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27 JUNE 1973 CONF

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT

MOSCOW LAUDS SUMMIT AND NEW ERA IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The Soviet Union has made extraordinary efforts over the past week to present Brezhnev's 18-25 June visit to the United States as an event of historical significance. The volume of radio comment on the visit has alone exceeded that devoted to any previous visit in more than a dozen years, being matched only by the coverage of Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959. The message conveyed is that of satisfaction with recent developments in Soviet-U.S. relations and of optimism about the future. The comment has stressed two main themes in characterizing the results of the visit:

+ The visit has solidified the gains made at the Moscow summit of 1972, added momentum to the trends set in motion by that event, and created an atmosphere conducive to further practical achievements.

+ The talks have recorded a number of historic achievements, including commitments to expand trade and to move ahead on strategic arms control. The crowning achievement is the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.

POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

Moscow has given a highly positive assessment of the results of the summit, going so far as to assert that its achievements exceeded all expectations. Echoing a theme developed in the weeks before the summit, the comment has played up the notion that Brezhnev's visit marks a "povorot" or turning point in East-West relations. IZVESTIYA on 26 June expressed confidence that the "long-awaited era of post-war history is now coming." Stressing the long-term nature of the developments represented by the visit, the comment has presented it both as a consummation of trends set in motion by the Moscow summit and as a powerful new impetus to those trends.

A corollary theme is the notion that the summit represents a political commitment with long-term implications. This theme was stressed by Brezhnev himself at the Soviet embassy dinner on the 22d, when he reassured skeptics that the Soviet attitude toward improved relations with the United States was "not something temporary" but a policy that derived from permanent principles. In underscoring this theme, the media has sought to provide historical justification for a belief that U.S.-Soviet detente can be a stable, long-term proposition by emphasizing the absence of inherently insoluble problems between the two nations and by recalling the good relations they had enjoyed in the past. The

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Moscow domestic service roundtable on the 24th concluded a review of these relations with the assertion that the two countries had "always ended up as allies" whenever their paths had crossed.

CONTINUING PROBLEMS Neither Brezhnev nor Soviet commentators have attempted to gloss over the difficulties that remain on the road to full normalization. Brezhnev more than once spoke of the long road ahead. At the Soviet embassy dinner he acknowledged that "many unsolved problems" await solution, citing specifically strategic arms limitation and trade. While the media have focused primarily on the bright prospects for improved relations they also have acknowledged the existence of problems, including those posed by the U.S. domestic opposition. Yuriy Zhukov and fellow correspondents in the 21 June PRAVDA reminded their readers that the favorable turn in relations between the two countries is not yet irreversible.

Moscow has displayed confidence, however, about the advantages and durability of the new relationship it is cultivating with the United States. It has been much less cautious than in the past in publicly acknowledging that common ground exists between the two countries on key world problems. Although Moscow has reacted strongly to charges that the summit represents a further example of superpower "collusion," it has nevertheless not hesitated to portray a deepening collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States on a wide range of issues and a joint U.S.-Soviet responsibility for the maintenance of world peace.

In justifying its policy of improved relations with the United States, Moscow has cited evidence from public opinion polls and elsewhere of the rapidly changing attitude of Americans toward the USSR and its policies. Though residual elements of opposition to bilateral cooperation are duly noted, their importance is discounted. Moreover, comment during the summit asserted that the Brezhnev visit itself has contributed to the process. The domestic service roundtable concluded that the summit and the agreements signed had "radically altered the attitude of Americans toward the land of the Soviets."

COOPERATION, TRADE Moscow has to a large extent eschewed extensive comment on the individual cooperation agreements signed during the course of the visit. The media has instead focused on the impetus they are expected to give to the development of a network of ties and to the encouragement of an attitude of cooperation between the two countries. In explaining the need for increased

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trade and the potential of the USSR as a partner in trade, the comment has generally echoed the arguments that were fully expounded in the media in the months preceding the summit.

