

Executive Order 11652

60-2856

Departure Statement from Washington
for CENTO and NATO Meetings and
Visit to Greece

TEH D-0/3
April 21, 1960

I am going to Tehran to attend the meeting of the Council of the Central Treaty Organization. Immediately thereafter, I shall meet in Istanbul with the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries at the regular spring Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Before returning to Washington I shall stop in Athens.

My visit to Iran is a welcome opportunity to renew friendships with the leaders of a country bound by traditional and close ties to the United States. I look forward to meeting with our associates in CENTO. We in the United States attach the greatest importance to the Central Treaty Organization. We strongly support CENTO's steadfast efforts to strengthen the principle of collective security in that vital area of the world and to promote the economic well-being of their peoples.

I also look forward to my visit to Turkey, a staunch friend of the United States and stalwart member of both CENTO and NATO. At the Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council we shall, in addition to other subjects, discuss preparations for the meeting of Heads of Government in Paris on May 16.

I much appreciate the invitation of the Greek Government to visit Athens and the courtesy shown by the King and Queen of the Hellenes in agreeing to receive me. I will also see Prime Minister Karamanlis for a discussion of subjects of interest to Greece and the United States.

This trip will take me to three of our oldest friends. It is my hope that it will serve to strengthen further the ties which for so many years have bound us in close and intimate friendship.

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STATE review(s) completed.

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TEH D-3/1

EIGHTH CENCO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION

April 21, 1960

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

AGENDA

- I. Installation of Chairman
- II. Opening of the Meeting -- Introductory remarks by the Secretary General and statements by the Chairman and Heads of Delegations
- III. Adoption of Agenda (C/8/A1 - Third Revise)
- IV. Appointment of a Drafting Committee for the Final Communique
- V. Report by the Secretary General (C/8/D6)
- VI. Report of the Military Committee (C/8/D5)
- VII. Report of the Liaison Committee (C/8/D1)
- VIII. Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee (C/8/D2)
- IX. Report of the Economic Committee (C/8/D3)
- X. Annual Report of the Economic Committee for 1959 (C/8/D4)
- XI. Review of the International Situation
- XII. Place and Date of the Next Council Meeting at the Ministerial Level
- XIII. Approval of Final Communique
- XIV. Any Other Business
- XV. Closing Arrangements:
 - (a) Final Photographs of the Council
 - (b) Issuance of Final Communique
 - (c) Press Conference by the Chairman

Recommended U. S. Position:

The Agenda is satisfactory.

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TEH B-11/3

April 21, 1960

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

Political-Economic Situation of Pakistan

(Background Paper)

Summary

In its first year and one-half, President Ayub Khan's regime has succeeded in consolidating its position and attracting wide popular support. It has made substantial progress in political, social and economic reform but still faces formidable basic problems. Its most notable achievements have been in land reform, refugee rehabilitation, balance of payments and fiscal management. While martial law has been replaced in practice by ordinary civil law, it remains formally in force as a deterrent to corruption and other activities which might disrupt the regime's program.

A Constitution Commission has been established and restoration of representative, constitutional government is anticipated within one year. Meanwhile, the regime is proceeding with the "Basic Democracies" program aimed at evolving democratic institutions from the grass roots up as well as implementing, and gaining popular support for, its policies. While refraining from political persecution, the regime has moved to disqualify corrupt and irresponsible ex-politicians from holding public office for the next few years.

Organized opposition to the regime is not anticipated in the foreseeable future. There is, however, a longer-range possibility that popular opposition may develop, particularly in East Pakistan, if the regime should fail to satisfy the basic economic requirements of the people and the desire for greater participation in government. The long-range prospects for the economy are not bright unless sizeable foreign assistance continues.

Pakistan remains firmly committed to the West, and participates actively in CENTO and SEATO. It continues to pursue a conciliatory policy toward India, but recently has hardened its attitude toward Afghanistan because of growing tension over the "Pushtunistan" dispute and Pakistan's apprehension over Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The U.S. is encouraged by the progress being made by the Government of Pakistan and continues to support it with economic and military aid.

* * * * *

Internal Situation

During one and one-half years in power, President Mohammad Ayub Khan and
the controlling

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the controlling group of Pakistan military and civil officials have succeeded in consolidating their position and in attracting general popular support. Ayub personally has gained wide popularity and continues to retain the loyalty of the armed forces.

The government has made substantial progress in its far-reaching program of political, social and economic reform. Its most dramatic achievement has been in agrarian reform with the virtual completion of a land redistribution program in West Pakistan coupled with a vigorous "Grow More Food" campaign. While the effect of these measures on agricultural output is still uncertain, they have had the intended political effect of reducing the power of the landlords and of attracting mass sympathy and support for the government.

Significant progress has also been made in the rehabilitation of refugees through relief measures, construction of low-cost urban housing, granting of proprietary rights to refugees, and settlement of refugee claims. Reports have been rendered by reform commissions in the fields of law and justice, public education and the press, and plans are under way to carry out their recommendations. Regulations to control labor, prices, tax evasion and various forms of "anti-social activity" (e.g., official corruption, smuggling, blackmarketing) have been imposed and enforced. The government is shifting from direct to indirect economic controls and plans to restore a free market in foodgrains.

Reforms have also been introduced in the governmental field. Civil servants were screened to remove corrupt and inept officials, with somewhat uneven results. Essential reforms have been adopted in fiscal management, and a program of austerity has been introduced in governmental operations, including defense expenditures. The government has been reorganized along somewhat more efficient lines, and administration has been placed largely in the hands of experienced professional civil servants.

Martial law was largely replaced by ordinary civil law early in the regime, but it remains formally in force and the government has demonstrated from time to time its readiness to resort to martial law to deter corruption and other activities which might disrupt the regime's program. The judiciary remains independent and relatively free from interference by the administration.

While the government has suppressed communist and other subversive activity from the start, it has refrained from general political persecution. A number of the more corrupt and irresponsible ex-politicians, however, have been disqualified from holding public office (or coerced into retirement) until 1966 under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO).

