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Executive Registry
103-10451

17 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Report on Negotiations with the Department of Defense

1. In accordance with your instructions that our negotiations with the Department of Defense on a number of important coordination items be substantially completed by 17 May, there is herewith summarized the status of these negotiations.

a. Current Intelligence: The CIA is preparing a memorandum which will be forwarded to you and [redacted] summarizing the results of our negotiations on the current intelligence bulletins. These negotiations have resulted in an agreement that CIA will produce the Central Intelligence Bulletin as the National daily, but DIA may continue to produce its Bulletin as a strictly departmental publication.

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b. NRO: In view of the imminent departure of Dr. Scoville, this entire program should be re-examined in order to insure that his successor can make it work. Basically, the NRO agreement is sound and provides a method for accomplishing our objectives.

c. Counterinsurgency: Coordination is working satisfactorily in this area. We are currently discussing with the Army and DOD their proposals for operations into North Vietnam and carefully monitoring SWITCHBACK.

d. NPIC: There has been an exchange of correspondence with DIA working out the details for the manning of NPIC jointly by CIA and DIA personnel. There appears to be full agreement in this area.

e. Clandestine Collection: The DDCI has been engaged in direct discussions with Generals Carroll and Quinn, and DIA is working out improved coordination methods within the military structure. All clandestine collection problems involving Defense are now being brought to the attention of this office for prompt adjudication.

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f. NIC Location: DIA is pressing the Department to insure the prompt relocation of NIC in an area contiguous to the DIA Intelligence Production Center.

2. In addition to the above major items there is attached a summary of a variety of subjects on which current negotiations with Defense are in progress.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

Attachment

cc: DDCI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

17 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

SUBJECT: CIA-DIA Relations

1. This is for your information, and submitted pursuant to your request on 18 March for a run-down of the extent, character and general effectiveness of this Agency's current relations with DIA.

2. In terms of day-to-day operations our relations with DIA are extensive, relatively trouble-free and can be described as generally good, although some actual (and more potential) problems are discernable. CIA counterparts in DIA are predominately "transplants" from their respective service organizations who are still functioning in their same fields of specialization, but under new management. Virtually all CIA offices report that DIA personnel contacted are very cooperative. As is normal in any military organization, the difficulties appear to be the result of rapid turn-over of personnel and DIA's apparent requirement that military officers rather than civilians be in every "command" position.

3. In the field of intelligence production there appears to be a free exchange of information with the usual amount of variation in interpretation and analysis of it. A temporary problem due to the reorganizational process within DIA is that in some instances Army, Navy or Air members have withdrawn from sub-committees of the EIC or GMAIC before DIA members have been appointed. This has resulted in a slow-down of the activities of the affected sub-committee. DIA is, however, working on a solution.

4. More serious than any single current problem in relationships is the developing situation regarding duplication of effort. This is still largely potential rather than actual, but indications are sufficient to warrant attention. The most advanced case is in current intelligence reporting,

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
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illustrative of what may happen in other fields. I would attribute this trend to the preoccupation of DIA personnel with the task of implementing their stated mission, as they see fit to interpret it, irrespective of the mission of others and of existing capabilities elsewhere in the intelligence community. There is as well a determination to demonstrate that they can do what we do but do it better.

5. The attached report was prepared by the Liaison Staff/OCR in consultation with the operating components of the Agency. The body of the report is supplemented by a comparative content analysis of the DIA Summary and the Central Intelligence Bulletin for January (TAB A), and a tabular summary of contacts between major CIA components and their DIA counterparts (TAB B). We will of course be glad to supplement this summary orally.