As expected, the Soviet commentaries have emphasized trade as a key element in the development of a better cooperative relationship. They have focused on the sharp increase in trade registered during the past year and on future prospects rather than on the difficulties noted by U.S. economists and congressional critics. This approach was likewise taken by Brezhnev in his official statements during the visit. The media have been highly critical of the congressional frustration of most favored nation status for the USSR, with IZVESTIYA calling it "intolerable discrimination to which the Soviet Union cannot agree." At the same time, the PRAVDA report suggested flexibility in the Soviet position by noting Washington POST reports that the meeting with Congressmen had given rise to talk of compromise--"and this is what the Soviet Union is seeking."

Most of the Soviet comment on trade was centered on Brezhnev's meetings with members of Congress on 19 June and with prominent U.S. businessmen on the 22d. On the first meeting, the comment went to unusual lengths to acknowledge the critical role that Congress will play in deciding the success of Brezhnev's efforts to increase Soviet-American trade. In discussing the meeting on the 22d, PRAVDA, along with most of the central press, gave front-page treatment to Brezhnev's unusually candid remarks regarding the mutuality of interests and the urgency of abandoning "obsolete ideas and traditions" in this field. Soviet accounts suggested that Brezhnev had achieved some success in his talks, and it was in this context that praise for his personal role, otherwise at a moderate level, was most apparent.

STRATEGIC ISSUES The comment has described the agreement reached on SALT as marking "a new step forward" and as opening "favorable prospects" for a permanent agreement on strategic offensive arms in the future. Zhukov and others in the 22 June PRAVDA said that the agreement on the principles of negotiations signed on the 21st should "accelerate" the talks, but they reflected the cautious language of the agreement by speaking only of the "possibility" that the eventual permanent agreement would limit qualitative aspects of the arms race. On the whole, the media has praised the SALT document in general terms but has avoided substantive comment, hewing to a well-established practice on sensitive SALT issues.

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Attention in the strategic area has been focused instead on the agreement on prevention of nuclear war, signed on 22 June. That agreement has been portrayed by Soviet media as the main document to emerge from the summit and as an event of supreme historical significance. In addition to stressing its importance for U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, the comment has drawn particular attention to its importance for third countries. TASS director general Zamyatin, in a press conference at San Clemente reported on the 22d, said that the agreement is intended in part to "prevent the outbreak of nuclear war between either side and other states."

By playing up the image of superpower self-restraint implied by the agreement, Moscow may hope to allay third country suspicions regarding U.S.-Soviet "collusion" and in general give support to its claim that U.S.-Soviet cooperation is beneficial to all countries. It may also hope to counter the suspicions concerning a possible Soviet nuclear strike against China. The comment has already asserted that the agreement refutes the "superpower collusion" charges made by the Chinese and the opponents of detente in the West. In France on 26 June, Brezhnev reaffirmed the significance he personally attaches to the agreement while reassuring the French and other third parties potentially affected that the accord is "in the vital interests of all peoples."

The nonuse of force pledge in the agreement is consistent with Moscow's long expressed desire and its efforts in recent years to reach comprehensive bilateral and regional nonuse of force agreements with potential adversaries. Such agreements were a basic element of the Soviet "peace program" outlined by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress in the spring of 1971. The USSR has concluded such a treaty with the FRG and has proposed one to the Chinese. The formulation in the U.S.-Soviet agreement differs from earlier Soviet versions by pledging nonuse of force with respect to third countries and by declaring the pledge applicable only in circumstances "which may endanger international peace and security."

The emphasis on nonuse of force has largely replaced the earlier Soviet advocacy of a specific ban on the use of nuclear weapons alone--a notion which made little headway in the postwar period in the face of West European concern about a nuclear ban while Soviet conventional forces remained intact. A Soviet proposal at the United Nations last fall formally linked the two concepts for the first time. Brezhnev in December 1972 announced a Soviet desire to follow up the UN resolution by signing bilateral commitments with the nuclear powers.

