CIA FDD TRANS NO 956 SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSL", NO 7, 1963

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090013-2

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In many cases on such headings it will be advantageous to use tactical airborne landings. Sometimes, depending upon the situation, it will be necessary to temporarily break off combat operations completely in one or another corridor and shift the effort to a more advantageous one which is less exposed to radioactive contamination.

Thus, through skillful operations, troops on the offensive are able, even in conditions of radioactive contamination of terrain, to successfully carry out their mission.

Defensive operations can also very often be set up and conducted on contaminated terrain. An especially complex situation for troops may come about when shifting to the defensive in the course of an offensive operation. Troops will be forced to occupy a defense under enemy action on unfortified terrain, and with the presence of regions contaminated by radioactive substances. For the purpose of protection from nuclear attack, and for the successful execution of their assigned mission, the troops on the defensive will try even harder to heighten their maneuverability and performance, concentrating their efforts on those axes where the aggressor is most successful. In view of the fact that the advancing troops, as has already been mentioned, will take measures for crossing contaminated zones on the move or will go around them, the defending forces will have to concentrate their efforts mainly in these corridors.

The organization of the defense will have to be altered to a certain extent, depending upon the execution of missions by troops, the drop in the radiation level, and the creation of new contaminated zones. In our opinion, it will be more necessary on the defensive than on the offensive to replace forces which have received the maximum possible dose of radiation, and also to withdraw them from regions with high levels of radiation to new defensive lines or corridors of operation.

In conditions of radioactive contamination of terrain, the movement of troops forward becomes considerably more complicated, especially when the second echelons (reserves) are being committed to battle. When moving troops from the rear in compliance with the situation, including a radiative situation, it will be necessary to consider a greater number of alternate methods of introduction than was done in the years of the Great Patriotic War (World War II), and to refine or even change the routes and directions of operations of divisions and regiments. Often there may be a need to organize a detour around contaminated areas through an adjacent corridor, or to move troops to other routes for crossing those areas of the move at accelerated speeds, using protective means. In connection with this, the necessity arises, in addition, to coordinate matters of movement

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and operations of forces of adjacent divisions and even larger units.

As a consequence of terrain contamination, there is inevitably created the threat of defeat of those forces and fire-power which, at a given time, deploy themselves over a given location. To avoid the defeat of these forces, including rear area units, and the contamination of materiel by radioactive substances, the most diverse measures may be taken. One of the most acceptable measures is the withdrawal of troops and the transfer of rear area units from contaminated territory into uncontaminated areas. But this is not always as easily accomplished as may seem at first glance. Additional irradiation of personnel may occur in new regions due to the absence of cover, since in the course of transferring troops and materiel, nuclear strikes and enemy fire are not precluded. Therefore, the problems of preserving the combat efficiency of troops located in fortified areas and in the rear must also be resolved, proceeding from the specific radiative situation and disposition and designation of divisional and regimental units. It will be necessary, for example, to calculate what dose of irradiation they will have, taking into account that already received, if they continue to occupy regions in contaminated territory, or if they transfer to new areas, what supplies must be preserved above others for the security of troops already in operation, and so on.

Of course, first and foremost, it will be necessary to withdraw into new areas those troops and rear area units who have received high levels of radiation; their defeat is not precluded even when they have taken all known measures and methods of protection. And sometimes it will prove advantageous to bring troops closer to the front ahead of the deadline, especially if their immediate commitment to battle is being contemplated. The transfer of troops must be accomplished smoothly, and swiftly, observing all measures of camouflage and protection.

A radiative situation has a profound effect upon the control of troops; it complicates it and increases the volume of work for commanders and HQ's. A great deal will depend upon the ability to foresee the radiative situation, to evaluate it quickly and correctly, and, in connection with this, to determine the most advantageous direction and methods of troop operations, adopting corresponding decisions and delivering them to those who will carry them out. A constantly changing radiative situation will require alternate, often personal directives to the troops.

Along with equipping forces with individual protective means and with means of special treatment, the continuous observation of radiation and the timely information of forces and rear area units concerning impending radioactive contamination of terrain based on the

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observation of the direction and speed of the radioactive cloud takes on important significance in the course of combat operations.

Special preventative measures, aimed at increasing the resistance of the human organism to the effect of radioactive substances as well as corresponding preparation of combat and transport materiel are also necessary. Under any circumstances, HQ's need to establish continuous control over the irradiation of personnel, to organize and swiftly carry out the liquidation of the after-effects and the swift restoration of the combat efficiency of units.

The content, extent, and order of conducting these measures may vary. They depend upon the type of combat operation and also upon the expected and established overall operational situation, including the radiative situation.

The data on the radiative situation must be obtained both by intelligence forces and facilities, and by all operating ground forces and aviation, so that the commanders and HQ's are able to notify in time those groupings which are in the most danger, and to specify if needed, earlier adopted decisions and designate new methods of troop operations which insure precise and swift execution of combat missions. When envisioning operations in contaminated territory, it will be necessary to hermetically seal combat and transport vehicles, and to make the necessary adaptations on them. The protection of stationary and portable rations and medical supplies must be especially reliable, and for this it is necessary to use standard and improvised means which protect against contamination by radioactive dust.

Most complex is the elimination of the irradiation after-effects to personnel and the contamination of combat materiel by radioactive substances for the swift restoration of the combat efficiency of troops. This will often be bound together with the necessity of replacing and temporarily withdrawing units from combat for the purpose of giving special and medical treatment to personnel and the decontamination of combat materiel.

Sometimes it will be necessary to resort to an evacuation of those troops who receive significant doses of irradiation not just beyond the contaminated territory into safe areas, but also into the interior.

For the constant knowledge of the radiative situation and an account of its changes, in our opinion it is necessary to set up in operations HQ's a special map with representations of the centers of the nuclear strikes of both sides, the times and altitudes of the strikes, the boundaries of the zones of contamination thus formed,

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and the radiation levels, also the probable changes in radiation according to time, direction, the speed of movement of the radioactive cloud, etc. In a tactical unit it is possible to confine oneself to plotting the data of the radiative situation on a general situation map.

The problems of a radiative situation, most likely, will be reflected in oral information as well as in written combat reports. It is advisable to keep a record of radioactive irradiation of personnel in separate journals based on the general and special reports periodically presented at headquarters.

All of this data will be the basis for an evaluation of the radiative situation when planning combat operations and when adopting or elaborating decisions, when making calculations, connected with the determination of the summary doses which can be taken in by troops operating on contaminated terrain, and also when deciding other matters concerning the control of troops and security of their operations.

The protection of personnel of command elements from radioactive substances is organized by HQ jointly with heads of service branches. In doing this, the skillful selection of primary and alternate areas for the disposition of control points, determination of the order and speed of their transfer out of contaminated territory has great significance. As far as possible, movement through contaminated zones is to be avoided, as well as dispositions within them, especially if there is no special man-made cover. For the swift transfer of control points, it is advisable to use air transport.

When conducting combat operations under conditions of a radiative situation, the volume of problems which are handled by the rear area in connection with the need to preserve materiel from the contamination of radioactive substances multiplies significantly, and the work in connection with these materials and the evacuation of the sick and wounded is complicated.

