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25 JULY 1973

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Confidential

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TRENDS

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INDOCHINA

SIHANOUK, INSURGENTS EXPRESS CONFIDENCE, OPPOSE COMPROMISE

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk and spokesmen for his government (RGNU) have sustained a heavy output of authoritative pronouncements expressing firm confidence in the insurgents' military position while equally firmly ruling out an accommodation with the Phnom Penh regime. A day after issuing a message discounting pressure from Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow on the insurgents to accept a compromise settlement, Sihanouk left Peking on 20 July "for a rest" in North Korea. He was not accompanied by his usual Khmer Rouge shadow, Ieng Sary, who along with RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth saw the prince off in Peking. Earlier this month Sihanouk told AFP that Khmer Rouge representatives might be willing to meet with Dr. Kissinger.

Amid the expressions of confidence in the insurgents' military offensive, the three top in-country leaders issued a statement purportedly adopted at a "national congress" held in the "liberated zone" of Cambodia from 19 to 21 July. The statement, addressed to the peoples of the world, took note of the tightening military pressure being exerted on Phnom Penh and affirmed that Sihanouk and his associates will take control of the capital to establish a neutral nation. The statement sought to project a peaceful image, but Sihanouk took the occasion of a banquet speech in Pyongyang on the 21st to crow that President Nixon and the United States will soon be handed a defeat that will represent a shameful loss of face "unprecedented in history."

While insisting that there can be no compromise with Lon Nol and the other top Phnom Penh leaders, the insurgents have been appealing to lower-level officials to quit the regime and thus be spared the dire fate facing the leadership. Thus a statement on 16 July by the three in-country RGNU leaders said "the time is now ripe," when the insurgents occupy a "position of crushing superiority," to rise up and "take up weapons or any means" to destroy the Lon Nol regime. Similarly, Sihanouk's 44th "message to the Khmer nation," issued on the 19th, warned functionaries that they will be severely punished after the fall of Phnom Penh unless they hasten to abandon the regime.

SETTLEMENT QUESTION

Sihanouk's message and other recent RGNU statements have taken pains to rebut "odious lies" that the insurgents are prepared to arrange a compromise settlement that would leave the Lon Nol government at least partially

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intact. In his message Sihanouk stated that Penn Nouth and the in-country leaders have never agreed to have any contact with a Phnom Penh emissary. In a show of unity with Sihanouk by the Khmer Rouge elements, their top leader, Khieu Samphan, sent a message to the prince (dated 7 July and issued by the front press agency on the 21st) expressing "great admiration" for his recent tour of Africa and Europe. Taking note of "maneuvers and intrigues" by the Nixon Administration on the Cambodian question, the message said that in this "most complex and subtle situation" Sihanouk "demonstrated to the world his inflexible position" and determination to pursue the struggle without "compromise, sham negotiation, sham cease-fire . . . or partition" of the country.

Sihanouk's 44th message explicitly raised the question of pressure from the communist countries in behalf of a compromise settlement. He stated that Peking and Hanoi will unfailingly support his March 1970 five-point position, and he discounted Moscow's role by saying that it will never have sufficient leverage regardless of its friendship with the United States. Sihanouk also addressed this question in his 21 July Pyongyang speech, noting that the Nixon Administration is now engaging in political and diplomatic maneuvers in "certain big capitals in Europe and Asia"--a formulation that would embrace Peking. He did not, however, suggest that the Chinese are a party to these activities. Rather he ruled out as "absolutely unacceptable" proposals for a compromise settlement presented by the United States and "certain West and East European powers," presumably meaning France and the USSR in particular. He concluded by invoking Kim Il-song's warning that the United States hopes to dominate small countries while improving its relations with big powers.

FOREIGN SUPPORT Peking and Hanoi have not departed from their low posture on Cambodian developments in recent weeks. While avoiding authoritative comment on its own, Peking has replayed much of the RGNU's output, including passages criticizing the Nixon Administration's diplomatic moves. Peking has, however, shown circumspection toward President Nixon personally, as in NCNA's editing out of a sentence calling him "a perfidious, obstinate, and cruel individual." Peking has also failed to carry Sihanouk's 21 July speech in Pyongyang, in notable contrast to the full coverage given the prince's speeches during his North Korean visit last April. This omission may reflect Chinese sensitivity toward his references to U.S. diplomatic moves in Peking and elsewhere as well as to the effects of big-power detente.

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Hanoi, but not Peking, officially seconded a 16 July RGNU spokesman's protest against U.S. actions in Cambodia. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 21st expressed support for the RGNU's "correct stand" on a settlement and voiced confidence that the insurgents would achieve the goals set forth in Sihanouk's five-point declaration. Also on the 21st, a VNA statement rebutted a charge by Phnom Penh that North Vietnamese forces were involved in the siege of the Cambodian capital.

Soviet coverage of Cambodian developments has been unexceptional, describing in low-level reports the concern felt in Phnom Penh as "the Cambodian liberation forces are increasing their pressure on the enemy's defense lines" around the capital.

PHAM VAN DONG BEGINS EAST EUROPEAN TOUR IN HUNGARY

DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's 16-23 July "official friendly" visit to Hungary was capped by a new agreement on military and economic aid and a joint communique which was much more in line with Hanoi's policies than the detente-oriented statement issued a week earlier at the conclusion of the Moscow visit by First Secretary Le Duan and Dong. The communique was released on 21 July after which Dong took a two-day rest before going on to Poland. Hanoi has announced that the delegation will next go on to Romania.

While in Hungary, the DRV delegation was hosted at a banquet given by Premier Jeno Fock, Politburo member and chairman of the Council of Ministers, and held talks with a party-government delegation headed by Fock. There was also a rally and the North Vietnamese were received by First Secretary Janos Kadar and President Pal Losonczi. Premier Fock led a party-government delegation to Hanoi in February 1972; however, the last DRV group on this level to visit Hungary was a delegation led by Ho Chi Minh in 1957.

