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TRENDS in Communist Propaganda 17 Oct 74

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Confidential

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TRENDS

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CONTENTS

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Brezhnev Urges Progress on Trade, Slaps U.S. Delays. 1

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR Plays Down Kissinger Trip, Stresses Support for Arabs . . . 2

U.S.-POLAND

Moscow, Warsaw Praise Gierek Visit, Emphasize Bloc Ties. 4

USSR

Article on Anniversary of Khrushchev Ouster Boosts Brezhnev. . . 6
Practice of Honoring Brezhnev Becoming Standard at Meetings. . . 6

VIETNAM

DRV Government Statement Endorses PRG Call for Thieu's Ouster. . 8

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

USSR Environmental Warfare Ban Proposal Given Little Fanfare . . 11

ASIAN SECURITY

Moscow Injects Anti-China Polemics Into Samarkand Conference . . 13

PERU

Moscow Approvingly Assesses Lima Policies, Downplays Arms Aid. . 15

NOTES

PRC-Taiwan; USSR-PRC-Disarmament; PRC-Germany-USSR;
Historical Article Defends Chou; Chinese Education;
PRC Province on Foreign Trade; Moscow on U.S. African Policy;
GDR Reparations Issue. 17

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. i

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

BREZHNEV URGES PROGRESS ON TRADE, SLAPS U.S. DELAYS

In a speech evidently calculated to put pressure on the U.S. Administration regarding the most-favored-nation issue, Brezhnev told the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council in the Kremlin on 15 October that attempts to attach conditions to U.S.-Soviet trade relations were "utterly irrelevant and unacceptable." Repeatedly stressing the need for prompt action in removing restrictions on trade, Brezhnev implied that continued delays in this regard might jeopardize the progress already achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Although Brezhnev did not mention it, the U.S. Administration's move on 5 October to hold up Soviet purchases of grain in the United States may have played a role in determining the tone of his speech. In addition, the current troubles of the U.S. economy, which he described in exceedingly bleak terms in his speech in Kishinev on 11 October, may have contributed to the sense of urgency he displayed.

Although laced with warnings, Brezhnev's speech was not entirely negative or devoid of optimistic notes. Indeed, the warnings had more to do with matters of pace than of substance. As far as the substance of policy was concerned, Brezhnev made it clear that he was satisfied with what the United States had done thus far and with the "stated intentions" of the Ford Administration. He averred, moreover, that the Soviet Union was committed to seeking improved economic relations with the United States and that this policy was solidly grounded on ideological principles and national tradition. It was, he said, an "immutable line of our party" bequeathed to us by Lenin, and to buttress the point he quoted Lenin as having said: "We are decidely for an economic understanding with America--with all countries, but especially with America."

Soviet media treatment of the speech and the meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council has projected a positive image of the proceedings. TASS's English summary of Brezhnev's speech, although including the negative aspects, was framed in such a way as to play up the positive. The Moscow domestic service reported the course of the meetings and, in addition, carried interviews with Secretary Simon both at the start and at the conclusion of the meetings. Both interviews seemed calculated to project a favorable image of Secretary Simon and of U.S. policy.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR PLAYS DOWN KISSINGER TRIP, STRESSES SUPPORT FOR ARABS

Against the background of Secretary Kissinger's latest discussions in the Middle East regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement, Moscow has been depicting its role in Middle East affairs as dynamic and ongoing. Remarks by Brezhnev and routine comment have reaffirmed the Soviet position on key Middle East issues and emphasized areas of increasing Soviet-Arab contacts and cooperation as well as "principled" Soviet support to the Arab cause. Coinciding with Kissinger's 9-15 October trip to the area, these efforts testify to Moscow's continuing concern that it maintain its claim in the achievement of a future settlement. This concern over a Soviet role was underscored with the announcement by TASS on the 15th that Brezhnev and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi, meeting that day in Moscow, agreed that a Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting would take place in Cairo in January.

BREZHNEV SPEECH Observing that the Middle East situation "deserves to be dwelt on," Brezhnev in an 11 October speech in Kishinev implicitly referred to Secretary Kissinger's earlier diplomatic efforts in remarking that the Geneva conference had been replaced by "group talks" on troop disengagement. He called such military separations a useful "initial measure," but pointed out that this did not solve the main question of a "complete" settlement. He strongly reasserted the standard Soviet position on resumption "without delay" of the Geneva conference, accusing Israel and its "traditional foreign patrons" of seeking to avoid reconvening the Geneva talks. Brezhnev warned that such delay and the continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands created a situation that aided only Israel and could "explode at any moment." At the same time, Brezhnev noted that the Soviets "highly value our contacts with Arab leaders" and added that "under present conditions" such contacts are especially necessary and useful.