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EAST EUROPE ALLIES HAIL SUCCESS OF SUMMIT MEETINGS

Brezhnev's U.S. visit was warmly approved by Moscow's orthodox East European allies, who published the text of the 25 June final communique in their main party dailies and maintained a moderate volume of favorable comment during the course of the summit. In contrast to the treatment of the earlier Moscow summit, the comment this time largely avoided criticism of the United States, stressing instead the achievement of the summit as a triumph for Moscow's detente policy. Sporadic criticism of Peking in connection with the visit appeared in the comment of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

Concern on the part of Romania and Yugoslavia over the implications of the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations resulted in more restrained treatment of the recent summit by these two countries, as compared with their comment last year. Typically, Tirana stepped up its diatribe against the alleged U.S.-Soviet "collusion."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND, BULGARIA

Moscow's most reliable allies in East Europe hailed the summit and the agreements that accompanied it as an unprecedented and unqualified success for the Soviet detente policy and for Brezhnev personally. This success was attributed to the adoption of "realistic" policies by the Nixon Administration allegedly prompted by the repeated failure of the policies of the "cold war." The achievements of the summit, however, were said to be opposed by cold-war politicians in the United States and elsewhere in the West and, as pointed out by Prague commentators, by the "Maoist" leadership of China.

Following Brezhnev's departure from the United States, the Prague party daily RUDE PRAVO commented that the Nixon-Brezhnev talks had "followed the systematic and continuous current of the Soviet foreign policy initiative, a current which the entire progressive world correctly calls 'the peace offensive.'" Referring to the 22 June agreement on prevention of nuclear war, the paper added that "the United States was compelled to sign" this document providing for renunciation of the threat of force against the Soviet Union and its allies. Also in the wake of this agreement, the Bratislava radio on the 24th said unqualifiedly that Brezhnev's visit was "the most productive summit in history."

A Warsaw PAP commentary on the 23d was similarly lavish in declaring that "the number and scope of agreements signed by L. Brezhnev and

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R. Nixon have no precedent in the history of international relations," and that "all these agreements provide breathtaking vistas" regarding detente, removal of tensions, and arms control. The Bulgarian military daily NARODNA ARMIYA on the 26th attributed the trend toward detente in international relations "primarily to the peaceful and constructive foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries," exemplified by Brezhnev's visit. A RABOTNICHESKO DELO editorial on the 22d had noted, like Prague, that the Soviet detente policies were not to the liking of either the "cold war" exponents or "the Peking rulers."

Polish commentaries, including one in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 25th, called attention to the effectiveness of Brezhnev's TV speech both regarding its content and its impact on the American public. Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 21st also noted the effectiveness of Brezhnev's informal appearances before American TV cameras.

GDR, HUNGARY Comment by East Berlin and Budapest was somewhat more restrained, combining praise for the achievements of Brezhnev's visit with reminders of the obstacles facing detente. The visit did not receive primary attention in East Berlin newscasts until the 25th, when the final communique appeared. In contrast to the optimistic treatment of Brezhnev's TV speech by Warsaw and Prague, an East Berlin radio commentary on the 25th used the speech as the occasion for a long diatribe against the opponents of detente. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, which carried the text of the final communique on the 26th, commented in the same issue that Brezhnev's visit was "an" outstanding event in international relations and "a significant contribution" to consolidating peace.

Hungarian comment, while more optimistic than that of the GDR regarding the long-range impact of the summit, still manifested caution in this regard. Thus NEPSZABADSAG's authoritative foreign affairs commentator Ferenc Varnai observed on the 24th that even with the "tremendous" results of the summit, "foreign political experts and commentators are analyzing whether we are facing an assured and lasting tendency" or "only a short-lived detente." He went on to note that militarists and anticommunists, whose "role is still a significant one, are doing their utmost to curb the present process." Varnai concluded that on balance the situation "may develop in the world when a large part of the socialist resources are not tied down by the expenditures of military defense," but can be devoted to peaceful competition with capitalism "in a hard and complex struggle over many more decades." NEPSZABADSAG's correspondent on the 26th referred to the "not yet completed balance of the Soviet-American summit" in noting that

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"more and more Americans understand and agree that, in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the tradition sealed with the name of President Franklin Roosevelt is beginning to dominate." This fact, he added, is reflected in "the present American Government's considerably deeper sense of reality" than that of its more recent predecessors.

On the 16th, two days before Brezhnev's arrival, NEPSZABADSAG's correspondent had bracketed opposition in the United States to Brezhnev's visit with tendencies toward closer relations with the People's Republic of China. The correspondent warned that "the sober American circles know well that this 'Chinese orientation' would be a dangerous policy from the point of view of America's interests."

ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA

The two independently oriented European communist countries--fearful that intensified U.S.-Soviet detente could be detrimental to their precarious position vis-a-vis Moscow--evinced less enthusiasm for Brezhnev's visit than they had for the President's visit to the USSR. They had, in turn, been less effusive about the Moscow summit than they had been over the President's trip to Peking. In contrast to the coverage of the Moscow summit, when Bucharest's SCINTEIA commented favorably on the President's visit the day after his arrival in the Soviet Union, Romanian media carried only factual reports on Brezhnev's visit to the United States, without comment. In addition to Bucharest radio news bulletins, the party daily SCINTEIA carried brief news reports of Brezhnev's activities and summaries of the bilateral agreements on its back page under the heading "International Life."

Yugoslav comment, smaller in volume than during the Moscow summit, treated Brezhnev's visit as a success but noted "many obstacles" remaining in the way of full rapprochement between the two countries. Also, with obvious reference to the interests of the third-world countries, Belgrade's POLITIKA cautioned on the 26th that "great hopes stimulated by American-Soviet rapprochement should be confirmed by practical broadening of the possibilities of democratizing world relations," adding that "if these relations are not democratic, they cannot be firm." Similarly, BORBA urged the same day that the results of the visit be applied to "the main problem" of peace, security, and international cooperation "on an equal basis." Another commentary, carried by the Belgrade domestic radio on the 26th, noted that the final communique did not reflect agreement on the Middle East, adding however that, "in spite of everything, the Nixon-Brezhnev talks have yielded positive results."

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ALBANIA Tirana stepped up the volume of its charges of "collusion" between "the two superpowers" over the level reached during the Moscow summit. A broadcast in Polish on the 26th charged that "the numerous agreements" signed during Brezhnev's visit "have been depicted in a demagogical way in the communique as a considerable contribution to world peace," thus "camouflaging the dangerous plots" between the two leaders. ATA on the 24th assailed the agreement on prevention of nuclear war, citing "foreign observers" to the effect that the United States and the USSR "are continuing underground nuclear explosions." The same report cited REUTER for the observation, regarding Brezhnev's visit to San Clemente, that "the chieftain of the Soviet revisionists 'was the first leader of a foreign country to whom this honor has been reserved.'"

In one of the few references to Peking in the Albanian comment, an editorial on Brezhnev's visit in the 21 June ZERI I POPULLIT charged that "the Brezhnev clique . . . aims at placing China in a double encirclement, from one side with its armies which it has long since concentrated along the Soviet-Chinese border and, on the other, with the Americans who are setting foot and extending their hands on Siberia" in the form of "broad plans for mass exploitation" of its underground resources.

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MIDDLE EAST

BREZHNEV CALLS FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT; MOSCOW REASSURES ARABS

The joint communique on Brezhnev's U.S. visit dealt with the Middle East in much more cursory fashion than the communique issued at the conclusion of the President's visit to the USSR in May 1972, but the two sides did pledge to continue their efforts to faciliate a settlement. Brezhnev referred only briefly to the Middle East in his speech on U.S. television, but this was in keeping with his generally low-key treatment of major international questions. Broadcasts in Moscow's Arabic-language service during the Brezhnev visit played up the significance of his discussions there for international detente and asserted that Arab public opinion considered that the visit and "other Soviet foreign policy steps"--unspecified--would have a "direct influence" on the Middle East situation. Followup comment in Arabic described the Middle East passage of the communique as in harmony with the interests of the Arabs and claimed that it compelled "the forces of aggression" to take into account "objective facts" of the contemporary world.

U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

In the joint communique the sides expressed deep concern over the Middle East situation and exchanged opinions on ways of achieving a settlement, agreeing "to continue their efforts to facilitate an earliest possible settlement." As in the U.S.-Soviet communique on the May 1972 summit talks in Moscow, the current document noted that the sides "set out their positions" on the problem. But in a notable variation from the 1972 communique the current one failed to repeat the sides' expression of support for Security Council Resolution 242. The communique's failure to mention the resolution is the more puzzling in view of Moscow comment before and after Brezhnev's visit. Thus, a Petrov article in NEW TIMES (No. 23, 8 June) observed that the 1972 U.S.-Soviet communique "officially sealed the U.S. position" with regard to the need for a settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of Resolution 242. And TASS commentator Kornilov commenting on the summit meeting on 27 June cited the resolution, and Jarring's mission, in reiterating Soviet support for a peaceful political settlement.*

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* Arab criticism of the communique for failing to mention Resolution 242 was obliquely acknowledged by TASS in a Beirut-datelined dispatch on the 27th. According to TASS, a Lebanese paper editorially defended the communique for speaking of "more important matters" than those dealt with in the resolution--specifically, Palestinian rights, which were "discussed for the first time at summit level."