Re-establishment of Representative, Constitutional Government

During the past six months the Ayub regime has made significant progress

toward the

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toward the restoration of representative, constitutional government in Pakistan and toward the gradual evolution of democratic political institutions in the country through the so-called "Basic Democracies" program. In nation-wide local elections completed in January 1960, some 80,000 persons were chosen on the basis of universal adult suffrage to serve on village and town councils (called "union councils"). The following month these persons served as electors in "legitimizing" Field Marshal Ayub as President of Pakistan through an overwhelming "vote of confidence" conducted by secret ballot.

The government is now in the process of selecting 40,000 appointive members for the "union councils", the base of a five-tier government structure, and is also preparing to establish councils on the four higher levels. While the "Basic Democracies" program is designed in the long run to develop democratic institutions and processes from the grass roots up, its more immediate objective would appear to be to implement, and gain popular support for, the government's policies at the local level.

Considering the "vote of confidence" in mid-February to be a popular mandate, President Ayub promptly appointed a commission to draft recommendations for a new national constitution which will probably be promulgated by early 1961, bringing an end to martial law. It appears likely that the Constitution will establish a unitary form of government with strong executive authority vested in the President.

Prospects of the Regime

While organized opposition to the regime is not expected within the foreseeable future, there is a distinct longer-range possibility that popular discontent and even hostility may develop if the regime's reform efforts should fail to satisfy the basic requirements of the people for the necessities of life. Pressures may also develop for greater popular participation in local and national affairs among politically-sophisticated elements of society, especially in East Pakistan where demands for local autonomy have long been voiced and resentment of alleged domination by West Pakistan has been chronic. Another potential danger would be the development of factionalism and dissension among members of the controlling group. This could frustrate the government's reform program and could even precipitate a change to a regime less desirable from our standpoint than the benevolent dictatorship which prevails.

While prospects for some short-term basic economic improvement, especially in agricultural production, appear rather good, the long-range prospects for solution of Pakistan's formidable economic problems (e.g., attaining a favorable balance of trade, keeping production pace with a rapidly growing population, and establishing a viable economy) are not bright.

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The government recently released a Second Five Year Plan (1961-66) which foresees a modest improvement in per capita income during its period, eventual attainment of self-generating economic growth and an end to dependence on foreign economic aid. Nevertheless, Pakistan is expected to require substantial foreign aid for a long time to come.

International Position

The Ayub government has manifested a determination to maintain and even strengthen Pakistan's close ties with the U.S. and the West, and to uphold its international commitments and obligations, including active participation in CENTO and SEATO. At the same time it, like its predecessors, has endeavored to obtain through these pacts, and bilaterally through its allies, assurances for its defense against aggression other than communist or communist inspired. It also continues to press for material assistance in modernizing its armed forces.

Recently Pakistan has shifted the emphasis of its defense policy toward the Sino-Soviet threat, and has assumed a conciliatory policy toward India. It has adopted a "hard" attitude toward Afghanistan in the light of growing tension over the "Pushtunistan" dispute and apprehension over Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The Indus Waters dispute with India is in the final stages of negotiation through the good offices of the IBRD which, with friendly foreign countries including the U.S., has promised financial assistance toward a plan of settlement. While both India and Pakistan have accused each other of raising last minute objections, a solution is still possible. Pakistan continues to seek solution of other outstanding Indo-Pakistan issues with the ultimate objective of a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. India, however, is reluctant to discuss Kashmir and asserts that recent developments in Indo-Pakistan relations have set back the course of rapprochement.

U.S. Attitude Toward the Regime

U.S.-Pakistan relations are probably more close and cordial than ever before, as exemplified by the good will generated during the President's highly successful visit to Pakistan in December 1959. We have been encouraged by the new regime's progress in tackling fundamental economic and social problems, as well as by the deliberate steps it is taking toward restoring constitutional government and establishing democratic political institutions in Pakistan. We believe these measures should strengthen Pakistan's internal position and her international posture as an ally. We therefore continue to give encouragement to the government of President Ayub and to support it with military and economic aid.

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TEH D-11/11

April 21, 1960

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

Position Paper

U. S. Attitude Toward the Summit
(The Secretary might wish to raise)

Introduction

Because of the great interest which the regional members of CENTO will demonstrate in the U. S. attitude toward the Summit, the recommended U. S. position has been set forth in the Discussion Section in the form of a talking paper.

This position paper outlines (1) basic U. S. motivations in agreeing to a Summit conference, (2) the question of participation, (3) Summit preparations, (4) a broad appraisal of the Soviet position, and (5) the general U. S. approach to the Summit.

It is considered desirable that U. S. views be covered at some length in view of the importance which all three regional members attach to this subject. The Iranians and to a lesser extent the Pakistanis have not been kept informed of Summit preparations on a continuing basis. The Turks have been kept informed on such a basis through NATO.

Anticipated Position of the Foreign Governments

The regional members of CENTO will expect to learn of the U. S. and the U. K. views regarding the Summit with primary interest in reassurance that nothing will be done at the Summit

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which would tend to lessen their collective or individual security.

Like other smaller members in the free-world alliance system, the regional members of CENTO want to be assured that their views on Summit issues will be taken into consideration during the broad consultative processes preparatory to the Summit.

While the Turks, Iranians and Pakistanis have shown some understanding of the rationale which motivates the U. S. to engage in a summit meeting, they have been suspicious of Soviet motives and apprehensive lest a one-sided detente weaken their positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and result in increased rather than lessened Soviet pressures in their region. The situation has been complicated by the Turkish announcement of a Menderes-Khrushchev exchange of visits. The Turks have indicated they do not intend to discuss matters of substance with the Soviets but anticipate that their position in NATO will be restored by this indication of their willingness to participate in the general effort to lessen world tensions. The Iranians have greeted the Turkish decision with approval and are now considering more actively than before a visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister to Moscow. The Pakistanis have manifested some uneasiness about the Turkish action, which some fear will counteract their heretofore successful efforts to persuade Iran to resist Soviet blandishments or threats.