HUNGARIAN-DRV RELATIONS

The joint DRV-Hungarian communique on the visit stated that the talks had taken place in the "spirit of fraternal friendship, comradeship, and mutual understanding" and that there was "complete unanimity of views" on all problems discussed. An identity of views was similarly claimed in the 8 February 1972 joint statement on Fock's visit to Hanoi, just as it was last month during Pham Van Dong's visits to Mongolia and North Korea.

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By contrast there was no claim of unanimity in the recent joint statement on the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong Moscow visit--or during the earlier DRV visit to Peking.* This omission would seem to be a reflection of a basic conflict of Hanoi's national goals and strategy with the big-power interests of its allies. Notably, there had been claims of unanimity of Soviet-DRV views during Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi in October 1971--seven months before the President's trip to Moscow. Presumably at that time Moscow was more successful in reassuring the North Vietnamese that a policy of detente would not be pursued at their expense.

The aid agreement concluded during the Budapest visit was described by VNA as one on "gratuitous economic and military aid" for 1974. Speaking at the rally on 17 July, Fock had recalled past Hungarian shipments of technical, consumer, and military goods to the DRV and he announced that the Hungarian party and government had decided to waive the DRV's "repayment obligation for all past deliveries." The joint communique reflected this decision with the proviso that all loans granted over the past years were to be considered as gratuitous. This follows the pattern of the Moscow visit when Brezhnev announced in his welcoming speech that past Soviet aid would be considered as given free. And the Soviet-DRV joint statement specified that past credits for economic development would be gratuitous. Moscow made no mention of future military aid to the DRV and no aid agreement for 1974 was announced,** although broad Soviet-DRV economic cooperation was forecast in the joint statement and agreement "in principle" said to have been reached on the question of aid.

INDOCHINA SITUATION, DETENTE POLICIES

While the Soviet leaders were not persuaded by their DRV visitors to endorse Hanoi's views on the U.S. role in Indochina, the Hungarians showed far less reticence on this issue. Thus the Hungarian-DRV communique called for strict implementation of the Paris agreement and specifically demanded U.S. and Saigon adherence to its provisions. By contrast the Soviet-DRV joint statement had merely expressed general support for the DRV policy of implementing

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* The visits to Mongolia and the DPRK are reported in the TRENDS of 11 July 1973, pages 6-7; the China visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 and 13 June 1973.

** A TASS summary of the Hungarian-DRV communique reported most of its major points but omitted its reference to the new aid agreement.

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the accord. Budapest also departed from the Soviet position in giving "full support" to the six-point PRG proposal on a settlement in South Vietnam--a proposal not endorsed by Moscow or by its Mongolian ally during the Vietnamese leaders' visits. Unlike Moscow, the Hungarians also specifically condemned U.S. bombing in Cambodia, both in the communique and in Fock's rally speech.

Budapest did follow Moscow's lead on the question of the position of the PRG, affirming in its accounts of the joint communique that the PRG is the "only factor really expressing the aspirations of the South Vietnamese population." A similar ambiguous formulation was used in the Soviet statement, but in both instances VNA's reports on the documents substituted the standard formulation that the PRG is the "sole authentic representative of the people of South Vietnam."

Although Fock used the rally as a platform to laud Soviet policies of detente and recall Brezhnev's visits to Western capitals--views predictably omitted from VNA's account of his remarks--the joint communique reflected a deference to Hanoi's disquiet over Moscow's policies. Its references to Soviet peace-seeking efforts were briefer than those in the Soviet statement, presumably because Budapest did not pressure the Vietnamese visitors to endorse the Soviet foreign policy line.

COMMUNIST UNITY Pham Van Dong, in his 17 July rally speech, revived a call for the restoration of communist unity which has not been used by Hanoi spokesmen for more than a year and which, in the past, has been associated with Hanoi's efforts to improve relations with its communist allies. Dong affirmed Vietnamese determination to "strive with all their might to contribute in the worthiest manner to the restoration and strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp, of the international communist and workers movement on a Marxist-Leninist, proletarian internationalist basis." The communique echoed this view with both sides pledging to continue to contribute to "the restoration and consolidation of the unity of the world socialist system and in the international communist and workers movement . . . and to the strengthening of the solidarity among all the anti-imperialist forces."

An instruction to endeavor to restore communist unity was contained in Ho Chi Minh's last will and testament and, following his death in September 1969, Hanoi put considerable stress on this point. Calls for restoring communist unity abruptly dropped out of DRV statements in July 1971, however, with the exacerbation of Sino-DRV

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relations over the issue of Sino-U.S. detente. The formulation reappeared in Hanoi comment in October 1971 at a time when Hanoi's relations with its allies had seemed to have improved. A call for restoration of unity was included in the October 1971 Soviet-DRV joint statement on Podgornyy's visit and such appeals continued to appear through early February 1972 when the formulation was used in the statement on Fock's visit to Hanoi. After that, perhaps because of new strains in Hanoi's relations with its allies produced by the visits of President Nixon to Peking later in February and to Moscow in May, the formulation again was dropped from Hanoi statements. Since February 1972 it is known to have been used only once--in a May 1972 article in the army journal QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh's birthday.

DRV MARKS GENEVA PACT ANNIVERSARY, IGNORES GVN PROPOSALS

The 19th anniversary of the 20 July 1954 signing of the Geneva agreement on Vietnam prompted editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, but the usual more authoritative trappings were absent. Last year the anniversary was marked by a statement by DRV President Ton Duc Thang and a DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum was released a week after the anniversary.* This pattern accorded with practice over the years when the anniversary had frequently been marked with a foreign ministry statement or memorandum and a pronouncement by Ho Chi Minh.

