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DRAFT - 21 February/PC

MEMORANDUM FOR: CONSIDERATION BY THE DIRECTOR
(To be incorporated as a section in the Director's reply to
the Executive Secretary of the NSC, re the Dulles Report)

SUBJECT: The Dulles Report

1. Throughout the Dulles Report there are many references to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, but only seven conclusions and recommendations pertaining thereto. In view of the fact that there are still divergent views on the functions of this committee, as will be noted from the individual reports on the Dulles Report from the individual members of the IAC, especially the report on this subject submitted by the Naval member, I should like to submit herewith my views on the IAC.

In paragraph 3 on page 63 it is recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation become a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. I have no objection whatsoever to this, but would point out that the present charter of the IAC permits me to invite to IAC meetings agencies in addition to the permanent members when the subject matter to be discussed is of interest to additional agencies. This seems to me to be adequate.

The FBI was invited to meetings of the old IAB, but in 1946 discontinued attending these meetings. It is thought that the FBI would not now care to join the IAC as a permanent member, but I shall be glad to invite it to participate on a permanent basis if the National Security Council approves of this recommendation in the Report.

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As stated in paragraph 5 on page 63, I agree that the IAC is soundly conceived as an advisory committee. Nowadays it is meeting regularly and more frequently for coordination purposes and there is more joint preparation of estimates for briefings of the Secretary of Defense, the AEC, Senate and House Reports, etc.

Paragraph 6 on Page 63 which recommends the permanent membership of the IAC adds to its present complement the FBI, but omits the JIG and AEC as regular members. As stated above I have no objection to the FBI, but I am opposed to dropping the JIG and AEC as regular members.

Paragraph 4 on page 81 states: "Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence these estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee whose members should assume collective responsibility for them." I maintain that most of the CIA estimates which are not of a current urgent nature are now discussed with the IAC Agencies, but not necessarily with the IAC members themselves or with all of them together at the same time. Instructions have been issued that just as many estimates as possible should be discussed in advance of publication with the IAC Agencies, and even if they are of an urgent nature, this practice should be followed, and that laxness in this regard should not continue on the part of CIA. It is believed that when a concurrence is received from an IAC Agency that constituted a part of the collective responsibility, but on this point there

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not unanimous agreement within the IAC.

My interpretation of the recommendation quoted above is that "reconstituted" applies not only to the suggested changes of membership in the IAC, but also to the suggestions in the Report that the members of the IAC should more actively participate in substantive intelligence. So long as it remains an advisory committee, I think it would be well to have more frequent meetings to discuss substantive intelligence and I am endeavoring to follow this practice nowadays.

It is, however, quite unrealistic to expect the IAC members themselves to meet and give personal consideration to every intelligence estimate which is issued. If these estimates are given consideration on the working levels in the different IAC Agencies, or when urgent by the IAC Agency that has the dominant interest in the matter under consideration, I consider that this is the best practicable discussion that can take place, and that an agreement in such a coordinated effort does indicate "collective responsibility." Where there is non-concurrence in such estimates the dissent is published with the estimate.

As suggested in paragraph 5 on page 81 the members of the IAC are agreed in a method of more expeditiously handling crisis situations than in the past. A difficulty on this score is that the intelligence agencies are not always supplied with "Eyes Only" communications which report such situations. If the intelligence agencies do not receive such communications which come into their departments they are naturally unable to take action thereon.

I agree with paragraph 6 on page 81 that coordinated intelligence estimates

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should be recognized as the most authoritative estimates, but of course cannot assure how they will be received by the recipient after they have been produced and disseminated by CIA.

With regard to paragraph 5 on page 119 the Central Intelligence Agency does not assist in the military estimates of the JIC and the JIC can dissent from CIA estimates through the military departments or through their representative on the IAC. I think this coordination is now working effectively.

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With regard to the many comments throughout the Report about CIA's position with reference to the IAC, I should like to submit the following comments thereon.

It is stated on page 3: "What is needed is continuing and effective coordinati^{ng} action under existing directives and also directives establishing more precisely the responsibility of the various intelligence agencies." If directives were fully implemented there undoubtedly would be better coordination. The NSCID's, in accordance with the existing procedures were recommended to the National Security Council by the Director after they had received unanimous approval by the IAC Agencies. Heretofore these agencies have objected to defining "precisely" the scope and limits of departmental intelligence activity, and have granted to CIA, under paragraph 2 of NSCID 1 authority to inspect only intelligence material.

The basic question behind the comments on page 6 of the Report is who prepares an initial draft of an estimate, i.e., preparation vs. assembly of intelligence reports. If the IAC Agencies were willing and able to meet dead lines it might be unnecessary for CIA to prepare the initial draft of many reports. Under the present organization, however, the IAC Agencies are responsible to their different departments, and not to the Director of Central Intelligence, so they have different priorities with regard to their own departments

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work rather than the interdepartmental CIA work. It has been found necessary, therefore, to prepare the initial draft of an estimate in CIA and obtain the concurrence or non-concurrence of the IAC Agencies, rather than to assemble the final estimate after receiving contributions from all of the IAC Agencies. This is doubly true in urgent matters where an estimate is requested of CIA on short notice.

It is pointed out on pages 8 and 9 of the Report that scientific intelligence has not heretofore been adequately developed. An Office of Scientific Intelligence, however, has already been established within CIA to improve this field of intelligence, and NSCID No. 10 about collection of foreign scientific and technological data was issued on January 19, 1949.

With regard to the general discussion about the IAC on pages 43 to 45, I am opposed to the IAC becoming a Board of Governors or a Board of Managers (see comments of the Naval member), as I consider this is contrary to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, and a wholly improbable solution to a centralized intelligence agency. If responsibility of the IAC were increased to this extent it would be quite contrary to the tenor of this Report which emphasizes so frequently throughout, the desirability of having strong central ^{direction} ~~discussions~~ for the coordination of intelligence matters. As an advisory committee, I believe that it is of great value and I am thoroughly in agreement with the statement on page 45 that interdepartmental coordination of intelligence

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cannot be achieved solely by directives and without the fullest cooperation of the interested departments. I am also in agreement with the statement on page 5 of the Report: "It should be emphasized that coordination can most effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies."

As stated on page 69, national intelligence should be prepared on all available information and be prepared with full knowledge of our own plans and in the light of our own policy requirements. However, CIA does not now receive all such information and the intelligence agencies themselves, as pointed out above, do not get all of this information within their own departments.

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