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Recommended U. S. Position:

1. U. S. Motivations. In agreeing to a meeting of the Heads of Government of the U. S., the U. K., France and the Soviet Union, the U. S. had in mind the following purposes with respect to the Summit conference: (a) to clarify positions and to reduce the possibility of miscalculation; (b) to probe Soviet intentions and sincerity with respect to moves toward a detente; (c) to press the Soviet Union to curb its expansionist tendencies; and (d) to demonstrate the confidence and faith which the free world maintains in its institutions and the values which underlie its social systems.

2. Participation. As recent Soviet policy has stressed the crucial questions of Berlin and Germany, the U. S. considered the Summit conference should be restricted to the powers primarily concerned with this problem. It was felt, too, that a limited meeting would facilitate discussions of other questions of mutual concern.

In agreeing to a limited conference, however, it should be clearly understood that the U. S. does not consider the Summit meeting as a "Four-Power" directorate which has arrogated to itself the responsibility for negotiating for the rest of the world. On the contrary, the U. S. recognizes that it can bind only itself to any agreements which might be reached and that questions affecting its allies or other free nations throughout the world can only be negotiated in consultation and with the consent of those directly concerned.

3. Summit Preparations. Intensive and thorough preparations have been undertaken and are continuing on the Western side in anticipation of the conference. A large measure of accord on substantive issues has been reached by the U. S., the U. K., and France. The Western Heads of Government will undertake a final coordination of their positions just prior to their meeting with Premier Khrushchev on May 16.

4. General

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4. General Analysis of Soviet Position. The U. S. recognizes that the Soviet leaders continue to harbor a fundamental hostility toward all non-Communist forms of society and that Khrushchev and his colleagues continue to desire to consolidate their post-war gains and to expand the Soviet system by any means apart from those which might jeopardize their home base in the Soviet Union. This latter consideration appears to rule out deliberate resort to an all-out nuclear war, and we must try to ensure through our own efforts that this calculation continues to obtain.

Moreover, the U. S. is aware of the implications inherent in the Soviet thesis that a "fundamental" and "serious" shift has taken place in the balance of world forces in favor of the "socialist camp." Khrushchev may view the Summit meeting as a concrete recognition by the Western powers of this change. He clearly considers the Summit as a forum for the projection of the image of a peaceful and progressive Soviet Union and of the Communist program of "peaceful coexistence," which is designed to further Soviet penetration of non-Communist areas, to turn neutral opinion against Western policy, and in time to weaken and divide the free world.

5. U. S. Approach to the Summit. The U. S. believes that the present stage of nuclear weapon and missile technology has its own imperatives for Communist and non-Communist alike. We consider it desirable, therefore, to utilize the opportunity of the Summit to probe for areas in which it might be possible to reach mutually beneficial agreements.

One of the first tasks of the Western leaders at the Summit will be to demonstrate through their attitude and the clarity and firmness with which they present free world positions that the Soviet analysis of the world-power relationship is incorrect and unacceptable. We hope to shake Khrushchev's belief that the free world's unity can be breached and to make it clear to him and to world opinion that there can be no real cooperation between or peace among nations as long as the Soviet Union adheres to its expansionist aims.

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We believe this approach can be effective only insofar as the free world alliance system remains vigorous, strong and cohesive. In short, the free world must continue to give the highest priority to the maintenance and strengthening of its collective security arrangements.

In view of the depth of the issues which presently divide the Communist and free worlds, we do not envisage any dramatic resolution of these differences at the approaching Summit. We must be realistic and must also recognize that one summit meeting may provide no more than tentative indications of Soviet intentions. By a realistic appraisal of our prospective negotiating effort, we will guard against premature relaxation in free world defense efforts and disappointment and frustration which would flow from unrealistic expectations.

Nevertheless, this will not deter the U. S. from entering into the Summit discussions in a constructive spirit. We are not merely content to ascertain how far the Soviet Union is willing to go on specific, limited agreements of mutual benefit. We intend to approach the Summit as an opportunity to assert and prosecute affirmative purposes of our own. We view the Summit as a means to enhance free world confidence and cohesion and to further worldwide respect for the free world alliance system, its firmness, its clarity of purpose and its claim to the future.

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TEH D - 5/1
April 21, 1960

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

U. S. Views on the Report of the Secretary General

Position Paper

Anticipated Position of Foreign Governments:

The member governments may be expected to note the Secretary General's Report.

Recommended U. S. Position

1. That the Council should take note of the Report of the Secretary General and commend him for his frank, forthright and encouraging account of CENTO's affairs during the past six months.

2. To state that the United States has taken note of specific comments contained in the Report and will bear them in mind in the course of future CENTO activities.

Discussion:

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Discussion:

The Secretary General's Report is intended to review CENTO's progress from October 1959 to April 1960. Mr. Baig's presentation is a somewhat rambling account but generally is vigorous, forthright and encouraging. In places it is somewhat carping, and tends to reflect the Secretary General's impatient and critical personality.

At its Washington meeting, the Council accepted the Secretary General's previous Report subject to comments to be made later in the meeting on matters with which delegations were not in full agreement. Secretary General Baig indicated at a recent meeting of the Council Deputies his dissatisfaction with this procedure, as in fact no comment was made during the subsequent sessions of the Washington meeting. In his view this presumably meant all his recommendations had been accepted, although he concluded this was obviously not the case. He therefore hoped the Council would make clear at its Tehran session whether or not it accepted his Report.

In our view the Secretary General's position on this matter is not realistic. The reports he submits are not merely reviews of past events but also expressions of his own personal and professional views on substantive matters and procedures arising in all aspects of CENTO affairs. They are prepared without any participation by or consultation with representatives of the five governments supporting CENTO. The Ministerial Council should not be asked either to accept his reports, and thereby indicate its endorsement of their contents in toto, or alternatively to discuss their contents paragraph by paragraph until full agreement is reached throughout. The Secretary General should be encouraged to state what is on his mind without requiring the Council to pass judgment, and in essence this is our recommended position set forth above. If the Secretary General also has specific recommendations on which he wishes the Council's views, these should be set forth separately and clearly identified, and under usual circumstances it may be expected they will be referred to appropriate sub-bodies of CENTO before being discussed in substance by the Ministerial Council.

