva agreement. He did not repeat Commentator's argumentation in this regard, but he did say that there was no "understanding" about the 1968 bombing halt, adding that the U.S. commitment to cease bombing the DRV "was made during private meetings between ourselves and Harriman and Vance and which we have made public."*

PEACE SETTLEMENT OR CONTINUED WAR

In his Paris arrival statement, Le Duc Tho said that the peace talks had failed to make progress in four years because the United States had persisted in the Vietnamization policy and refused to enter into serious talks. He also criticized the United States

* See the TRENDS of 26 April 1972, page 25, for a discussion of Xuan Thuy's 20 April press conference at which he discussed the private meetings in 1968.

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for "unilaterally" making public the content of the private meetings with the DRV and for suspending the Paris talks. The Americans "were obliged," according to Tho, to resume the normal work of the conference "in the face of our demand and under the pressure of American and progressive people throughout the world." He added that "we demand" a halt to the bombing of the North and said that the United States has no right to demand a price for such a halt. The DRV Foreign Ministry statement said more directly that President Nixon has said he will continue the attacks with air and naval forces until North Vietnam stops its attacks on the South. Dismissing the U.S. rationale for the attacks on the North, the statement said the truth is that the Nixon Administration "intends to maintain for an unlimited period of time a part of the U.S. ground force and an important part of U.S. air and naval forces in South Vietnam."

Le Duc Tho did not mention the U.S. eight-point peace plan outlined by the President on 25 January and referred to in his 26 April speech. But the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 29th ridiculed the President's "boast" that the proposal is a "most generous" offer and said "our people and world public opinion have condemned and rejected Nixon's deceptive eight points." Commentator only indirectly acknowledged some of the substance of the eight-point plan when he called it a scheme to force the South Vietnamese to stop their struggle and "to participate in an electoral farce organized within the system of U.S.-puppet machinery of coercion and oppression."

Le Duc Tho also failed to mention either the PRG seven-point proposal or the DRV's nine points, first revealed in the President's 25 January speech. But he repeated elements of the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of its two basic points. Thus, he said "we demand" that the United States set a deadline for the rapid withdrawal of American and allied troops from South Vietnam, adding that "it is our hope" that the U.S. troops and prisoners can go home as soon as possible.

Regarding a settlement in the South, Tho said: "We demand the immediate resignation of Thieu and a change of policy of the Saigon administration and the abolition of all forms of coercion and oppression against the population so as to insure necessary conditions for the exercise of the most elementary

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democratic rights as provided for by Article 14 C* of the 1954 Geneva agreements." Point two of the 2 February PRG "elaboration" had referred to the Geneva agreements, without specifying the article, when it said: "Thieu must resign immediately; the Saigon administration must end its warlike policy, disband at once its machine of oppression and constraint against the people, stop its 'pacification' policy, disband the concentration camps, set free those persons arrested on political grounds and guarantee to the people the democratic liberties as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements." Mme. Binh at the 27 April Paris session, as reported by VNA, had repeated the 2 February elaboration in somewhat truncated form. Unlike Tho, in calling for Thieu's immediate resignation she had specified that Saigon's "machine of oppression" must be abolished. But she did not mention the guarantee of democratic liberties as provided for in the 1954 Geneva agreements.

Le Duc Tho followed his reference to a change in Saigon policy by directly responding to the President's remarks. He said that "what we want in South Vietnam is a three-segment national concord government. We do not want in any way to impose 'a communist regime' in South Vietnam as pretended by Mr. Nixon. But our people are at the same time determined not to allow the American administration to establish a puppet power in its pay there." Tho went on to warn that if the United States resists negotiations and pursues its Vietnamization policy, "it will only create obstacles preventing the Paris conference on Vietnam from progressing and will only prolong the war." He concluded with the standard assertion that no threat or military pressure will deter the Vietnamese, an assertion repeated in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement.

Vietnamese determination to continue the fight was stated in dramatic terms in a Hanoi radio broadcast on 2 May pegged to the President's remarks in Texas on 30 April. The broadcast said that the President, in stressing that he would not allow the communists to triumph, revealed his intention "to maintain the rotten lackey

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* Article 14 is on political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line, and point C reads: "Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties."

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clique headed by Thieu." Observing that the President was threatening the North Vietnamese and had said "let them make the choice," the broadcast added:

> We have made the choice long ago. This choice is that if the U.S. imperialists are unwilling to relinquish their aggressive designs, our people will persistently advance the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle toward complete victory. We will fight until the Americans are ousted and the puppets are toppled. We are determined to bankrupt the Vietnamization policy and Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam.

The President's 30 April remarks were also assailed in a 3 May NHAN DAN Commentator article which quoted him as saying "we will not be defeated" and added that "this is the essence of the policy of the American international gendarme." The Commentator article struck an atypical note when it made a point of saying that the Vietnamese "bear no grudge against the American people. And as soon as the war is over, friendly relations* will be promptly established between the two peoples."

The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d observed that the President was demanding that the socialist countries refrain from providing assistance to the Vietnamese and said that despite Nixon's "sinister moves," the movement in support of Vietnam "is developing with unabated vigor in the socialist countries and elsewhere in the world." The U.S. "challenge" to the socialist countries was brought up in the 3 May Chien Thang article on the communist offensive. After declaring that Hanoi and Haiphong are prepared to join the South in fighting the Americans until final victory, Chien Thang said: "In his pain and embarrassment Nixon is resorting to threats. He is insolently challenging the socialist countries and the world peoples."

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* Point five of the PRG's 1 July proposal, in the course of dealing with foreign policy, says that after the war, political, economic, and cultural relations can be established between the United States and the South Vietnamese.

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PEKING RESPONDS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, FETES LE DUC THO

Following a pattern that is standard in timing and level of comment, Peking reacted to the President's 26 April speech with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 30 April and a companion NCNA account on the preceding day that criticized the address in restrained terms while firmly rebutting the argument that North Vietnam had invaded the South in violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements. Peking followed its regular practice of carrying the texts of official DRV and PRG statements on the President's address, but it carefully sanitized provocative Vietnamese communist comment on less than the official level and scrupulously deleted all references to criticism by Senator McGovern and other U.S. political leaders. Peking's coverage of military developments during this period has been restricted to reports from Vietnamese sources.

The Commentator article accused the President by name of having "slandered" the DRV by saying it had violated the Geneva agreements and of having made a "naked war threat" against the Vietnamese by saying bombing of the DRV would continue. Though the NCNA account quoted the President extensively, the Commentator article directed the remainder of its polemical thrusts at the "U.S. Government" rather than the President personally. Thus, at one point Commentator said the "U.S. Government's declaration to continue bombing North Vietnam . . . gave the lie to its high-sounding promise" to end the war. In contrast to its reaction to the President's 25 January address, Peking this time did not charge the United States with pursuing "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" or call the President's alleged threats a provocation against the Chinese.

The Commentator article cited the "successive brilliant victories" recently won in both parts of Vietnam as evidence that U.S. "military adventures" will fail. After reiterating demands for the United States to end Vietnamization, stop supporting Thieu, and "consider seriously and respond positively" to the seven-point plan, Commentator reaffirmed in routine terms that the Chinese "firmly support" the war effort and will continue this support "to the end," adding a prediction of "complete victory" in view of "the excellent situation prevailing in Indochina."

The Commentator article and the NCNA account placed special emphasis on countering the President's position that North Vietnamese forces had crossed an international border and invaded South Vietnam

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in violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements. Following a line that has run through Chinese comment in the course of the communist offensive, Commentator stressed that "the Vietnamese nation is an integral whole" and that "it stands to reason" that people from the North and the South "should support each other and fight jointly" against the United States for the unification of their fatherland. The article claimed that the United States by its intervention had "scrapped" the 1954 Geneva agreements, a claim that falls short of Peking's longstanding position that the accords had been "torn to pieces" and were no longer valid.