Followup comment on Brezhnev's remarks placed them in the context of Secretary Kissinger's most recent initiatives: The 13 October Moscow radio observers' roundtable, for example, explicitly contrasted the uncertainty of U.S. policies and motives underlying the Kissinger trip with the consistency and principled position of the Soviet Union as reaffirmed by Brezhnev. In the same context, the roundtable discussion emphasized that the Brezhnev speech was "in the center of attention of the international public" and

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

reiterated many of his remarks on the Middle East. PRAVDA on the 13th highlighted world media reaction to Brezhnev's remarks, claiming that the U.S. press was "concentrating most attention" on his speech and quoting from his remarks. And a TASS commentary by K. Dudarev on the 14th amplified the same theme, stating that Brezhnev's remarks were being received "everywhere" as fresh proof that the USSR "is actively involved in the efforts to resolve the Middle East crisis."

KISSINGER TRIP Moscow's public treatment of Secretary Kissinger's recent trip sought to place it in a context that would minimize both its immediate significance and any eventual achievements, while avoiding predictions of the probable course and outcome of the new U.S. diplomatic efforts. Much of the Soviet comment has stressed that present U.S. policy in the Middle East is motivated primarily by a need to bring about reductions in Arab oil prices, which Moscow describes as a vital necessity for the economically troubled West and a goal that explains the expedient modification--not abandonment--of the traditional pro-Israel nature of U.S. policy. The most polemical comment, for the most part in Arabic-language broadcasts by Moscow radio and Radio Peace and Progress, in some instances reduced U.S. policy goals and motivation to this factor alone. Most comment, however, while mentioning the issue of oil prices, has generally characterized the trip as opening a new series of U.S. maneuvers which might--at the limit of success--extract some "partial concessions" from Israel and thereby assist the quest for a final settlement.

In a 10 October IZVESTIYA article pegged to Secretary Kissinger's seventh round of Middle East "shuttle diplomacy," senior political observer A. Bovin in commenting on the disengagement agreements remarked that "half-measures" do "play a role" in politics. He repeated the usual assertion that such partial measures could serve to "freeze" a situation. But in an unusually favorable observation on "half-measures," he claimed that they could also "serve as a useful means for shifting the situation from a standstill and facilitating radical advances." He seemed to suggest that there were proponents of both views in Washington, professing to see one trend alined with Israeli interests and another "believing it expedient to increase the distance between the United States and Israel." He found it "hard to predict the outcome of the clash" between these and other contradictory forces and trends, but anticipated that Kissinger's visit "should elucidate Washington's intentions." In any case, Bovin concluded with the standard call for immediate resumption of the Geneva conference machinery.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

U. S. - POLAND

MOSCOW, WARSAW PRAISE GIEREK VISIT, EMPHASIZE BLOC TIES

PZPR First Secretary Edward Gierek's 8-13 October visit to the United States was praised by both Moscow and Warsaw as an important contribution to East-West detente and a demonstration of socialist Poland's growing prestige in the world. Moscow's detailed coverage and comment on Gierek's trip contrasted with the spotty, uninformative Soviet treatment of the December 1973 visit to Washington by Romania's Ceausescu--the only other top leader of an East European Warsaw Pact country to visit the United States. Moscow and Warsaw comment, as well as Gierek's public statements during his U.S. tour, regularly included references to the solidity of Poland's alliance with the USSR and its allies, a point stressed also in the notably heavy volume of advance comment in Polish media that followed the 28 August joint announcement by Moscow and Warsaw of the impending visit. Predictably, there was no mention in Soviet or Polish comment of Warsaw's most-favored-nation status in trade with the U.S., a distinction enjoyed only by Poland and Yugoslavia among the communist states.

POLAND'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS

Warsaw comment showed a preoccupation with the "equality" of the U.S. and Poland as negotiating partners and with what it viewed as an enhanced appreciation of Poland on the part of the Americans. Thus, a PAP correspondent's report on the 14th, entitled "America Discovers Poland," declared that "for the first time during Edward Gierek's visit, the American press said openly that Poland, a member of the great socialist community, plays an active and constructive role" in strengthening detente. The commentary portrayed U.S. economic and political circles as having been compelled by Poland's achievements to revise upward their assessment of the Polish market and Polish industry. An observation in the 14 October commentary that the new American appreciation of Poland was based not on "altruism" but on "sober assessment" may have been inserted to offset the effusively favorable treatment of the United States by Warsaw media during Gierek's visit.

Gierek's speeches, which repeatedly mentioned Poland's achievements under the socialist system, stressed at the same time his country's close identification with the Soviet bloc. Thus, in his address to Congress on the 9th he declared that Poland, "together with the USSR and other allies," was dedicated to making

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detente irreversible. And at the National Press Club the same day he added that the "common line" of the USSR and its allies on detente "was fully reasserted at this year's conference of the Warsaw Pact"--the April Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in the Polish capital. Without mentioning Brezhnev or Nixon, the Polish leader also paid tribute in his speeches to the contribution of the U.S.-Soviet dialog to detente. While Moscow and Warsaw provided only a sketchy account of the question-and-answer session following Gierek's Press Club speech, they did report his reply to a question on the stationing of foreign troops in Europe. The reports quoted Gierek to the effect that, while the withdrawal of foreign troops was a "complicated" question, it "would eventually be solved following a growth in international confidence."