Supplying troops with materiel brought by the transport mentioned above must be attempted in uncontaminated areas or at least with short halts in areas with low levels of radiation, using motor convoy routes most favourable in respect to radiation and also mechanized means of loading and unloading. It is evident that it will be necessary to increase the stores of materiel close to the troops, to systematically prepare and maintain roads in rear areas, to increase the maneuverability of rear area units, and to employ air transport for the shipping of materiel.

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In conclusion it should be emphasized that the known difficulties which are created when planning and conducting combat operations under conditions of radioactive contamination of terrain are entirely surmountable if commanders, headquarters, and forces are prepared for them beforehand.

Future theoretical elaboration of matters concerning the operations of troops under conditions of radioactive contamination of terrain will contribute to the raising of the level of their operational and combat training.

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NAVAL SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES

CPYRGHT

By Captain 1st Rank N. V'yunenko

Equipping ships and naval aircraft with nuclear rocket weapons has further increased the Navy's striking power. Due to rocket-carrying surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, the Navy has not only become capable of destroying large groupings of the enemy's navy at sea as well as destroying targets deep in the rear and annihilating concentrations of troops on land. Because of this, the missions of the Navy and the methods of carrying them out have been re-evaluated. We will examine what new aspects have appeared in the field of naval support of ground troop "soyedineniya" and "Ob'yedineniya"* attacking in littoral sectors.

Naval support of ground troops was widespread in past wars. This concept sometimes included all naval operations, even those conducted by its forces independently, outside the realm of ground troop operations and having only an indirect relation to them. But inasmuch as naval successes had a definite effect on the situation on the land front, where the main goals of the war were usually attained, it was thought that the decisions affecting all naval missions was subordinate to direct support of ground troop operations on the coastal front. In our opinion, only those naval operations which are dependent on the purposes and aims of the operations being conducted by coastal fronts should be regarded as support of land forces operations in littoral axes.

During the Great Patriotic War (World War II) our Navy concentrated a large share of its efforts for direct support of ground troops, both in offensive and defensive operations. The theory of naval art even included an operation for supporting ground troops on the shore. All naval operations were determined by a purpose -- either to facilitate the advance of group troop "chasti"** and "soyedineniya" along the shore or to provide shore defense for them from strikes of enemy surface ships and amphibious landings, or coastal groupings of hostile troops. The most important individual missions

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* "Soyedineniya" is a unit of divisional size or over. "Ob'yedineniya" is an "Army" or "Front" (a unification of Armies). (Translator's note)

** A "chasti" is a unit of regimental size. (Translator's note)

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of this operation, as is known, were artillery support of ground troops from the sea, the landing of tactical amphibious forces, the destruction of enemy naval forces supporting their own troops, destruction of enemy naval lines of communication by which coastal groupings received supplies, and protection for friendly lines of communication which directly connected the troops with rear lines on the shore.

To a considerable degree our former ideas concerning ground troop support have retained their significance. But today the Navy has new missions; for example, the destruction of surface ships and submarines carrying nuclear rocket weapons at sea. At the same time, a number of those missions have been retained whose fulfillment by naval forces creates favorable conditions for the operations of ground troops.

Modern ground forces, being highly mobile, can conduct combat operations at very high tempo. They are able to destroy with their weapons important targets even in the operational depth of the enemy and can destroy amphibious landing forces thereby ensuring the rapid advance of friendly "chasti" and "soyedineniya" in the depth of the enemy defense. However, it would be incorrect to think that in a nuclear war the need of naval support for their operations would be lessened.

The Navy possesses great potential for successfully combatting hostile naval forces that will certainly give opposition to troops operation in coastal areas as well as areas adjacent to them. It is true that the forces and means at the disposal of ground troops, as pointed out, could be used to combat a naval enemy which is attempting to hinder them from accomplishing a combat mission on shore. But they are less effective than those at the disposal of the Navy, and, consequently, to divert them to fight against naval targets is less desirable. Moreover, transferring even a small portion of the troops' nuclear rocket weaponry for the destruction of naval targets has an adverse effect on the combat efficiency of groups carrying out the main missions of routing enemy forces on land.

Successful destruction by the Navy of enemy naval units not only leads to a radical improvement of the situation in littoral areas, which in itself facilitates accomplishment of combat missions by ground troops, but also makes it possible for them to keep a significant part of their striking power for operations in the whole depth of littoral areas. Therefore, even in modern conditions, ground troops advancing in littoral areas will constantly feel the need for naval support.

In what forms are naval operations in support of ground troops

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expressed and what changes should be expected in this field? A naval operation in support of ground troops as a form of activity for achieving the operational goal of troop support has long been out of date. The majority of missions, which have determined its scope and content, have now become more enlarged, but not to the extent that accomplishing each of them would constitute a special operation, even though it might yield enormous operational results (for example, amphibious landings in the depth of the operational formation of opposing hostile forces, destruction of enemy naval forces supporting their own troops). Today the operational goals can be achieved in a short period of time by the infliction of powerful strikes by ground and Navy forces directly on the main targets of the basic concentrations of enemy forces at sea and on shore.

In our opinion, an operation in support of ground forces can be converted into the accomplishment of combat activity by various types of naval forces in which practically every naval mission is fulfilled (combatting the striking forces of the enemy's navy, his amphibious landings, destruction of naval communications, protection of our own sea lanes, strikes on land targets, landing amphibious forces). This circumstance, which gives all naval operations in support of troops enormous scope, at the same time precludes using them in a single operational formation. Indeed, how is it possible to think that in NATO naval exercises, aircraft carrier task forces maneuvering in the Bay of Biscay or the Mediterranean Sea and supporting troops in the European theater, and submarines with Polaris missiles taking positions in the Norwegian Sea and inflicting strikes on land targets in the interests of these same troops, comprise elements of one and the same operational formation of naval forces supporting ground troops?

We suggest that strike, antisubmarine, and amphibious task forces of ships, submarines, and aircraft by their very nature and sphere of application are so different from each other as to preclude any single formation of them for executing missions in support of ground troops.

The nature of naval support of ground troops in offensive operations in littoral areas will be different than it used to be. Today it is no longer required that naval forces and all their operations be attached directly to the flank of ground troops moving toward the sea. The Navy can effectively support those groups which are carrying out their missions in the heart of the mainland and the Navy itself can be located a great distance from the shore. Formerly, these naval operations only indirectly affected the situation in which troop operations were being developed, but today this influence will be direct. Among these types are naval operations against aircraft carrier groups whose aircraft are supporting troops in one of the

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operational areas of a theater of military operations.

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Combatting the enemy's navy has acquired a primary significance in the matter of supporting ground troops. Naval aircraft from carriers and land bases will be a constant threat to the troops. They will begin to show the greatest activity in support of their own troops in the development of combat operations on land following delivery by the belligerents of powerful nuclear strikes using strategic weapons. Naval aviation, having preserved its arms, will attempt to fill the gap in the ground support role which may be caused by the destruction of a significant portion of land-based aircraft.

Let us examine the critical importance of combatting naval aircraft, which are a threat to many branches and arms of the armed forces. The battle against naval aircraft will not be directly linked with providing support for any one grouping of ground troops. Nonetheless, the destruction of carrier strike task groups of aircraft carriers, for example, will significantly weaken the enemy air forces. This is very important for the troops conducting operations in littoral sectors and sectors adjacent to them.