PARIS TALKS Peking's considerable attention to the resumption of the Paris talks has consisted of accounts of the 26 April statements by DRV and PRG representatives in Paris on their agreement to resume the sessions, coverage of Le Duc Tho's stopover in Peking on 27-29 April, and a report on Tho's arrival statement in Paris on the 30th. Peking for the first time publicized excerpts of the speeches by Chou En-lai and Tho at the standard banquet in the negotiator's honor. NCNA on the 27th quoted Chou's remarks that evening promising to support the Vietnamese so long as the United States continues its war policy and "no matter in what form the war is carried out," denouncing recent U.S. "war escalation," and charging that Washington had "long violated" the Geneva agreements. In what seems a reflection of Peking's reserve toward the recent offensive in South Vietnam, Chou was not quoted by NCNA as directly assessing the drive, but as congratulating the Vietnamese communists and their Indochinese allies in general on their "brilliant victories." In contrast, Tho was quoted as saying the Vietnamese "are launching an offensive" on "the entire battlefield of Vietnam." According to NCNA, he said the communists have recorded "some" victories. VNA's version, however, has Tho claiming "great" victories.

As at the time of Tho's visit to Peking last August, NCNA characterized the atmosphere of the banquet as full of "revolutionary friendship and militant unity," and it quoted Tho as praising the "daily consolidation and growth of the militant unity" between the two sides. The VNA version did not contain these characterizations of Sino-Vietnamese relations, quoting Tho rather as expressing gratitude to China "and other fraternal socialist countries" for their support. NCNA's report on Tho's departure from Peking on the 29th said he left for Paris, implicitly acknowledging his subsequent stopover in Moscow by noting the presence at the airport of Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov.

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PEKING-HANOI DIFFERENCES

The manner in which Peking has sanitized Hanoi's comment reflects divergent concerns of the two allies, particularly Peking's concern to balance its commitment to its ally and its interest in the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship. Accordingly, by excising references to opposition to the President by American political leaders and to presidential politics as a factor in the Vietnam struggle, Peking has avoided giving the impression that there is a viable alternative to dealing with the Nixon Administration.

Peking's approach has also been more forthcoming than Hanoi's toward the Administration as a negotiating partner. Thus, NCNA's account of the 29 April NHAN DAN Commentator article on the President's address, in addition to omitting references to criticism by two U.S. Senators, softened its attack on the President's eight-point peace proposal. Similarly, Peking had tailored its accounts of Hanoi's reaction to the proposal last January by deleting charges that the proposal contained nothing new and was essentially deceitful.

MOSCOW TREATS PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, VIETNAM ISSUES IN LOW-KEY

Moscow has continued in its propaganda to balance the demands of support for its Vietnamese ally with considerations involving Soviet-U.S. relations. Reaction to President Nixon's 26 April speech, though routinely critical, has been minimal. Party Secretary Katushev's 26-29 April visit to Hanoi, in the wake of Kissinger's visit to Moscow, was presumably made with the purpose of reassuring the Vietnamese, but it has been given no publicity beyond the announcement--carried in Hanoi and Moscow media--that it took place. Le Duc Tho, who stopped over in Moscow from 29-30 April on his way back to Paris, was not reported to have seen any Soviet leaders.

Although Podgornyy on May Day criticized "U.S. aggression" in Vietnam--for the first time in a speech on this occasion since 1968--he did not go beyond offering the Indochinese patriots "militant solidarity."*

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* Brezhnev, who gave the speech in the previous three years, failed to attack the United States by name in any context, although Grechko, who spoke in 1968, did score "U.S. aggression" in Vietnam and the Middle East.

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PRESIDENT'S SPEECH Moscow reacted to President Nixon's 26 April speech with the usual prompt factual TASS report, but there has been little followup comment. The TASS report said "local political circles" assess the President's statement that Vietnamization is proceeding favorably as an effort to weaken the antiwar protest. In reporting the President's speech, TASS pictured the United States as the aggressor and glossed over his references to the current communist offensive in South Vietnam. While noting that the President announced that another 20,000 Americans would be withdrawn from Vietnam in the next two months, TASS juxtaposed this to his statement that air and naval attacks on North Vietnamese military installations would continue--neglecting, of course, to mention that he said these attacks would continue until the North Vietnamese "stop their offensive in South Vietnam." TASS concluded that the troop withdrawal announcement does not mean any curtailment of the war, since the United States, while reducing the strength of its ground forces, is increasing its use of air and naval forces.

Reporting the President's announcement that the United States had agreed to resume the Paris talks, TASS noted that he stressed that the first order of business would be to return the American POW's and get the enemy to "halt aggression" (sanitizing the President's reference to the "invasion of South Vietnam"). TASS commented that he thus characterized as aggression the "just struggle" of the "patriots" against American "invasion."

In commenting on the "current military situation," TASS noted President Nixon's citation of General Abrams' view that there will be "several more weeks of very hard fighting" in which "some battles will be lost" by the Saigon troops, failing to mention that Abrams added that Saigon would also win some battles. The report said the President "factually admitted" that the GVN troops cannot keep up their resistance without American naval and air support.

Moscow radio broadcast a similar report of the speech to domestic and foreign audiences on the 27th. A foreign-language report said that the President called upon the American people to support the policies of the government and commented that first reactions showed such a response to be unlikely. "American progressive circles," said the Moscow commentator, consider that the speech contains "nothing new," is filled with "artificial optimism," and reflects "a dangerous orientation." On the 28th TASS reported comments critical of the speech by Senators Fulbright and Kennedy.

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A participant in the 30 April domestic service roundtable discussion said the American press evaluated the speech as encompassing "the world pre-election strategy of the Republicans." The panelist commented that the withdrawal of American troops will not change the situation in Indochina because the United States is still not prepared to stop aiding the Saigon regime and continues naval and air participation in the war.

SOVIET AID TO VIETNAM, COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE

TASS did not mention the President's references to his Peking and Moscow trips or to Kissinger's visit to Moscow. It also ignored his allusion to Soviet aid to the current offensive when he warned of the dangers of allowing a country "armed with the most modern weapons by major powers" to invade and conquer another nation. However, an IZVESTIYA International Review by Kudryavtsev on the 29th contained an atypical justification of Soviet assistance in the offensive which seemed responsive to the President's remark. Kudryavtsev argued that the United States does not intend to end its aggression in Vietnam and merely seeks to reduce its casualties by the Vietnamization program while claiming that the "Vietnamese patriots' offensive allegedly 'hinders' the planned withdrawal of American armed forces."

Kudryavtsev played down the unprecedented scale of the current assault, saying that "war is war, with its offensives, retreats, and other attributes," and insisted that "one thing needed" to end the war is the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops. He asked rhetorically why the Vietnamese patriots should not have the "right to resist," the "best form of which" is "attack." He scored the United States for complaining that the Vietnamese communists are using heavy equipment, noting that the Americans "'blame' the Soviet Union for this and use this to 'justify' the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi," and he defended the PRG's concern that its fighters be well armed.

Moscow had not previously acknowledged the role of Soviet arms in the current offensive in the South quite so explicitly. A panelist in the 23 April domestic service roundtable discussion had made the only known previous reference to U.S. criticisms of the Soviet role when he cited comments by Secretary Laird on Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese "liberation forces," but the panelist avoided any reference to the current offensive. A foreign-language radio commentary by Shakhov, broadcast on 14 April, had ridiculed U.S. "slander" regarding an invasion from the North and had noted that the patriots in the South receive arms aid from their "friends."