There follows a summary of some of the comments contained in the Report, arranged according to its section headings:

Political - The Secretary General notes the success of the Washington meeting and comments favorably on President Eisenhower's visit to the CENTO countries and on the visit to the CENTO headquarters by President Ayub, the first made to the headquarters by a CENTO Chief of State. He comments

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there has been a "noticeable abatement in the propaganda against CENTO formerly carried on in India, the UAR and Iraq" but states that "Communist pressures on the regional member states have shown little change," and that there has been a continuation of the Soviet policy of exploiting disputes such as the question of "Pakhtoonistan" without reference to their merits.

Administration - The Report refers to various administrative topics, in the course of which the emphatic views of the Secretary General are set forth on certain matters as follows: (a) the work of the Budget and Administration Committee is impeded by the practice of some members in referring questions of even minor importance back to their governments for instructions; (b) Secretariat positions are not to be filled in rotation by nationals of the participating countries; (c) there is need for a status agreement providing, inter alia, tax exemptions on salaries and other immunities to members of the Secretariat, whether stationed in Ankara or traveling elsewhere in participating countries on CENTO business; and (d) Secretariat personnel should not have their national pension rights adversely affected by their CENTO service.

Military - The Secretary General speaks with moderation and brevity under this heading, noting favorably the activities undertaken by the PMDG. In the concluding section of his Report he refers to Command Structure and adds:

"Whatever may be the future course of these military deliberations, it is satisfactory to note that they are at least under way and moving in the right direction. It would perhaps be unrealistic to expect so many interests and perspectives, being considered from such widely separated geographical and psychological angles, to be resolved in a hurry. Geography is usually the governing influence in foreign policy, and foreign policy must of necessity control military policy. These two aspects of our defence, with all that they imply in historical backgrounds and emotions and present relative strengths and needs, involve complications that may take a considerable amount of time and thought to work out on any rational and practical basis. But no enemy is likely to wait indefinitely on his opponents' convenience before attacking."

Economic - The Secretary General comments that CENTO's economic record shows solid results but that activities are lagging for lack of financing and that there is a need to find ways of effectively promoting progress in projects of joint interest to Pakistan and Iran.

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April 21, 1960

EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION
Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

Position Paper

Afghan-Pakistan Relations

(To be raised only at foreign initiative)

Anticipated Position of Pakistan

1. Pakistan is likely to raise and emphasize strongly the problem of Afghanistan in the context of one or more of the following claims:

a. That Afghanistan has passed the point of no return in its relations with the USSR and has virtually become a Soviet satellite, thus constituting a potential threat to Pakistan's security;

b. That Pakistan is faced with the threat of direct or indirect aggression by Soviet-equipped and inspired Afghan forces;

c. That Afghan intrigues in the Pushtun tribal areas constitute a subversive threat to Pakistan by fomenting disorder in the tribal areas of Pakistan;

d. That Afghan-USSR collaboration in the political field represents a potential threat to Pakistan of communist or communist-inspired subversion.

e. That by endorsing the Afghan position on "Push-tunistan" recently, Soviet spokesmen have indulged in unwarranted interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and should be condemned for their action.

2. Pakistan is therefore likely to call for a manifestation of support from its CENTO associates in its differences with Afghanistan, possibly in the form of:

a. A public statement by the CENTO Ministers declaring their

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governments' recognition of the Durand Line as the legal boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the SEATO Council did in March 1956 (See attached Discussion section and annex);

b. A CENTO Council communique, or a public statement by the Secretary General of CENTO, strongly condemning Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan for their recent public pronouncements on the "Pushtunistan" issue.

3. Pakistan may also be expected to propose that CENTO undertake contingency planning to meet an increasing security threat to the treaty area from Afghanistan (See separate papers on U.S. Views on Afghanistan and CENTO Military Contingency Planning).

Recommended United States Position

1. The United States does not consider Afghanistan to be completely under Soviet influence or to be in immediate danger of coming under Soviet domination. While not wishing to minimize the extent of Soviet influence in Afghanistan, we continue to believe that the Afghan leaders and people are determined to maintain their national independence and neutrality. (See separate paper on U.S. Views on Afghanistan.)

2. The United States considers the survival of Afghanistan as an independent and neutral nation to be important to the Free World. An improvement in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is considered to be a crucial element in containing Soviet penetration of Afghanistan. We believe that whatever the origin and merits of the "Pushtunistan" dispute, it has now become inextricably linked with Afghan susceptibility to Soviet influence. It is our judgment that a "tough" forward policy by a CENTO country against Afghanistan will, according to past experience and present circumstances, inevitably drive the Afghans for protection into the Soviet camp. We believe, therefore, that it is of the utmost importance for Pakistan and Afghanistan to settle their differences by conciliatory means as soon as possible. We believe the two countries should deal with the "Pushtunistan" and other Pakistan-Afghanistan problems through bilateral negotiations, and we stand ready to assist in any practicable way in seeking solution to such problems provided there is reasonable hope of success and both countries request our assistance.

3. Regarding a possible Pakistan proposal for a CENTO statement either recognizing the legal standing of the Durand Line or condemning Soviet leaders for their pronouncements on "Pushtunistan", or both, we

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continue to regard the "Pushtunistan" question as primarily a regional issue to be handled through bilateral negotiation. We do not favor action by CENTO responsive to the "Pushtunistan" question per se because we believe such action would tend to transform this local dispute into a "cold war" issue and only heighten the controversy, thus contributing to the undoubted Soviet objective of increasing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Our recognition of the Durand Line is already a matter of public record and needs no reiteration.

If, however, other regional members of the Council wish to support some CENTO statement in response to recent Soviet statements, we would be prepared to agree to a carefully worded statement which would (a) refrain from judging the merits of the "Pushtunistan" dispute and (b) condemn recent Soviet statements as interference in an essentially local dispute and as a transparent attempt to increase tensions in the treaty area.