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in the course of registering both sides' hopes for a settlement in line with the interests of all states in the area, the communique referred to the Palestinians' "legitimate interests." Such expressions of concern for the Palestinian people have long been a staple of Soviet propaganda, but there was no such reference in the 1972 Moscow communique.

BREZHNEV TV ADDRESS

Brezhnev's brief remarks on the Middle East in his television address were consistent with Moscow's low-keyed treatment of the problem in recent months, and Brezhnev himself in formal speeches has usually addressed the issue only in generalized terms. Remarking that he and the President had "touched" on the "acute" Middle East situation, Brezhnev went on to express the belief that justice must be insured in the area and a lasting peace settlement achieved which would restore "the legitimate rights of those who suffered in the war" and would insure "the security of all peoples of the area." While the formulation on security of "all" peoples has seemed calculated to point to Israel,* Brezhnev might also have had in mind Arab arguments that their security interests should also be considered. He added that this "is important for all the peoples of the Middle East without exception."

Brezhnev's reference to "the legimate rights of those who suffered in the war" would seem to be a variation of the phrase in his 21 December report last year on the 50th anniversary of the USSR. On that occasion he called for "concrete political actions" to force Israel to agree to a peaceful settlement and to recognize "the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples." In that speech he had pledged Soviet readiness to contribute to this effort and had referred to resolution of the conflict on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions.

ASSURANCE TO ARABS

During Brezhnev's visit, Moscow radio repeatedly assured Arab listeners that the U.S.-Soviet summit would not be detrimental to their interests. Arabic-language broadcasts have said, among other things, that the Soviet struggle for general international detente is compatible

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* The security formulation has apparently been used as an alternative to Moscow's previous expressions of support for Israel's right to exist. Brezhnev in a speech in August 1970 declared Soviet support for insuring "national rights, security, and independence for all states" in the area. And a Soviet Government statement in September 1972 called for "an opportunity for all peoples of the area to live in peace and security."

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with hopes for a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Denying Arab press allegations of U.S.-Soviet "collusion," Moscow insisted that efforts to achieve a solution in the Middle East do not at all mean that the USSR is anxious to settle the problem "at any cost."

Moscow's reassurance has been directed in particular to Egypt, and a CPSU delegation's visit to Cairo coincided with the beginning of Brezhnev's U.S. trip. Arabic-language broadcasts reported that the delegation stressed to its hosts--the Arab Socialist Union--the significance of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks and at the same time reaffirmed "consistent" Soviet assistance and support for the Arabs' struggle for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories. The delegation head, in an interview broadcast in Arabic on the 21st, insisted that officials of the Arab Socialist Union regarded the Brezhnev visit as an important international event, while "ordinary people" in Egypt expressed total satisfaction with the USSR's peaceful coexistence policy.

The CPSU delegation apparently also sought to restrain Egyptian press criticism of Moscow's Middle East policies: TASS reported on 17 June that at a meeting of the delegation with Deputy Prime Minister for Culture and Education Hatim, the sides agreed that Egyptian and Soviet mass media "should be used only in the interests of strengthening, developing, and propagandizing" the friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations, and should expose all attempts to question the sincerity and strength of this friendship. Moscow has seemingly tried to keep its rejoinder to recent Cairo press critiques in low key; thus a 2 June article by the editor of the weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWM speculating on the correct interpretation of the Middle East passage in the May 1972 Soviet-American communique drew no direct Soviet reply, but a week later the Cairo paper published what it described as a response by "official Soviet sources" in Moscow. The "Soviet officials" maintained, according to AKHBAR AL-YAWM, that Brezhnev during his meeting with Nixon would defend the Soviet Union's interests in the Middle East which they described as in line with Arab interests.