GROMYKO VISIT TO WARSAW

As if to avoid any hint of possible Soviet dictation to Gierek, the publicity surrounding the 29 September-1 October unannounced visit to Warsaw by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko omitted any reference to the Polish leader's impending visit to the United States. PRAVDA's 2 October report on Gromyko's visit mentioned only briefly his talks with Gierek, dwelling instead on his meetings with Foreign Minister Olszowski, which dealt with Soviet-Polish relations and "urgent questions of the current international situation." Gromyko was awarded Poland's Order of Merit by Gierek for his work in behalf of "the foreign policy of the USSR and the whole socialist community" and Soviet-Polish relations.

PRC, ALBANIA ON GIEREK TRIP

NCNA on 15 October carried a recap of the major events and agreements concluded during Gierek's American trip. The Warsaw-datelined report highlighted Polish-U.S. "satisfaction" over the progress achieved and the prospects for future economic relations. NCNA noted, where Warsaw and Moscow did not, that Gierek's visit was in return for "the U.S. President's visit to Poland in 1972." The Tirana party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on 5 October denounced Gierek's upcoming visit in a commentary headed "Polish Revisionists On the Road of Consolidating Relations With the United States." Portraying an increasing exploitation of Poland's economy by U.S. capital with Moscow's approval, the paper noted that Poland had been granted most-favored-nation status by Washington.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

USSR

ARTICLE ON ANNIVERSARY OF KHRUSHCHEV OUSTER BOOSTS BREZHNEV

PRAVDA's long 13 October editorial article on the anniversary of the October 1964 Central Committee plenum which put Brezhnev and Kosygin in power reveals a strong pro-Brezhnev bias. It plays down what was proclaimed at the time as the main achievement of the plenum--the reestablishment of collectivity following Khrushchev's ouster--and notes instead that the Politburo is "headed by" Brezhnev. Further, in discussing the accomplishments of the past 10 years, it completely ignored Kosygin's economic reform and the September 1965 plenum which enacted it, while lauding the March 1965 plenum at which Brezhnev presented his agricultural program. It attributes the economic successes of the regime to measures largely associated with Brezhnev, such as the campaigns for socialist competition.

In discussing the latter, the editorial uses Brezhnev's December 1973 plenum distinction between the "two pillars" of party economic policy: improvement of leadership of the economy and mobilization of the masses. While not really elaborating on the first, it devoted three paragraphs to the second, lauding the new forms and methods for mobilizing the masses developed in the last three or four years and attributing to them a big role in economic growth. The all-union socialist competition--of which Brezhnev was the initiator--is credited with helping surpass the 1974 pledges for 5 billion rubles of above-plan industrial production and raise labor productivity faster than planned.

In the meantime, further support for the hortatory approach to economic problems was registered by Brezhnev protege, Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, in a 4 October speech to Ukrainian ideological officials reported in the 9 October RADYANSKA UKRAINA. Noting Brezhnev's 7 September Novorossiysk appeal for even wider development of socialist competition, Shcherbitskiy stressed that all propaganda and media work must be concentrated on whipping up the workers to prefulfill the five year plan.

PRACTICE OF HONORING BREZHNEV BECOMING STANDARD AT MEETINGS

The practice of describing the election of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev as honorary presidium at Soviet meetings has become standard over the past year, although anomalies in press reporting of these formalities still crop up from time to time. The most recent inconsistency in reporting was in connection with the 9 October Moscow conference of peace supporters.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

The TASS account of the peace conference carried by PRAVDA and a half dozen other central newspapers on 10 October reported that the conference had elected the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev. IZVESTIYA's account, however, written by its own reporters on the scene, reported the election of the Politburo without mentioning Brezhnev. The confusion was compounded by RURAL LIFE, which carried the rather lengthy TASS account but omitted the sentence mentioning the election of the presidium--a highly unusual act, since as a rule the papers carefully include this item in even the briefest accounts of such meetings. While this appears to be the first case of contradictory reporting on this point by central papers, TASS in at least one case in the past--on 22 December 1973--included the "headed by" Brezhnev formulation in its account of the election of the Politburo at a local meeting in Tadzhikistan, though the local newspaper had failed to use the Brezhnev formulation.

The practice of describing the election of honorary presidiums "headed by" Brezhnev was itself an anomaly only a year ago. In late 1973 the "headed by Brezhnev" phrase began to be added to the impersonal formula, which mentioned the Politburo but not Brezhnev, and by early 1974 had become virtually the uniform practice. This pattern was disrupted by a 23 August 1974 miners' day ceremony, which reverted to the old practice of reporting the election of a Politburo without mention of Brezhnev.* The oddity of the occurence was pointed up in the Ukrainian press, which carried the TASS account of the Moscow ceremony, omitting the Brezhnev honorific, along with a report on the Ukrainian miners' day ceremony which elected the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev.

