PEKING'S "DUAL-TRACK" POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PRODUCES GAINS
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SUMMARY

Peking has achieved significant success over the past four years in normalizing China's relations with several noncommunist Southeast Asian neighbors by a series of adroit political and economic initiatives designed to break down longstanding regional suspicions of China. Peking has pursued a dual-track policy, cultivating normal relations with local governments while continuing to lend muted support to insurgent parties within the same countries. In recent months Peking has adjusted its public position as to what constitutes the chief external threat to peace in the region, shifting its focus away from the United States and efforts to secure a reduced U.S. presence in the region—as that has actually occurred in Indochina—and centering on the Soviet Union as the main strategic danger to the region.

China's initial breakthrough in its revived Asian diplomacy was the normalization of Sino-Burmese relations during Prime Minister Ne Win's August 1971 visit to China. Peking subsequently established formal diplomatic relations with Malaysia in May 1974, the Philippines in June 1975, and Thailand in July 1975. The establishment of such relations has thus far not endangered Peking's opposition assets in the area—the Maoist communist parties that are leading armed insurgencies against several Southeast Asian governments. Peking has managed this by publicly muting its own relationship with the insurgents, while China-based clandestine radios have continued to serve as outlets for hardline ideology and propaganda attacks on the local governments.

The spring 1975 communist military victories in Indochina and the ensuing U.S. military withdrawals in Southeast Asia caused several noncommunist states there to reassess their foreign policies and speed up their normalization of relations with China. But these developments do not seem to have noticeably altered Peking's pace or affected the substance of its long-range, "step-by-step" measures to enhance China's influence. The focus of Chinese media attention to external threats against the region, however, has shifted markedly. In the past Peking sought to extend its influence largely at U.S. expense, encouraging neighboring states to work against U.S. policy in Indochina and to force a reduction of the U.S. presence. Now, Peking portrays the Soviet Union as the main strategic danger in the region and promotes good Southeast Asian relations with China, regional solidarity, and a continued U.S. military presence in the area as useful bulwarks against alleged Soviet ambitions.
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STATE RELATIONS IMPROVED, INSURGENT SUPPORT MAINTAINED

"The Chinese people consistently support the just struggles of all oppressed nations and oppressed peoples. This is our internationalist duty."

"We hold, at the same time, that the social system of a country can only be chosen and decided by its own people and cannot be imposed by other countries. Countries with different social systems can develop state relations on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."

This passage from Premier Chou En-lai's 28 May 1974 banquet speech for visiting Malaysian Prime Minister Razak underscores the two basic tenets in China's dual-track propaganda approach to noncommunist Southeast Asian states over the past five years. On the one hand, the Chinese have maintained support for pro-Peking insurgencies led by Maoist parties which speak against existing regimes in the name of "oppressed" peoples in the area. On the other, the Chinese leaders at the same time have developed a steadily growing effort to improve and normalize state relations with Southeast Asian governments on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Since the early 1970's, the Chinese have gradually moderated propaganda support in their own name for the small and generally ineffective communist-led insurgencies in Southeast Asia that previously had been the focal point of Chinese foreign policy there. As China emerged from the internal chaos and diplomatic isolation caused by the cultural revolution, and as the situation in Southeast Asia became more fluid when the U.S. military withdrawal from the area accelerated, Peking gradually placed more emphasis on improving bilateral relations with noncommunist Southeast Asian governments heretofore alienated from China. Peking opted for a long-term, gradual political and economic strategy designed to reassure neighboring states suspicious of Chinese intentions. The Chinese have employed a series of "people-to-people" contacts, trade deals, unofficial leadership meetings, and formal political consultations with their noncommunist neighbors in order to cultivate feelings of good will or at least reduced suspicion concerning China.
Part of Peking's effort to reassure the Southeast Asian states has been reflected in a gradual reduction of open and direct propaganda support for Southeast Asian insurgencies, but with continued reliance on three PRC-based clandestine radio stations, broadcasting in the name of the Maoist communist parties of Thailand, Malaya, and Burma, to carry the major load of propaganda support to the antigovernment insurgencies. Thus, while Peking's own media have reduced criticism of Southeast Asian regimes and support for insurgencies, the stations—the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR), and the Voice of the People of Burma (VOPB)—have carried a daily fare of antigovernment propaganda advocating popular armed struggle against existing authorities. They also have departed from Peking's own media line in sharply criticizing the foreign and domestic policies of Southeast Asian governments.

The Peking media no longer attack Southeast Asian leaders by name. The Chinese have also markedly reduced their former practice of replaying reports from the clandestine stations on insurgent battle successes. Peking's infrequent references to the communist parties and to their clandestine radios occur mainly on ceremonial occasions, such as the commemoration of major anniversaries. Maoist party delegations residing in Pek'ing no longer receive high-level Chinese leadership attention, and they are virtually ignored in PRC media reportage.

In the past, sparse Chinese coverage of the Southeast Asian insurgencies has highlighted the importance of the Maoist strategy of armed struggle in the countryside to surround and ultimately annihilate the enemy in the cities. Recent reportage, however, has also acknowledged the more volatile situation in Southeast Asian cities by encouraging the development of "mass movements" in urban areas.