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PAUL A. BOREL
Assistant Director
Central Reference

Attachments

cc: Deputy Director/Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

17 April 1963

SUMMARY FINDINGS ON CIA-DIA RELATIONS

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE


1. The Office of Scientific and Technical Intelligence of DIAAP (Assistant Director for Processing) will not be established until late April at the soonest. For that reason OSI relations with DIA representatives have been largely restricted to USIB Committee activities, including those of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), and the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC).
2. Relations with DIA personnel in USIB Committee activities have been satisfactory to date. The DIA representatives have, in effect, replaced the former Joint Chiefs of Staff member. Other Service representatives (Army, Navy and Air) have continued to represent ACSI, ONI and AFCIN. In the future, however, it is probable that DIA will be the only Service agency represented. OSI cannot accurately predict what the effect will be on committee activities. Its present guess is that the committees' role in the intelligence community will be weakened. This seems evident because DIA will be coordinating the various Services' positions, a role now performed within the USIB Committees.
3. At the present time the DIA representatives on JAEIC, GMAIC and the SIC are members of the Science and Technology Division of the Estimates Office (DIAAP-2). In late April these people will be members of the Office of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DIAAP-4). This new office will pull together several minor S&T components that are now scattered throughout the DIA.
4. The major problem OSI foresees with DIA is duplication of effort. In reviewing the Department of Defense Directive (No. 5105.28, 1 December 1962) which established and defined the scope of scientific and technical intelligence within the DIA, many areas were found in which duplication of effort with OSI will almost certainly occur. The Directive defines technical intelligence in terms (paragraph III.A.1.) that practically match those of OSI. These are:

"1. Foreign developments in basic and applied research in natural and applied sciences and in applied engineering techniques."

"2. Scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities and limitations of specific foreign weapons, weapons systems, and material and production methods employed for their manufacture."

While OSI views some duplication of effort as desirable, it seriously questions the advisability or need for duplication of S&T efforts across the board. In their planning DIA has neither asked for OSI's opinions nor suggested a division of labor (e.g., OSI might handle basic and applied science and technology and DIA could stick with the development of weapons systems). There may be serious OSI objections to the DIA Office of Scientific and Technical Intelligence if duplication apparent in its operational plans in fact materializes.

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5. OSI's second concern relates to scientific intelligence manpower, a relatively scarce item even before the creation of DIA. OSI has already lost several key intelligence officers to the DIA. Because the new Office of S&T Intelligence is only now forming up, OSI can expect further proselyting by DIA. Personnel losses have seriously affected OSI research efforts on Soviet missile developments and Communist Chinese nuclear weapons activities. Additional raids could cripple these efforts.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

6. The Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), while it subscribes to the earlier statement that its day-to-day relations with DIA are generally good, considers the over-all relationship in its most basic sense to be unsatisfactory because the program of DIA's Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC) seems an attempt at duplicating and competing with OCI.

7. The Central Intelligence Bulletin is the community's prime vehicle for daily intelligence reporting. The Bulletin is produced by OCI under a procedure endorsed by USIB, which provides for systematic consultation with the other intelligence agencies but reserves to the DCI the final authority on substantive content. The Bulletin was designed to fulfill the DCI's responsibilities under NSCID 3, as revised in 1957, which states that "Normally, the current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and the National Security Council." Following its establishment, the number of daily intelligence publications produced by other departments were materially reduced. Indeed duplication in this field was virtually non-existent until the DIA established a current intelligence publication in 1961.

8. When DIA's proposals for setting up a current intelligence shop first became known, it seemed that DIA planned to put itself in competition with CIA and that this would re-introduce the duplication which the Joint Study Group backed by the President's Board had successfully eliminated. It is now clear that DIA is following this course.

9. NSCID 3 authorizes the production by USIB agencies of any departmental intelligence for which their parent departments feel a need. Prior to the establishment of DIA, there was an unfilled need within the Defense Department for detailed current intelligence on military subjects of the kind which is too specialized for OCI's publications and which OCI does not have the manpower to produce. OCI believes that there is a legitimate requirement for departmental intelligence. Through this loophole DIA has driven a truck.

10. DIA publishes two dailies, the highly classified Summary and the secret Bulletin. Neither is coordinated, although there is occasionally some informal discussion between DIA's analysts and OCI's. The content of these publications follows roughly the same pattern as that of CIA's Bulletin and Digest, with some additional emphasis on military aspects. DIA gives its publications an extremely broad dissemination: 237 hard copies and 170 wire addressees.