Since the miners' day anomaly, meetings reported in the central press have resumed the practice of referring to the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev. PRAVDA alone reported 10 such meetings during September. However, a second anomaly appeared in the 8 September PRAVDA report of the Novorossiysk liberation anniversary. It was noted that the ceremony, addressed by Brezhnev himself, elected the Politburo, but there was no mention of Brezhnev heading it. Brezhnev's presence clearly was not the reason, since he was present at other meetings, both before and after this event, which reportedly elected the Politburo "headed by Brezhnev" as honorary presidium.

Reports of provincial meetings, while normally adhering to the standard Moscow practice, also occasionally refer simply to the election of "the Politburo" as honorary presidium. Such cases were reported, for example, in the 18 September SOVIET BELORUSSIA and the 11 and 14 September RADYANSKA UKRAINA.

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* The 24 August instance on Soviet miners' day is discussed in the TRENDS of 28 August 1974, pages 20-21.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

VIETNAM

DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ENDORSES PRG CALL FOR THIEU'S OUSTER

An 11 October DRV Government statement has supported the 8 October PRG statement that gave official sanction to revived Vietnamese communist calls for the ouster of Thieu, but the DRV statement failed to mention the PRG's avowed willingness to meet at the negotiating table with a newly constituted administration in Saigon following Thieu's departure.* While both statements focused mainly on the "present situation in South Vietnam," the DRV Government statement--the first since March 1974, when one was issued supporting the PRG six-point proposal for implementation of the 1973 Paris agreement--broadened its scope to draw attention to longstanding grievances against the United States. These included claims of intrusions by U.S. ships and aircraft into North Vietnam's territorial waters and airspace and allegations of U.S. refusal to provide the North with reconstruction assistance under the provisions of the Paris agreement.

The latest DRV statement described the "unbearable" situation that the United States and Thieu have allegedly caused in the South and claimed that there is now a "widespread and powerful movement" involving a broad range of people in the urban and rural areas controlled by Saigon who are "demanding . . . the overthrow of the corrupt, dictatorial, and warlike Thieu." Declaring that the DRV government "fully supports" the PRG stand defined in its 8 October statement, the statement repeated verbatim the PRG's two main demands that the United States terminate its "military involvement and interference" in the South and that Thieu be overthrown and replaced with an administration willing to implement the Paris agreement.

NEGOTIATIONS While the DRV Government statement failed to refer to the PRG offer to negotiate with an administration which replaces the Thieu government, this offer has been noted in other Hanoi propaganda. The 9 October NHAN DAN editorial on the PRG statement, for example, implied approval of the PRG offer by claiming that it was an indication of PRG "good will." The first known reference to negotiations with a new Saigon regime appeared in a 19 September Liberation Radio broadcast. Hanoi in reviving

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* The PRG statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 October 1974, pages 11-12.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

the demand for Thieu's ouster over a month earlier in a 15 August NHAN DAN editorial, by contrast, had vaguely indicated only that a new Saigon regime would implement the Paris agreement.

BACKGROUND: Although Hanoi and the PRG had protested the original suspension of the bilateral consultative talks at La Celle-Saint-Cloud, precipitated by Saigon on 16 April in retaliation for alleged communist seizure of the Tonle Cham base earlier in the month, the PRG in mid-May formally declared its own suspension of participation in the conference, as well as in the two-party Joint Military Commission (JMC), allegedly because of Saigon's "negative attitude." While the PRG had previously boycotted individual JMC sessions in the past, this constituted the first indefinite postponement of the meetings. This was followed up in late May with statements by PRG and DRV military delegations to the four-party JMC announcing indefinite suspension of their participation in the four-party meetings, thus completely severing all formal negotiating ties with Saigon and the United States. After a brief resumption of JMC meetings in June, the PRG and DRV later in the month--on the eve of former President Nixon's trip to Moscow--announced the most recent complete termination of its participation in all talks, blaming this last rupture on Saigon's "refusal" to discuss "full implementation" of the privileges and immunities for the communist teams in the South.*

CHARGES AGAINST UNITED STATES

While Hanoi from time to time has routinely issued foreign ministry spokesmen's statements charging the United States with conducting overflights of the DRV for aerial reconnaissance, the most recent protest being lodged on 12 October, the issue of the U.S. obligation under Article 21 of the Paris agreement to contribute to postwar DRV reconstruction has not been raised in monitored Hanoi media in recent weeks. In the past the propaganda has injected complaints of U.S. noncompliance with Article 21 into discussions of U.S. servicemen still missing in action, and it was in this context that the last such reference was noted in a Hanoi radio commentary broadcast on 3 August. In a more recent mention, Budapest domestic service on 27 August--in reporting a press conference given by the DRV ambassador to Hungary--quoted him as alluding to U.S. "unwillingness" to observe the provisions of Article 21.