With the signing of the Paris agreement on Vietnam, it is possible that nondecennial anniversaries of the Geneva agreement will receive diminished attention. The NHAN DAN editorial this year drew a parallel between the two agreements, maintaining that in each the adversary had recognized the fundamental rights of the Vietnamese--sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity. The editorial charged that the United States had "trampled" on the 1954 agreement and was again "seriously violating" the Paris agreement, the act of the international conference, and the joint communique signed in Paris on 13 June. Taking a somber tone, it warned that the present Vietnamese "struggle to achieve national democratic revolution" is a "long, hard, and complex process." While the editorial held that the 1954 and 1973 agreements were the "legal basis" and "important weapons" in the continuing struggle, it voiced the militant view that "the only decisive factor is revolutionary struggle."

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* For a discussion of the 1972 anniversary propaganda and background on previous years, see the TRENDS of 19 July 1972, pages 1-2.

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Hanoi has not yet responded to Saigon's government statement on the Geneva agreement anniversary which renewed the GVN proposal for talks with Hanoi and advocated that both governments seek membership in the United Nations. The DRV has previously expressed opposition to any action which would recognize the Saigon regime as the only legitimate government in the South. Hanoi last commented on the proposal for bilateral negotiations on 28 June in an authorized VNA statement reiterating the view that the GVN was not qualified to engage in such negotiations. The proposal had been rejected earlier in Hanoi and PRG comment on a 14 May GVN note which initiated the idea.

HANOI RESUMES HARSH CRITICISM OF THAI GOVERNMENT

In contrast to Hanoi's relative circumspect approach to the Thanom-Praphat government earlier this year, the media recently have been marked by a spate of sharp attacks. Commentaries have shown particular concern over alleged Bangkok-Washington cooperation in attempting to shore up the Lon Nol government by sending Thai troops into Cambodia. And, most recently, a 13 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting the alleged presence of Thai troops in Cambodia denounced the "Thanom reactionary clique" as a "U.S. lackey."

In the fluid situation in Southeast Asia in the wake of the Paris peace agreement, both Bangkok and Hanoi appeared willing to assume less acrimonious positions in their traditionally hostile relationship. A 28 January stopover in Thailand of DRV and PRG delegates to the Joint Military Commission in South Vietnam was not reported in DRV media. But Hanoi subsequently began treating Thailand in general and the Thanom government in particular more gently than in the past. Last winter a 1 December 1972 NHAN DAN article on the 30th anniversary of the Thai CP had labeled the "Thanom-Praphat clique" as "obedient lackeys serving U.S. interests," and a 12 January broadcast in Vietnamese concerning U.S. bases in Thailand had scored Thanom personally as "a vile U.S. lackey" who has embarked on a "people-betraying and country-harming path." But in February harsh attacks against the regime by name dropped out of the propaganda. A 15 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary concerning Dr. Kissinger's trip to Bangkok used neutral terms such as "Kittikhachon, Thailand's leader" and "Thai authorities" in referring to the Bangkok government. A 16 February NHAN DAN commentary criticizing the shift of U.S. forces from South Vietnam to Thailand went further by refraining from any reference to Thai leaders by name.

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Hanoi did not renew its criticism of the Thai Government until 22 April when a broadcast in Vietnamese charged that General Haig's concurrent tour of Southeast Asia was designed in part to "employ the reactionary Thai ruling clique more vigorously in the hopeless gamble of the Nixon Doctrine," and warned the Thais not to become involved in Cambodia. A 24 April broadcast in Vietnamese denounced the "reactionary Thanom-Praphat clique" while condemning the alleged presence of Thai troops in Cambodia. A NHAN DAN commentary on the 26th denounced the "Kittikhachon clique" for turning Thailand into a "vassal country" and for allowing U.S. troops to remain in Thailand. Frequent commentaries on Thailand since that time have taken a similarly harsh line.

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CHINA

LIAONING PUBLISHES CRITICISM OF COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAM SYSTEM

Liaoning, the provincial bailiwick of Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, has become the first province to vent the frustrations of rusticated youth over college entrance examinations. A Shenyang broadcast on 19 July detailed the experience of a youth unable to pass the recently restored examination because of time devoted to work among the masses at the expense of time for studying substantive academic subjects. According to the broadcast, the 19 July LIAONING DAILY frontpaged a letter addressed to the "leadership" by an applicant who had turned in a blank paper after finding himself "helpless" in face of the geometry, physics and chemistry questions. An accompanying editor's note used this case to raise nothing less than "the question of line regarding the whole college entrance examination system." While inviting readers to express their views on the problems of reconciling the rustication program with more stringent academic requirements, the editor's note took care to point out the "necessity" of "appropriate academic tests."

Liaoning's airing of this issue, with its implications for the policy lines developed in recent years in reaction to the cultural revolution, raises the possibility that a challenge is being mounted to those elements in the leadership who have espoused these policies. However, both the rustication program and the tighter academic standards have been associated with the same leadership interests, and the questions posed by Liaoning may represent an effort to strike an optimum balance rather than to question basic policy lines. The disappointed applicant said he did "fairly well" in basic knowledge tests and could answer the examination questions if given a few days to study. The editor's note invited discussion on such questions as whether the examination should determine students' problem-solving ability or how many books they have studied at school, and whether students should engage in activities with the masses or study behind closed doors.

PRC media have been conducting a campaign to make rural job assignments for educated youth more palatable. Chou En-lai's personal authority has been associated with improving the well-being of the rusticated youths, and cadres at all levels have been instructed to make them self-supporting, provide them with better housing and more study time apart from the masses, and make greater use of their educational specialities. Publicizing

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the failure of the rusticated youth in Liaoning to pass the amination because he had spent "all" his time on productive .bor and was poorly prepared may be aimed at further improvement of conditions for youths sent to the country while retaining what is termed a "permanent" program. There may also be an effort to enhance preparations for admitting students with low cultural levels into special "preparatory" classes instead of mixing them in with more qualified students. Guidelines on college enrollment released this spring stressed that admissions should be as flexible as possible to meet the needs of workers, peasants and cadres of varying degrees of academic ability.