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INDOCHINA

Within two weeks after the conclusion of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in Paris and the signing of the 13 June communique reaffirming the Vietnam peace accord, both the PRG and the DRV have issued official protests over alleged Saigon violations of the agreements. While Hanoi is generally more restrained than the PRG in criticizing the United States, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 26th underlined its view that the United States is responsible for Saigon's actions.

Moscow continues its circumspect treatment of the United States while deploring Saigon's violations of the peace accord. Brezhnev in his 24 June speech on U.S. television went beyond earlier Soviet statements when he declared that "the improvement of Soviet-American relations undoubtedly has played a role in helping to end the years-long Vietnam war." Other forums for Soviet statements since the peace agreement have not lent themselves to such a claim. But a Soviet role in the settlement could be read into Brezhnev's 30 January Moscow remarks in Le Duc Tho's presence that the USSR actively helped its Vietnamese friends on the "diplomatic" as well as military and political fronts. As though to reassure its allies of its concern Moscow radio on the 23d broadcast in Vietnamese a PRAVDA article warning that the prospects for full implementation of the peace agreement have been darkened by reported Saigon military operations.

While Hanoi has carried brief reports of Brezhnev's activities during his visit to the United States, it has refrained from comment. Moreover, VNA excised an endorsement of the trip from its account of a speech by Mongolian party chief Tsendenbal at a 22 June reception honoring a DRV party-government delegation headed by Premier Pham Van Dong. PRG media have ignored Brezhnev's trip.

Le Duc Tho on 25 June returned home from his Paris talks with Kissinger after a week's sojourn in Moscow, from 16 to 23 June, and a stopover in Peking on the 24th and 25th. There was no explanation for the lengthy stay in Moscow, where he had been received on the 18th by Kirilenko and Katushev. The Chinese gave him their standard reception--a meeting with Chou En-lai for a "very cordial and friendly conversation" and a banquet in his honor.

PRG, DRV PROTEST U.S., SAIGON "VIOLATIONS" OF PEACE ACCORD

The 25 June PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement accused both the United States and Saigon of "violating their commitments by words and deeds" during the past two weeks and demanded that they strictly

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implement the peace accords. The statement said that, "first and foremost," Saigon must "seriously" observe the cease-fire order, and it claimed that in the two-week period the GVN had perpetrated 2,405 violations of the cease-fire, including 184 infantry operations, two of them of division size. Saigon, it said, had also violated other provisions of the accord, including those on guaranteeing the realization of democratic liberties and the return of prisoners, and had obstructed the consultative talks with the PRG in Paris as well as the two-party JMC sessions in Saigon.

DRV endorsement of the PRG charges came promptly on the 26th with a foreign ministry spokesman's statement of its own. And the seriousness with which the communists view the continued military action in South Vietnam was demonstrated in an article in the Hanoi army daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th. It asserted that the PLAF has the right to "use all forces and take all measures to cope with Saigon's war acts," and it specifically warned that the PLAF would not only respond to Saigon attacks in the "liberated areas" but would also, "when need be, directly strike at their staging and command bases."

The complaints against the United States were in terms of its support of the GVN and of the continued U.S. bombing of Cambodia. The PRG statement said that Saigon in violating the accord had been "supported and encouraged by the United States." The DRV spokesman protested that "the U.S. side has not taken any positive action to make the Saigon administration seriously implement the Paris agreement on Vietnam and the joint communique." Both the PRG and the DRV statements made clear that they regard U.S. bombing in Cambodia as a violation of the peace agreement and the Paris communique. While the PRG spokesman directly challenged Kissinger's 13 June Paris press conference statement that the communique does not restrict U.S. military activities in Cambodia, the spokesman for the DRV, like earlier Hanoi comment, avoided mentioning Kissinger and instead criticized only Schlesinger for his 18 June remarks. Both statements cited Schlesinger as saying that he would not rule out a resumption of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 27th suggested concern about possible bombing of the North. Repeating earlier denials of reports that a North Vietnamese jet had flown over Quang Tri a week earlier, it asked rhetorically: "Did they fabricate these stories in preparation for new sinister schemes and adventures?" The paper pointed out that the story was released on the heels of

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Schlesinger's statement raising the possibility of resumed bombing of the DRV and that it coincided with President Thieu's 19 June Armed Forces Day statement that peace could only be achieved by military force.