11. The competitive nature of DIA's Summary vis-a-vis the Central Intelligence Bulletin shows up in various ways.

a. The Summary largely duplicates the coverage of OCI's Bulletin, with only slightly less emphasis on political and economic subjects. (A comparative content analysis for January is attached as Tab A).

b. DIA insists, with some jealousy, on its right to publish any sensitive material in its Summary which OCI publishes in the Bulletin.

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This means that no matter how much OCI reduces the circulation of the Bulletin to protect sensitive information within it, this information will be given a wide dissemination by DIA.

c. DIA views itself as the final authority on military matters and, as a matter of policy, resists any effort by CIA to speak independently in this field. Because OCI is required to coordinate the Bulletin with DIA, but DIA need not coordinate its Summary with OCI, DIA has an advantage which it sometimes tries to use to delay publication of military items in the CIA Bulletin until DIA's slower and less responsive apparatus is able to speak on the subject at hand.

d. DIA will agree only with great reluctance to the publication of a military item before it is able to publish on the same subject itself. This is especially true of anything dealing with advanced weaponry. As a consequence, OCI military analysts prefer to go through a tortuous process of clearing an item in advance with all the Service agencies and CIA organizations concerned before submitting an item for the Bulletin. This sometimes causes a delay of several days.

12. OCI is thus faced with a situation in which it cannot make the improvements it thinks necessary in the Bulletin without making some change in its relations with DIA and in DIA's own activities in the current intelligence field. What is needed is a decision by the Department of Defense that DIA's current operations be confined to the production of departmental current intelligence in accordance with NSCID 3, with the intent of the President's Board, and with the President's own wishes on control of sensitive information. Such a decision would automatically make the DIA Summary more specialized in content and would make it possible for OCI to reserve all intelligence of great sensitivity for a high-level audience.

13. The above is not intended to imply that DIA does not require some sort of mechanism which will enable it to provide current intelligence support to senior officials of the Department of Defense. OCI performs this mission as a departmental service for the DCI and for the White House. While these functions of OCI and DIA are similar, carrying them out need not be duplicative; the requirements of high-level officials are individual, and the material they receive must be "custom-tailored." Similarly, although DIA maintains a 24-hour watch not unlike OCI's Watch Office, there seems little doubt that both are required as departmental services.

14. While CIIC is the element with the specific mission of current intelligence production, its analytic support rests in various other elements of DIA, and, at least until recently, of the individual Service agencies. OCI on the other hand contains its own analytic base for political intelligence, and has effective means for bringing the output of ORR and OSI to bear on its mission. These portions of DIA's production base also duplicate OCI. Furthermore, DIA's political capability is, to be generous, thin.

15. DIA could argue that OCI's military base, equally thin in terms of DIA's resources, is duplicative and wasteful. The idea which inevitably stems from this argument that a division of functions is feasible is a dangerous one. The DCI, if he is to function as the President's chief intelligence advisor, must have a capability for checking the work of other agencies in the intelligence community. He must have independent sources of information and analysis. Moreover, highly-trained long-term civilian analysts, insulated from the political and budgetary pressures in the military establishment and not subject to the vagaries of military personnel management, have consistently produced more timely and accurate intelligence than the Service agencies.

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CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

16. There are no current difficulties with DIA concerning coordination or other liaison problems connected with NSCID 5 and [] because DIA has not yet actually taken over from the three Services the substantive handling of clandestine collection programs and operations. DIA therefore recognizes that it is not now in a position to handle with the Agency the coordination problems that arise from such programs and operations.

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17. There is a clear understanding between Chief, FI, and the DIA Assistant Director for Acquisition that whenever the DIA does take over the supervision or control of the clandestine collection operations of the Services in Washington and the Commands in the field, the DIA will be the point of contact with CIA for the coordination problems that arise. It is recognized by both DIA and FI that this is basically an internal DOD problem and that FI will have liaison with whatever elements in the DOD have responsibility for clandestine collection operations.

18. Earlier this year the DCI was presented with a paper which summarized serious problems existing between the Agency and the individual Military Services in regard to coordination under [] FI feels that, until some of these basic problems of coordination are tackled and resolved, the current problems will continue to prevail even after the DIA has assumed a central role in the Armed Forces clandestine collection activity.

