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DCI/IC 73-1396  
13 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham

THROUGH :

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT :

Kissinger Appearance Before  
the Murphy Commission

1. I had a long, friendly chat with George Pickett (NSC) this morning. He called out of courtesy to tell me that Secretary Kissinger will be testifying before the Murphy Commission on 21 January (as now scheduled). He thinks the context will be as National Security Advisor, but is not certain whether the State Department will be covered, as well.

2. George wanted to inform me that Dr. Kissinger's remarks will include an annex on intelligence. As now planned, that annex will address very generally the organizational links between intelligence and policy, the subject of guidance and control, the allocation of intelligence effort, and how intelligence has performed.

3. Most of the statements are fairly pro forma, and are not very different from Mr. Colby's remarks. The subject of performance is interesting, however. The draft statement now says:

a. That intelligence support of current (immediate) policy problems is generally very good.

b. That as we move from present to future concerns, and from hard to soft data, intelligence support weakens.

c. That improved means of communication between intelligence and policy makers are needed. This has to do more with basic format changes and the management of data

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volume as they relate to a specific problem area than it does with cosmetic changes in the appearance of documents. Included here also was the need to tailor product so that the most useful mix of both basic data and analysis is available for each specific problem area.

✓  
It will ✓  
d. The volume of reporting (not data) is generally too high. This has to do in part with writing discipline and the failure to give quantified probabilities whenever possible. ✓  
George said the proposed new products of the community (NID, NIB, etc.) would not be particularly helpful unless they supplanted some of the others (like the CIB and the DIA INTSUMS, etc.). He was not certain that greater integration of analysis (community coordination) would be useful. He said Kissinger is a voracious consumer of data and probably a quicker and more perceptive analyst than most in the community. (He cites the 28 September Kissinger query about the possibility of a Mid-East war as the only serious question along these lines at the time.) ✓

Answers -  
e. There should be more dissent reflected in analytical documents.

4. I suggested to George that there is often inadequate feedback about what kind of facts and analysis are satisfactory. He had complained that on a number of occasions specific questions were asked of intelligence and no answers were given. He cited some instances in which the NSC was told that we didn't have the data, when later it was discovered that we had it squirreled away and simply didn't know where to look for it. I told Pickett that a number of Andy Marshall's memos since 1969 had been too ambiguous in their suggestions about how to do better--that we found it difficult to translate their ambiguity into some useful form of human activity. He said he understood that this might be a problem. I suggested that when the NSC evaluates intelligence output it should be as terse in its analysis as it wants us to be in ours. He seemed to gain a sudden appreciation of this problem and will probably work to tighten up the feedback process.

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5. It was clear throughout our talk that Kissinger and the NSC expect intelligence to improve itself. They don't have the time to spend to give better direction.

6. I followed the Pickett call with one to Tom Reckford of the Murphy Commission Staff. He says that there are plans to explore intelligence support for policy in the Kissinger hearings, and with Secretary Schlesinger, who appears tomorrow, 14 December.



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cc: 

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Remarks:

For info. A most  
 (Kissinger & Murphy of  
 Commission) comments

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