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Discussion

Since 1947 there has been almost constant friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan's relations with the Free World and particularly with Pakistan are greatly complicated by the so-called "Pushtunistan" dispute, a controversy over the question of autonomy for the four to five million Pushtun tribesmen residing in the northwest frontier area of Pakistan. The Soviet Union has exploited this issue by supporting Afghanistan, thereby inducing the Afghans to rely on Soviet political, economic and military support.

Background of the "Pushtunistan" Dispute

The history of the "Pushtunistan" dispute is long and complex. It antedates the partition of the Indian subcontinent but has reached its present acute form only since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Afghan agitation against Pakistan, mostly through informational media such as Radio Kabul, has fluctuated over the years. At times it has reached vicious proportions and at other times it has been muted to a whisper. Since Prime Minister Daud came to power in 1953 the dispute has become more inflamed. In 1955 it led to virtual cessation of diplomatic relations between the two countries and to economic reprisals by Pakistan. This, in turn, resulted in closer relations between Afghanistan and the USSR. The friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan, therefore, is directly reflected in the willingness of Afghan leaders to accept Soviet aid and influence.

Pakistan has reacted to Afghan claims in various ways at different times. On the whole, Pakistani leaders claim that the "Pushtunistan" issue is a complete fabrication -- a "stunt" -- with no basis in fact. Their first reaction, therefore, is to ignore the matter. On the other hand, at various times, pricked by Afghan propaganda attacks, the Pakistanis have seriously considered attempts to overthrow the Royal Family either by an internal coup or by instigating tribal uprisings. At other times, the Pakistanis, alarmed by exaggerated or inaccurate reports of Soviet subversion in the tribal areas, have pleaded for United States aid to maintain a strong military position along the Afghan border in order to deter any Soviet-instigated border incursions.

The Afghans claim that they have no territorial ambitions against Pakistan and that they are satisfied with the present frontier. They have at various times offered to consider the problem settled provided Pushtun leaders on the Pakistan side would declare themselves to be loyal Pakistanis and satisfied with conditions in the tribal areas. The Afghans have also hinted that if Pakistan were to admit publicly the existence of "a political problem" and were to grant a greater measure of local autonomy to the

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Pushtu-speaking area of Pakistan, this might satisfy the basic Afghan desire to protect Pushtun culture and identity. Although the sincerity of these Afghan overtures is open to some doubt, it has never been tested because the Pakistanis fear such proposals to be merely a trick to get Pakistan publicly to acknowledge existence of the problem and recognize the right of a linguistic minority to demand special status. This would be a dangerous precedent in a multi-lingual nation such as Pakistan.

Recent Developments

In recent times an era of good feeling between Pakistan and Afghanistan followed the exchange of high level visits in 1956 and 1957 between the King and Prime Minister of Afghanistan and the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. This impetus, however, was lost after the October 1958 revolution in Pakistan. The arrest of several Pushtun leaders by the martial law authorities in Pakistan for alleged anti-national activities and the new regime's apparent determination to retain a unified province in West Pakistan displeased the Afghan Government and provided it with grounds on which to reassert its Pushtunistan claims. It denounced the Ayub regime and revived its propaganda campaign which became particularly intense by the fall of 1959. An attempt by the Pakistan Ambassador in Kabul to obtain agreement on a "face-saving" formula to end the "Pushtunistan" dispute -- the so-called "Khattak Plan" (which we supported with both governments) -- failed when the Pakistan Government declined to endorse the proposal on the ground that it was imprecise and might prejudice its legal and moral position.

The Pakistan Government refrained for some time from striking back publicly at the Afghan propaganda attacks. Privately, however, President Ayub and his colleagues began to advocate the adoption of a "hard" forward policy toward Afghanistan. They proposed to us at the highest levels the application of a concerted "shock treatment" on Afghanistan, including a U.S. threat to withhold economic aid to Afghanistan unless it abandoned its "Pushtunistan" policy and its heavy reliance on the Soviet Union. The Afghan Government, on its part, began to suspect renewed Pakistani designs to overthrow the regime in Kabul; it complained of Pakistani involvement in inciting anti-government riots in the Afghan city of Kandahar toward the end of December 1959 and in fomenting trouble among the numerous Pushtun tribes in eastern Afghanistan.

A meeting between Afghan Foreign Minister Naim and President Ayub -- initiated largely at our suggestion to Foreign Minister Qadir following the last CENTO Council session, and carried through only after urgent intercession on our part with both governments -- was arranged in Rawalpindi in mid-January this year in the hope that agreement might be reached to reduce

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tensions pending further negotiations. This meeting miscarried as both sides remained inflexible and the Pakistanis, in particular, antagonized the Afghans by proposing self-determination for all the Pushtuns, starting with those residing in Afghanistan, or better still that the Afghans simply "dodge the issue".

Reacting to increasingly heavy and virulent Afghan propaganda, the Pakistan Government reversed its long-standing policy of restraint and by February this year began to retaliate "in kind" through the press and radio. Its stated reason was the need to protect itself from criticism, and possible disaffection, among Pakistani Pushtuns for pursuing a weak and cowardly policy in the face of Afghan provocations. The resultant Pakistani counter-propaganda effort matched and even exceeded the Afghan campaign in intensity and was directed primarily at the Afghan Royal Family itself. Moreover, the general deterioration in relations between the two countries was manifested in other ways, e.g., suspension of work in implementing the Pak-Afghan transit agreement, harassment of each other's diplomatic and consular representatives, and repeated indications of intrigue by one government against the other in the Pushtun tribal areas.

USSR Reiterates Support for "Pushtunistan"

Premier Khrushchev capitalized on this situation during a brief visit to Kabul at the beginning of March 1960. In the joint communique at the conclusion of the visit, Khrushchev associated the USSR unequivocally with the Afghan position on "Pushtunistan" and endorsed "the principle of self-determination" as the "reasonable way of solving this problem". On his return to Moscow, Khrushchev went one step farther by asserting that "historically, Pushtunistan has always been part of Afghanistan", thus implying that the Afghans had a territorial claim to the "Pushtunistan" area.

