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
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6 September 1985


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INDIAN AND PAKISTANI VIEWS OF A PROPOSED US NUCLEAR EMISSARY



Summary

New Delhi is cool to the idea of US involvement in Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations but is nonetheless willing to receive a nuclear emissary to avoid giving offense. In our view, the US emissary's best chance of gaining a fair hearing will be if he meets with Prime Minister Gandhi. Gandhi probably will avoid anything approaching agreement to serious US involvement in the problem; indeed, the Indians probably will want to avoid discussing any specific proposals. The Pakistanis will welcome an emissary, but will want assurances that the US can deliver India on any specific measures. Islamabad will point to the many proposals it has already made to India to resolve their nuclear differences.



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* * * * *

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESAs, [redacted] Information as of 6 September 1985 was used in the preparation of this report. [redacted]

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INDIAN AND PAKISTANI VIEWS OF A PROPOSED US NUCLEAR EMISSARY

[Redacted]

The Importance of Seeing Gandhi

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] we believe a US proposal is most likely to get a fair hearing if the emissary meets with Prime Minister Gandhi--although Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari and close Gandhi advisor Arun Singh might also be receptive. Gandhi's personal style and priorities have provided much of the impetus for warmer Indo-US ties. [Redacted]

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Gaining an audience with Gandhi will probably require a high-ranking US emissary. There is a risk that anybody else would be received by an Indian official who would sidetrack US suggestions. [Redacted]

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We are not sanguine that even a meeting with Gandhi will produce positive results. We expect that he would try to keep the discussions at a general level. He might simply welcome Washington's offer of a regular dialogue on nuclear issues as a means of broadening contacts and conveying India's views. [Redacted]

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Is There Flexibility in the Indian Stance?

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The question of a US role in South Asian nuclear affairs is likely to surface basic differences with New Delhi. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Even assuming that New Delhi takes the US offer at face value, the Indians are likely to have serious reservations about encouraging US involvement in Indo-Pakistani relations. Like his mother, Rajiv has made clear his desire to minimize great power involvement in regional affairs. Moreover, although he has made some attempt to play down Indian discomfiture over US military ties with Pakistan, Gandhi in our judgment still doubts Washington's desire to deal evenhandedly with Islamabad and New Delhi.

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There is some evidence suggesting that Gandhi has been looking at alternative approaches to the Indo-Pakistani nuclear issue. A senior Pakistani official told US diplomats that Gandhi had suggested during bilateral meetings in late July that the two governments devise mechanisms for allaying mutual suspicions about each other's nuclear programs. The Pakistani revealed no details but alluded to a proposal by a leading Indian defense analyst--published in a newspaper just before the talks--that argued for an arms control rather than a nonproliferation approach and suggested that the two countries sign a no-first-use agreement.

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if Gandhi did advance a no-first-use proposal, he probably would be concerned that US involvement in the issue could give President Zia an excuse to sidestep the Indian initiative.

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Gandhi may view with particular distaste any US proposal aimed at securing India's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, given his doubts about the US commitment to arms control. Both during and since the six-nation disarmament initiative he led in New Delhi last January, Gandhi has emphasized that the major threat to global survival is the failure of the superpowers to work seriously toward disarmament--not nuclear proliferation among other powers. He may underline for the US envoy his view that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a moral right to press nonproliferation on non-nuclear weapons states until the superpowers show marked progress on arms control.

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-- There is an outside chance that Gandhi or his advisors would tell the US envoy that New Delhi would be more willing to consider US efforts to promote nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia if Washington in turn acknowledged the right of nonaligned nations to increased participation in arms control fora.

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The Pakistanis Will Play Along. . .

We believe Islamabad would welcome any nuclear emissary Washington might send. President Zia, who knows Pakistan has little to lose by supporting a US attempt to mediate a nuclear accommodation between Islamabad and New Delhi, probably would give even a relatively low-level envoy a serious hearing. Zia probably would exploit the visit to demonstrate Pakistan's peaceful nuclear intentions and sincerity in improving regional relations. [redacted]

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The specific Pakistani reaction to the emissary will hinge on the Indian response. If New Delhi agrees to US proposals, Islamabad probably will follow suit, although the Pakistanis will want elaboration on specific steps Washington can take to bring New Delhi to the negotiating table. They will argue that they have taken the lead in nonproliferation matters, pointing to India's failure to respond to their proposals for:

- A nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia.
- Mutual Pakistani-Indian agreement to international inspection of their respective nuclear facilities (or failing that, reciprocal inspection).
- India and Pakistan to sign the NPT.
- A joint renunciation by India, Pakistan, and others in South Asia of the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. [redacted]

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But Will Islamabad Be Convinced?

We have grave doubts that even with a formal nuclear agreement, Pakistan would trust India to abide by its provisions. As a result, we do not believe that an agreement would mean that Pakistan would end its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Nor do we believe Pakistan would be receptive to US offers of assistance in exchange for such unilateral concessions as acceptance of the NPT or inspection of Pakistani facilities. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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