Liaoning has been the most forthcoming province in calling for intellectuals to adopt a more enthusiastic attitude toward selected cultural revolution "achievements" in educational reform. In line with the other provinces, however, it has been careful to stress that in striking the proper balance between "red and expert" the trend will continue to be toward expertise. In a report on a work conference on 1973 student enrollment tasks in Liaoning, the Shenyang radio in early June stressed that in order to determine the qualifications of students for enrollment, applicants "must be tested on their cultural level so as to determine their basic knowledge." At the same time, it cautioned that it is "necessary to guard against putting scholastic marks in command."

Chen Hsi-lien has been appearing regularly in his Liaoning power base during the past few weeks but has had no occasion to speak out on educational policy. At the opening of the provincial trade union congress on 11 June in Shenyang, Chen termed the current domestic and international situation "excellent" and made a routine call for strengthening party leadership over the trade unions.

KWANGTUNG RAISES ISSUE OF WORKER-PEASANT HIGHER EDUCATION

Liaoning having raised a "question of line" on educational policy, Kwangtung has aired educational issues in the context of the ongoing campaign against discredited leaders, principally Lin Piao, who are attacked as being "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi." Using the occasion of the graduation of the first group of workers, peasants, and soldiers from higher educational institutions in the province, an editorial in Canton's SOUTHERN DAILY, broadcast by the Kwangtung provincial radio on 22 July, lashed out at swindlers for trying to raise the question of quality education in order to strangle the "newborn thing" of higher education for workers and peasants. The

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Liaoning discussion, which dealt with rusticated educated youth, did not directly link the educational issues it raised with leadership conflict.

Kwangtung's defense of a cultural revolution innovation fits with a general change in approach this year in criticizing Lin's heresies. Throughout last year, PRC media portrayed an "ultraleftist" Lin to repudiate many educational guidelines that arose during the radical phases of the cultural revolution and to buttress Peking's moves toward quality education. Amid attacks on Lin for committing a leftist deviation from Mao's educational line, cadres were enjoined to struggle against the influence of swindlers who sought to turn youth into "political imbeciles who cannot work, plow the fields, or fight a war." Meanwhile the regime raised academic standards, restored a formal college examination system, and instituted remedial programs for worker-peasant students. At the turn of the year, Lin's deviations were redesignated "ultrarightist" and "newborn things" of the cultural revolution were defended, but this campaign was pursued in such a way as to permit the continued rebuilding of a quality educational system.

The Kwangtung discussion is striking in that its criticism of swindlers counterposes "newborn things" in education with the drive toward quality education, thus raising the possibility of a basic policy conflict over education. At the least, it reflects concern over finding the right methods and techniques for realizing a goal--in the Kwangtung case, educating workers and peasants--that is difficult to reconcile with the demands of a more stringent educational system. According to the SOUTHERN DAILY editorial, there is a danger of "disconnecting study from application" if teaching materials and methods are not improved and students encouraged to cultivate problem-solving abilities.

The concern for improving the prospects of worker-peasant students in the higher educational system may be keyed to the fifth anniversary of Mao's call to "put proletarian politics in command and take the road of the Shanghai machine tools plant in training technicians from among the workers." Several articles reporting on local progress in setting up "21 July" workers universities have appeared in both the central and provincial media. A Peking broadcast on the 18th, for example, gave a positive report on the current status of educational reform at Peking University, once a hub of Red Guard activity. The report noted that both students and teachers at the university have "raised the level of their professional skills" and are "advancing in the direction of

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becoming red and expert." Teachers and students of the liberal arts department were said to have overcome the influence of swindlers and no longer "bury themselves in their work in disregard of politics." After studying "some history of Chinese philosophy and foreign philosophy and history of ancient China," students go to factories and villages to keep in touch with "actual struggle." Reflecting the need to square the Maoist educational ideal with the pressing need for substantively trained graduates, the broadcast noted that the number of hours devoted to teaching outside Peking University is one-third of the total number of class hours.

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USSR-CHINA

SOVIET BORDER NEGOTIATOR RECALLED; AIR AGREEMENT SIGNED

In an unusual move, Moscow announced on the 19th that its chief negotiator at the border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, had left Peking for home "on official duties." Three days earlier, Moscow reported the signing of a Sino-Soviet civil aviation agreement, the first agreement other than trade pacts to be signed by the two sides since the border fighting in 1969. It has been standard practice for Moscow to report the trade agreements and other signs of bilateral normalization, but Ilichev's movements between the two capitals have previously been reported only upon his return to Peking. In December 1969, two months after the border talks opened, both sides had announced the first departure from Peking of Ilichev's predecessor, with the Chinese couching their announcement in such a way as to put pressure on the Soviets to return the negotiator to the talks in a timely fashion. Subsequently, prior to Moscow's recent report, both sides avoided mentioning the Soviet negotiator's departures, thus removing the use of such announcements as tactical moves.

Moscow's decision now to announce Ilichev's recall raises the possibility that it is a move related to a new development in Sino-Soviet relations. Last month's Soviet-U.S. summit may have set the stage for a new Soviet initiative, particularly in view of the agreement on preventing nuclear war. With the air charged with expectation of a new Chinese party meeting, the Soviets may wish to probe the PRC leadership's intentions at a time of basic deliberations, and they may have announced Ilichev's recall as a pressure tactic or to prepare for new instructions. During the middle of the CCP's last congress, in April 1969, Moscow had observed a polemical standdown that may have been intended to serve such a probe.

Moscow's ongoing polemical attacks on the Chinese hardly augur well for improved relations, and the Soviets have been using the adversary relationship with Peking as a backdrop for their current campaign for unity in "the socialist community." In addition to recent denunciations of the Chinese by such senior figures as Podgornyy and Suslov,* Moscow has used proxy comment by its allies

* See the TRENDS of 18 July 1973, page 5.