Denouncing the Khrushchev statements as unwarranted interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, Foreign Minister Qadir issued a statement declaring that "the time has come to put by some of the restraint which Pakistan has all along observed...", and repeating publicly President Ayub's earlier proposal to Foreign Minister Naim for a plebiscite among the Pushtuns, beginning with those in Afghanistan.

Adding fuel to the fire, the new Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, during a press conference immediately following his presentation of credentials to President Ayub in Rawalpindi on March 12, characterized Foreign Minister Qadir's proposal as "a joke", asserted that the USSR did not recognize the Durand Line as a legal international boundary, and endorsed again the principle of self-determination for the Pushtuns in Pakistan.

U.S. Conciliatory Effort Unsuccessful

Meanwhile, in late February we instructed our Ambassadors in Karachi

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and Kabul to propose to the respective governments a 90-day propaganda truce during which bilateral discussions might be held to seek a more permanent settlement. While President Ayub indicated his willingness to cease all Pakistan propaganda if the Afghans would reciprocate and to acknowledge publicly the existence of "political differences" for negotiation with the Afghans, Prime Minister Daud held that our proposal would not serve a useful purpose unless the Pakistanis openly acknowledged the existence of the "Pushtunistan problem" per se and unless the problem itself were tackled directly. We have thus far been unable to resolve this dilemma without further damaging our relations with the two countries -- particularly with our ally, Pakistan.

We are now coming under increasing pressure publicly in Pakistan, privately from the Pakistan Government and in the CENTO forum to make a formal statement of support for Pakistan in its dispute with Afghanistan, especially since the Soviet Union has openly taken sides with Afghanistan. Pakistan has reminded us of the SEATO communique of March 9, 1956 (text appended) in which we joined with her other SEATO allies in affirming recognition that the "sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line". Pakistan also recently proposed that the CENTO Secretary General be instructed to issue a strong communique condemning Soviet statements on "Pushtunistan" as having a subversive effect on the area, and implying CENTO support for Pakistan in its dispute with Afghanistan. While a proposal to this effect was recently withdrawn by the Pakistanis from consideration by the CENTO Council of Deputies, there is reason to believe that they may introduce it in the Ministerial Council meeting.

Current U.S. Position

The United States continues to believe -- as earnestly reiterated by the Afghan King, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to our Ambassador in Kabul recently -- that Afghanistan is determined to maintain its freedom and independence despite its heavy reliance in recent years on the USSR for military and economic aid. We are also convinced that a "tough" forward policy toward Afghanistan, such as advocated by Pakistan, is more likely to drive Afghanistan for protection into the Soviet fold than cause it to back down on its "Pushtunistan" claim and abandon its heavy reliance on the USSR. In any event, we prefer not to render the already complex "Push-tunistan" problem more difficult to solve by placing it in a "cold war" context through formal CENTO action vis a vis the USSR. We continue to regard the problem as essentially a regional dispute and to advocate moderation on both the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan in their relations with each other. We believe the two governments should deal with the "Pushtunistan" and other Pakistan-Afghanistan problems through bilateral negotiations.

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negotiations. We continue to stand ready to offer our assistance in seeking a solution to such problems provided there is reasonable hope of success and both countries request our aid.

Annex: SEATO Communique, March 9, 1956.

Drafted by: SOA - Mr. Spengler and Mr. Poullada	Cleared by: SOA - Mr. Adams and Mr. Bartlett NR - Mr. Gannett NEA - Mr. Hart C - Mr. Achilles
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Annex

Excerpt from the Final Communiqué of the Second SEATO Council Meeting, held in Karachi, Pakistan, March 6-8, 1956:

"...The Council agreed that there had been useful progress in cooperation among member governments in assisting each other to combat subversive activities. They observed that communist tactics were placing increasing reliance on methods of political and economic infiltration. They noted, however, that this shift in tactics was unaccompanied by any convincing evidence of intent to abandon efforts to subvert, weaken and overthrow the political, economic and social systems which have been freely chosen by the peoples of the area. The Council attributed in large measure this seeming shift in tactics away from violence in some parts of the world to the collective security arrangements of the free nations.

"They particularly deplored statements and interventions by Soviet leaders in recent months designed to increase tension and promote division in the Asian communities and among other nations of the free world. Insofar as these statements referred to 'Pakhtoonistan' the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it was consequently affirmed that the Treaty area referred to in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty includes the area up to that line..."

- March 9, 1956

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Please substitute the attached page 4 at the proper place in the briefing paper TEH D-6/1 (U.S. Views on Report of the Military Committee) issued April 18, 1960.

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(d) Infrastructure

(i) We do not favor the establishment of a CENFO "common infrastructure" program, which would have to be financed largely by the United States. We have agreed, however, to a CENFO Infrastructure Coordinating Committee to develop common standards. We also agree that the CMPS might usefully make a study of existing and required facilities.

3. The Secretary may also wish to state that, in connection with the invitation extended to members of CENFO's Combined Military Planning Staff and other regional military representatives to be U. S. guests at selected training exercises, we should be pleased if the regional governments would consider including officers from the Permanent Military Deputies Group (PMDG) among those attending these military exercises.

Discussion:

D-6/1
Revised page 4.
April 21, 1960

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Position Paper

April 21, 1960

Menderes-Khrushchev Exchange of Visits

(To be raised only at foreign initiative)

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The Problem

The Turkish Government has announced a Menderes-Khrushchev exchange of visits, with Prime Minister Menderes going to Moscow in July and Khrushchev visiting Ankara later. According to the Turks, the visits are being arranged to indicate their participation in the general effort to bring about some relaxation of tensions and to promote a favorable atmosphere for calmer resolution of Turkish-USSR problems. The Turks do not intend to discuss substantive questions, and it is generally believed Menderes can be expected to deal with the Soviets without detriment to the West. Some concern is felt for the ultimate effect the visits may have on other countries, notably Iran and Pakistan, and Greece has already manifested a reaction of embarrassment and annoyance.