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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

19. Within CIA the Requirements Coordination Staff (RCS) coordinates, registers, validates and levies collection requirements. Its counterpart in the DIA is within the Directorate for Acquisition. To facilitate the development of requirements of mutual interest to both agencies, RCS maintains continuing contact with offices, divisions and branches within DIA Acquisition. It also levies requirements on DIA for collectors under DIA control and accepts DIA requirements for CIA collection.

20. Though RCS personal relationships with DIA are amicable and quite satisfactory, the net results of those relationships are often disappointing. The basic problem appears to stem from the fact that DIA's requirement program approaches a closed system which has the effect of discouraging community coordination.

21. The most obvious and most documented manifestation of this development is DIA's unwillingness to accept CIA requirements which on a subject basis are already stated in DIA's Defense Intelligence Requirements Manual (DIRM) and its new Collection Guidance series, no matter how brief or in some cases how indirect the reference.

22. Specifically DIA's system incorporates into one manual (DIRM) a brief general statement of every DOD collection need. In addition, as a backup piece it is developing a Collection Guide series which, when finished, will provide background information concerning each subject in the DIRM. Having these two series (the DIRM and Collection Guides) which pertain to every subject of interest to DOD, the DIA can refuse any CIA requirement or guidance publication which is "already covered." In practice this is precisely what is happening. Today, most CIA requirements are rejected as duplicative. Possible solutions to the problem are:

a. Do nothing. It can be argued that since the CIA gets copies of all reporting responsive to DIA requirements, CIA needs are met without levying requirements on DIA at all. This, of course, would be true if DIA requirements in fact reflected precise CIA needs. This they often do not.

b. Negotiate to establish "the first requirement valid" principle. Applying this technique no one in either CIA or DIA would develop and levy

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requirements which were already on the books in the community. This technique as applied to ad hoc requirements shows considerable promise. In fact, as the all-source CIA Requirements Registry becomes widely known, this can be done. How effective it will be remains to be seen. In terms of CIA general requirements and DIA Collection Guides, however, this solution is unquestionably not satisfactory. In the first place, continuing requirements and guides produced by one agency are rarely acceptable to another as fully representing its needs. Beyond that, the DIA system itself calls for requirement statements in the DIRM and background data in the Collection Guides to cover all their needs, whether or not similar needs have already been stated by CIA.

23. Program Requirements and Guides on a national basis. In recent months both CIA and DIA have done much to reduce the amount of collection guidance in their holdings. In contrast to having over one hundred series of collection guides as they had before, DIA now has one series. In like manner CIA has moved in the direction of reducing its holdings. Both agencies, however, wish to retain some collection guidance.^{1/} One solution to the problem, then, would be to program the development of such collection guidance jointly in the community. Under this arrangement, production of guidance on those subjects of common interest to CIA and DIA would be accomplished jointly. Then, when completed, such guidance would be accepted by both DIA and CIA as representing the interests of both.

24. Establish a National Requirements Facility. It is possible that the coordination of the Requirements function between agencies will never be entirely satisfactory until it is approached on a national basis. In such a system all collection guidance including guides, continuing and ad hoc requirements, and support briefs would be coordinated and levied from one center.

25. In conclusion it can be stated that:

a. Coordination of requirements with the DIA is far from satisfactory. Now that the DIA system is approaching maturity relatively few CIA requirements are accepted by DIA.

b. In many subject areas CIA must be content either to take whatever reporting results from DIA requirements, or, be willing to participate with them in planning and developing joint requirements and guides prepared within the limits of a philosophy contrary to our own.

(Note: A review of these problems with DIA should probably await the outcome of present plans to organize a strengthened DDI collection guidance center.)

LIAISON AND REFERENCE SERVICES

26. The Office of Central Reference (OCR) has had three members of its Liaison Staff formally accredited to DIA since its inception in August 1961. They visit some part or other of DIA almost daily and have been well received. From time to time, however, they have each detected among some of their contacts a growing feeling that DIA sooner or later is going to challenge some of the prerogatives which CIA now holds under existing NSCID's, not to mention what some quarters in DIA feel is an overly liberal

^{1/} CIA feels the need to retain "continuing requirements" and "area support briefs." DIA's new Collection Guide series, which is similar to CIA continuing requirements, contains long-range requirements and brief background descriptions of subjects covered in the DIRM.