Considerable attention is being given to development of methods for the employment of naval aircraft. For example, during US and NATO naval operational training, carrier-based aircraft, in addition to improving methods of delivering nuclear strikes on targets in the enemy rear, systematically develop methods for air support of ground troops. The NATO Command believes that aircraft carriers will be shifted into joint operations with ground troops after carrier-based aircraft have accomplished their mission in a so-called general nuclear offensive. Therefore, the destruction of even a portion of naval aircraft significantly lessens the enemy nuclear strike force from the sea to land targets and will narrow the scope of air support for hostile troop operations in littoral sectors.

Rocket-carrying submarines may also threaten ground troops from the sea during an nuclear war. They are able to deliver surprise nuclear strikes from any direction of the sea and from distances of 1,000 km. or more. It is true that this is a strategic weapon system and that its basic purpose is to deliver powerful nuclear missile strikes on large, stationary area targets, which could be military-industrial and administrative-political centers or important military targets in the heart of the country. The use of submarine-launched Polaris missiles directly against ground troops, as the US press writes, is unlikely. Nevertheless, the possibility that this weapon might be employed on large concentrations of ground troops in certain cases has not been excluded.

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Destroying submarines and preventing them from using their armament is one of the navy's primary missions. It will be accomplished by naval forces independently from the very beginning of the war. Its successful execution (similar to the successful struggle against naval aircraft) will mean immediate elimination of the threat of nuclear-missile strikes from the seas not only on rear targets, but also on concentrations of ground troops, which will certainly create favorable conditions for coastal operations.

The navy's basic method of combatting missile-carrying aircraft is systematic search and immediate destruction of them by submarines, ships, and aircraft. Against missile-carrying surface and other ships the method is joint or separate strikes, chiefly by submarines and missile-carrying aircraft. In the past, the decisive factor making it possible to conduct a successful struggle against submarines was the creation of ship hunter-killer groups. They literally hunted submarines. Combat situation now includes aircraft as well. Today, in a number of navies, hunter-killer groups of submarines, aircraft, and surface ships have been created to combat missile-carrying submarines. They are assigned to continuously check areas of the sea, from which it is possible to launch rockets from underwater, and to destroy all detected underwater targets. If necessary, mine barriers hampering the movement into launching position by hostile, missile-carrying submarines may be erected in certain areas of the sea. Erecting them can decrease the front of the active struggle against enemy submarines.

Another important enemy strategic weapon which can also be used under certain conditions against groupings of ground troops and targets in the depth of their operational area is surface and transport ships equipped with the very same Polaris missiles. At the present time a great deal of attention is being given to the development of these forces, called chameleon ships in the U.S. press. Although not all of their capabilities are discussed in the foreign press, it can be assumed that in a certain situation the enemy will attempt to use this weapon to support the operations of their troops. That is why "ob'yedineniya" (units above division level) of ground troops will be no less interested than the navy itself in a favorable outcome of the struggle against enemy naval strike forces.

Certain peculiarities are inherent in the operations of naval strike forces under the conditions of a nuclear-missile war. This is because the struggle against enemy carriers with rocket weapons does not need to be linked with the solution of specific missions on land. It should be a continuous, systematic struggle. The destruction at sea of an enemy ship with rocket capability is important to the same degree as the successful destruction of rocket installations in the line of advance of ground troops. That is why

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combating the enemy's navy (more precisely, combating that portion of his forces which are deployed on the open sea, even if far from the shore, when such forces are perhaps directed against ground troops) should be regarded as naval support for friendly attacking troops.

In the not too distant past naval forces carried out missions in the interests of ground troops in tactical and, less frequently, in operational cooperation with them. Moreover, the navy mainly operated in coastal waters or at a relatively small distance from its shores. Today naval operations have taken on considerable independence. Its "soyedineniya" (task groups), in destroying enemy rocket-carrying aviation forces in remote areas of the ocean, will perform this mission without coordination with the ground troops. But in destroying or weakening groupings of enemy naval forces, the navy will be supporting the operations of ground troops in the most direct method and, by doing so, will contribute to the overall goal of routing the enemy. At the same time, however, using naval force in operational and even in tactical cooperation with the troops has not been excluded. But this is characteristic for performing other missions.

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The problem of combating surface ships of the enemy operating in the immediate vicinity of the coast is closely related to the problem of combating aircraft and rocket-carrying submarines. Essentially, the execution of this task formerly consisted of providing cover for a grouping of ground troops against enemy attacks from the sea. It included the destruction of "artillery" ships which were trying to fire on important targets in the coastal zone. A similar problem still exists under present conditions. However, it has acquired a completely different meaning as a result of the above-mentioned changes in armament and, consequently, the increased combat capabilities of naval forces.

During World War II, large warships, mainly battleships and cruisers, inflicted heavy losses on troops operating along the coast by heavy fire with their long range guns, and forced such troops to halt their advance. With the acquisition of rocket weapons, it is unlikely that even ships with long range guns would be used for this purpose. However, there now exists a threat of shelling important targets not only from ships but also from missile ships. At present, attacks from ships and particularly from missile boats, which come close to the shore at the time of firing, may result in heavy destruction. If decisive and prompt counteraction is not taken against these ships, they would be able, with their effective firing range, to inflict heavy losses on individual

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groupings of troops, demolish road junctions, bridges, ferries, and coastal airfields, and thereby hinder the successful completion of operations.

Military specialists in different countries have noted the great superiority of ships carrying short-range missiles over ground troop rocket launchers. These ships are more mobile than ground rocket units; they are highly maneuverable both before and after using the weapon, and they can fire on coastal targets practically from any offshore area. Even with an economical expenditure of forces, the coastal defender would be forced to have a great number of different forces and equipment in order to retain the coast line and to provide effective counteraction against the enemy fleet.

According to occasional statements in the press, the operations of large surface ships against coastal targets are considered impractical at the present time. In approaching the coast, it is difficult for them to remain undetected and they can be quickly destroyed even by coastal defense weapons. For this reason it is believed that it would be more effective to operate missile boats near the coast. Owing to the fact that they present smaller targets for radar, they can stealthily enter offshore launching areas and their rockets can hit important targets on the coast.

One might agree with this point of view if all rockets installed on ships and missile boats were to have the same, and in this case, short range. But actually, the longer the range of rockets, the greater is their size; consequently, larger ships must be used for carrying the rockets. In other words, the larger the missile ship, the longer the distance from which it is able to hit coastal targets and the less need there will be for the ship to come close to the shore. At present special missile-carrying ships are under construction in foreign countries for firing on coastal targets. For example, surface rocket carriers are being built for the West German armed forces, in addition to ships equipped with conventional weapons. Therefore, one should not abandon the investigation of effective methods of combating surface ships, including large ones.