Anticipated Turkish Position

Turkish leaders will characterize the visits as Turkish efforts to keep in step with the current world-wide spirit of detente, which they maintain should be viewed as an expression of Turkish solidarity with the West in similar efforts. Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu has stated the GOP feels that after an exchange of visits Turkey would be under less pressure from some of its NATO allies who have expressed the view that the GOP has maintained a "provocative" attitude toward the USSR. Menderes has undertaken not to discuss basic foreign and defense policies affecting Turkey's allies in NATO and CENTO. Turkish officials have indicated their conviction that there is no change in the position or attitude of the USSR, and no significant developments in Turk-Soviet relations are anticipated.

Recommended U.S. Position

In earlier discussions the U.S. informed the Turks that the question of a Menderes-Khrushchev meeting was a matter for decision by the Turks and that we had full confidence in their ability to conduct their relations with the USSR in a manner advantageous to the West. The U.S. continues to be confident that Turkish leaders in making the decision have weighed the advantages and disadvantages and that their relations with the USSR will be conducted without prejudice to Western interests. The U.S. welcomes the decision of Turkey to approach the visits as a NATO member and to continue in close communication with its NATO allies about any developments. If the Turkish Foreign Minister should allege that criticism within NATO of Turkish policy towards the USSR motivated the forthcoming Menderes-Khrushchev visits, the Secretary should assure him that the U.S. has never engaged in such criticisms in NAC or elsewhere.

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EIGHTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION

TEH D-0/1
April 21, 1960

Tehran, April 28-30, 1960

Annotated Agenda

I. Installation of Chairman - Public

Council Action: CENTO practice would have Iran serve as Chairman on two counts: (a) 1960 is Iran's turn for the year, and (b) customarily the Chairman for the year defers to the host representative, in this case again Iran.

U. S. Position: Concur in Installation of Iranian Representative.

Document: None

II. Opening of Meeting - Public

Council Action: The Secretary General will open the meeting. The Iranian Minister of Court, Husein Ala, may welcome the Council to Iran on behalf of the Shah. Public Opening Statements will then be made by heads of delegations.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should speak.

Document: Secretary's Opening Statement.

III. Adoption of Agenda - Closed

Council Action: Approve the proposed agenda.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should approve the proposed agenda.

Document: Agenda (D-3/1)

IV. Appointment of a Drafting Committee for Final Communique - Closed

Council Action: Each delegation will nominate one or more persons for the Communique Drafting Committee.

U. S. Position: The Secretary may wish to nominate Mr. Berding, assisted by Mr. Joseph Roland, to be U. S. members.

Document: None.

V. Report

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V. Report of the Secretary General - Closed

Council Action: The Report will be noted. The Secretary General may seek specific endorsement of the Report or, alternatively, seek discussion by the Council of it in substance.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should take note of the Report, commend the Secretary General for his frank, forthright and encouraging account of CENTO's affairs during the past six months, and state the United States will bear in mind his specific comments.

Document: U. S. Views on the Report of the Secretary General (D-5/1)

VI. Report of the Military Committee - Closed (possibly Restricted)

Council Action: The Council will have before it the Report of the Military Committee indicating in general terms CENTO military progress made to date. In addition to discussing a CENTO Command Structure, regional members may raise during consideration of the Report a CENTO planning document entitled "Basic Assumptions for Global War," CENTO liaison with NATO and SEATO, the International Budget for CENTO's Combined Military Planning Staff (CMPS), CENTO military contingency planning covering Afghanistan and Iraq, and their desires for increased U. S. military assistance.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should indicate that the Report is agreeable. He may express the hope that the regional member states will consider their national representatives in the PMDG in connection with the invitation to U. S. training exercises extended at the Military Committee meeting by General White, to the CMPS and to regional CENTO member representatives. He should state the following positions if the issues they concern are raised by others: (1) The U. S. opposes the creation of a CENTO Command Structure now or in the immediate future for political reasons but believes that the PMDG and CMPS should be encouraged to proceed under the guidance of the Military Committee with perfecting contingency plans for such a Structure, to

be available

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be available on a standby basis if and when the Council agrees that the Structure is needed and politically desirable; (2) The U. S. opposes CENTO military contingency planning covering Afghanistan and Iraq; (3) The Council should not concern itself with the planning document "Basic Assumptions for Global War," which should remain before the Standing Political Working Party; (4) The U. S. believes CENTO civil review of the CMPS budget would be useful in conforming CENTO administrative practices but should not cover operational military items when and if such items are included in the CMPS budget; (5) The U. S. and its partners in the MSP are likely to have to do more with less money in the period immediately ahead.

Documents: U. S. Views on Report of the Military Committee (D-6/1)

CENTO Command Structure and Related Question (D-6/2)

CENTO Military Contingency Planning (D-6/3)

Basic Assumptions for Global War (D-6/4)

VII. Report of the Liaison Committee - Closed (possibly Restricted)

Council Action: The Council will be asked to approve the Report of the Liaison Committee containing the estimate of the subversive threat to the CENTO treaty area.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should congratulate the Liaison Committee on its careful drafting of this comprehensive intelligence estimate and state that the Report is satisfactory. He should note that in a multilateral estimate of this type differences of emphasis may exist, especially when treating with a dynamic area such as the Middle East where new developments frequently occur to alter past estimates. U. S. views therefore may differ from some of those set forth in the Report and may be discussed further in the restricted review of international developments.

Document: U. S. Views on the Report of the Liaison Committee (D-7/1)

VIII. Report

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VIII. Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee - Closed (possibly Restricted)

Council Action: The Council will be asked to approve the Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee, which includes a resolution for internal CENTO use on "Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against Iran." Pakistan may request in this connection (or more probably during Review of the International Situation - see XI below) that the Council approve a resolution for public use on Soviet interference in the "Pushtunistan" issue.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should approve the Report, including the resolution "Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against Iran." (See XI below as regards U. S. position for handling the "Pushtunistan" issue if it is raised by Pakistan.)