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* For discussions of communist moves concerning negotiations, see the TRENDS for 24 April 1974, pages 20-21; 15 May 1974, pages 9-10; 30 May 1974, pages 12-13; 5 June 1974, page 18; and 26 June 1974, pages 12-13.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

PEKING COMMENT Peking responded to the PRG and DRV government statements, of 8 and 11 October, respectively, with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which offered general support for the Vietnamese demands but did not directly call for Thieu's overthrow and played down Vietnamese charges against the United States. Commentator noted the Vietnamese position, including the "legitimate demand" for Thieu's overthrow, but did not list the specifics of the Vietnamese position in offering the Chinese people's "firm support" for their "just and solemn stand." Like the DRV statement, the article made no mention of the PRG offer to negotiate with a new Saigon regime. It did, however, lambaste the Thieu administration as a "tool" of the United States and a "serious obstacle" to implementing the Paris agreement.

The 15 October article is only the third authoritative PRC comment in support of Vietnamese statements this year. Previous PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles, Peking's lowest level of authoritative comment, were issued in response to PRG and DRV government statement's on the PRG's 22 March six-point proposal and on foreign ministry statements on the PRG's breaking off talks with Saigon in May.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

USSR ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE BAN PROPOSAL GIVEN LITTLE FANFARE

Moscow's latest disarmament "initiative" at the United Nations, a proposal to ban environmental warfare, has received only token publicity since it was first made public in a letter from Gromyko to UN Secretary General Waldheim in early August. The letter, delivered on 7 August and published in PRAVDA two days later, set the pattern for subsequent comment. Moscow has largely avoided making any connection between the proposal and the passage in the joint Brezhnev-Nixon statement, after the Moscow summit this past summer, regarding exploratory talks on the problem of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

DRAFT PROPOSAL Gromyko in his August letter and his 24 September General Assembly address explained the Soviet initiative as prompted by the progress in scientific and technical knowledge which creates new possibilities "for the use of the results of this progress not only for peaceful but also for military purposes." A model treaty made public by Moscow on 27 September, declared that all signatory states would undertake not to develop meteorological, geophysical or any other scientific-technical means of modifying the natural environment for military and other purposes incompatible with the well-being and health of people. Enumerating a long list of categories which would fall under the definition of "modifications," the draft treaty made clear that the ban would not affect future programs aimed at conserving and improving the natural environment for peaceful purposes, a point emphasized in Gromyko's August letter and stressed in subsequent comment. According to the model treaty, the main international controlling body for verification procedures would be the UN Security Council, thus insuring Moscow's own interests through the Soviet veto.

U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT The minimal comment on the environmental initiative has for the most part failed to recall the passage in the joint Brezhnev-Nixon statement this past summer which said the sides' "advocate the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes" and would start exploratory talks on this problem. Gromyko made no reference to this passage either in his August letter to Waldheim or his UNGA speech, although in the latter he did touch on other agreements reached during the recent summit.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

In one of the few detailed discussions of the environmental proposal, a participant in a panel program broadcast by Moscow radio in English on 29 September pointed out that the Soviet initiative was "definitely" in keeping with the spirit of the U.S.-Soviet bilateral statement and that the new proposal was for "an international convention that would enforce a universal ban" on environmental modification for military purposes. And as if to demonstrate a favorable Washington reaction to the Soviet move, TASS on 25 September reported a statement by Davies, assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in such a manner as to make it appear in support of the Soviet action.

Comment on the proposal has generally refrained from resurrecting past charges of U.S. "ecocide" through "meteorological warfare" in Vietnam, although the subject has been broached in passing. Thus a participant in the radio discussion program on the 29th remarked that "one of the reasons for the concern about weather modification" was that "the world has already seen such methods of warfare tested by the United States in Indochina."

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

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ASIAN SECURITY

MOSCOW INJECTS ANTI-CHINA POLEMICS INTO SAMARKAND CONFERENCE

The official "appeal" adopted by the Soviet-sponsored 25-28 September Asian Security Conference in Samarkand and Tashkent offered largely standard Soviet formulations on collective security. Although the appeal itself did not refer to China, the chief Soviet delegate criticized China at length in his main address. The appeal from a similar Dacca conference in May 1973 had indirectly criticized China's policy toward Bangladesh and its rejection of Brezhnev proposals for Asian collective security. Possibly enhanced Soviet interest in this year's conference was suggested by the more prominent leadership of the Soviet delegation--Politburo Candidate member Rashidov this time, compared with Supreme Soviet deputy Kamalov at the earlier Dacca session--and by the fact Brezhnev himself signed the traditional greetings to the Samarkand conference, whereas Premier Kosygin had signed the Soviet message to Dacca.