The opinion has been stated at times that surface ships of the enemy should be combatted by the navy together with ground troops, particularly with their rocket weapons, and also by fighter-bombers. Of course, in many instances this will be the case. However, one should not forget that the rocket weapons of ground troops (of the "Honest John" and "Corporal" type) are supposed to be used for the destruction of semi-mobile and predominantly area targets. Their use against highly mobile, floating targets is not very effective and not even profitable. However, the use of fighter-bomber carrying rockets would have a greater effect. Unfortunately, they will

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always be put into operation completely over land zones. Moreover, the weapons used on aircraft are more capable of hitting land targets than nautical targets. One should also take into account that it would be undesirable to use aircraft operating jointly with troops for combating a naval enemy, since this would weaken the direct support of ground troops engaged in continuing combat operations on land.

Surface ships of the enemy, which support their troops on land, can be destroyed by submarines, aircraft, and even by coastal rocket units. This will be of great help to the troops, since they will be relieved of the necessity to detail a considerable part of their forces to coastal defense against an attack by enemey surface ships.

In addition to the task of destroying enemy ships, one of the tasks of the navy is to provide fire support for amphibious forces and for the advancing units of ground troops. Ground troops equipped with long range rockets and nuclear weapons would now, of course, be capable of hitting various targets in the depth of the enemy defense without resorting to the help of naval ships. However, under certain conditions, such as naval support of troops operating in mountainous regions or in the Arctic, missile boats and rocket-carrying ships may be more successful in using their weapons for the benefit of the troops than the troops themselves would be able to do. This would be the case especially in hitting targets located very close to the water. Naturally, in such cases it will be necessary to seek the support of surface ships for troops on the coast.

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New methods have also been planned for the use of amphibious landing forces. In a number of coastal zones, troops cannot always advance independently at high speeds, without the help of the navy. A rapid advance of combined-arms "soyedineniya" is hindered by river estuaries, straits, and channels, which are very difficult to cross on the march. The enemy will attempt to use these features to create defensive lines. The river-crossing equipment of the ground troops alone will, of course, be insufficient to overcome these water barriers at high speed. It will be necessary to use naval ships both for landing amphibious troops in the depth behind the enemy defense and for organizing rapid river crossings by troops. This is one of the most reliable methods of guaranteeing a high speed of advance of troops along the coast. This method has justified itself in the past and it will be retained in the future. It is true that special ships and landing equipment are necessary for this purpose. The navies of many countries have various types of landing craft.

The purpose of amphibious landing operations in support of troop advances was usually the penetration of shore defenses and the capture

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of important fortified points on the coast. As an example, we might mention the Novorossiysk landing operation of the Black Sea Fleet, which took place in September 1943.

Under present conditions, a landing operation would hardly have the same purpose. Now its main purpose would be a joint operation with troops advancing from the front to complete the routing of an enemy grouping.

Amphibious landing operations may also take place in the rear of the enemy for the purpose of occupying a portion of the coastal area and rapidly developing an offensive from there in the depth of defense, to prevent the enemy from forming any strike forces against the troops advancing along the coast.

The U.S. Navy has assault helicopter carriers, dock landing ships, troop and freight transport ships, supply ships, and others, for the landing of troops. It has a total of more than 250 landing ships and 350 smaller landing craft. According to the foreign press, almost all of these craft have an "age limit." Most of them, i.e., 86 percent, were built during the war and are able to serve not more than three to five additional years.

U.S. military theoreticians believe that the landing of large amphibious forces may form the basis of an "amphibious war." In other words, amphibious operations at sea may be considered as offensive operations, which have the purpose of taking possession of large islands, straits, naval bases, or important coastal areas. These operations will be conducted by the joint efforts of front-line formations of ground troops and naval forces, with adequate air support. The composition of landing forces and the methods of combat operations are subordinated to the idea of providing a fast tempo of troop movements within the area to be liberated from the enemy. Amphibious operations may also represent the first step in deploying ground troops for combat in new operational directions, and possibly in theaters of operations where no groupings of ground troops had previously existed.

In the past, amphibious forces were often landed within the tactical depth of enemy defense. Therefore, in order to be successful they had to connect rapidly with the advancing troops. Now, however, an amphibious force should also be landed in the rear area so that it may affect the whole depth of deployment of enemy forces. The landing of amphibious forces (with the exception of reconnaissance groups) slightly ahead of advancing troops may lose the significance which was formerly attached to it. An amphibious force, which has been landed at a short distance from the troops launching an attack along the shore line, may not even have time to carry out

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its assignments before the approach of the rapidly moving divisions operating from the front. In this connection, the depth of landing of an amphibious force must be calculated in such a way that the landing force, after seizing an area, may have time to regroup quickly on the move and act decisively to forestall the enemy in capturing important positions in the depth of defense and preventing the enemy from hindering the advance of troops moving along the shore.

The U.S. Navy has conducted a large number of exercises in landing amphibious forces. For example, in 1959 U.S. amphibious forces in Korea conducted an exercise involving the landing of a force in the rear of the "enemy," whose advance was checked by the defending side. Immediately after the landing, the amphibious force had to occupy important sectors in the rear of the "attacking" force and, by its actions, to create suitable conditions for the troops to pass from the defensive to the offensive and to capture, during movement, important objectives in the depth of "enemy" territory. A Marine brigade, a helicopter squadron, 38 ships of the U.S. 7th Fleet, including one attack aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 2 submarines, 23 transport ships and LSTs, and units of land-based aviation took part in this exercise. Similar exercises were conducted in the fall of 1960 in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea during Operation "Cool Time."

The order of landing amphibious forces has also changed from that which was in effect at the end of World War II and during the first postwar exercises. To speed up the time of preparation and landing, the landing force must be of a combination type, i.e., it should consist of airborne, helicopter, and amphibious units. Airborne and helicopter landing forces, equipped with small arms, can quickly occupy key positions in the enemy defense. The task of an amphibious force, which has heavy equipment, i.e., mainly tanks, heavy rocket launchers, and antiaircraft equipment to provide cover for all landing troops and ships during the landing and the subsequent combat operations, will consist in quickly occupying part of the territory held by the enemy and starting operations in support of the troops advancing from the front.

The speed of landing must be as high as possible. This necessitates the use of new landing equipment with greater speed of operation, capacity, and mobility. This requirement is met most completely by the equipment available in the navies of some countries, such as fast-moving dock landing ships, which are able to land amphibious forces with their own floating equipment on the move. A transport dock ship with a displacement of about [illegible] can simultaneously carry on board up to 1,000 marines, 10 amphibious craft, 6 to 12 helicopters, and 2,500 tons of freight. The operational speed is 20 knots (up to 40 kilometers per hour). Work is in progress

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in a number of countries for designing a ship which would combine the qualities of a helicopter carrier and a dock transport ship. The possibilities of building submarine underwater landing craft have also been studied extensively.

Three ways have been suggested for improving the tactical capabilities of so-called light amphibious forces, i.e., their landing equipment. Such improvements would include the introduction of hydrofoil craft, the development of air-cushioned motor vehicles and ships, and the use of gas turbines as the principal power on landing ships. The course of development of new boats, amphibious craft, and amphibious wheeled motor vehicles has been precisely laid down. The hull outlines have been improved, retractable wheels have been installed, and the engine power has been increased. The use of aluminum as basic material will enable wheeled motor vehicles to develop higher speeds. The installation of retractable hydrofoils will increase the speed of movement 5 to 6 times. All these types of equipment can be used for the landing of troops, and some of them for transport of heavy equipment, in which case it will not be necessary for amphibious detachments to spend many days being shipped by sea.