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A 16 April SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article had observed that the South Vietnam PLA was using heavy equipment in current military operations, but did not explicitly refer to Soviet aid.

U.S. press comment on the connection between an improvement of Soviet-American relations and the issue of Soviet aid to Vietnam was noted explicitly in an article by a doctor of legal sciences, reprinted in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 28 April from NOVOYE VREMYA No. 18. In a review of Soviet foreign policy principles, the writer asserted that the "central principle" of socialist internationalism is present in all the USSR's foreign policy actions. He cited the example of assistance to the Vietnamese, saying Brezhnev's assertion in his 20 March trade union congress speech that the USSR will fulfill its "internationalist duty" to help the Vietnamese was an answer to "Western press" commentaries which claimed that an improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations "depends on the termination or reduction" of Soviet aid to the Vietnamese.

KATUSHEV IN HANOI

The 26-29 April Hanoi visit of the Soviet delegation led by CPSU Secretary Katushev was publicized in Moscow and Hanoi media on the day of its departure, when TASS and VNA issued identical announcements. An effort to play down the significance of the visit seemed evident in the announcement's description of the visit as a "friendly unofficial" one. Normally visits by Soviet officials to foreign capitals are described, if not as "official," merely as "friendly" without spelling out their "unofficial" character.

The announcement said that the Soviet delegation, which included Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin and party central committee official Ognetov, had "friendly meetings and discussions" with Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and "other Vietnamese leaders." The visitors expressed the Soviet people's "invariable solidarity" with the Vietnamese struggle against "American aggression," according to the announcement, which added that the "development and strengthening of Soviet-Vietnamese relations" and "some questions of mutual interest" were discussed in an atmosphere of "cordiality, fraternal friendship, and mutual understanding." The characterization of the talks suggested a close convergence of views, falling somewhat short of complete agreement.

LE DUC THO IN MOSCOW

Le Duc Tho stopped in Moscow from 29 to 30 April on his way to Paris. He was met at the airport by party central committee official Rakhmaninin, Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and others. He

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was seen off the next day by Katushev and the other officials. There are no reports that Le Duc Tho had talks with any Soviet leaders, but this may have been deemed unnecessary in that Katushev had just been in Hanoi talking to DRV leaders. When Le Duc Tho stopped in Moscow last July en route home from Paris, he reportedly had "warm and cordial" talks with Politburo member Kirilenko. In June 1971 en route to Paris, he met with Kirilenko and Katushev. There were no reports that he met with any Soviet leaders during a stopover in January 1970. He met with Kosygin and once with Mazurov during a number of his earlier trips in 1968 and 1969.

MAY DAY "RALLY," COMMENT SCORE U.S. WAR ACTS, PRESS DRV TASKS

VNA's 30 April account of the "grand rally" held to celebrate May Day says it "manifested the might and determination of the North Vietnamese to cope with and defeat the frenzied U.S. war escalation." The May Day celebration was attended by Politburo members Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi.* Hoang Quoc Viet, president of the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions, delivered an address in which he praised recent victories in both North and South Vietnam. Denouncing the United States for "serious acts of escalation," he "earnestly called upon the working class and peoples in the socialist countries and of peace- and justice-loving countries the world over to take varied, vigorous actions to stop these new criminal escalation steps." As is customary, he also took the opportunity to express gratitude "for the great, effective assistance of the Soviet Union, China, and the other fraternal socialist countries."

Viet denounced the Administration for "overtly sabotaging" the Paris talks, turning down the PRG's seven-point proposal, and "undertaking utterly serious acts of war escalation against North Vietnam." He charged that the President on 26 April "made lengthy arguments which were very cunning and smacked of gunpowder." Rejecting the allegation that "we have no real desire to negotiate

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* Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap have attended the annual meeting at least since 1966. Since that year, Truong Chinh was absent only in 1969, when he was not reported to have appeared publicly from 20 March to 19 July. Le Duan has not been present at a meeting since 1969, although he attended regularly before that.

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for peace," he appealed to people worldwide to strengthen the international movement for solidarity with the Vietnamese and join the U.S. working class to demand that the United States end the bombing of the DRV and the war against the South, withdraw U.S. troops, enter into serious negotiations in Paris, and "terminate all support for the country-selling puppet Nguyen Van Thieu administration."

Comment on U.S. "threats" has included editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th which noted White House spokesman Ziegler's remark, in announcing the U.S. return to the Paris negotiations, that this did not imply an end to bombing of the DRV. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN stressed that in addition to the continual bombing and shellings, "the Americans have also resorted to many psychological warfare tricks to pretend that they are narrowing the scope of their attacks." The Vietnamese armed forces and people, the paper said, will "devote everything to the frontline and to the kith-and-kin South" and carry out such tasks as civil defense, evacuation measures, and air defense.

A 29 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary cited REUTER on 24 April as disclosing that in a secret report, Kissinger had said that the new bombing of the DRV "must be increasingly fiercer and that it was necessary to take risks in these bombings and to inflict casualties on civilians in order to destroy war-supporting cargoes and to achieve expected results." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said the President "has also especially stressed the use of commandoes to penetrate deep into enemy territory or to attack from the air or from the sea." It commented that the President's hope to use bombs and bullets "to intimidate and subdue our people and to prevent the rear from aiding the frontline" is a "stupid calculation."

CIVIL, MILITARY TASKS IN DRV

Hanoi media continue to exhort the populace to carry out various tasks related to the war and to respond to the 16 April joint party-government appeal. There has been a pervasive stress on civil defense tasks in DRV domestic propaganda, and recent comment has also gone into detail on tasks in communications, transportation, and military recruitment.

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A 28 April NHAN DAN article, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 29th, said that "tens of thousands of compatriots are moving out of urban areas" and that such necessities as grain, food, and fuel had been made available in advance for transport by the evacuees to relocation areas. The article commended the trade sector for having satisfactorily carried out the first step of its air defense task but said it must "make more efforts, especially in organizing the transport and delivery of goods."

A 22 April HANOI MOI editorial, discussing the maintenance of security and order in considerable detail, urged vigilance against security leaks and infiltration and emphasized the need to protect state property and materials. HANOI MOI warned that in addition to the bombing and strafing, "the enemy may send in spies and rangers for sabotage, to carry out psywar activities, to spread false news and so forth. Scoundrels and opportunists may also take advantage of our shortcomings to cause disturbances." It called upon all families, organizations, and communities to "strictly observe the regulations on family census registration, watch for and detect in time all strange phenomena, and smash all false arguments by not listening to or repeating false rumors." It also called for the "resolute and timely punishment" of any offender.

The Hanoi domestic radio version of Hoang Quoc Viet's May Day rally speech noted that he voiced the determination of the North to respond to the 16 April party-government appeal and that he cited Ho Chi Minh's July 1966 appeal. The northern working class and people, he said, "must satisfactorily carry out its sacred task of meeting, in the most timely and adequate way, the frontline requirements for human and material resources, insuring uninterrupted communications and transportation under all circumstances."

While Hanoi generally has not specified targets of U.S. strikes, a 28 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial said that one of the United States' "insidious schemes" is to intensify air raids, naval bombardment, and commando activities "aimed at sabotaging our roads, bridges, storage facilities, and vehicles along communications lines" in order to prevent the armed forces and people "from carrying out their duty to provide support and assistance for the battlefield" and to create difficulties for the local populace in carrying out daily activities. The

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editorial warned that the military communications and transportation forces, especially in the Fourth Military Region and along communication lines to the front, "will encounter many new difficulties." An article in the 21 April issue of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN by Col. Hoang Duom of the Nghe An provincial military command asserted that the United States is "paying special attention" to the Fourth Military Region--especially Nghe An.