The final conference appeal--aside from its omission of Peking references--reflected in large part the thrust of Rashidov's speech to the conference, praising Soviet foreign policy and detente and advocating united action to insure peace and security in Asia. Rashidov broke little new ground in discussing the situation in Asia along lines set forth by Brezhnev in his October 1973 keynote speech to the Moscow World Peace Congress. Rashidov declared that the situation in South Asia was becoming "normalized" and that "favorable conditions" for a "stable and lasting peace" and implementation of an Asian collective security system were developing. The anti-Chinese polemics in Rashidov's speech ranged from warnings of "objective difficulties and obstacles" hampering the cause of peace in Asia to direct attacks on the "anti-Soviet slander" in the Chinese leadership's denunciation of the Brezhnev proposals for Asian collective security, calling the Peking response an effort to divert attention from its own "hegemonistic, great-power" aspirations. Rashidov dismissed as "fabrications" Chinese fears of "encirclement" by Moscow and accused Peking of acting in the same "combat formation" with the imperialists. A 28 September TASS report noted that "many" Asian delegates also had criticized the Chinese, but did not elaborate with details of their speeches.

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1

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After the conference had ended, the anti-Chinese polemical theme emerged more sharply in Soviet media treatment, which during the sessions had focused on Brezhnev's greetings message and his high evaluation of the conference's work. A 5 October PRAVDA editorial, for example, summarized the conference work and attacked the Peking leadership for "distorting" the Asian security concept with charges that Moscow allegedly was encircling China, adding that all Asian states "without exception" should join in a security arrangement. Soviet commentaries beamed to South Asian and African listeners on the Samarkand conference devoted approximately the same proportion of attention to anti-Peking polemics as in the 1973 Dacca conference.

PEKING IGNORES CONFERENCE

Peking followed its usual practice in regard to Soviet-sponsored Asian security forums, ignoring the fact that such a conference had even been held but reiterating its disdain in a passing comment in a 27 September PEOPLE'S DAILY signed article. The article noted that Soviet efforts to implement an Asian security system were generally "ignored" and were doomed to "ignominious failure." Peking's ally Albania, however, criticized the Samarkand meeting directly in two commentaries carried by the ATA agency. They characterized the conference as "revisionist demogogy" and asserted that despite statements by "known followers of the Kremlin clique," most delegates had "avoided" discussing the collective security proposals.

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PERU

MOSCOW APPROVINGLY ASSESSES LIMA POLICIES, DOWNPLAYS ARMS AID

Since the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile, Moscow has held up the left-leaning Peruvian Government as a model of proper "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" policies in contrast to the decadence of the Chilean junta and its "hysterical" anti-Peruvian pronouncements. At the same time, responding to Chilean and U.S. press criticism of Soviet military and other agreements with Peru, Soviet comment has insisted that arms support is justified by Chile's "increasing hostility" toward Peru, but has softpedaled the extent of the USSR's involvement, claiming that it has been exaggerated by Chilean journalists and "U.S. propaganda misinformation centers."

SOVIET-PERUVIAN RELATIONS

While Moscow had displayed reticence regarding Soviet arms sales to Peru, occasional comment has justified Peru's military buildup. A 6 September Spanish-language commentary by Jose Miguel Varas, for instance, deplored "virulent" anti-Peruvian statements and "false charges" from Chilean news media, "abetted by U.S. interests," against Peru's arms program. Varas accused Chilean President Pinochet of fabricating a motive for his own increasing military equipment purchases and maintained that Peru had the right to obtain "from any country whatsoever" the means to defend its sovereignty.

Responding to criticism of another Soviet-Peruvian agreement, a 13 October PRAVDA article reported by TASS denounced the "slanderous campaign" against the Aeroflot agreement signed by Moscow and Lima. PRAVDA charged that "hired pen-pushers" from the Chilean paper EL MERCURIO were playing an "instigatory role" in seeking to complicate Peru's relations with neighboring states. PRAVDA also complained that some U.S. journalists, "in the same harness" with the Chilean papers, were falsely claiming that the Aeroflot agreement contained provisions which threatened Chile. The purpose of such charges, PRAVDA said, was to present a distorted picture of Peruvian foreign policy and to divert Latin American attention from events in Chile.

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Earlier, a 2 October PRAVDA article by V. Listov attempted, in typically roundabout fashion, to refute stories that the recently constructed Peruvian fishing port of Paita was functioning as a Soviet base. Listov quoted the Peruvian fisheries minister as saying that Paita was a purely Peruvian complex. Rumors about a Russian base, he asserted, originated in a "canard" prepared by EL MERCURIO that Paita was becoming a Russian base for nuclear submarines and nuclear missiles and that the port was "inundated" with Russian specialists.