PRG ROLE The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 25th took particular issue with GVN refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the PRG in South Vietnam. The spokesman specifically protested remarks by GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam, at a 14 June press conference, to the effect that the zones of control mentioned in the Paris agreement are merely areas of troop encampments and his view that the GVN is the only legitimate government in South Vietnam. The PRG statement charged that Lam had revealed the GVN design to annex PRG-administered areas and to deny the "reality" that "there exist in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and two zones of control." Emphasizing the importance the PRG attaches to this point, the spokesman added: "If this reality was not recognized, there would be no Paris agreement, no act of the international conference on Vietnam, and no joint communique."

While communist comment on the peace accord has argued that it recognizes the situation in South Vietnam with the existence of two administrations, the obverse proposition--that the agreement would not have been reached without this recognition--has not been commonly stated. But this notion was broached in a 10 June NHAN DAN editorial on the international stature of the PRG. It maintained that "denying the existence of the revolutionary administration means denying a basis that led to the signing of the Paris agreement."

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KOREA

PYONGYANG DECRIES SEPARATE UN SEATS AS PROMOTING TWO KOREAS

In the conditions of stalemate in the North-South Korean talks on reunification, both Seoul and Pyongyang have made sharply opposing moves in their jockeying for position in the international community in anticipation of this fall's UNGA consideration of the Korean question. On 23 June, two days before the 23d anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, ROK President Pak Chong-hui announced a new policy supporting entry of both North and South Korea into the United Nations, a policy he interpreted in the context of big-power developments as well the flagging momentum in relations between the Korean regimes. Later that day North Korean leader Kim Il-song expressed acute concern over the effect of separate membership in the UN on perpetuating a two-Koreas situation, and he countered by refurbishing Pyongyang's proposal for a North-South confederation as a means for entering the world body under one name. At the same time, both sides have expressed readiness to be represented separately at the UNGA debate on Korea, Pak having dropped Seoul's opposition to a North Korean presence, and Kim having omitted the demand that Pyongyang be invited "unconditionally."

Kim elaborated the DPRK's line at a Pyongyang rally honoring a visiting Czechoslovak delegation that began only ten hours after Pak's speech on the 23d. Avoiding any mention of Pak by name or any explicit reference to his statement earlier that day, Kim accused the "South Korean authorities" of obstructing the North-South dialog and seeking to perpetuate the division of Korea. Reflecting the deadlock in the talks between the two sides, Kim acknowledged that "the bright prospect for national unification which was opened before our nation when the historic North-South joint statement was published a year ago is now darkening." He then proceeded to "newly clarify" Pyongyang's proposals, including the convening of a "national assembly" comprising North and South Korean groups and forming a North-South confederation, "leaving intact the two systems existing in the North and South for the time being."

Embellishing this proposal, Kim suggested that the confederation be named "the Confederal Republic of Koryo," taking the name of a Korean kingdom from the 10th to the 14th centuries which Kim described as "the worldwide-known name of a united state which existed once on the territory of our country." Adapting this

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suggestion to Pyongyang's opposition to separate membership in the UN, Kim declared that if the two Korean sides "want to enter the UN before the achievement of the reunification of the country, they should enter it as one state at least under the name of the Confederal Republic of Koryo" after a confederation has been arranged. Kim indicated that in the meantime, however, he wanted Pyongyang's voice to be heard in international forums. He said that "separately" from the question of UN membership, the DPRK "should naturally be invited" to take part in the discussion if the Korean question is inscribed on the UN agenda. He made no reference to Pyongyang's longstanding insistence that it be invited unconditionally.

Where his South Korean counterpart had invoked international realities as justifying a policy which acknowledges two Korean regimes competing in the international arena, Kim registered disquiet over the stabilizing effect of improved U.S. relations with the big communist powers. He twice attacked the United States for seeking to dominate smaller nations while "improving its relations only with big countries," and he criticized the Nixon Doctrine as designed to create two Koreas. The international considerations in Pyongyang's reaction to Pak's demarche were evident in a 25 June KCNA assessment of the statement by "the person in high authority" in South Korea. Deriding Pak's statement as revealing his unchanged "treacherous stand" on Korean unification, KCNA complained that separate entry into the United Nations would foster a two-Koreas situation "even in the international arena," and it took exception to his "impertinent" overture for contacts with the communist countries.

KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY

Pyongyang's treatment of this year's Korean War anniversary muted the customary vituperation against the United States and the ROK while focusing on "the program for preventing the country from being divided indefinitely and promoting the cause of reunification" advanced in Kim's "historic speech" of 23 June. As if to underscore the importance of Kim's proposals, the usual Pyongyang rally on the 25th drew a higher-level leadership representation than last year and the size of the rally crowd was given as 200,000--ten times larger than last year. Premier Kim Il and Vice Premier Pak Song-chol headed this year's turnout followed by KPA Chief of General Staff O Chin-u, the ranking leader at last year's rally. O's address at the rally consisted almost entirely of a reiteration of the major points contained in Kim's 23 June speech. O pointed specifically at the "so-called 'special

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statement' made public by the person in high authority of South Korea on 23 June" as evidence that "the South Korean authorities do not want the country's reunification." O refrained, however, from criticizing Pak by name in calling for the "South Korean authorities" to "give up at once the plot to create 'two Koreas' and respond without delay to our proposal for founding the Confederal Republic of Koryo between the North and the South."

PEKING In keeping with its close ties with Pyongyang, Peking promptly weighed in with support for Kim Il-song's position on Korean unification. Only a day after Kim's 23 June speech, Chou En-lai used the occasion of a banquet given by the visiting Malian president to endorse Kim's "new initiative" as one that "will truly help toward the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea and the further relaxation of the tension in the Korean peninsula." NCNA highlighted Chou's endorsement by issuing a separate report on his remarks about Korea.

Peking also used the Korean War anniversary to offer authoritative support for the North Korean line, but its treatment of the anniversary reflected Peking's improved relations with the United States and Japan--two targets of Kim's polemical thrusts. A 25 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the anniversary expressed support for Kim's elaboration of Pyongyang's proposals on Korean reunification--including his objection to separate UN seats--and his demands for a U.S. troop withdrawal and for dissolution of UNCURK. Using an image favored by Mao in recent months for expressing Peking's affinities with other Asian communists, the editorial said that "China and Korea are of one family." However, Peking's divergences from Pyongyang regarding relations with the United States and Japan were reflected in the editorial's mild treatment of the United States and its failure to repeat last year's attacks on "Japanese militarism." For the second successive year, Peking failed to hold a rally to mark the anniversary.

The Taiwan question, which formerly figured prominently in Peking's observance of the Korean War anniversary, received only a pro forma passage in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, which notably failed to mention the United States in this context. The editorial omitted last year's criticism of two-Chinas proposals and failed to renew the demand for the United States to withdraw its troops from Taiwan. That demand was last presented authoritatively in the editorial marking the Korean War anniversary last year.

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MOSCOW The Soviets have been less reserved than a year ago in reacting to Pyongyang's moves on Korean reunification, but there has been only sketchy comment thus far. TASS briefly reported a "warm and friendly" meeting on the 26th between Premier Kosygin and the DPRK ambassador at the latter's request at which Kosygin termed Kim's proposals an "important initiative" aimed at "easing tension on the Korean peninsula." Also on the 26th, a Moscow broadcast in Korean told of a press conference in Moscow held by the DPRK embassy to explain the reunification policy "newly clarified" by Kim, but the specific terms of the policy were not discussed.

Another Soviet broadcast in Korean on the 26th reported the customary Moscow rally on the 25th to mark the Korean War anniversary and the attendant Soviet-Korean "solidarity month." The chairman of the Soviet-Korean friendship society voiced support for Pyongyang's reunification policy.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 JUNE 1973

Moscow (2909 items)			Peking (1117 items)		
Brezhnev in U.S.	(17%)	55%	Domestic Issues	(41%)	42%
[Brezhnev Speeches	(--)	20%]	Mali President in PRC	(--)	13%
[U.S.-Soviet Agreements	(--)	8%]	DPRK Economic Delegation in PRC	(2%)	6%
China	(5%)	3%	PRC Foreign Minister in Iran, Pakistan	(7%)	5%
Soviet Local Elections, 17 June	(7%)	3%	Cambodia	(7%)	5%
Vietnam	(3%)	2%	[Sihanouk in East Europe	(4%)	3%]
			Vietnam	(19%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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