Both the article and editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN brought up recruitment; the editorial claimed that in response to the 16 April party-government appeal an all-country movement has developed among youths "enthusiastically volunteering to go and fight the enemy." It called the mobilization of youths "a major task" and defined as "the most important task" the constant education of "our people and youths about the revolutionary situation and objectives so that they will realize their duty to defend the fatherland, dare to sacrifice their lives for the sake of our people's great cause. . . ."

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U.S. STRIKES ON DRV CONTINUE TO DRAW SPOKESMAN'S PROTESTS

Hanoi's official protests condemning U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam continue at the level of the foreign ministry spokesman, with statements issued on 27, 28, and 29 April and 1, 2, and 3 May. Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes rose to 3,531 including another B-52, as of 3 May.

+ The spokesman charged on 27 April that on the 25th and 26th the United States intensified and extended the bombings and shellings of "many populated areas" in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area.

+ On the 28th the spokesman said that on the previous day the United States sent "hundreds of aircraft to launch repeated waves of attack against many villages, townships, dikes, hospitals, and economic establishments in Thanh Hoa and Quang Binh provinces, killing or wounding many civilians and destroying" many houses. The statement said seven U.S. planes were downed.

+ On the 29th the spokesman charged that on the 28th and 29th U.S. planes and ships continued "to barbarously strike at Vinh City and many populated areas in Vinh Linh zone and Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa and Nam Ha provinces."

+ A 1 May statement by the spokesman charged that on 30 April the United States "carried out savage attacks on populated areas in Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces" and that U.S. ships "wantonly shelled many coastal villages in Thai Binh Province." It said two planes were downed, "killing a number of pilots."

+ The 2 May statement charged that on the preceding day the United States "continued savage air raids on many areas of heavy population in the provinces of Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and in Vinh Linh area."

+ On 3 May the spokesman charged that the United States sent planes "to carry out barbarous airstrikes against many populous areas in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and in Vinh Linh" and used ships to shell "many coastal villages" of Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, and Thanh Hoa as well as Vinh Linh.

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Following the pattern of the foreign ministry spokesman's statements issued since the 11 April government statement--on 13, 15, 19, 20, 22, and 24 April--the six latest statements were more strident in tone than is normal for protests at this level. Thus they all charged that the strikes have violated the U.S. "commitment" to unconditionally end the bombing of the North. While the protest of 1 May used the label "barbarous U.S. war acts," the other five all characterized the U.S. bombings as "very serious," "criminal" or "frantic war escalation acts."

All six of the protests alleged that U.S. bombings and shellings have been directed at civilian centers. For example, the 27 April protest said the Americans have continued to "savagely raid populated areas in North Vietnam, killing civilians and destroying the Vietnamese people's economic establishments and cultural and social institutions." And the protests of 29 April and 1 May asserted the Americans' "crimes" in attacking populated, civilian areas have "unmasked their deceitful allegation that the United States only strikes at military targets."

DRV CASUALTIES, U.S. LOSSES

Detailing of casualties included a VNA report on the 28th which said that on the 26th U.S. planes "dropped perforating and fragmentation bombs and fired rockets on Thuong Xuan hamlet in Vu Thu district, Thai Binh Province"--which it described as one of the most populous provinces in the Red River delta--and that 49 people were killed or wounded. The same VNA item said 27 people were killed or wounded in the 24 April bombing of Yen Lieu Catholic parish in Duc Tho district, Ha Tinh, where a church was "heavily damaged." On the 29th, a VNA report charged that on the 27th U.S. planes completely destroyed a school in Dong Yen village, Dong Son district, Thanh Hoa and that 16 schoolchildren, a teacher, and her two children were killed and many other pupils and teachers wounded.

As of 3 May, Hanoi's total of U.S. downed planes stood at 3,531. The seven planes claimed in the 28 April foreign ministry protest were noted earlier by DRV media on the 27th. The reports said that five planes were downed by "antiaircraft units, the people's air force and the regional forces" of Thanh Hoa and that a plane and later a helicopter were downed in Quang Binh. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 28th said that many crewmen aboard the rescue helicopter were "wiped out." The same reports belatedly claimed a plane downed in Thanh Hoa on the 25th and a ship set afire by Thanh Hoa forces on the 26th. On the 28th, Hanoi radio claimed that two F-4's were downed in Vinh Linh that day. And on the 30th VNA said that one plane was downed in Quang Binh and one in Nghe An

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the day before and that two were downed in Quang Binh on the 30th. A 2 May Hanoi radio report claimed that Vinh Linh downed a B-52 on 30 April--the seventh such claim since 1 April--and that three F-4's were downed on 1 May, two in Vinh Linh and one in Quang Binh.

Three more planes were claimed by Hanoi radio on 3 May--two A-7's in Quang Binh and one F-4 in Vinh Linh.

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CHINA

MOST LEADERS APPEAR ON MAY DAY; NO EDITORIAL ISSUED

As in the case of National Day last fall, Peking curtailed the traditional May Day celebrations, but it is not clear why Peking has departed from past practice on this occasion. There was no editorial greeting May Day this year for the first time since 1969, and Mao failed to attend the festivities for the first time since 1966. In the pattern of last fall's cancelation of traditional National Day activities, foreign diplomats were notified a few days in advance that for reasons of "economy" the celebrations would be curtailed and the customary fireworks display eliminated. There were public performances in the parks of Peking and other cities, and almost all of the active Politburo members were reported as present at one of the celebrations.

Mao's failure to make an appearance is unusual only for the period since the onset of the cultural revolution. Unlike his past practice of appearing regularly on National Day, Mao seldom appeared on May Day before the cultural revolution. By eliminating the tradition of a Mao appearance on either occasion, Peking has removed one ground of speculation over his health, so that now there are no occasions on which Mao's failure to appear can be taken in itself as a sign of illness.*

On the previous occasion when there had been no May Day editorial, in 1969, there had been a major joint editorial three days later commemorating the 50th anniversary of the May Fourth movement. There does not seem to be any similar occasion in the offing this year until 23 May, when the 30th anniversary of Mao's Yenan Talks is expected to be celebrated. (The first of the Talks was on 2 May 1942, but the 25th anniversary celebrations and editorial in 1967 were timed for the end of the Talks, on the 23d.) Failing the appearance of a major editorial taking the place of one for May Day, the absence of an editorial on this occasion raises the question of whether persisting policy or leadership problems have constrained the regime to avoid a major pronouncement at this time. However, NCNA's reports on the May Day festivities accounted for all the active Politburo members (except Li Hsien-nien, who has been reported carrying on his usual duties immediately before

* Mao's most recent appearance was on 26 February when he received President Nixon.

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and after May Day), making a point of noting the presence of Chiang Ching in Canton* as well as of the two regionally based military leaders at their home posts. Chou En-lai's strong position and the recently enhanced status of octogenarians Tung Pi-wu and Chu Te were reflected in the listing of leaders in Peking by party rank. Leading the list, Chou was followed by Tung and Chu; his long-time associate Yeh Chien-ying, who rose in the hierarchy after the purge of Lin Piao; and then by Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan.

Already as far back as 1 December Peking had been able to produce a joint editorial dealing with the leadership crisis and Lin's purge. Themes central to the ideological campaign growing out of the purge--injunctions to unite and not to split, to be open and aboveboard rather than to intrigue and conspire--appeared in a lengthy NCNA account of May Day activities in Peking. Consirtent with the stress on cadre policy in this campaign, NCNA noted that "cadres and workers, peasants, and soldiers" are following these injunctions in rectifying work style and in political education. In this context, which included a reference to criticism of "swindlers," NCNA noted the presence at the festivities of members of the Peking municipal party committee now attending "a study class in the history of the struggle between the two lines within the party."