In addition to amphibious landing equipment in the U.S. and British navies, they plan to make extensive use of helicopters, particularly for landing advance units. One of the British Navy ships specially adapted for this purpose is the aircraft carrier Bulwark, which carries 21 helicopters and a landing detachment of 600, armed with automatic weapons. The U.S. Navy has five assault helicopter carriers. Each one of them can transport from 1,500 to 2,000 marines and from 12 to 30 helicopters.

To reduce the time required for establishing a beachead, foreign armies use three different methods of landing operations: 1. disembarking from a helicopter after it has landed; 2. jumping from a helicopter hovering 0.7 to 1 meter above the ground (if the landing area is too rough); or 3. descending by rope (landing in a forest). When landing marines with the help of helicopters, it is recommended that the ship approach as closely as possible to the shore. It is considered that the maximum distance for helicopters to guarantee a successful landing of troops is 130 kilometers.

After landing on the shore in the depth of the operational deployment of the enemy troops, the landing force must disorganize the enemy's defense as quickly as possible and create favorable conditions for the speedy advance of ground troops operating from the front. In the event there is no continuous front of troops and the enemy defense system includes many areas unoccupied by troops, the landing forces must be given greater independence of action on the

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shore and more initiative in choosing the directions for developing an attack. Without engaging in protracted battles in order to capture individual centers of resistance, the landing forces, as well as ground troops, must carry out a wide flanking maneuver, bypass difficult defense areas in the rear of the enemy, and, on the move, capture important strong points, which will permit the troops operating from the front to maintain a high speed of advance. If the landing force is able to carry out all these tasks, its employment may be considered successful.

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The interdiction of sea lanes of communication, which supply enemy forces along the shore, is an important part of the support to ground troops. As a result of the destruction of troop and freight transport ships at sea, and the demolition of loading and unloading points for enemy ships, the enemy will be rendered incapable of maneuvering his forces across the sea, replacing losses in his troops, and supplying them with the materiel needed for armed combat. This is felt particularly in those areas of the coastal front which have a poorly developed system of highways and railways and limited possibilities of using transport planes.

The interdiction of sea lanes of communication result in great damage to the enemy. Sea transport cannot even be replaced by such numerous means of transport as helicopters, which have a small load capacity. With the help of helicopters, it is possible to deliver small loads of various freight, but so far it has been very difficult to transport heavy equipment and ammunition.

It is obvious that successful operations of naval forces in interdicting sea lanes of communication of the enemy will have a direct effect on the situation in the coastal zone. The greater the enemy's losses at sea, the more successful can be the operations of ground troops on the shore and the fewer efforts they will require to achieve their goals.

Ground troops engaged in combat in coastal areas will require reliable means of sea transport. It is an important task of the navy in supporting the ground troops not only to fight against the enemy sea lanes of communication, but to assure its own sea transport. This problem must be solved by the navy in cooperation with air defense troops. It is possible that in some cases these actions may assume forms similar to those which were developed during World War II. The protection of small groups of ships or individual transports against attacks by enemy submarines, surface ships and aircraft will apparently not go beyond the scope of regular operations of all forces which are capable of creating an insurmountable antiaircraft

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defense, while the escorting of large convoys may be regarded as a special operation.

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These are the tasks which may be assigned to the navy in rendering support to the ground troops. To provide this support, the navy will be used to the extent that it is necessary for ensuring a high speed of advance of the ground troops. It should be kept in mind that the principal naval assault forces will operate in independent sea areas and that their main activity will consist in combating naval surface ships, submarines, and convoys of the enemy.

In this connection, the question arises regarding the methods of organizing the operations of naval assault forces in support of ground troops. During the past war, the targets and timing for naval strikes were strictly coordinated with the plan of operations of the coastal front troops. This procedure of organization of joint operations of the navy and ground troops will not undergo any great changes in the future. However, in planning the use of naval forces (submarines and aircraft) in support strikes for ground troops, it should be taken into consideration that their actions in support of the troops will be on a one-time basis and will be carried out within short periods of time. It is not permissible now to divert these naval forces for a prolonged period from their principal missions. This could result in very serious consequences.

Naval forces must have more freedom in choosing the time and method for strikes against a specified target so that they may be able, at the proper time, to strike at those enemy groupings at sea which present the greatest threat at a given time, both to the navy and to ground forces, as well as to other branches of the armed forces.

In the deployment of naval forces for the support of ground troops, one should always keep in mind any changes in the character of the opposing enemy. Now, the armed forces of large countries have, in addition to strong ground forces, a powerful navy which is capable of inflicting heavy blows against groupings of the armed forces and against objectives in the depth of the area. The fight against such a navy, the routing of its assault forces, and the hindering of rocket and nuclear attacks from the sea, will constitute the main types of operations of our navy. Only after this particular feature has been taken into consideration will it be possible to involve the principal naval forces in direct support of the ground troops.

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The scope of problems to be solved by the navy has expanded and the need for forces has grown considerably. Therefore, in rendering support to the ground troops, the navy must be used in a purposeful manner for routing the most important enemy forces at sea creating a direct threat to the troops advancing in the coastal zone.

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THE THIRD EDITION OF "MARXISM-LENINISM ON WAR AND THE ARMY"[1],

Book Review by Col V. Morozov

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A relatively short time has passed between the second and third editions of the book being reviewed -- about a year and a half. But during this period in the life of our nation, an event of vast importance has occurred -- the 22nd Party Congress and its adoption of the new program of the CPSU, a new "Communist Manifesto" of the modern era. In the Program the most important points of Marxist-Leninist theory have received profound creative development, including the issue of war and peace under modern conditions. Therefore it is natural that there has arisen the necessity of reexamining certain issues of war and military science.

In general, the second edition of the book received a favorable evaluation from our military press. Col. I. Selezhev's review, published in "Voennaya Mysl" No. 6, 1962, gives a detailed analysis of the strong and weak points of the book. In evaluating the new, third edition, it is necessary first of all to approach the subject from the standpoint of how thoroughly the group of authors has managed to show the development of Leninist theses concerning war and the army in the documents and decisions of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU.

On the whole, having preserved the work's original plan and basic content, the authors augmented and strengthened the contents of many of the issues under examination. In the majority of the book's chapters the ideas, touched upon by the Congress, became departure points for the elaboration of the material. However, it must not be thought that all of the possibilities in that direction have been exhausted. Research must continue to ascertain what development Marxist-Leninist teachings regarding war and the army has received as a result of the proceedings of the 22nd Party Congress, especially in the Program of the CPSU.

Let us examine briefly the contents of the book and dwell on several new, and sometimes controversial theses.

The work opens with a preface (there was none in the second edition), in which the general character of Marxist-Leninist teach-

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1. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, Third edition revised and enlarged. Under the general editorship of Col. G. A. Fedorov (editor-in-chief), Major General N. Ya Sushko, and Col. B. A. M. Byeliy, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, 375 pp.