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calling for closed ranks against Peking. Thus PRAVDA on 15 and 19 July carried accounts of hard-hitting articles in the East German and Hungarian party organs propounding this line. The East German article was quoted as taking exception to Peking's current practice of leaving the German question open, in contrast to the Soviet bloc's demand that the postwar settlement be regarded as final. PRAVDA also cited the article's attack on Peking's "differentiated" line toward Moscow and its allies. The question of territorial claims, implicitly including Peking's, figured in a foreign-language commentary broadcast on Radio Moscow's Mandarin and Romanian services, among others, which stressed that the trend toward recognition of the permanence of present borders in Europe should extend to other regions as well. The commentary warned rather bluntly that to raise territorial claims in a nuclear age "is almost tantamount to suicide."

AVIATION AGREEMENT In announcing the signing of the civil aviation agreement, TASS on 16 July said it provides for regular flights by Il-62's of both airlines between Moscow and Peking in accordance with a 1954 agreement on air links. The Chinese have been active in developing their international air services, and the extension of these services to reach Moscow fits with their overall plans. Having signaled its interest in opening the service to Moscow by announcing the departure of the Chinese delegation on 31 March to conduct negotiations in Moscow, Peking notably failed to report the successful conclusion of the negotiations. This suggests a desire to minimize the implications for Sino-Soviet relations and to avoid indicating that the aviation agreement is a sign of political progress.

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USSR-EGYPT

COMMENT ON EGYPTIAN ANNIVERSARY REFLECTS CONTINUED STRAINS

The 21st anniversary of Egypt's 23 July revolution was duly greeted in a message of "heartfelt" congratulations to as-Sadat from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, accompanied by Soviet central press articles placing the usual emphasis on the importance of Soviet assistance to Egypt's economic development.* Anniversary materials on the surface attempted to portray a friendly, ongoing relationship, but there were hints of continued strains and Soviet dissatisfaction with Egypt on various counts. The principal problem is that posed by the U.S.-Soviet detente and Egyptian suspicions that this lessens Moscow's commitment to the Arab cause. Additionally, Moscow seems to be concerned over internal trends in Egypt and a possible turning away from the pursuit of "socialist" principles. Another irritant is the open Cairo press criticism of Soviet policies.

+ As-Sadat spelled out his preoccupation with the question of international detente in his anniversary speech in which he outlined three major factors Egypt must consider in preparing its "plan for confrontation" with Israel--Egypt's own resources, those of the Arab world, and "Soviet political and military support." The president noted Brezhnev's reassurances during national security affairs adviser Hafiz Isma'il's recent visit, but added that "to be frank," Soviet-Egyptian cooperation "has really been facing problems, including the question of international detente." Reviewing Cairo's relations with Moscow, as-Sadat revealed that from March 1971 to October 1971, when he went to Moscow, "relations were completely interrupted," and that he had been "surprised" that May when Podgornyy requested the signing of the treaty. A second period of soured relations began with the ouster last July of the Soviet military experts; he said that from July 1972 to February 1973 "our relations were almost completely paralyzed." A "relaxation" began in February with the visits of Hafiz Isma'il and later the war minister.

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* Soviet treatment of last year's decennial anniversary and Moscow's reaction to the ouster of Soviet military advisers, which had been announced by as-Sadat less than a week earlier, are discussed in the 26 July 1972 TRENDS, pages 13-19.

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TASS in briefly reporting the speech ignored as-Sadat's criticism of the U.S. stand at the Security Council debate on the Middle East, merely citing him as "strongly criticizing" Israel for its "maneuvering" at the United Nations, "supported by the United States." The account noted as-Sadat's expression of appreciation for the USSR's constant assistance and support in the economic, military, and political fields. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 24th drew listeners' attention to these remarks, calling them "a new confirmation of the extraordinary importance of Soviet foreign policy" in the Middle East as well as a "weighty reply" to those who try to distort this policy and harm friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations.

In an anniversary article in SOVIET RUSSIA, Igor Belyayev stressed that "only" in cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries was it possible for Egypt to implement scheduled development plans. He maintained that positive changes in the international situation in favor of relaxation would undoubtedly promote the solution of "national problems" in Egypt.

The Soviet leaders' congratulatory message also described the course of Egypt's "truly independent development" as "firmly linked" to the establishment and strengthening of firm ties of friendship and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union.

+ The leaders' message, as well as SOVIET RUSSIA and IZVESTIYA anniversary articles, emphasized the importance of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in the development of the two countries' cooperation. While such comment would be natural on the occasion of the revolution anniversary, it comes against the background of Cairo press hints that Egypt was re-examining the treaty in light of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks. TASS on the 19th implicitly recognized Western press speculation that Egypt was reconsidering the treaty when it reported that Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat in a LE MONDE interview rejected "concoctions of the bourgeois press about a 'worsening'" of Soviet-Egyptian relations. He stressed, TASS said, that Egypt would not denounce the treaty, an idea he called "absurd from our point of view."

+ A suggestion of concern over internal Egyptian developments came in the PRAVDA anniversary article by Demchenko, who took the occasion to convey his disquiet, previously expressed in a February article, over a growing trend in Egypt to encourage private enterprise, with attendant "negative social consequences." While possibly unrelated, this year's leaders' message, unlike

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the greetings sent last year, made no reference to Egypt's "road of progressive development" or to its transformation of society "on the basis of socialist principles," and did not repeat the 1972 message's call for a "significant role" for the Arab Socialist Union in Egyptian life

+ Cairo press comment on Soviet policies has continued to draw Moscow's fire. Soviet media for three successive days just prior to the revolution anniversary attacked the Cairo weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWM for a "clearly provocative" article claiming that the Soviet Union was preparing for a preemptive strike against China to force it to abandon claims to Soviet territory. The 14 July AKHBAR AL-YAWM article drew an implicit parallel between China's efforts "to restore its lost territories" and those of the Arabs, discussing the possible diplomatic, political, and military means by which Peking might achieve the return of "vast areas of Chinese territories annexed by force." Moscow's rebuttals responded indirectly to the parallel: TASS commentator Krasikov said on the 19th that the Egyptians were aware that the USSR upholds the principles of justice in relations among all states, and that this also applies to the Middle East. And an Arabic-language commentary the following day insisted that the Soviet Union continues to make all possible efforts for the success of the "just Arab cause." PRAVDA complained on the 21st that "it took an extreme lack of political principles" to publish such an article against the Soviet Union, "which is called in Egyptian political circles 'the first of our friends.'"

