

SECRET

3 November 1983

NOTE FOR: SA/DCI/IA

FROM: EA/DDCI

SUBJECT: Cryptic Feedback from 2 November McFarlane Meeting

Doug,

FYI.

25X1

Grenada

-- DDCI solved the mystery of the discrepancy between the US military's reaction to the resistance that they met and the debriefings of the Cubans claiming that they were all merely construction workers. It appears that 500 of the Grenadian military had been trained by the Cubans, and they therefore were the ones putting up the strong resistance to our troops.

-- This means that there is a hard core remaining that could be associated with the New Jewel Movement and the US Government will need to beef up a Grenadian security force so that we don't end up back where we started.

25X1

-- The White House has arranged for some of the evacuated students to visit some of the US forces in Fort Bragg, as well as some of the wounded in hospitals

SECRET

-- We need to find a way to deal with the press allegations of an intelligence failure.

-- Part of the problem was the restraint under which the military was operating. They were under orders to minimize casualties and therefore ended up in almost man-to-man combat.

-- The DCI advised that he has requested a paper on the balance among Lebanon/Syria/Soviet Union/Israel/US in the Middle East.

Lebanon



Iran/Iraq

-- The DDI should do a paper for delivery to McFarlane no later than Saturday morning on what Iran's reactions would be if Iraq used chemical warfare. (DDI has been tasked.)

-- The above paper should be an input for Monday's NSPG meeting.

President Reagan's Trip

-- Promised a continual flow of intelligence to the NSC and the Secret Service on any information relevant to the President's security during his upcoming Far East trip. (Tasking done.)

-- The DDI has also been tasked to consider ways to monitor North Korea for any indications and warning of possible threats to the President.

The Fowler Bill

-- Persuaded McFarlane that Dam and Schmults need to testify.

-- Explained that this was not simply a problem for us to solve but was a question of the President's Constitutional rights.

SECRET

SECRET

The Drug Tsar Legislation

- Mentioned slip up on the drug tsar legislation.
- McFarlane said that he would oppose this legislation.

INF/Arms Control

- DDCI explained his concerns about the need to do something to ease US/Soviet tensions.
- He noted that the GRU was being tasked to develop stay-behind operations in Europe. DDCI has tasked the DDI to develop a short paper pointing out the limited possibilities for any success in the arms control arena as long as the tension/rhetoric level is so high.
- McFarlane acknowledged that having 14 to 20 people sitting in on the Shultz/Dobrynin "informal discussions" probably was not too helpful.

Nicaragua

- McFarlane made a note of the DCI's suggestion that it does not seem to make any sense for the US to be buying \$30 million of bananas from Nicaragua.

NSDD-84

- McFarlane noted that Willard seemed to be on his own in defending the polygraph. The DDCI stated that we would help out. (Sporkin tasked to do so.)

Draft NSDD on Telecommunications/ADP Security (successor to PD-24)

- The DDCI advised of conversations with [redacted] from NSA. [redacted] understood that current draft would be unacceptable because of dilution of DCI's authority and the merger of computer security with communications security. STAT 25X1

- The DDCI agreed that given the linkage between communications security and computer security being driven by technology, he would be willing to include a mention in this forthcoming NSDD that there would be a follow-on one on computer security. [redacted] project could then be folded into that as appropriate. STAT

[redacted]

25X1

SECRET