ASSESSMENT OF REGIME

Soviet comment in the past few months has examined the general orientation of Lima's military government against the background of lessons learned from the failure of socialism in Chile, encouraging sound economic programs and careful control of both ultraleft and reactionary elements. Typifying the comment, a Kuznetsov article in NEW TIMES (No. 30, 26 July) praised Peru's "sober assessment of the actual state of affairs" and the "opposition to pseudorevolutionary haste." The military government, Kuznetsov observed, had placed chief emphasis on the economy and, while "altering radically" the country's economic patterns, had taken all steps necessary to prevent breakdowns which could be exploited by "opponents of reform." Emphasizing that the regime had won the support of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), Kuznetsov added that the PCP had rebuked "Trotskyites and ultraleftists" for criticism of the government. Kuznetsov expressed confidence in the regime despite increased "intrigues" by reactionary forces both within and without the country.

Along the same lines, an Andrianov IZVESTIYA article on 28 July praised Peru's technical advances as well as the growth of "sincere, cordial friendship" with the Soviet Union. He claimed that foreign monopolies and local reaction had adopted the "Chilean experience" of strikes, hoarding and other measures designed to create economic chaos, but asserted that the Peruvian people were "suppressing all onslaughts of reaction" and were determined that the current "deepening of democratic reforms" would continue.

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NOTES

PRC-TAIWAN: Peking chose the occasion of the Republic of China's National Day, 10 October, to show renewed interest in promoting Chinese unity and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan impasse. NCNA on the 10th reported that CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying that evening feted and had a "cordial" conversation with Shang Chen, a former high-level Kuomintang military and political leader who has been visiting China since late September. This marked the first such meeting with a high-level PRC leader in almost a year. On the same day a Peking broadcast to Taiwan carried an "open letter" from a former KMT official residing in the United States which stressed that "peaceful unification" of Taiwan with the mainland represents "the people's desire"--the first Peking reference to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem since early this year.

USSR-PRC-DISARMAMENT: Moscow has endeavored to discredit PRC UN delegate Chiao Kuan-hua's 2 October endorsement of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia by calling attention to Peking's allegedly hostile intentions in the area, focusing especially on a claimed buildup of Chinese forces in Tibet. An 8 October Moscow commentary in English to South Asia by Yevgeniy Nikolayev said that since Tibet "stands too close" to the "vital centers" of South Asian nations, a nuclear-free zone cannot be considered without reference to Peking's "missile and nuclear buildup" there. Nikolayev stated that Peking must prove its interest in a South Asia nuclear-free zone by "concrete deeds," including the withdrawal of missile and nuclear forces from Tibet. He also called for an end to PRC nuclear testing in the atmosphere and a halt to "behind the scenes bargaining with belligerent imperialist circles," as exemplified by PRC "agreement" to the U.S. Diego Garcia base.

PRC-GERMANY-USSR: NPC Vice Chairman Hsu Hsiang-chien, in remarks at a 14 October banquet for visiting FRG legislators, voiced Peking's strong support for German reunification while castigating Soviet oppression of the German people since World War II. In offering support for German reunification, the Chinese chose to disregard recent changes in the GDR position, including the revision of the GDR constitution to eliminate all language reflecting East German dedication to eventual all-German unification. Going far beyond Peking's bland calls in the past for an allied peace treaty with Germany and a fair solution of the "abnormal situation"

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of a divided Germany, Hsu voiced Chinese understanding and sympathy with the "resolute opposition" of the German people to a permanent split of their nation and "their demand for national reunification." Without explicitly mentioning the USSR, Hsu portrayed Moscow as the chief opponent to reunification, charging that "those who vainly attempt to dominate the world" have long branded the Germans with unwarranted labels as a pretext to extend their presence "from the Elbe to the Rhine and from East Europe to West Europe so as to dominate the people of the whole Germany and the whole Europe." TASS commentator Vladimir Goncharov promptly rebutted Peking on 15 October stating that the Chinese position had underlined its recent disregard for the GDR--"a socialist state on German soil," and reflects Peking's aim to incite West Germany and the rest of West Europe against the USSR.

HISTORICAL ARTICLE DEFENDS CHOU: Continuing the practice of portraying current Chinese leadership problems through historical analogies, an article in the October RED FLAG (reprinted in PEOPLE'S DAILY and excerpted by Peking radio on 13 October) used illustrations from legalist-Confucianist struggles to defend Chou En-lai. The article by Liang Hsiao appears to be a response to articles this summer, especially an August RED FLAG article by Lo Ssu-ting, which may have pointed to Chou in blaming the prime minister of Emperor Chinshihhuang for allowing Chao Kao, an evil Confucianist, to usurp power after the emperor's death. The August article had noted the many achievements of Prime Minister Li Ssu, stating that his "merits outweighted his faults," but accused him of having "wavered, compromised, and made concessions" to preserve his position when Chao Kao attempted his coup. The current article by Liang omits Li Ssu's role entirely, stating that Chao Kao sneaked in when Chinshihhuang "became somewhat dizzy with a peaceful atmosphere in which the people led a quiet life." Liang also pointedly discussed the strategem of a Han dynasty Confucianist prince, a relative of the emperor, who tried to change the legalist line pursued by the dynasty by tricking the emperor into getting rid of his legalist court minister. Liang noted that bourgeois representatives in the party have used similar tactics, and quoted a Mao statement that ever since Prince Liu Pi's scheme, many careerists have used the strategem to take power "in the name of ridding the emperor of a bad minister." Liang had also portrayed an apparent Chou figure favorably in a May RED FLAG article, using a Han dynasty dispute over government control over salt and iron to defend Chouist economic and resource allocation policies.