The absence of a May Day editorial, normally the vehicle for a pronouncement on foreign affairs, may more likely serve the regime's interest in avoiding a policy statement at a sensitive time in world affairs. Last May Day's joint editorial called for an "international united front against U.S. imperialism," trumpeted Chinese solidarity with the world revolutionary forces, and declared that for the Chinese to forget those struggling for liberation would mean "betrayal." Peking's place on the world scene has become more complicated since that time.

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* This marks her first reported public appearance outside Peking since February 1967, when she appeared at a literary and arts festival in Shanghai. Canton Military Region commander Ting Sheng was named Kwangtung revolutionary committee chairman early in April, but has not yet been identified as provincial first secretary. Chiang's presence in Canton may indicate that she is playing a role in the local leadership selection.

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NCNA's account of the May Day festivities was sprinkled with references to "comrades-in-arms" from areas like Indochina and the Middle East where struggle against "U.S. imperialism" is taking place. There was also a pro forma reference to the PLA's readiness to liberate Taiwan. In a show of people's diplomacy, NCNA quoted members of the visiting "U.S. solidarity delegation with the Chinese people" as conveying to the crowds "the cordial regards of the American working class for the Chinese working class."

LEADERSHIP CHANGES The NCNA report on the celebrations contained the first identification of Wu Te as Peking CCP committee first secretary and revolutionary committee chairman. Since the death of Hsieh Fu-chih at the end of March, Wu had been identified as "acting chairman" of the Peking revolutionary committee.

The only major change in provincial leadership ranks revealed by available May Day appearance lists occurred in Chekiang, where second-ranking party secretary Chen Li-yun was apparently outsted in the wake of the Lin Piao purge. In his former place, following first secretary Nan Ping, was Fukien secretary Tan Chi-lung. During the cultural revolution Tan was purged from his post of first secretary in Shantung. Another new secretary also appeared in Chekiang, ranked just ahead of the deputy secretaries. Only a phonetic version of his name is available (Tieh Ying) and he has not been further identified.

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KOREA

KIM IL-SONG DISCUSSES UN, RELATIONS WITH U.S., UNIFICATION

North Korea's Kim Il-song has again used the device of an interview with Japanese newsmen to air views on the United Nations, relations with the United States, and Korean unification. Once again he sought to project an image of moderation and flexibility, as he has been doing in recent months. His remarks to the Japanese, in a 27 April interview, have not thus far been carried in North Korean media and are available only in various summaries in Japanese media.

RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES

According to the most substantial report of Kim's remarks, a Pyongyang-datelined account by the ASAHI chief editor published on the 28th, Kim commented in an unusually forthcoming manner on U.S.-DPRK relations, leaving the door open for possible future improvement. Commenting on "speculation over the possibility of a channel of communication between North Korea and the U.S. Government," according to ASAHI's summary, he said that there are "no such indications yet" but that "as the international situation is very flexible, new developments should be carefully watched." (A brief KYODO version of the interview said that Kim "rejected a proposal" for setting up a channel of communications between Washington and Pyongyang, but it did not report his comments on the international situation.)

North Korean media have never carried any discussion of a possible improvement of relations with the United States, but the issue was raised by the chairman of the Pyongyang-sponsored General Association of Korean Residents in Japan in an interview with Western newsmen last March. As reported by Selig Harrison in the Washington POST on 7 March, the Korean commented, in connection with the U.S. endorsement of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in the communique on President Nixon's visit to the PRC, that a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea need not precede "expanded relations and an end to our confrontation with the United States."

According to the ASAHI version of the 17 April interview, Kim expressed satisfaction over the "important significance" of U.S. recognition of the five principles, but at the same time he criticized the United States for having expressed in the Sino-U.S. communique its support for the ROK's efforts to open

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communications with the North, calling this interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Another ASAHI version, sent from Pyongyang by a different correspondent, added that Kim also said that the United States instead should have stated its intention to withdraw its troops from South Korea and let the Korean people solve their own problems.

Kim's praise for U.S. endorsement of the five principles of peaceful coexistence repeated the line taken in a 4 March NODONG SINMUN editorial on the Sino-U.S. communique. The editorial praised the two sides for pledging to base their relations on the five principles and called it a "good thing" for countries to strive to normalize relations and to seek a relaxation of international tension.

UNITED NATIONS According to the longest ASAHI version of the interview, Kim indicated that North Korea "may" go to the United Nations to participate in the UNGA discussions of the Korean question if it is invited "unconditionally," that is, without the usual condition that the DPRK respect the UN Charter. (Other versions of the interview cite Kim as asserting positively that North Korea "will" accept an unconditional invitation.) This statement is consistent with Pyongyang's longstanding position that it has a right to participate in the UNGA discussion of the Korean question but that it will accept only an "unconditional" invitation. According to ASAHI, Kim added cryptically that "the first thing to be attended to in this connection is the UN's revocation of its resolution on the aggressors in Korea and other unwanted resolutions." A version of the interview broadcast over Okinawa TV said that Kim made this remark in connection with "the question of the DPRK's joining the UN" and that he added: "I will decide my attitude toward this question after closely watching developments in the UN." The KYODO version said Kim "refrained from making any comment on the simultaneous entry into the UN of divided nations, saying that the international situation is fast changing."

Kim had previously moderated the DPRK's stand on the UN in an 11 January interview with a visiting Japan Socialist Party official, doing so in a manner suggesting that the change was related to the seating of the PRC. (That interview was published in the JSP organ SHAKAI SHIMPO on 26 January, but it was not carried in Pyongyang media.)

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After pointing out that in the present situation ROK President Pak may have to give up his idea of UN-supervised elections in Korea, Kim added that "we are now in the midst of discussing the question of the UN and we have not yet decided on our final policy." He went on, however, to repeat demands that "as the first step" the UN must rescind its "unjust resolutions" against Korea and the U.S. forces must be withdrawn. In a 10 January interview with the Tokyo YOMIURI, subsequently carried in Pyongyang media, Kim used a formulation suggesting that Pyongyang would accept something less than a formal revocation of the UN resolutions. Kim said that the UN should revoke all the resolutions on the Korean question "illegally concocted" by the United States, "or it also might adopt a just policy toward Korea, thereby rendering previous illegal resolutions void." Kim may have in mind Peking's willingness to ignore past UN resolutions branding the Chinese communists as the aggressors in the Korean War, a stigma which did not deter the PRC from entering the world body.

NORTH-SOUTH CONFERENCE

According to the longest ASAHI version of the interview, Kim stressed the need for a "political conference" between North and South Korea for the unification of the country, explicitly pointing out for the first time that the conference could take place before the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South. Kim thereby took another step toward North-South rapprochment without the condition of a prior U.S. withdrawal. In his 10 January YOMIURI interview he had proposed for the first time that a North-South "peace agreement" (a subject apparently not discussed in the recent interview) could precede the U.S. withdrawal. In that interview he had proposed North-South "political negotiations" with the participation of all political parties in South Korea, including the ruling DRP, but he had not explicitly said that the negotiations could precede the U.S. withdrawal. In January Kim expressed readiness to contact anyone, regardless of his past "crimes," if he "sincerely repents." A similar point was made in the recent interview.