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW STRESSES STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE

Since the June summit Moscow has played up the strategic dimension in its new relationship with the United States. Soviet commentators--most notably, USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov in the 22 July PRAVDA--have stressed the immediate gains in the area of preventing nuclear war rather than the more distant benefits of increased trade and economic cooperation which were at the fore in the weeks before the summit. Arbatov maintained that "the main sphere of coincidence of interests" between the two countries was the prevention of nuclear war and that the summit agreement on this issue was its most important achievement. While acknowledging that sharp struggles over detente within the United States lie ahead, Arbatov offered reassurance that U.S. foreign policy was no longer being made by opponents of detente but by "those who have the interests of peace and goodneighborly relations at heart."

Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and others have sought to publicize the military benefits of the great power dialog by drawing on the statement in the U.S.-Soviet communique that political detente must now be followed by military detente. Brezhnev in his speech at a luncheon in honor of the visiting DRV delegation on 10 July said that Moscow now deemed it necessary to "press for practical steps not only towards political but also military detente."

Moscow has also drawn attention to two recent U.S. studies advocating reduced military expenditures, treating them as evidence of the beneficial impact of the summit in the military sphere. PRAVDA foreign editor Tomas Kolesnichenko, in the 22 July Moscow domestic radio observers' roundtable, cited the conclusions of one of the studies, by the Brookings Institution, as evidence that the summit agreements are causing leading U.S. strategists to consider drastic cuts in military spending. Kolesnichenko observed: "There you have the practical, concrete results of the Soviet-American dialog."

PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

Praise from Moscow for the prevention of nuclear war agreement has been lavish, but there has been only limited interpretation of its provisions and few hints of how Moscow views its implications for third countries. A number of commentators, including Arbatov and TASS director general

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Zamyatin in the 21 July SOVIET RUSSIA, have discussed the first two articles incorporating the pledges to refrain from the threat or use of force and to act in a manner that would exclude the outbreak of nuclear war. The remaining articles elaborating on the provisions of the agreement, as well as the condition in Article II attached to the pledge to eschew force have been ignored in Soviet comment. Some commentators have also dropped refinements in the language of Article I to conclude that the United States and the Soviet Union have ruled out nuclear war, while others have faithfully reproduced the text of the document which states more cautiously that the two countries "have agreed to act in such a way as to preclude" a nuclear outbreak. Brezhnev, in his 11 July Lenin prize acceptance speech carried by Moscow radio, dropped the conditional language, though TASS' international service reinserted it. The central press carried the TASS version of his remarks.

Moscow has begun to show some concern over the extent to which Peking's charges of superpower collusion have been echoed recently in West Europe in connection with its new relationship with the United States and especially the prevention of nuclear war agreement. In recent days commentators have explicitly rejected allegations that the agreement jeopardizes the security of Western Europe. But at the same time Moscow has made it clear that Europe is the area where an impact by the agreement is most desired. No one else has yet gone as far as Kolesnichenko in the domestic radio roundtable. He acknowledged that the agreement is "forcing the statesmen of other countries to rethink important tenets of their international policy, and particularly of the policy of the Western alliance." Recent broadcasts to Germany by Moscow radio military observer Col. Fedorov have cited assertions in the Western press that the agreement undercuts the U.S. nuclear deterrent in Europe. Fedorov did not take issue with those assertions, criticizing instead deterrence strategy itself.

MOSCOW CALLS FOR CONTINUED STRUGGLE AGAINST DETENTE OPPONENTS

In the wake of the Helsinki CSCE foreign ministers meeting, Moscow and its orthodox East European allies have stressed the theme of continued ideological struggle, adamantly denouncing Western proposals on human contacts and cultural cooperation as "ideological subversion." Among those singled out for criticism in this connection as "cold war warriors" have been British Foreign Minister Douglas-Home, General Goodpaster and Secretary Luns of NATO, and West German

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conservative leader Strauss. At the same time, the alleged Western "opponents" of detente have been linked with Peking in an intensified Soviet polemic with China.

Soviet comment has sought to counter Peking's charges that Moscow's assiduous promotion of CSCE has been motivated by designs for hegemony in Europe. Moscow accused Peking of implicitly collaborating with Western opponents of detente who impute aggressive designs to the Soviet leaders. The most recent exposition of this theme was by political commentator Yuriy Zhukov in PRAVDA on the 19th.

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

BUCHAREST ATTACKS BREZHNEV DOCTRINE OF "LIMITED" SOVEREIGNTY

An article in a July issue of the Romanian Communist Party theoretical journal ERA SOCIALISTA (no. 13) has criticized the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of "limited" sovereignty used to justify the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Entitled "The Sovereign State in International Relations" and authored by Dr. Victor Duculescu, the article outlined Romania's views on the role of the sovereign state in international affairs strictly in conventional terms of national interests rather than in Marxist terms of class interests. Directly broaching the Brezhnev doctrine, the article asserted that the views upholding "the necessity to 'limit' the prerogatives of sovereign states and to create some supranational structures run contrary to the objective realities of contemporary mankind." The article also included repeated allusions which could readily be interpreted as support for Romania's independent position vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact, CEMA, East-West relations, and intrabloc party relations.

