Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200160016-7

Wednesday, 15 November 1978

STAT

STAT

Dear

My problem with your materials for a discussion of "the intelligence role in arms control verification and monitoring" is that you have been progressively elaborating the topic since you first suggested it to me about a year ago and that, by now, it has become so broad and complex that I doubt it could be handled in a roughly three-hour discussion, much last pass muster with Bob Bowie.

You may recall that when you first suggested the topic the issue was Soviet requirements as regard confidence levels in arms control verification. It was in that form that I first reported the topic to Turner, though only as one we were considering for the future. Also, I might add, the subject in that form was especially attractive to me because I thought we could usefully involve the academic community (or at least some of its most inquisitive members) in philosophical speculations on how our level-of-confidence requirements compared with those of the Soviets and what the differences might mean.

When I reopened the question with you earlier this year I found that you had changed your view of the subject. The interesting issue was then differences of view within the U.S. Government on monitoring as a part of the verification process -- unless I understood you poorly. That too seemed an attractive subject, though it would eliminate most outside contributors.

Your present subject, which appears to me to be the intelligence aspect of the whole arms control problem, in all its ramifications, is

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200160016-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200160016-7

is, it seems to me, an entirely different cup of tea.

I appreciate the fact that the situation has progressed so that last fall's most interesting subject isn't necessarily the optimum choice for early winter, 1978. But I also perceive that your thinking has progressed to the point that you now want to present the arms control problem in its virtual entirety as an introduction to our discussion. Further, in the six or seven questions that you have suggested, you are projecting a discussion of impressive proportions. I must say, with regret, that I doubt both that Bowie will accept your presently proposed terms of reference and that we could have a well-focused discussion if he did.

May I suggest the following:

1. That you plan to limit your introductory remarks to ten, or at most fifteen, minutes, giving it the following focus:

   (a) a broad statement of the intelligence interest in the arms control process as a whole, with illustrative examples. Here you could refer to your chart -- <u>without trying to explain every box</u>.

   (b) A more specific statement of the issues that seem most crucial to you. Here you could cite your "Some Suggested Issues", again with examples but without trying to treat all of them, or any of them in detail

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200160016-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200160016-7

(c) Finally, a precise statement of the issue(s) on which you propose that our discussion focus, at least initially. Here my choice would be your 6th item, with emphasis on "adequate verification" versus "monitoring." The objective would be to bring out -- up for discussion -- situations in which verification might be satisfactory for our purposes (reasonably conceived) although fool-proof monitoring was not possible and other situations in which adequate monitoring itself might be the criterion of satisfactory verification.

Naturally, I do not insist on (c) above if there is some other issue you prefer to concentrate on. Only by deliberately bringing the discussion into focus on a limited part of the problem as a whole, however, do I believe that Bowie will be mollified and a useful discussion launched. I should think that many of the other items you point to in your introductory remarks, both on your chart and on your list of issues, would come up in the ensuing discussion.

Respectfully,

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200160016-7