Document: U. S. Views on the Report of the Counter-Subversion Committee (D-8/1).

IX. Report of the Economic Committee - Closed

Council Action: The Council will be asked to approve the Report of the Economic Committee and the resolutions it recommends to the Council. Consideration of this report may give rise to discussion by the regional member states of the financing of joint economic projects, the CENTO Telecommunications Project (i.e., the question of whether to use in this project the microwave or the tropospheric scatter system), and financing for the Turkish-Iranian railway link.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should approve the Report of the Economic Committee and the resolutions it recommends to the Council, noting that the United States reaffirms the views expressed on the Report and Resolutions by the U. S. Representative in the recent Economic Committee, as set forth in the Summary Records of that meeting. The Secretary may wish to use at this time the statement attached to Position Paper D-9/1, which has been prepared in part to counter expressions of discouragement and dissatisfaction by the regional member states.

The Secretary should state the following if the issues to which they relate are raised by others: (1) on the financing of joint economic projects, that the

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United States regards its bilateral aid programs as the principal channels for its aid to the regional members, that the United States has made very substantial contributions to CENTO multi-lateral projects, and that the United States is concentrating its assistance increasingly on the extension of financing on a loan basis for economically and technically sound projects; (2) on the microwave-versus-tropospheric scatter aspect of the Telecommunications Project, that the United States /U. S. position not yet formulated/; and (3) on the Turkish-Iranian rail link, that the United States has already provided foreign exchange financing for an extension in Iran, that the DLF is giving top priority to the Turkish loan application to the DLF for an extension to the shore of Lake Van, and that the United States is not prepared at this time to go further into the question of financing the balance of the project.

Documents: U. S. Views on the Report of the Economic Committee (D-9/1)

U. S. Position on Financing of Joint Economic Projects (D-9/2)

U. S. Position on CENTO Telecommunications Project (D-9/3)

U. S. Position on the Turkish-Iranian Railway Link (D-9/4)

X. Annual Report of the Economic Committee for 1959 - Closed

Council Action: The Council will be asked to approve the Annual Report of the Economic Committee for 1959.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should approve the Report.

Document: U. S. Views on the Annual Report of the Economic Committee for 1959 (D-10/1).

XI. Review of the International Situation - Restricted

Note: Although listed as a single agenda item, this will in fact take place at various times during each of the three days.

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Council Action: Each delegation will raise whatever political subjects may be of particular interest to it. There are no set speeches, and observations are off-the-record. It is in this context that such items as the Summit, U. S. adherence to CENFO, Afghan and Iraqi developments, etc., may arise.

It is likely that during a restricted session Pakistan will request the Council to approve a public statement recognizing the Durand Line as the legal Pakistan-Afghan boundary or a public statement strongly condemning Khrushchev and the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan for their recent public pronouncements on the "Pushtunistan" issue.

U. S. Position: The Secretary may wish to take the initiative in presenting the U. S. Attitude Toward the Summit (see position paper D-11/11). As regards subjects raised by other delegations, the Secretary may wish to respond as appropriate.

If Pakistan raises the "Pushtunistan" issue, the Secretary should say the United States regards this matter as primarily a regional issue to be handled through bilateral negotiations. The Secretary should say in response to a Pakistan request for CENFO action on this matter that the United States believes such action would tend to transform this local dispute into a "cold war" issue, heightening the controversy and contributing to Soviet objectives; however, if Iran and Turkey support some CENFO response to the recent Soviet statements, the United States can agree to a carefully worded statement which (a) refrains from judging the merits of the "Pushtunistan" dispute and (b) condemns recent Soviet statements as interference in an essentially local dispute. (See paper D-11/6.)

Documents:

- U. S. Adherence to CENFO (D-11/1)
- UAR Developments (D-11/2)
- Situation in Iraq (D-11/3)

U. S. Views

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- U. S. Views on Afghanistan (D-11/4)
- Iran-Afghan Relations (D-11/5)
- Afghan-Pakistan Relations (D-11/6)
- Soviet Pressures on Iran (D-11/7)
- Indo-Pakistan Relations (D-11/8)
- Khrushchev-Menderes Visits (D-11/9)
- The Jordanian Situation (D-11/10)
- U. S. Attitude Toward the Summit (D-11/11)

XII. Place and Date of Next Meeting - Closed

Council Action: The Council will seek to fix a time and place for the next Council session. It is possible that some delegations may seek a rescheduling of major Committee meetings vis-a-vis the Council session.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should go along with the wishes of the member states on the place for the next Council meeting. As regards the time he should indicate a preference for a somewhat longer interval than has been customary in order to allow opportunity for greater progress to be made between meetings, and may also indicate that a fall meeting would present certain inconveniences to the United States in view of its elections; however, if a fall meeting is desired by the other delegations, the United States is agreeable but the Secretary would probably be unable to attend in person. The Secretary may wish, as necessary, to reiterate the U. S. view that major Committees should continue to meet at least one month before the Council.

Document: Places and Dates of Ensuing Meetings (D-12/1)

XIII. Approval

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XIII. Approval of Final Communique - Closed

Council Action: To approve the draft communique presented by the drafting committee.

U. S. Position: The Secretary should approve any reasonable communique, providing it omits any reference to possible CENFO involvement in intra-area disputes.

Document: None.

XIV. Any Other Business - Closed.

Council Action: Delegations may raise such miscellaneous subjects as they desire. In particular, Pakistan has indicated it will propose a change in the present equal-shares budget sharing formula.

U. S. Position: If the question of cost sharing is raised, the Secretary should state that the United States cannot agree to a modification of the present equal-shares formula.

Document: The United States and the CENFO International Budget (D-14/1).

IV. Closing Arrangements - Public

- (a) Final photographs of Council.
- (b) Issuance of Final Communique.
- (c) Press Conference by Chairman.

Drafted by: NEA/NR - Mr. Gannett	Cleared by C - Mr. Achilles
S/S-RO - Raymond L. Perkins, Room 5274 NS, Ext. 4445	

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