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ings on war and the army are given, and in which its importance for a profound study of the problems of war under modern conditions is shown. "Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army," as the book goes, "is a theory, which has been called upon to solve the sociological problems of the origin, course, and the outcome of wars in world history, and first and foremost, wars in modern times. The Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the Army analyses war as a historical, socio-political phenomenon, reveals the natural dependency of war and the Army upon economic and other social conditions, and explains their role in the life and development of human society. This teaching is a division of Marxism-Leninism. Directly, it forms a part of historical materialism." (p. 3)

In the preface, the urgency and latitude of the problem of war and peace under modern conditions are shown. The question of war and peace has become a matter of life and death for millions of people. It occupies the primary place in the Marxist struggle against the ideologies of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, right-wing socialists, revisionists, and dogmatists. The author of the preface explains the necessity of a profound study of the problems of war by a special contradiction in the modern period of world history. (p. 4) In our opinion, the matter lies not only in the complexity and contradiction of our age, but most of all in its very nature as the era of transition from capitalism to socialism. Capitalism, inevitably on the road to destruction, is prepared to plunge humanity into a thermo-nuclear war in order to prolong its supremacy.

Unfortunately, the reader will not find in the preface the answer to the question of the relationship of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the Army to Soviet military science. This teaching, being a division of Marxist philosophy, has great methodological significance for the development of Soviet military theory, for the solution of numerous problems confronting military science in connection with the change of the balance of forces in the world arena, and in connection with the modern revolution in military affairs.

In examining the essence of wars, their classic content and economic conditionality, the role of politics in the preparation of war and its role in directing an armed conflict (ch. 1.), the authors focus primary attention on the analysis of modern wars. The perpetrators of every war of the modern era and the only source of war peril is imperialism. The authors emphasize the sharp intensification of the aggressiveness of imperialism in our time. Not counting on a victory in world competition with socialism, the imperialists are embarked on the preparation and unleashing of a nuclear war against socialist countries. Another reason for the particular aggressiveness of present imperialist states lies in the fact of the aggravation of antagonisms "between the imperialist states and

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the peoples of colonial and dependent underdeveloped countries." (p. 30). The disintegration of the colonial system creates a threat to the enormous profits which the imperialists are wringing out of the underdeveloped countries. The imperialist powers are striving at all cost to preserve colonialism in old and new forms and to protect the colossal profits obtained from the exploitation of economically underdeveloped countries. The book's authors emphasize a third reason for the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, i.e. the aggravation of every internal antagonism of the capitalistic structure.

The book brings to light the role of imperialist policy in the military, diplomatic, economic preparation of aggressive wars, and the conclusion is made that wars do not arise voluntarily and spontaneously. They are consciously prepared and unleashed by the imperialist governments which are carrying out the will of monopolistic capital. War is not a fatal inevitability. Under modern conditions, there exist powerful forces which are able to seize the imperialist aggressor by the hand to restrain the forces of war.

The growing might of the countries of the world socialist system plays a decisive role in the struggle for the preservation of peace.

The authors also point to the circumstance that numerous accidental occurrences play an acknowledged role in the origin of wars, and that factors are now at work which are heightening sharply the role of chance in the unleashing of war. The tension in international relations, artificially induced by the aggressive circles of the imperialist states, and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons are such factors.

These factors were given birth to by imperialism and they are working in the imperialistic world. Fatal accidents may occur where anti-communist hysteria and the policy of injecting fear go hand in hand with the mad nuclear and conventional arms race.

In analyzing the role of politics in directing an armed conflict, the authors broach the subject of the correlation of war and armed conflict. War, as the book states, "is a process considerably wider and more complex in content than an armed conflict; war embraces economic, diplomatic, and ideological forms of conflict." (p. 45). It seems that this complicated thesis should have been explored in more detail than was done in the book, and not in connection with the matter of the role of politics in directing an armed conflict, but in the division on the nature of wars. The viewpoint expressed in the book requires a more convincing and comprehensive argument. It is not enough to say that an economic, diplomatic, and

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ideological struggle continues even during war; it is necessary to bring to light their specific role in the achievement of military objectives. At the same time it is necessary to emphasize more strongly that it is armed conflict, having a decisive significance in the course of a war, which constitutes the specific character of the war. The fundamental Marxist thesis on war as the continuation of policy by forcible means heralds the fact that in a war the armed conflict itself is permeated with politics in all of its manifestations, and has a political nature.

The book shows well the flimsiness of the bourgeois assertions of the ideologists, who are trying to prove that nuclear war will come out from under the control of politics and will cease to be an instrument of politics. These assertions mask the reactionary, anti-national character of the imperialist policy of the arms race, which allegedly serves not the interests of the monopolists, but which is necessary for "survival" in a nuclear war. In the relationship between war and politics, the latest variation does not lie in the fact that war has now ostensibly ceased to be a continuation of policy, but in the fact that "now there are no such economic and political objectives which could be attained by any aggressor in a nuclear-missile war." (p. 53) If the imperialists unleash a war against the socialist countries, it is inevitable that this will bring about the destruction of the capitalistic structure.

In criticizing bourgeois social theories on the essence and causes of war, the authors properly note that in spite of the abundance of these theories, they all serve reactionary goals, interconnected among themselves, and actually supplementing each other. The theory of violence, the theory of "saving civilization", the racist, geopolitical, and Malthusian theories of war, the "psychological explanation" of the sources of war, are all called upon from different sides and in a uniformly unscientific manner to justify and substantiate the aggressive policy of the imperialists -- of these strategies of "fear", "restraint", "nuclear survival", "flexible strategy", etc.

In exploring the nature and types of wars in our time (ch. 2), the authors take up questions having great practical significance for the activities of Communist parties and for the armed forces of socialist countries. Deserving of special attention is the approach to the question of classifying wars according to their nature and types. "If the distinction of justifiable and unjustifiable wars," the book states, "expresses an evaluation of those goals pursued by each of the belligerents, the classification of wars according to types immediately takes into consideration the belligerents." (p. 84) As far as the types of war are concerned, they should be differentiated according to substance of the antagonisms which brought about

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the wars and according to the nature of the social forces entering into armed conflict with one another. Corresponding with these theses, the book enumerates the possible justifiable and unjustifiable wars of our time, and the types of modern wars are minutely analysed.

In the edition under review, a precise, and in our opinion, correct definition of justifiable wars is given: "That war which is conducted for the sake of freeing national masses from social and national oppression and therefore promotes historical progress is justifiable." (p. 75) Justifiable wars bear the character of a retaliatory measure against aggression and violence manifested by reactionary forces. Marxist-Leninist parties consider it their duty to support justifiable wars of liberation against imperialism and to oppose each and every unjustifiable war, every predatory war.

In the book a very important thesis is set forth concerning the fact that "while criticizing pacifist ideology, at the same time it is necessary to support in every possible way every sincere opponent of war." (p. 83) The authors correctly point out that under modern conditions it is important to include in the general peace movement those capitalist ideologists who are attracted to pacifism. However, these hypotheses turned out to be poorly connected in the book with a criticism of pacifist ideology, given on the preceeding page. As a matter of fact, the book did not give treatment to an important concept which is expressed by the Marxist-Leninist thesis that every war is a disaster and leads to the destruction of human lives and the loss of material values, that socialists have always considered wars between nations a barbarous and beastly matter. (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 21, p 271) "...as a beastly means of resolving the disagreements of mankind..." (V. I. Lenin Collected Works, Vol 8, p. 529). The methods of violence in the struggle for the liberation of the national masses from class and national oppression are deemed necessary by Marxist ideology, and the humane essence of Marxism finds expression in this.

