

I think it important to put in context the psychological operations manual which was prepared in the Psychological Operations Section of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) command in Honduras in October 1983. In the early stages, the FDN was working with non-United States military advisors. In the late spring of 1983, these non-United States advisors produced the draft of an urban insurgent manual. US advisors found that draft to be totally unacceptable because it called for widespread use of indiscriminate violence. US advisors urged that this manual never be used and all copies were destroyed.

In the summer of 1983, it was decided that a code of conduct and training in psychological operations were necessary to assure that FDN fighters going into Nicaragua would be prepared to deal with villages they might enter and the civilians there in a manner consistent with the FDN's democratic objectives.

The first step was to develop a code of conduct for FDN fighters. This code, known as the blue book, was prepared and printed in pocket size and each FDN fighter is expected to carry it with him in his shirt pocket. It explains that the objective of the FDN is the development of a democratic and pluralistic government in Nicaragua. It describes the need to achieve a reconciliation of the Nicaraguan family, to establish social justice and human rights in Nicaragua, to restore the freedoms violated by the Sandinistas, and to achieve economic reform and greater social mobility. This booklet (El Libro Blanco Y Aful) is the bible in which every FDN soldier is schooled and which is taught in classes on political action and psychological operations conducted for non-commissioned officers and the psychological operations cadre of the FDN.

To teach these classes, the Central Intelligence Agency contracted with a retired military officer who had extensive experience in US Army special operations and who had served as an instructor at the Army special warfare school at Fort Bragg. The instructor proceeded to Honduras in late August 1983, a training site was established, and classes were conducted under the auspices of the Psychological Operations Section of the FDN command.

The advisor translated into Spanish the special warfare lesson plans which he had written and used while an instructor of the Fort Bragg special warfare school and used these as the basis for instruction given to men selected to serve as psychological operations officers when, in the conduct of military operations, towns and villages in Nicaragua were visited or occupied. The advisor would present an introductory lecture to the students and the remainder of the classes would then be conducted by FDN instructors. In late October 1983, FDN personnel involved in this program expressed a desire to have the lesson plans converted into a handbook which could be sent into Nicaragua to provide political guidance there.

The manual, entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, was prepared from the notes used by the American advisor for his lectures and printed in Honduras. It is a document which runs \_\_\_ pages in English. Media discussion and political dialogue about this document over the last several days has focused on four brief passages. A portion of the document containing these passages has been reprinted in The New York Times. As Senators Nunn and Wallop stated yesterday, and as indicated on pages 69-71 of a copy of the manual in English, you will see that three of these four passages were deleted by the FDN. The fourth of these passages which was not removed has been stretched beyond both its intended and its literal meaning.


To understand the significance and intended meaning of those passages, it is necessary to grasp the context in which they appear. The manual was prepared by and addressed to people who had made the fateful decision to engage in armed combat in order to resist oppression by a totalitarian regime, a resistance which the Central Intelligence Agency has been authorized and funded to assist by the President of the United States and the American Congress. The purpose of this manual is that every combatant will be "highly motivated to engage in propaganda face to face, to the same degree that he is motivated to fight," and so that the "individual political awareness, the reason for his struggle, must be as acute as his capacity to fight." It aims to make every FDN guerrilla "persuasive in face to face communication--a propagandist combatant--in his contact with the people; he must be capable of giving 5 or 10 logical reasons why, for example, a peasant must give him fabric, needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves this way, enemy propaganda will never turn him into an enemy in the eyes of the population." It goes on to deal with developing political awareness, using group dynamics, interaction with the people, "live, eat and work with the people," respect for human rights, teaching and civic action.

It then goes on with advice on dealing with the problems any fighting force can face in handling local opposition when it visits or occupies a community. It specifies that the "enemies of the people, the Sandinista officials or agents, must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal actions even though the guerrilla forces may have suffered casualties."

There is a section headed "guerrilla arms are the strength of the people against an illegal government." This deals with protecting the guerrillas and citizens when a town is occupied. There is also a section on the training

and operations of armed propaganda teams, made up of six to ten members charged with raising political consciousness within Nicaragua and personal persuasion within the population. Again, the emphasis is on education, avoiding combat if possible, "not turning the town into a battlefield."

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