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16 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Programs Evaluation


Bronson:

In line with our discussion with the Director this morning, I think we need to reorganize our paper to coincide as closely as possible with his oral remarks, which he obviously has pretty firmly fixed in his mind. I would summarize them as follows:

a. The thrust of the OMB paper is okay. It is not our purpose to argue with it but rather to make some suggestions along the lines the OMB paper suggests and directed to this paper.

b. The letters of exhortation which the DCI has received from the President give him no role in community resource management, and the big problem is How can he get a handle on it? The OMB paper and the Director recognize that most of the resources (85 percent) are in the Defense Department. Any effort toward better resource management must first focus on DOD. The Director believes that a good beginning has been made through the Froehlke arrangement. The Laird posture statement provides for an additional Deputy Secretary of Defense and an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence (or some comparable position). This is already on the record, and the Director believes that it would be most inadvisable to attempt any more legislation than this at this time. If we could get DOD resource management under one man who would cooperate with the DCI, it should be possible to effect some savings. Recognizing that 85 percent of the assets and resources are in DOD, it is simply not realistic for the DCI or any other outsider to "command" the entire community.

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c. Addressing himself to production, the Director thinks it is not new people we need but a better relationship with Dr. Kissinger and our other principal consumers. He would welcome a council of consumers, possibly chaired by Dr. Kissinger. He feels a real need for some super-evaluative body of consumers to critique the product. The Director feels quite strongly that the interplay between production and collection is very important, and he wants no part of the scheme to set up the DCI and the production components as a separated entity.

d. The Director feels that the report quite properly recognizes that the DCI is a very busy man. He thinks it entirely feasible, however, that a good bit could be delegated to subordinate officials such as the DDCI or, in the case of the Clandestine Service, to the DD/P, which would give him more time to help with resource management.

e. With regard to readjustment of the organizational structure, the Director feels it would be a great mistake to make the DCI responsible for NSA. He feels that, when you start to replace all of the military with a civilian manpower pool, the military services would no longer support it, and in any case, we do not want this responsibility. He recognizes that Gayler is going to be out for greater budgets but that Froehke or Packard is simply going to have to tell him there isn't any more money and there will probably be less. He feels that the OMB role in allowing the community budget to grow to its present size has been a pusillanimous approach. Why have they allowed this? The DCI has always been available for consultation but has not been invited in, so to speak.

While the Director was not specific about this, I think we have to recognize that PFIAB and Mr. Laird, at least, have been asked for their comments. The Director's written response should therefore be couched in rather diplomatic terms. All of the several comments are going to have to be brought together at one point, and the leaky ship on which we ride also causes me to assume that in due course DOD and others will have a copy of the Director's comments. They should therefore be plain but not appear to be a power grab by the DCI. I think we should also assume it is entirely possible that these comments will be communicated as submitted to the President, which again means that they must be very carefully written.

L. K. White

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21 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with [redacted] of the Vice President's Office, 20 April 1971

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1. [redacted] came in to see me for an hour Tuesday morning, by appointment. We had known each other previously when I had the Africa Division and [redacted] besides working at headquarters, had been posted in [redacted]. After reviewing his career in politics since leaving the Agency, [redacted] got down to business. He acknowledged the current malaise at policy levels with the intelligence community, citing rising costs, lack of commensurate improvement in product and a general feeling the community suffered from lack of coordination and inordinate duplication. I told him this was indeed a familiar theme nowadays, although it was seldom as specific as might be helpful. I also said that whereas no one in our profession had illusions about perfection, it was nonetheless apparent to us that the work of the community was more effective and the product better than in days gone by. We discussed the lack of feedback from the senior consumers, even though we agreed that the [redacted] series of the National Estimates had been improved as the result of specific suggestions. Here I also pointed out that these were changes to meet the needs of the new Administration rather than improvements as the result of substantive criticism.

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2. At [redacted]'s instance, we soon began to discuss the role of the DCI and quickly got onto the familiar ground of substantive coordination as contrasted with authority over resources. [redacted] who seemed quite well prepared on these matters, was familiar with these aspects and asked what might be done if the DCI should be given specific authority over resources, budgets and program reviews. He acknowledged that the Department of Defense programs were a massive factor in any DCI's authority and I told him I felt good centralized coordination from the DCI would only be accomplished with a cooperative working relationship with the Secretary of Defense and/or his subordinates to whom he might delegate authority for intelligence programming. In reply to [redacted]'s question, I gave it as

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my view that increased DCI authority need not be accompanied by any major upheaval in the organization of the community and that at all costs legislation (beyond what Secretary Laird has been discussing with the Congress in regard to a new Deputy Secretary and possibly two new Assistant Secretaries) should be avoided. [] 25X1
appeared to understand this fully and concurred. [] asked what 25X1
type of evaluative work the NIPE Staff had been able to accomplish and what I felt could further be done in the event DCI authority should be bolstered. In reply, I talked about systems analysis, the work done for the NIRB, some examples of specific studies [] 25X1
was already familiar with most of those I mentioned), winding up with a generic description of the ELINT study as pointing the way to what might be done on a broader community basis. We agreed that this technique had considerable promise for certain types of collection programs, although probably less for others. [] was particularly 25X1
interested in wondering whether such studies would also emphasize the managerial aspects of individual programs and reflect findings on the degree of coordination or lack of it reflected in the intelligence community. I told him that whereas present work concentrated on substantive evaluations, these other conclusions could be drawn without too much difficulty from the studies. As [] pointed out, it was 25X1
these latter aspects which most exercised critics at the policy level.

3. Pursuing the subject of what exercised policy-level critics of the intelligence community, [] brought up the crises which 25X1
resulted from such incidents as the "Pueblo" and the shoot-down of the EC-121. [] was aware that much reconnaissance activity is now cleared with the 40 Committee and the DCI has no handle on tactical intelligence activities springing from local commands. He merely emphasized this was a fact of life and that no argument that the DCI didn't have authority in such and such a field would be of much use the next time there was a public flap. I put it to [] that whereas 25X1
the DCI probably never would have much leverage in tactical matters, for perfectly obvious reasons, any increase in his authority over national intelligence matters would tend to draw a crisper line between these and the tactical sector.

4. At one point, while discussing the quality of the product, 25X1
[] implied that whereas technical collection had made great strides in measuring hardware and related matters, other aspects such as intent, policy, philosophy, etc. seemed to be less well covered. As a result, we discussed for several minutes the relative invulnerability of the Soviet bureaucracy these days and some of the reasons I thought lay behind it. This discussion was, naturally 25X1
enough, inconclusive but [] did not seem greatly to disagree with what I had to say.

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5. [] asked about the status of relations with Bob Froehke's office, particularly the systems analysis side, and I told him this was generally cordial and that it was my experience systems analysts knew each other and had little difficulty keeping in touch no matter what their parent organizations might do. I told him I thought this was all to the good and merely meant that if the work of the NIPE Staff should change as the result of any increase of authority on the part of the DCI, the Staff was in a position to move forward with somewhat greater facility as a result of it. When he left, he promised that he would not be quoting NIPE as his authority but was hopeful that he could return to the subject at some later date, possibly after some new arrangements for intelligence community coordination had had a chance to prove themselves.

(Signed) Bronson Tweedy

Bronson Tweedy
D/DCI/NIPE

cc: DCI
DDCI
Executive Director

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Miscellaneous papers regarding reorganization
of the intelligence community

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