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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>ER</i> <i>Mary Ann</i>		
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<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:
*Here is the material on the
Darlittle Group I talked
to you about.*

DIA
review(s)
completed

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE

A.D./
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

SEP 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

25X1

ATTENTION:

SUBJECT: Comments on U. S. Military Attache Strengths
in Different Countries

1. Your memorandum of 3 September 1954 asked that we provide an answer to a request by the Special Study Group on the CIA position concerning the question of the reduction of the number of military attaches.

2. The military attache representation in most countries is considered to be adequate. There are a few countries where some reduction in strength could be made without jeopardizing information collection; there are more countries where an increase in the number of military attaches or the establishment of a military attache office could provide additional valuable information.

3. Attached are comments which cover in detail the adequacy of the U. S. military attache representation.

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151 for
ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director, Intelligence

USSR AND SATELLITES

- A. Countries where service attache reporting is considered adequate:
1. There is no Orbit country, where in our view, service attache reporting can be considered adequate for intelligence purposes. This statement must immediately be qualified, however, by observing that communist security restrictions are of such a nature as to preclude adequate intelligence reporting. Therefore, it is necessary to weigh the security restrictions imposed by an individual country, against the number of attaches in a given country and their current work load, in order to determine the desirability of increasing mission strength. While we do not have first hand knowledge of the work load of each individual mission, it is our general belief that most, if not all, have more than enough to do and that their capability would be improved by additional strength. (see C.)

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B. Countries where the number of US attaches could be reduced:

We believe that there is no Orbit country where the number of service attaches should be reduced. In fact it should be pointed out that representation in these countries is now at what we consider to be a bare minimum. According to the Foreign Service list of 1 April 1954, service representation in Orbit countries was as follows:

Albania	0
Bulgaria	0
Czechoslovakia	3
Hungary	5
Poland	4
Rumania	1
USSR	

While comparison with service attache representation in Western countries is not fully accurate since these personnel have many other duties in addition to intelligence collecting it is interesting to note that the US has 15 service attaches in Spain, 7 in Portugal and 8 in Thailand.

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C. Countries where the number of service attaches should be increased:

In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary our service attaches, who have considerable freedom of movement, have supplied valuable military intelligence, as well as economic and some political intelligence. In Rumania, there has been some recent relaxation of travel restrictions which has resulted in some improvement in our intelligence coverage. An increase in service representation in any of these countries would increase opportunities for travel and thereby our intelligence coverage.

It is our belief that regardless of security restrictions in any given Orbit country, US service representation should consist of more than one attache per service, if only to backstop one another in case of sickness, leave, emergency or unusual intelligence opportunity. For example, if travel bans were suddenly lifted it would be a number of months before additional service representation could be sent to take advantage of the situation.

According to the Foreign Service listing of 1 April 1954 there is only one army attache in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, one Navy attache in Poland, and one air attache in Poland. In addition there are no navy or air attaches in Rumania. Of course, the absence of diplomatic representation in Albania and Bulgaria means that there are no service attaches in either of these countries.

It should be pointed out that the foregoing is addressed primarily to quantitative representation. The quality of the representation has not been discussed and obviously varies from country to country. For example, the quality of air attache reporting from the USSR in the past year has improved. Furthermore, aside from the collection of military information, the service attaches also provide valuable economic and, in some cases, political information gleaned from trips, receptions, press, etc.

While we have not discussed service attache representation in countries bordering on the Orbit, e.g., Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece, they provide us with some military intelligence on the Orbit. Cutbacks, which might result in the reduction of such intelligence would not be desirable.

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NEAR EAST AFRICA AREA

1. At the following posts it is proposed that the strength of Defense Attachés be maintained at present levels: Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, French West Africa, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tangier, Union of South Africa. The reporting from these attachés represents an essential or useful part of the overall reporting for the area.

2. At the following posts it is proposed that the strength of Defense Attachés be reduced:

- Greece - Some overall reduction in reporting if possible.
- Iran - - Some reduction in naval and air attaché reporting.
- Turkey - Some reduction of air attaché reporting.

3. At the following posts it is proposed that the strength of Defense Attachés be increased.

- Algeria - No reporting at present.
- Cyprus - - No reporting at present.
- India - - A country of rapidly growing importance; an increase of personnel might compensate for the decrease in information available to present staffs because of increasing Indian security restrictions. At a minimum, staffs should be maintained at present size.
- Kenya - - No reporting at present.
- Pakistan - Of increasing importance to US.
- Tunisia - No reporting at present.

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WESTERN EUROPE

1. **Countries where Defense Attache representation should remain unchanged:**

Italy	United Kingdom
Spain	Ireland
Portugal	Sweden
France	Norway
The Netherlands	Denmark
Belgium and Luxembourg	Finland
Switzerland	Iceland

2. **Countries where representation can be reduced:**

None.

3. **Countries where representation should be increased:**

None.

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FAR EASTERN DIVISION

7 September 1954

SUBJECT: Comments on Attache Reporting.

I. Remain at present strength:

- A. Australia and New Zealand: Reporting by all three services, though not extensive, has been adequate for our purposes. We would not like to see it reduced.
- B. Japan: Reporting is adequate for Japan's limited rearmament. As Japanese forces expand, intelligence requirements will be proportionately greater. At the same time, the disappearance of other US military agencies in Japan which now supplement attache reporting would place a greater burden on the latter.
- C. Malaya and Singapore: Coverage from Navy and from Army Liaison Officer in Singapore is adequate.
- D. Philippines: Cable reporting of significant events with bearing on Philippine armed forces has been quite satisfactory and often has provided the first available report and comment. Army attache reports especially have been prompt and helpful in commenting on such events as surrender of Taruc, appointments of key personnel in armed forces commands, and of developments in connection with 1953 election.