Although Moscow and its orthodox East European allies have not yet reacted directly to the article, NCNA on 12 July predictably reported the article with selected quotations featuring the passage on "limited" sovereignty. In this connection, NCNA on 7 July cited the 4 July statement of Soviet press spokesman Sofinskiy at the Helsinki conference which, according to NCNA, "openly justified the Soviet armed invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and indicated that the same would be done in the future, according to reports from Helsinki." Sofinskiy, responding to a question at a press conference on whether Moscow regards its CSCE proposal on noninterference in the internal affairs of other states as applicable to the 1968 Czechoslovak situation, was quoted by NCNA as saying: "In regard to Czechoslovakia, there was no interference in internal affairs, but a request for assistance from the Czechoslovak Government. The same goes for the future." The NCNA report of Sofinskiy's remarks was similar to reports published in the Western press.

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USSR

MOLDAVIAN KOLKHOZ COUNCIL OFFICIALS LOSE GOVERNMENT POSTS

The Moldavian Council of Kolkhozes has undergone important changes involving the loss of governmental posts by members of its leadership.* Under an experiment approved by the CPSU Central Committee earlier this year, the council was granted responsibilities formerly vested in the republic agriculture ministry. When formed last March at the Moldavian congress of kolkhozniks, the council's 11-man presidium was chaired by Deputy Premier for agriculture N.M. Zaychenko and included as deputy chairman Agricultural Equipment Association chief V.V. Mashtaler. A week after the congress Mashtaler was relieved of his state post, and on 4 July Zaychenko lost his post of deputy premier, while continuing to function as council chairman at Moldavian agricultural conferences. As a result of these moves, together with the failure of Agriculture Minister I.N. Berezhnoy to gain re-election to the council's presidium at the March congress, the presidium no longer includes the leaders of the republic agricultural bureaucracies.

The loss of governmental posts by members of the council's presidium indicates that the council must now deal independently with other agencies without the advantage of any additional bureaucratic leverage. However, since Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul continues to show enthusiasm for the Moldavian innovation, it is unlikely that the recent changes are intended to weaken the authority of the council. Instead, they may result from the transformation of the council from an advisory body to an executive organ requiring the full-time attention of its leaders.

Bodyul continues to promote his agricultural innovations with other republic leaders, and he may be receiving support from USSR Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy.** In early June Polyanskiy visited Belorussia and the Baltic republics--areas especially unreceptive to the kolkhoz union-kolkhoz council concept in the past--and, perhaps as a result, Lithuanian First Secretary A. Yu. Snechkus and Agriculture Secretary R.I. Songayla arrived in Moldavia on 4 July to observe Bodyul's innovations. The Moldavian

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* For background, see the TRENDS of 14 March 1973, pages 25-26.

** For an analysis of Polyanskiy's attitude toward the councils, see the TRENDS of 5 July 1973, pages 16-17.

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press publicized the visit with photos and detailed daily accounts, while Bodyul spent three days escorting his guests on a tour of farms and lecturing them on the virtues of the republic's varied agro-industrial complexes and associations, interkolkhoz organizations and kolkhoz councils. Nevertheless, in a 8 July SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA interview at the end of his visit, Snechkus carefully avoided endorsing any of Moldavia's controversial reforms, and the limited Lithuanian press coverage of the visit ignored the subject of kolkhoz councils. On 13 July Bodyul used the occasion of a national conference on plant nurseries in Kishinev to promote his innovations to agricultural officials of other republics and oblasts. He also promoted his innovations in an article in the 31 May RADYANSKA UKRAINA.

RUSSIAN LANGUAGE REMAINS UNPOPULAR AMONG NATIONAL MINORITIES

There have been numerous signs in recent weeks--both in the republic press and at the just concluded USSR Supreme Soviet session--of growing official concern over the unpopularity of the Russian language among certain ethnic minorities of the USSR.* A 10 July ZARYA VOSTOKA editorial, for example, cited statistical studies indicating that the "main mass" of Georgians, including many highly trained scientists, engineers, specialists, teachers and party and government leaders, have poor knowledge of Russian and that their inability to speak the language is hampering scientific-technical progress and communication with non-Georgians. Without blaming former First Secretary Mzhavanadze by name, the editorial complained that actually little was done to promote the Russian language "in the last 10 to 15 years."

In April a Georgian ideological aktiv meeting had also acknowledged the poor knowledge of Russian even among party and soviet officials and the need for "radically" reorganizing the teaching of Russian. The 27 April ZARYA VOSTOKA account of the meeting reported that the Georgian Central Committee bureau had recently set up a special commission to develop measures to "sharply improve" teaching of Russian.

Similar concerns were expressed at the 17-19 July USSR Supreme Soviet session. USSR Education Minister M.A. Prokofyev stated that measures were being adopted to improve teaching of Russian.

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* For an analysis of the problem in the Kirgiz republic, see the TRENDS of 18 July 1973, pages 15-17.

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Estonian Secretary V.I. Vyalyas disclosed that the Estonian Central Committee bureau had recently adopted a decision to improve teaching of Russian and had established a special scientific center to study the development of dual-language capability. A Tadzhik teacher revealed that study of Russian was being introduced in the first grade of Tadzhik schools this year. And Moldavian First Deputy Premier G.I. Yeremey spoke of the need to improve training of Russian language teachers in Moldavia so that all graduates would be able to speak the language.

Although the Supreme Soviet session discussed and adopted a new law on education, including a provision reasserting the "freedom of choice of language of instruction," this provision received little attention. The only faintly controversial references to the subject at the session were a Mordvin writer's proposal to add a provision to the law "intensifying" use of Russian and a Buryat doctor's cautious statement that Buryats had been debating the "most advisable practical implementation of the principle of freedom of choice."

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NOTES

EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN UNITY: Moscow has conveyed its disapproval of union between Egypt and Libya by its treatment of the "unity march" on Cairo, launched on 19 July, to pressure as-Sadat into signing an agreement. Thus, TASS on 18 July reported that as-Sadat in a message to al-Qadhdhafi that day had called on him to prevent "the so-called 'march of Libyans'" to Egypt, and on the 21st TASS reported his second and stronger message insisting that al-Qadhdhafi take responsibility for controlling the marchers and warning that Egypt "would be compelled to apply 'the force of law'" to prevent the marchers from proceeding to Cairo. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 20th summed up Cairo press comment critical of the march and cited Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat as saying in a LE MONDE interview that 1 September was the date for holding a referendum and "not for unification." The broadcast said he added that "experience from past failures prompts us to be extremely cautious."