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USSR-EGYPT

COMMUNIQUE SAYS ARABS CAN USE "OTHER MEANS" TO REGAIN LAND

Egyptian President as-Sadat's 27-29 April "friendly visit" to the USSR has drawn only a moderate volume of Moscow publicity, as in the case of his similar visit in February.* The communique is notable for a new element--acknowledgment of the Arabs' right to use "other means" in addition to political measures to regain the occupied territories. And the two sides agreed on further strengthening of "military"--rather than "defense"--cooperation and arranged "appropriate important measures" in this regard. But the communique, echoed in supporting propaganda, again calls for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and Moscow comment continues to refer to a political settlement while giving the "other means" formula little publicity.

There is no repetition of the February communique's call for early resumption of the Jarring mission. TASS noted on 2 May that Jarring had returned to New York "to make one more attempt" to revive his mission, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ghalib was reported by Belgrade's TANJUG on the 28th as saying Egypt believes Jarring's efforts represent the best way to work out a solution.

BILATERAL TALKS As in February, the Egyptian leader had talks with Brezhnev and Kosygin and other officials; Podgornyy apparently did not participate on either occasion. While Moscow failed to report as-Sadat's separate meeting with Brezhnev in February, TASS this time did note that they met on the 29th in a "comradely and cordial atmosphere" to discuss bilateral relations, including party ties, as well as the Middle East situation. The communique characterizes the general atmosphere of the Moscow talks as one of "full trust and mutual understanding," dropping the "friendship" additionally mentioned in February. But the communique this time makes no reference to discussion of "problems involved in bilateral relations," as the

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* President as-Sadat's last two previous visits to Moscow, 2-4 February 1972 and 11-13 October 1971, are discussed in the TRENDS of 9 February 1972, pages 31-36, and 14 October 1971, pages 13-14. His first visit after taking office was a "secret" one on 1-2 March 1971 which he revealed in a speech on 7 March.

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February statement had done; the two sides instead express "profound satisfaction" with the development of relations of friendship and fruitful cooperation, as well as satisfaction that the close friendship is "permanent, not transient."

As in February, as-Sadat was honored at a luncheon held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere" at which he and Kosygin exchanged speeches. Neither Moscow nor Cairo divulged the substance of the speeches in February and Soviet media again failed to publicize them this time, but Egyptian media did carry a short account of both leaders' remarks. Without acknowledging that as-Sadat's visit had been cut short by a day,* Kosygin seemed at pains to stress that the short talks resulted from "common understanding and unity of aims" and did not mean that "we have differed or that we have not reached agreement on certain matters." Kosygin added, according to the Cairo report, that "we were able to save efforts and reach an agreement which, without this approach, we would not have reached in three months of continuous talks."

Kosygin also reportedly declared that the discussions "emphasized the unity of action which will not be shaken under any circumstances." The Cairo account provided no elaboration of this assurance, which may have responded to Egyptian concern over President Nixon's forthcoming talks in Moscow. While Soviet propaganda made no reference to the Nixon visit in connection with as-Sadat's discussions, the Egyptian president, in a 24 April meeting in Cairo reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), said it was "imperative" that he visit Moscow before President Nixon "because the Middle East subject will certainly be discussed" by the Soviet and American leaders. The communique routinely refers to growing U.S. political, military, and financial support to Israel in the course of assailing Tel Aviv's "expansionist policy" and "unreasonable demands" for annexation of occupied Arab lands.

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* Cairo radio on the 28th, announcing the schedule for as-Sadat's visit, said he would leave on the morning of the 30th; later the same day MENA reported that the "spirit" which prevailed at the talks helped complete the discussions in one extended session lasting five and a half hours.

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POLITICAL SOLUTION AND "OTHER MEANS"

Differences between MENA's initial account of the communique and TASS' shed some light on the negotiations over formulation of the statement--not specifically attributed to one side or the other--that in present conditions, the Arab states against whom aggression has been committed have every right to "use other means, too" to regain the occupied lands. As transmitted by MENA on the 29th, this passage contained two additional elements: The Arab states have--"in addition to their efforts for a peaceful settlement"--every right to use other means to restore the Arab territories usurped by Israel. "All the peaceloving peoples," it added, "will accept with full understanding the use of these means." An hour later, MENA issued a correction deleting the two phrases to make its version coincide with that of TASS, except that both the MENA correction and a later Cairo radio report on the communique rendered the expression "other means" as "various means."

The "other means" passage in the communique is balanced by repetition from past communiques of a formula to the affect that a just and lasting peace can be established only with the implementation of all provisions of Resolution 242. The formula puts additional emphasis on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, calling this an "imperative condition," and adds routinely that the lawful rights of the Palestinian Arabs must be insured. It omits a phrase from this formula, present in the February and October communiques, referring to the rights and interests "of all countries and peoples" of the area. In another passage it refers to "hostile circles" frustrating a political settlement, while the February communique failed to mention such a settlement in any context.

Moscow's followup comment has repeated the "other means" passage in only two known instances, while continuing to stress the need for implementation of Resolution 242 and making occasional references to a political solution. A foreign-language commentary by Rassadin on the 30th, citing the "other means" phrase, went on to assert that after the as-Sadat visit "imperialist and Zionist propaganda" repeated the "threadbare idea" regarding the Arabs' "so-called aggressive character"; Rassadin insisted that Egypt had many times confirmed its readiness to settle the conflict "by political means" on the basis of Resolution 242. In the second instance, a dispatch on 1 May by PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent cited AL-AHRAM as stating that the Arab states are fully entitled to resort to "different means" to liberate their lands. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in

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Hebrew on the 27th had assured listeners that the "basic aim" of as-Sadat's visit was, "as before, to bring about a just political settlement." And a report on the communique broadcast by Radio Moscow in Italian on the 29th led off with the statement that the Soviet Union and Egypt "have expressed determination to continue to strive for a political settlement."

BACKGROUND: Moscow propagandists showed some concern last December, as as-Sadat's "year of decision" was drawing to an end, to counter what they called Western and Israeli propaganda exaggerations of "the significance of the military factor in Egyptian policy." RED STAR that month, for example, claimed that Israel was accusing the Arabs of aggressive aspirations in preparing political alibis for itself in the event of the renewal of military actions.

An atypical commentary last December did assert the Arabs' right to use "all means" in their struggle: The Soviet Union holds, it said, that "for the restoration of the Arab people's national rights and as a counterattack to imperialist aggression, it is the Arab people's sacred right to adopt all means" to continue the struggle for liberation. The commentary, broadcast in Mandarin on the 16th, responded to PRC "vilifications" of the USSR's Middle East policy during the UN General Assembly's Mideast debate. But other commentaries on the debate, including those broadcast in Mandarin, took the usual line that Peking was urging the Arab countries on to war and thus trying to further complicate a conflict that can and should be settled by political means.*

ANTI-ARAB "INTRIGUES" Several passages in the communique reflect concern over questioning in Egypt about Soviet-Egyptian relations as well as strains and dissensions among the Arab states. Soviet propaganda has been bearing down on alleged "imperialist-Israeli" psychological warfare against the Arabs, while as-Sadat in recent remarks in Cairo has displayed preoccupation with a "campaign of doubts." The communique notes that the Middle East situation is marked by an intensification of "imperialist intrigues" directed at undermining the progressive movement of Arab countries and

* Moscow reported in Arabic on 30 April that Egyptian presidential advisor Mahmud Riyad, discussing his March visit to China with Egyptian journalists, said Peking could not give effective military or economic help to the Arabs.

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isolating it "from its natural and reliable ally," the Soviet Union. The two sides also express conviction that the Arabs will surmount the "perfidious intrigues" of unidentified "enemies of peace and progress in the Middle East."