Despatch reporting by all three services is less useful. Comments on training developments are sometimes sparse, and fuller discussions of general trends, such as rumored reorganization of army organization and recent re-subordination of constabulary units to army commands would be helpful.

- E. South Korea: Service attache reporting from Korea has been sparse, and concerned principally with routine personnel transfers and organizational changes. In terms of its potential value and capability to cover subjects of particular interest, attache reporting has been inadequate. We believe the capabilities of the present attaches are not being fully utilized.

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F. Thailand: Attache reporting from Bangkok is adequate and should remain so as long as Thailand remains firmly pro-Western in its political orientation. Therefore, the chief concern from an intelligence point of view lies in the field of indications that may indicate a shift in Thailand's orientation.

II. Where attache strength can be reduced:

A. Burma: Attache reporting from Rangoon has generally been adequate in view of the handicaps under which they have had to operate. With improving US-Burmese relations such routine information as OB and operational reports should become increasingly available. Both Air and Navy Attaches' reporting appear to be more than adequate.

III. Where attache strength should be increased:

- A. China (Hong Kong): Attache comments in Hong Kong joint weeks are very valuable. More information is desired, however, and more complete coverage of Communist activity north of the 25th parallel in China is desired. Air: Reporting on Communist activity in southern China is good but more information is desired. Army: Reporting for southern provinces is good, more from further north is wanted. Navy: Reporting is good, considered sufficient.
- B. China (Taipei): Air: Volume of air reporting on Nationalist air is small, material is generally highly detailed and technical. Would appreciate more coverage with broader scope, especially on current air OB and capabilities. Army: Volume and quality of reporting on Nationalists adequate. Reporting on Communists good. Navy: Volume and quality of Alusna reports on Nationalists very good. Reporting on Communists could be more timely. There is apparent tendency to consider too many Nationalist reports, particularly those dealing with Communist air developments, as unworthy of immediate reporting by cable.
- C. Indochina: Army: The difficulties inherent in the system of French handouts are understood but make all the more necessary the attache's frequent comments on the information given him. We would like to have increased reporting on the indigenous forces, developed

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if possible independently of the French. More on-the-spot intelligence derived from frequent field trips would be appreciated. Navy: The reporting is generally adequate, except that more information on the extent of illegal coastal traffic would be useful.

- D. Indonesia: Navy and Air coverage appear adequate; Army coverage is generally good. More detailed reporting on military-political situation, however, would be helpful particularly during present period when certain army factions are among principal deterrents to government's leftist trend.

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LATIN AMERICA

1. Countries where Defense Attache representation should remain unchanged:

Argentina	Cuba
Brazil	El Salvador
Chile	Guatemala
Uruguay	Honduras
Peru	Mexico
Ecuador	Nicaragua
Venezuela	Panama
Colombia	

2. Countries where representation can be reduced:

None.

3. Countries where representation should be increased:

1. Bolivia: There are no service attaches in Bolivia at this time. It is recommended that an Army Attache be stationed in La Paz because of the importance of the Army and Police in maintaining the stability of the government and their importance as a source of political information. Such information can best be obtained by an Army Attache who can fraternize with the Bolivian military. The current administration is constantly threatened by the right as well as the Communists who exploit the government's many difficulties.
2. Paraguay: There are no service attaches in Paraguay. Paraguayan stability is constantly threatened by revolutions and the changeover in governments is comparatively rapid. Since the army is in effect the arbiter of Paraguayan politics, an Army Attache would have the best opportunity for collecting information on the personal loyalties of important military elements and prospects for stability as well as routine military information. At present such information is not available. The seriousness of this lack of information is demonstrated by current reports that a powerful and opportunistic politician, considered by many to be a Communist, is planning a coup against the Stroessner administration.

3. Venezuela: The staff of the Army Attache in Venezuela should be increased, because reporting is now wholly inadequate for a country governed by a military dictator. The embassy periodically refers to "rumors" of dissension within the armed forces, but the OARMA staff appears unable to shed much light on them. The staff also appears inadequate to provide factual background for new personnel assigned there. The staff of the US Air Attache should be increased for the same reasons and also because of the need for added US prestige in the field of military aviation. Venezuelan Air Force procurement of considerable British equipment has made it especially vulnerable to British influence.
4. Colombia: The staff of the US Military Attache in Colombia should be increased, because it is apparently unable to furnish routine reports on guerrilla and other disturbances, except on a requirement basis. It has also been unable to provide information on the nature of the friction between the former war minister and the commander of the armed forces and similar "power clash" situations within the government which is run primarily by the armed forces.
5. Costa Rica: Given the state of tension between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and armament plans of both governments, the assignment of an Army Attache to Costa Rica is suggested. The Army Attache in Managua is currently accredited to Costa Rica.
6. Dominican Republic: Because the Dominican Navy has suffered budget cuts and general impairment of efficiency and morale in the last two years, and because reporting on the Dominican Army's acquisitions of equipment appears to be incomplete, a change in the service representation is suggested. An Army Attache should be assigned, whether in addition to or in replacement of the naval representative. Army and Air Attaches at Havana are now accredited.
7. Haiti: The appointment of an Army Attache might be desirable if the Haitian application for a military assistance agreement is accepted. Army, Naval, and Air Attaches at Havana are accredited.