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CHINESE EDUCATION: Increased Peking resolve to enroll new college students who have substantive knowledge as well as the proper political credentials was reflected in an 8 October Shanghai report on this fall's local enrollment drive. While stressing the need to give first consideration to an applicant's political performance, the broadcast contained the unusual admission that special attention was paid to enrolling "some of those who had truly performed well," and it revealed that Shanghai enrollment officials were careful to "insure the quality of the admitted students." National guidelines released last summer called for the use of revised entrance examinations to aid colleges in selecting new students capable of meeting Mao's "red and expert" goal, but did not hint that some admissions could be based primarily on academic considerations. Quantitatively, China's higher education system, which was shattered during the cultural revolution, continues to expand. NCNA on 14 October announced that 167,000 new college students were enrolled in universities throughout the country this year; 153,000 new students were admitted last year. Only 200,000 new students were admitted during the three-year period of 1970-72.

PRC PROVINCE ON FOREIGN TRADE: A Hofei broadcast on 13 October updated Anhwei's progress in expanding the range of local products for export. The broadcast revealed that the amount of merchandise available for export has been increased by 18 percent over last year and that several new products, including transistors, sulfa drugs and hydrochloric acid, have been added to the export list. A strong provincial commitment to foreign trade had been reflected last May in another broadcast from Anhwei which revealed for the first time that a separate bureaucratic chain of command had been set up to pass central instructions from Peking through a hierarchy of foreign trade offices reaching down to the county level. Following Anhwei's lead, several other provincial radios then revealed the existence of local foreign trade offices. The latest Hofei broadcast portrayed Anhwei's foreign trade offices as busy sending out cadres to areas where export products are produced to encourage the masses to step up production.

MOSCOW ON U.S. AFRICAN POLICY: U.S. press publicity for a 1970 classified National Security Study Memorandum on African policy and allegations that Secretary of State Kissinger had once proposed a "tilt" toward South Africa prompted a single TASS report on 14 October which omitted all references to the Secretary and

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obscured the time frame of the memo. Stressing charges of U.S. support for "racialist regimes" in South Africa, TASS cited "irrefutable evidence" in the memorandum, excerpted by Jack Anderson in the 11 October Washington POST, that the United States is guided by "military-strategic interests" and "monopolies' demands." TASS' circumspect treatment of Kissinger is consistent with general Moscow media deference to the Secretary in the current detente period. Ignoring the fact that the memo dated back to 1970, TASS presented highlights in the present tense as if current U.S. policy was the issue. The TASS report also noted Washington POST editorial comment suggesting that the United States "places economic and political interests above human rights."

GDR REPARATIONS ISSUE: A GDR 25th anniversary article by Acting Foreign Minister Fischer, published in the Vienna daily WIENER ZEITUNG on 6 October as a "paid advertisement," was notable for a rare acknowledgment that the GDR is one of two successor states to Nazi Germany. The article declared that the GDR, through the "fulfillment of the commitments of the Potsdam agreement--which are binding for both successor states of the imperialist German Reich--has gained the confidence of the peoples." Fischer added that because the GDR had fulfilled the Potsdam decisions, it had also "fulfilled its reparation commitment." The article came against the background of continuing denials by East German spokesmen--not available from GDR media--of assertions that East Berlin, in establishing diplomatic relations with Washington, agreed to compensate Israel for victims of Nazi Germany. Following a denial issued by the GDR embassy in Cairo in September, Premier Sindermann, in a 27 September East Berlin press conference reported by DPA, denied that the GDR in negotiations with the United States had declared it was ready to pay reparations to or to have contacts with Zionist organizations or Israeli authorities. Sindermann said that only negotiations on claims by U.S. citizens against the GDR and GDR citizens against the United States would be considered.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7 - 13 OCTOBER 1974

Moscow (2253 items)

GDR 25th Anniversary	(11%)	17%
[Brezhnev Speeches in GDR	(4%)	6%]
Moldavian 50th Anniversary	(--)	11%
[Brezhnev Speech in Kishinev	(--)	7%]
China	(8%)	4%
UNGA Session	(2%)	2%
Soviet Peace Committee 25th Anniversary	(--)	2%

Peking (877 items)

UNGA Session	(14%)	12%
[Chiao Kuan-hua Speech	(9%)	3%]
Gabon President Bongo in PRC	(9%)	11%*
Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(4%)	5%
PRC National Day	(27%)	4%
Vietnam	(--)	3%
Lao Independence 29th Anniversary	(--)	3%
Albania	(1%)	3%
Middle East	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Bongo's meetings with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

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