Earlier Moscow had suggested its disapproval of Egyptian-Libyan union simply by virtually ignoring the subject. The Benghazi Declaration last August announcing plans to prepare for Libyan-Egyptian unification by 1 September 1973 was acknowledged at that time only in a brief TASS report. Al-Qadhdhafi's lengthy stay in Egypt in late June-early July for unity discussions also drew no Soviet comment.

JAL HIJACKING: Following past practice, Moscow has reported without comment the 20 July hijacking of a Japan Air Lines Boeing 747 out of Amsterdam to Dubayy and the destruction of the aircraft by the hijackers in Benghazi, Libya on the 24th. The brief Soviet reports made clear Moscow's disapproval of the action, however, and were consistent with Soviet efforts, in previous instances, to dissociate the Palestinian fedayeen organizations from the incident. A Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 21st said the motives and the perpetrators of the "new act of air piracy" were unknown. TASS on the 23d reported that the "unidentified" hijackers said they belonged to an organization called "sons of the occupied territories" and the next day cited the Palestinian resistance leadership in Beirut as calling this a nonexistent organization and describing the hijackers as "adventurists." On the 25th TASS promptly picked up a statement issued by the Palestinian command in Beirut "strongly condemning" the destruction of the aircraft and declaring that such actions "have nothing in common" with the Palestinians' struggle against Israel. TASS

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also noted Libya's denial that it had anything to do with the hijacking and reported Tripoli radio as announcing that the "group of persons" who destroyed the plane would face trial.

U.S. "VIOLATION" OF DRV AIRSPACE: For the first time since the 13 June signing in Paris of the joint communique on implementing the Vietnam settlement, the DRV has officially protested an alleged violation of North Vietnamese airspace by a U.S. reconnaissance plane. A statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 25 July claimed that the violation occurred along the southern coast and over nearby Con Co Island. The statement pointed out that Article 1 of the joint communique stipulates that the United States stop air reconnaissance activities over DRV territory. Following the signing of the peace agreement in January, Hanoi had periodically (beginning in March) protested alleged air violations, most recently on 21 May; Article 2 of the peace agreement--which prohibits military activities but does not specifically mention reconnaissance flights--and "the U.S. Government's commitments" were cited as prohibiting such flights.

PRG AID AGREEMENTS: Against the backdrop of recent moves by the PRG to enhance its stature as a legitimate government in South Vietnam, the PRG this month signed its first formal aid agreements with foreign states. On 5 July LPA reported that Yugoslavia's first vice minister for foreign affairs and the PRG ambassador three days earlier had signed an agreement on "non-refund aid" to "rebuild war-devastated South Vietnam." TANJUG reported the signing on the 2d, indicating that the agreement would cover the PRG purchase of 2.5 million dollars worth of installations and goods in Yugoslavia. A second aid agreement was made public some two weeks later when NCNA, on 19 July, reported that an agreement covering Chinese "emergency supplementary free economic aid" to the PRG in 1973 had been signed that evening by PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Li Chiang and the PRG ambassador. NCNA noted that members of a PRG "economic specialists' group" attended the signing ceremony and had a "very cordial conversation" with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien--the highest-level Chinese official present. LPA reported the agreement on the 20th, stating that it covered "supplemental urgent gratuitous economic aid."

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MOSCOW ON WATERGATE: Moscow has continued its discreet coverage of Watergate developments since the Brezhnev visit. Moscow radio and PRAVDA in brief dispatches have informed domestic audiences of statements issued by the White House while ignoring proceedings at the Senate committee. Though these reports were attributed to TASS, the news agency's international services did not carry them. TASS' silence was broken on 21 July when it reported that the President, on leaving Bethesda Naval Hospital, had "flatly rejected" conjectures in the American press about his intention to resign because of the "Watergate affair." The two-sentence dispatch was subsequently carried in domestic radio broadcasts and appeared in all central papers on the 22d.

REACTION TO NUCLEAR TESTS: Differentiated reactions to recent nuclear tests reflect the political implications for Peking and Moscow. The French nuclear test of 21 July has been ignored by Peking media, which had also been silent during the series of French tests last year. In contrast, Peking on the 25th reported the Soviet underground test that took place two days after the French test. Implying that Soviet-U.S. agreements in this area do not inhibit Moscow's own nuclear weapons program, the NCNA report noted that the Soviet test was the second one since the signing on 22 June of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on preventing nuclear war. This marks Peking's first mention of that agreement since the 28 June NCNA account of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

In Moscow's case, the contrast is between its sharp criticism of the recent Chinese nuclear test and its brief, factual reports of the French test. The only Soviet criticism has been indirect, with TASS on the 23d citing an AFP report that Peru planned to break relations with France because of the test, and on the 24th reporting a World Peace Congress condemnation of the test. Though TASS statements of protest followed French tests in the early 1960's, Moscow has maintained a low profile since the special relationship with France emerged in the last De Gaulle years.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16 - 22 JULY 1973

Moscow (2623 items)

Supreme Soviet Presidium Session	(--)	10%
[Mazurov Speeches	(--)	3%]
DRV Leaders in USSR	(22%)	7%
Polish National Day	(--)	5%
70th Anniversary of Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 2d Congress	(6%)	5%
China	(3%)	4%
European Security Conference	(3%)	2%

Peking (1181 items)

Domestic Issues	(56%)	57%
Cambodia	(9%)	12%
[Sihanouk Messages to Cambodian People	(--)	4%]
Vietnam	(2%)	5%
[PRC/PRG Supplemental Aid Agreement	(--)	2%]
European Security Conference	(3%)	5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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