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interpretation of the National Security Act of 1947 by this Agency. This is reflected to a degree in the earlier portions of this report, itself an indication of apprehension at various CIA levels about future moves by the DIA.

27. Even though our liaison relationship with DIA has been generally cordial, the growing pains inherent in any new organization make our job of getting things done more difficult. For example, in January 1963 we asked DIA for copies of the "DIA Production Center Detailed Plan." We were turned down on the basis that many of the details in the plan were subject to change and the time-phasing for implementing the plan would probably not be met. In lieu of providing us with copies of the "plan," briefings on the Production Center were offered at some vague future date. Accordingly, we asked the Secretariat to line up two briefings on the Center for the Agency, the first presentation to be given to our senior officials and the second to our working level personnel. We are still waiting for these briefings to materialize.

28. We have attempted to establish control points in DIA through which requests for documentary support and contacts may be handled. We have not been wholly successful for lack of a central dissemination point in DIA. In discussing these matters with DIA we found that it would be extremely helpful to both the DIA Production Center and CIA research components if a classified functional directory of "Who's Who" and "Who Does What" were developed for the two agencies. Over the years we have lived with complaints about CIA not having such a directory, the availability of which would promote working level discussions between the respective research elements.

29. Before the establishment of the DIA Production Center, selected CIA intelligence information reports were provided ACSI, AFCIN and ONI for evaluation. We have now worked out arrangements with DIA whereby the Production Center will provide such evaluations.

30. We plan to revise the OCR publication Biographic Contacts in the Intelligence Community once DIA decides how it will handle military biographic data. We could also make available our OCR handbook, Searching for Information, now being revised. Although produced to provide to Agency personnel a concise picture of our central reference files and how to use them, it might enhance working level contact. The original version is used by DIA's Defense Intelligence School (DIS). And speaking of the latter, OCR representatives, and other Agency personnel, do regularly brief the DIS attache and intelligence analyst classes in what appears to be a mutually satisfactory arrangement.

Attachments:

TAB A: Comparative content analysis of DIA Summary and CIA Bulletin for January 1963.

TAB B: Summary of contacts between CIA components and their DIA counterparts.

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A

COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS
OF THE
DIA SUMMARY AND CIA BULLETIN
FOR JANUARY 1963

1. Any survey for duplication is complicated by the use of differing language in the two publications and variances in interpretation and level of detail. There is also a strong subjective element in judging whether an item published by DIA and not by CIA was actually of national interest.

2. Even with these reservations, it is clear that there is a large element of duplication. In the 26 issues of the DIA Summary during January, there were 257 items exclusive of the longer "supplement" articles, which should be considered as the counterpart of the Current Intelligence weeklies. Of the 257:

a. 95 (37%) duplicated at least the major points of material appearing in the Bulletin the same or previous days (sometimes giving additional detail).

b. 20 (8%) were partially duplicative.

c. 17 (7%) carried developments of lower priority, on which the two publications would speak intermittently, but not necessarily the same day. Thus, over a period coverage was approximately the same, but not from issue to issue.

d. 100 (39%) were items which were judged not suitable for the Bulletin; they included status reports, negative reports, events of minor significance to the primary Bulletin audience, and general "nuts and bolts military" reporting.

e. 3 (1%) were apparently based on OCI memoranda previously distributed to the community.

f. 2 (1%) were based on information received too late for inclusion in that day's Bulletin.

g. 20 (8%) were items which might have been included in the Bulletin but were not. None of these were of major importance.

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
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| 1 | DDCI | 6/18/63 | [Redacted] |
| 2 | DCI | 5/24 | |
| 3 | Gen Carter 127 | | |
| 4 | Ex Director | 6 July | |
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Remarks:

DCI:

The 17 April attachments are well worth reading - They raise danger signals in many areas of CIA/DIA relationships.

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Central Intelligence Agency - Defense Intelligence Agency RELATIONS

1963

(CIA-DIA Relations)

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REPORT #47