There is, in addition, a guarded reference to "events of recent months" which show that "circles hostile to progress in the Arab East and their agents" aim at breaking the Arab peoples' will, frustrating a political settlement, and forcing the Arabs to give in to imperialist demands. This cautious statement may have been prompted by King Husayn's 15 March announcement of a plan for a federated United Arab Kingdom, to which as-Sadat reacted by breaking relations with Jordan. Moscow's response to Husayn's proposal has been reserved: The highest-level reaction was only a belated statement by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee on 29 March expressing the concern of the "Soviet public" over the plan.

The communique as usual urges Arab unity on an anti-imperialist basis and resolute opposition to "attempts at splitting their ranks." As in February, the two sides did not take the occasion to repeat the October communique's condemnation of attempts to spread anticommunism and anti-Sovietism and thereby split the ranks of Arab revolutionary fighters. (However, the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union, in a 21 April communique issued with a visiting Hungarian party delegation, did assail anti-communism and anti-Sovietism as incompatible with the anti-imperialist struggle and the "cause of the Arab peoples' revolutionary movement.")

Soviet comment surrounding the visit has repeatedly called attention to attempts by "imperialism and rightwing Arab circles" to undermine Soviet-Arab relations and make the Arabs doubt their own strength. Thus a Glukhov article in PRAVDA on the 27th assailed "malicious activities" aimed at demoralizing the population and isolating Egypt from its friend the USSR. A panelist in the 30 April domestic service commentators' roundtable agreed with Cairo's AL-JUMHURIYAH that "some people in the West" are shedding crocodile tears over the threat to Egypt's independence "from the so-called Soviet 'presence.'"

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TASS at the time failed to report as-Sadat's defense of Soviet-Egyptian relations in a sharp question-and-answer session on 24 April with ASU members and representatives of the media. But a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 27th remarked that the Egyptian president "replied resolutely" to the imperialist-Zionist propaganda campaign to "cast doubts on Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union." It added that on the matter of strengthening defense capability--"an important issue for Egypt at present"--as-Sadat said it was the USSR which was providing Egypt with "decisive aid." According to Cairo accounts, as-Sadat, in responding to pointed questions about Soviet military deliveries, army morale, and domestic differences, repeatedly referred to "the campaign to cast doubts." While upholding the Cairo-Moscow relationship, he conceded that "we are short of certain things which it did not give us" and expressed willingness to accept assistance from any quarter.

SOVIET ARMS As in the October communique, the present document refers to further increasing Egypt's "military potential" rather than to the customary "defense capacity" as in the February communique. The two sides, it says, "found it necessary to study again in a spirit of fraternal cooperation measures directed at protecting" the Arabs' lawful rights and interests, "in particular by way of further increasing Egypt's military potential." It adds that agreement was reached on "a further strengthening of military cooperation between them," and on "appropriate important measures in this direction."

While the communique lists Soviet Defense Minister Grechko and Egypt's newly appointed air force commander, Maj. Gen. Husni Mubarak, as participating in the discussions, Moscow did not indicate that any further military talks would be held. In reporting the airport farewell ceremonies, TASS named Mubarak among those departing with as-Sadat. But MENA, reporting the delegation's return to Cairo, said it had been agreed that Mubarak and presidential advisor Marwan "would stay behind in Moscow for a while"; the two returned to Cairo at midnight on the 30th, MENA later reported.

TASS on 2 May, reporting as-Sadat's May Day speech in Alexandria, predictably ignored his statement that Egypt "will obtain in a reasonable time the necessary strength to liberate our land." This TASS account merely noted his sharp" condemnation of the United States and his "grateful comments" on the Soviet position.

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ROMANIA

BUCHAREST STRESSES PARTY UNITY THEME ON MAY DAY

In the wake of recent high-level personnel changes and Ceausescu's renewed diplomatic activity, Bucharest used the May Day festivities to underscore the theme of party unity under Ceausescu. According to AGERPRES, the large public rally in Bucharest stadium on 28 April was punctuated by lavish praise of the Romanian leader. The agency noted that Ceausescu and the other leaders were greeted on their arrival with ovations and by chanting of "Ceausescu-RCP" and "Ceausescu and the people"--the first appearance of the latter slogan in monitored Bucharest media.

The May Day address was delivered by Niculescu-Mizil, the party ideologue and close advisor to Ceausescu who was recently transferred from the party Secretariat to the office of deputy premier. The choice of Niculescu-Mizil as keynote speaker was manifestly designed to counter widespread Western speculation that has ranged from conjectures that he is being groomed as a replacement for the ailing Premier Maurer to suggestions that his removal from the Secretariat, where he handled delicate international and ideological issues, is a sop to Moscow. The official announcement of Niculescu-Mizil's transfer, reported by Radio Bucharest on 19 April, had merely explained the move in terms of "strengthening the activity of the Council of Ministers."

In the tradition of May Day speeches, Niculescu-Mizil praised the country's economic achievements in glowing terms, describing them as "a brilliant confirmation of the correctness and realism" of the party's economic and social policies. While acknowledging that the country "still has many problems to solve, many drawbacks and shortcomings to overcome," he declared confidently that the party, "closely united around the Central Committee headed by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu," would surmount its problems. The tasks of "perfecting party and state activity, to improve the governing of the whole society," he said, will be on the agenda of the party conference scheduled for July.

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Defending Romania's role in world affairs, Niculescu-Mizil underscored the responsibility of "each country, big or small," to promote world peace and reaffirmed that Romania will continue to make an "active" contribution "to the settlement of vital problems facing mankind." This policy, he added, "found brilliant expression in the recent visit paid by President Ceausescu to the countries of Africa." This apparently alludes to Ceausescu's reported offer to mediate in the Middle East. According to a 20 April Western press report, Ceausescu had made an offer to mediate between Egypt and Israel during his visit to Cairo earlier in the month, and it was accepted by as-Sadat. On the same day, Radio Bucharest reported that Israeli Premier Golda Meir would pay an official visit to Romania in the first half of May. In a possibly related development, AGERPRES reported that Ceausescu had met with Soviet Ambassador Drozdenko on the 19th "at the latter's request" and that the meeting had transpired in "a comradely atmosphere"--a euphemism for substantive differences. In his remarks on the Middle East, Niculescu-Mizil merely reaffirmed the Romanian call for a political settlement of the conflict based on the Security Council resolution.

Maintaining Romania's balancing act in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Niculescu-Mizil reaffirmed his country's determination to cooperate with "all" the socialist countries, specifically naming Moscow and its bloc allies as well as Peking and Tirana. He stated that Romania's international relations are based on "sovereignty, independence, and noninterference." He also reaffirmed Romania's determination to struggle against "the imperialist policy of diktat, aggression, and enslavement of peoples, against every manifestation of the threat of force in international life, and for the observance of the right of each people to decide its own fate."

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CUBA

CASTRO DESCRIBES GUANTA AS HOSTAGE IN MAY DAY SPEECH

In the course of a largely domestically oriented May Day speech on the eve of his departure for an extended tour of nine countries--including the Soviet Union in late June, a month after President Nixon--Cuban Premier Fidel Castro restated Cuba's lack of interest in any normalization of relations with the United States as long as the Nixon Administration is in power and raised the issue of the Guantanamo naval base in notably truculent terms. Portraying Guantanamo in effect as a hostage to keep the United States on good behavior, his remarks contrasted with earlier carefully moderated assurances of Cuban restraint. A pointed avowal that there would be no "secret talks" between Havana and Washington betrayed Castro's apprehensiveness about big-power diplomacy, as did an insistent assertion of confidence in Soviet adherence to "principle" in the face of President Nixon's "maneuvers." Castro also took the occasion to pledge continuing solidarity with Vietnam, promising "our plasma and our blood."