Marxists subject pacifism to criticism because of its failure to understand the class nature of war and because of its rejection of the need for revolutionary violence in the struggle against the overlords. Under modern conditions, when nuclear war threatens all of mankind with catastrophy, the unity of all forces in the struggle for peace is necessary. "The main thing is to avoid nuclear war, not to allow it to break out. And the present generation is able to do this."[2]

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2. Materials of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Gospolitizdat, 1961, p. 362.

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Manifestly, the question of world and local wars received insufficient treatment in the book. Only a few short remarks are made concerning these categories of war. (pp 85 and 182) This question, by the way, has great significance, since local wars are considered by many bourgeois ideologists as a means of preserving the remnants of the colonial system and strengthening the capitalistic structure. It would be proper to expose the danger of local wars for the cause of peace, the possibility of their developing into a world nuclear war. It is all the more necessary to do this, since certain political figures of the West openly declare that they will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in local wars. Thus, local wars, unleashed by the imperialists, are a direct path to a world nuclear catastrophy. In our opinion it would be advisable to devote a separate paragraph to the discussion of the problem concerning world and local wars.

In examining the relationship between war and the socialist revolution, the authors show conclusively the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist tenet that the determining cause of revolution is not war, but deep social antagonisms and the rise of a class struggle within the country. "War only sharpens these antagonisms, enhances the political activity of the masses, and incites them to revolutionary actions." (p. 124) Another equally important conclusion is correctly substantiated: "A new world war, which will take on an unprecedented destructive nature and which will lead to the destruction of hundreds of millions of people, not only would not accelerate, but would delay the transition of humanity to socialism; without war, man will make the transition to socialism more rapidly and easily." (p. 124) It can only be hoped that the examination of the peaceful growth of the socialist revolution can be supplemented by a thorough criticism of the point of view which states the socialistic revolution in modern conditions is inexorably connected with war.

In the book's third edition there has been some revision of the exposition of war in defense of the Soviet Fatherland and the role of the Soviet camp and the popular masses of all countries under modern conditions. (Chapter 3) The definition of socialist Fatherland has been made more precise (pp. 130-132) and its character has been supplemented in accordance with the experience of the development the countries of the world socialist system. The essence of patriotism and socialist internationalism, and the necessity for armed defense of the socialist Fatherland against imperialist aggression has been more profoundly and more thoroughly revealed. The authors show that the creation of a world system of socialism defines the new terms of the defense of the socialist Fatherland. "Under modern conditions, armed defense of each socialistic Fatherland is accomplished not only by its own forces, but also by the forces of every state which enters into the world system of Socialism." (p. 160)

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pulse aggression, the authors fail to take into account in due measure the specific character of a future war. Modern methods of combat permit the destruction of aggressors in a short time. N.S. Khruschev said in a speech at a voters' meeting of the Kalinin constituency of Moscow of February 27, 1963, "The Imperialists should know that if they unleash a war, our armed forces will deal a crushing blow to the enemy in order to overturn and crush them on the very first day of the war." This means that the activities to strengthen the defense capability of the countries must be directed first and foremost toward fostering everything necessary in peacetime for the frustration of an aggressor's surprise attack and for his complete and utter defeat. The improvement of the combat capability and readiness of the armed forces and measures taken in the field of civil defense serve to resolve this task. At the same time we must bear in mind the possibility of a protracted war. It appears that much greater attention ought to be devoted to these matters, even at the expense of somewhat abridging the general political tenets which do not have a direct relationship to those reviewed in the present chapter.

A separate chapter (the fourth) has been devoted to the social nature and purpose of the Army. The authors proceed from the correct position that a socialist society by its internal structure does not need a military force; it is forced to raise an army by exploiter classes who employ any means to destroy a socialistic system odious to them. The book scrutinizes the features of the armies of socialist states and reveals their noble, historic mission, i.e. to defend the achievements of socialism and preserve peace throughout the world. The authors examine the laws of development of the new types of armies in the countries of people's democracy.

The work devotes much attention to the [illegible] of the building of the Soviet Armed Forces which has been completely fulfilled in the spirit of general Soviet construction. The most important adherence to natural law of the Soviet military structure emphasized in the book is the elevation of the directing role of the Communist Party in the life and activities of the Soviet Armed Forces and the strengthening of the importance and influence of Party organizations in the Army and Navy. The authors acted correctly in singling out the leadership of the Communist Party as the basic foundation of the Soviet military structure and examining in this connection the Lenin Party principles of the leadership of the Armed Forces. There is great practical significance in the conclusion drawn in the book that systematic, well presented Party-Political work is an important instrument of influence of the Communist Party on the life and activities of the Army and Navy, and one of the Lenin Party principles of the direction of the Armed Forces. (p. 211) Our officer cadres must well appreciate the great importance of Party-Political work and not

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The book reveals the basic features of wars in defense of socialism: Their absolute justice, their revolutionary, national and international character. It shows the intensification of the role of Marxist-Leninist parties in guiding the defense of socialist Fatherlands in a thermonuclear war, and the decisive role of the socialist camp and the peoples of all countries in the destinies of war and peace.

At the same time the chapter has individual shortcomings which we would like to point out for the book's authors and readers.

In connection with the analysis of the revolutionary character of wars to defend the socialist Fatherland the book cites the provision that a future world war, if unleashed by the Imperialists, will inevitably be crowned with the destruction of the Imperialistic system. (p. 150) Unfortunately, the book's authors limit themselves only to the statement of this correct tenet and do not reveal the causes that will lead Capitalism to its downfall in case of war. True, on page 176 the "technical" side of the matter is touched upon, and it is stated that our enormous territory and lesser concentration of population in large industrial centers, and also our available means of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense will afford us the opportunity to survive in a nuclear war. It appears, however, the substance of the matter lies not merely in this. A new world war will arouse the unparalleled wrath of the people against Imperialism, and will unmask in the eyes of the people its anti-national reactionary nature. "The people will no longer tolerate the system which plunges them into devastating wars."[3] War wastes many millions of human lives, but those who are spared will bury capitalism for good. The book should have taken notice of the <u>social</u> side of the problem, in order to show the indigence of the hopes of the imperialists for a world war as a means of destroying the <u>contradictions</u> of bourgeois society.

In our opinion also, the book does not make specific enough its exposition of another questions the fraternal cooperation of socialist countries in strengthening the defense capability of the socialist camp. (pp. 160-161) Instead of being limited to the features of treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid concluded between socialist countries, the authors should have given examples from the past and present of how cooperation and mutual aid in this field are realized in practice.

While setting forth the task of preparing the countries to re-

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3. Op. Cit p. 364.

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relegate it to the solution of the problem of seeing that the commander's orders are carried out. It is only a pity that the pages of the book devoted to Party-Political work are written dryly and schematically, in the style of a directive.

All of the basic principles of the Soviet military structure are examined in the book. There is no need to enumerate them in this review. However, we wish to air our views on individual questions.