Restating his views on relations with other countries in Latin America, Castro was notably more moderate than he has been in the recent past in referring to the Organization of American States (OAS).

GUANTANAMO The Cuban leader pegged his remarks on Guantanamo to the U.S. directives issued earlier this year with respect to assistance to vessels that are subjected to Cuban naval attack, asserting that "the Pentagon's instructions . . . cannot scare us." He declared truculently that "if they are planning to use their warships against Cuba, let them not forget that they have the Guantanamo base here, which is a part of our territory that they have usurped"; that U.S. "ships, airplanes, and installations at the Guantanamo base are within the range of our artillery"; and that "if they sink a Cuban warship while protecting pirate ships, their installations and ships in Guantanamo will have to answer for that action."

Castro has not broached the Guantanamo issue in such terms in many years. He mentioned it twice in December, but in carefully moderate terms. At a 3 December press conference in Santiago, Chile, he remarked that "from a military and strategic viewpoint, the base is useless nowadays" and that it serves "only to humiliate our country . . ., only as a point of provocation and

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humiliation." Cuba's objectives, he continued, "do not include the conquest of this base or recovery of it." Insistent on this point, he added that to take Guantanamo by force "could be described as a great provocation, madness" and that "anyone who says we can and should try to take the Yankee base by force from the United States should be disqualified as an observer." Again, in a 22 December speech explaining the Cuban capture of two ships which had allegedly executed piratical actions against Cuba, Castro asserted that the recovery of Guantanamo "is not an objective in our basic policy" because "we know that one day they will have to leave Guantanamo."

THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT TALKS

Without directly mentioning the President's impending trip to the Soviet Union, Castro betrayed clear sensitivity to the notion that Cuba might become a pawn in the U.S.-Soviet discussions. Professing "full and absolute faith in the Soviet Union's foreign policy," he exhibited his chronic apprehensiveness over the vulnerability of small states to the self-interest of the big powers, declaring "we know that the maneuvers of Mr. Nixon will clash with the policy of principles of the Soviet Union in the international field" and that "the desperate efforts of this gentleman will not achieve anything."

The locus of Castro's concern was underscored in a 24 May radio commentary by the freewheeling Guido Garcia Inclan, a longtime close associate of Castro: Garcia Inclan said the Cuban leader's expression of confidence in Soviet foreign policy was responsive to speculation by "some shrewd and brainy persons" that "our Fidel had been called to Russia to talk there with them after they had held talks with the American President."

Although Cuban media briefly reported the 16 March announcement of the dates of President Nixon's USSR visit, there has been no direct comment on the summit in Cuban media.

On relations with the United States, Castro said "we will wait quietly until one day when realistic men rule that country," men who "show awareness of reality" and recognize that the United States can no longer serve as "gendarme of the world." In an allusion to secret diplomacy between the great powers, he said there would be "no secret talks" between Cuba and the United States. "We can wait as long as necessary," he declared. "What need do we have of relations with Yankee imperialism? What need do we have of fixing things with Mr. Nixon?"

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THE OAS AND LATIN AMERICA

On relations with the OAS and other Latin American nations, Castro restated the familiar Cuban positions. He noted the "increasing contradictions within the heart of the OAS," calling it a "colonial ministry" of the United States, and observed that "we respect the countries and the governments which have shown their more friendly positions toward Cuba." Reiterating Cuba's ideological commitment to revolutionary goals, Castro asserted that "we do not support any reformist policy" because "reformism resolves nothing," but that "in Latin America we favor a revolutionary policy" because "only genuine revolutions can resolve" the problems. Among the member governments of the OAS, he claimed, were "manifestations of a spirit of national independence which can become deep contradictions and which can go forward and become a revolution."

But Castro did not resort to the denunciatory epithets about the OAS that have embellished his previous speeches; nor did he specifically restate Cuba's refusal to rejoin the OAS; and he did not repeat his call for a "union of Latin American states." He did assert, however, that Cuba had been "deeply wounded, attacked, affronted" by the "economic aggression" of OAS members and that Cuba was not interested in "halfway terms" or "deals of any kind." "We will not be satisfied except for the full redemption of Cuba's rights," he asserted, adding that "we are in no hurry."

TRIP ITINERARY

Disclosing the details of his forthcoming foreign tour for the first time, Castro announced that he was beginning "a prolonged trip abroad" to visit nine countries--Guinea, Algeria, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. He explained that he had not traveled abroad for many years but that the "level" of Cuba's international relations and particularly "the present magnificent state of our relations with the revolutionary movement, with the socialist countries . . . inevitably require the acceptance of the invitations we have received repeatedly for years." Castro last visited Moscow in January 1964, prior to the fall of Khrushchev.

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In response to speculation about the stability of the Cuban system during his absence, Castro declared:

> We will leave confidently. The revolution is solid, strong. . . . A few years back, none of us could think of leaving the country, due to the imperialists, their threats, their things. This is not so today. Despite the imperialist threats and problems, we know that there is a solid nation, a solid revolution, and a solid leadership with more than enough men capable of accomplishing any task, to handle any situation.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

IZVESTIYA URGES AGRICULTURE MINISTRY TO BACK MECHANIZED LINKS

Renewed official interest in unregulated mechanized links is suggested by a flurry of articles in mid- and late April praising the controversial innovation. IZVESTIYA on 19 April published an article on the achievements of mechanized links in Krasnodar and Stavropol krays, along with a commentary by its agricultural observer M. Nikolayev challenging the Agriculture Ministry to support the innovation. Nikolayev asserted that the link system has entered a new stage of development requiring the support of scientists and specialists, and he explicitly called on the Agriculture Ministry and the Lenin Agricultural Academy to take a definitive stand on the links and to work out zonal systems of labor organization based on pay for the quality and quantity of the harvest.

The IZVESTIYA article criticized the ministry for not taking a "clear, responsible" position on links--for not having "any definite opinion about the importance of links and their prospects." Noting that the ministry had only recently created a study group on the problem, the article complained that scientists were also avoiding the subject and that "the last discussion of links occurred over two years ago" at a conference in the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for the Organization and Payment of Labor in Agriculture. It criticized a statement by a Stavropol scientist in January that unregulated links were producing widely varying results and were still in an experimental stage.

The work of mechanized links also drew praise in a 19 April RURAL LIFE article by Kalinin First Secretary N. G. Korytkov, a 20 April RURAL LIFE report on a Moscow oblast seminar of link workers, a 20 April SOVIET RUSSIA article by Krasnodar agriculture secretary I. Kalashnikov, and an article in the April PARTY LIFE, No. 8, by Central Committee agriculture section deputy head I. N. Kuznetsov. Reporting that "thousands" of brigades and links modeled after Vladimir Pervitskiy's pioneer mechanized links were at work in the Kuban and the Ukraine, Kuznetsov predicted that "this progressive form [of labor organization and wages] has a big future."

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

SALT AND DISARMAMENT

Moscow's commentary on SALT remains minimal and at a low level, predictably ignoring Kissinger's 26 April statement to reporters in Washington on the progress of SALT. Nor has there been any Soviet reaction to White House press secretary Ziegler's 1 May announcement on the "major advance" that resulted from communications between President Nixon and Brezhnev. A 2 May Moscow radio international service commentary by N. Arkaddin observed without elaboration that "the Soviet-U.S. talks in Helsinki are approaching a decisive stage." It went on to stress the prohibitive costs of modern weapons, noting that the "main underwater long-range rocket systems" developed by the United States would each cost one billion dollars. Moscow duly noted the 27 April adjournment of the Geneva disarmament talks until 20 June and routinely attacked the United States and Great Britain for delaying a treaty on chemical weapons.

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