In setting forth the essence of such a social-political principle of military structure as the unity of the Army and the people, the authors of the book assert that "the class principle in Soviet military structure has outlived itself and has lost all meaning ..." (p. 218) This is correct, if one keeps in mind the mode of recruitment in the Army and Navy and the principle of the selection of the officer cadres. But if the military structure includes also the education of personnel of the Army Forces, and in this realm the class, Party approach cannot lose its meaning. The Soviet Armed Forces are intended for the resolution of external problems of a class character. War, if the Imperialists set it off, will be an unprecedentedly sharp class conflict between two systems. The authors of the book themselves emphasize the fact that the ideological-theoretical basis of the Soviet military structure is Marxism-Leninism -- the ideology of the working class which, in our country, has become the ideology of all the people. Soviet military education has as its basis the universality of interests of the entire Soviet nation and the peoples of all socialist countries directed against imperialists, the most cruel foes of the working class and all workers. One of the tasks of the education of Soviet soldiers is the cultivation of hatred toward imperialist aggressors.

Analysing the organizational principles of the Soviet military structure, the authors speak of the revolution which has taken place in our military science. This question is raised also in a number of other places in the book, but nowhere is it systematized. Incidentally, the problem of the essence, reasons, significance, and composition of the revolution in military science is very important for practice and arouses a lively interest among our officers. The contemporary revolution in military affairs has social and scientific-technical causes. It is taking place under the influence of changes in the combat personnel and the application to military use of the huge scientific discoveries and technological achievements of our time.

The revolution in military affairs has led to radical changes in the methods and means of combat and to the creation of new foundations for accomplishing the task of defeating the imperialist aggres-

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sors in the event they attack the socialist states. In future work on the book, it seems worthwhile to give proper consideration to this problem. The same may be said about the problem of the relationship of man and technology in a modern war. This is touched upon only in the most general way. (p. 230)

In examining the economic, social, and political bases of the military might of states and the nature of armed conflict (chapters 5-6), the authors attempt a new approach to the solution of the problem concerning the causes which determine the course and outcome of a war and military operations. Having reflected the dogmatic line of the well-known formula concerning constantly operating factors, they focus attention upon an examination of the bases of the military might of states and the tactical might of the armed forces, i.e. the "natural laws" of military actions. In this, military might is regarded by them as the totality of economic, scientific, moral, and war potentials. Not limiting themselves to an analysis of the bases of the military might of individual states, the authors undertake the task of studying the military power of two systems: socialist and capitalist.

Speaking on the economic, moral and political basis of the military might of a state, the role of natural and technical sciences, and the role of ideology in modern wars, the authors point to the essence and significance of economic, scientific, moral, and political potentials. They analyze the elements of tactical might of armed forces, the laws of armed conflict, and the natural development and changes in the methods of conducting it. It would be desirable to note the particularly interesting, in our opinion, profound exposition of the issues concerning the growth of the role of economics in modern war, and the existence of the four most important groups of the regularities of war and military operation to the thesis of the laws of armed conflict by means of opposing diametric tendencies and through chance; the impact of social revolutions and radical changes of military technology and weapons upon the methods of armed combat; the reflection of the style of Marxist-Leninist policy in Soviet military art; and numerous other issues. The authors do not stop at a description of phenomena, but strive to reveal the tendencies in the development of military affairs which are applicable to the conditions of a nuclear missile war, and they strive to show that which is new that it will bring.

In our opinion, the question of the role of the morale of the people in a nuclear missile war has been set forth in too general a scheme. (pp. 283-286) In this division the advantages of the socialistic system, the significance of the high conscientiousness of the Soviet people, the solidarity in their support of the CPSU and the Soviet government should have been shown more graphically. It should

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have brought to light the growth of the moral capability of the Soviet country and of the socialist camp as a whole -- the moral capabilities which make for the successful building of Socialism and Communism. Our growing moral capabilities permit us to ensure the high self-discipline of the Soviet people in the event of a war.

The authors quite properly expose the reactionary substance of bourgeois ideas, according to which ideological differences are the cause of modern wars. Unfortunately, those practical features of modern wars which receive a distorted reflection in bourgeois ideology are not stated. For the readers it may remain vague why, for example, it is impossible to underestimate the potential of the pernicious influence of the reactionarly ideology of Imperialism, and why the bourgeoisie often manages to inspire the masses with their false, anti-national ideas.

In our opinion, the law of war formulated by Lenin demands a deeper examination: "In any war, victory, in the end, depends upon the condition of the spirit of those masses who shed their blood on the battlefield." In the book a number of appropriate thoughts are expressed apropos of this, but the essence of the matter is not fully uncovered. "The morale of troops," states the book, "plays a decisive role in achieving victory in the end; that is, in reciprocity with the other elements of tactical power, which it strengthens, or the lack of which it partially compensates, but undoubtedly does not completely replace." (p. 309) This thesis may very well be attributed to any one of the factors which secure a victory, and may be subjected to the same criticism. Apparently the point lies not only in reciprocity, but in the fact that the morale of troops determines the degree to which all of the remaining factors are used, so far as their development, strengthening, and utilization is inconceivable without the work of the people. The decisive role of the mental spirit of troops stems from the general sociological law concerning the decisive role of the popular masses in history.

The answer to the question raised by the book's authors requires further elaboration: "What are the most important circumstances which cause a sharp increase in the demands upon the morale of troops in a nuclear missile war?" (p. 310) It appears as though the interesting concepts expressed in the book on this issue should be augmented by an examination of the mental qualities of fighting men which are necessary in a modern war. But morale as a quality includes not only mental but also a psychological element, and first and foremost [illegible] qualities. A nuclear missile war makes exceptional demands upon the mental stability of troops and upon the resolute characteristics of people, upon their [illegible] and

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[illegible]. When cultivating and developing these aspects of the spiritual composition of the Soviet forces, military commanders and political workers strive for high conscientious discipline, troop initiative, military comradeship, a will to heroic deeds, and other qualities without which it would be impossible to carry on an armed struggle. It ought to have given a deeper and more thorough analysis of the psychological aspect of the moral of troops, beginning with the demands of a nuclear missile war.

Moreover, it follows to note that altogether inadequate consideration (in all, several lines, pp. 353-54) has been given to such an issue as a criticism of the harmful consequences of the personality cult of Stalin in the field of military science. In this criticism, it is necessary to go further and deeper in exposing, in particular, the harmful aftereffects of the personality cult in methods of military analysis and in the problems of the military structure. The personality cult fettered the development of the Soviet military concept, gave birth to dogmatism and declarativeness in military exploration, led to the alienation of theory from the requirements of modern war, and to blind admiration of past experience. "The Chronicle of Wars, Armed Rebellion, and Military Conflicts (Since the End of the 19th Century)", subjoined in the book, and compiled by Colonel G. A. Fyedorov, Colonel E. A. Khomenko, and Captain D. B. Ryskin, will serve as a useful reference guide when studying Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the Army.

A brief survey of the positive aspects and the shortcomings of the third edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army allows us to draw the conclusion that the Authors' Association of the Lenin Military and Political Academy has created a useful scientific work, which thoroughly brings to light the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the Army. The book will help our military personnel and the broad circle of readers interested in military matters to gain a deep understanding of the most pressing problems of the present, and to purposefully direct their efforts to the further strengthening of the defense potential of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist camp.

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