SUPERPOWER RIVALRY INFLUENCES PEKING'S REGIONAL GOALS

While the pace and elements of Peking's dual-track policy toward individual Southeast Asian countries have remained relatively constant over the past half decade, the Chinese have carefully adjusted their strategy to protect PRC interests in the changing situation in the region as a whole. In the early 1970's the Chinese effort centered on expanding Chinese and allied influence in the area and encouraging rapid U.S. withdrawal. Peking harshly rebuked such states as Thailand for their continued support for U.S. bases used in the Indochina wars. It scathingly attacked SEATO, U.S. bilateral defense pacts, and U.S. naval activities in the area. The Chinese expressed sharp criticism and suspicion.
of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), seeing them as thinly disguised efforts by pro-West bourgeois states to block Chinese and other communist expansion.

Peking's concern included suspicion of Malaysia's proposal for a Southeast Asian zone of peace and neutrality, which China viewed as a possible effort to build a Southeast Asian diplomatic order blocking Chinese influence. Peking at the same time was on record as vocally supporting Overseas Chinese rights in the area and had attacked local authorities over instances of alleged discrimination against Chinese minorities.

The developing Sino-U.S. rapprochement following former President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China, the continuing U.S. military withdrawals from areas throughout China's periphery in East and Southeast Asia, and growing Chinese concern about allegedly enhanced Soviet ambitions in Asia have sharply changed the focus of Peking's strategy in Southeast Asia. The Chinese now see the Soviet Union as the main danger in the area, and Chinese leaders recently have repeatedly warned visiting Southeast Asian dignitaries that in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, they must guard against "letting the tiger in through the back door while repelling the wolf through the front gate."

Recent Peking comment is replete with charges against Soviet military maneuvers, spying efforts, and economic advances in Southeast Asia. By contrast, the United States is criticized only mildly, and some Chinese reportage has even played up favorably U.S. and foreign statements on Washington's resolve to stay in the area and protect it against Soviet advances. Thus, Peking has dropped criticism of SEATO and has recently treated favorably U.S. defense commitments under terms of the ANZUS pact, while at the same time it scathingly denounces what it regards as the true Soviet intentions behind Moscow's proposed Asian collective security arrangement. A 16 June 1975 Peking domestic radio commentary on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the region following the U.S. setbacks in Cambodia and Vietnam noted approvingly that the United States was "reluctant to abandon its interests in this region." The commentary acknowledged Assistant Secretary of State Habib's spring 1975 tour of Southeast Asia, viewing it as evidence of U.S. determination to maintain its position as an "Asian and Pacific country" and to play "its deserved and responsible role for the sake of the interests of the United States and this region." The commentary at the same time portrayed the Soviet Union as the principal menace to Southeast Asian independence, trying hard "to replace the United States and dominate Asia."
Peking's altered goals have also brought about a shift in the Chinese line on ASEAN, which Peking now depicts as a useful framework for regional stability that will free the region of big-power influence, particularly Soviet. The Chinese media now report regularly on periodic ASEAN meetings, favorably noting progress of the member countries toward regional political and economic cooperation and independence from outside powers. Peking now applauds the ASEAN-backed zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia as a useful means to freeze the USSR out of the region. The Chinese have also formally renounced past broad claims to be the protector of Overseas Chinese interests, and for two years Peking media are not known to have criticized Southeast Asian governments for alleged suppression of Overseas Chinese.

The anti-Soviet emphasis in Peking's present regional objectives was recently pointed up by Peking's efforts to include the so-called "antihegemony" clause in joint communiques with Southeast Asian leaders. The clause pledges the signing countries to oppose "any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world." This clause has been included in Chinese communiques normalizing relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and has been roundly criticized by Moscow as a thinly veiled anti-Soviet PRC scheme in Asia. In the case of the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty, Moscow has even formally protested to Tokyo against inclusion of the clause. By contrast, the United States has twice formally endorsed the clause in communiques with the Chinese. The United States was the first country ever to employ the clause in a joint commune with Peking, during former President Nixon's February 1972 China trip. Recent Chinese reportage has been unusually explicit in underlining Peking's intentions regarding the antihegemony clause. NCNA reports in July 1975 carried Thai press comment depicting the use of the clause in the 1 July joint commune establishing Sino-Thai relations as a further link in the PRC-fostered "antihegemony front" designed to create the "surest guarantee" for Southeast Asia in the face of "intensified Soviet expansion."

PEKING RELATIONS WITH VARIOUS STATES IN AREA

MALAYSIA: Peking's establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Malaysia in a joint commune signed during Prime Minister Razak's May 1974 visit to China was Peking's first such diplomatic breakthrough in Southeast Asia in almost two decades. It set a pattern that was followed in establishing...
relations with the Philippines and Thailand this year.* Peking gave a high-level welcome to the Malaysian Prime Minister, including meetings with Mao and Chou En-lai, and it endeavored in the joint communique and in Chinese leaders' banquet speeches to reassure the Malaysian visitors about Chinese intentions toward the pro-Peking insurgency and the large Overseas Chinese population in Malaysia.

Peking media had smoothed the way for the visit by dropping past critical references to Malaysian leaders, praising some of Kuala Lumpur's actions in foreign affairs and domestic policy, and reducing customary Chinese media replays of antigovernment news reports from the clandestine VOMR. Since the establishment of relations Peking has replayed only five reports from the VOMR. These dealt with anniversary and ceremonial occasions and avoided reference to Malaysian affairs. Peking has also ceased entirely the practice--common before Razak's visit--of periodically replaying VOMR reports on the Malayan insurgents' battle victories.

In line with the persisting Chinese dual-track approach, however, NCNA publicized the 29 April 1975 CCP greetings message marking the Malayan CP's 45th anniversary, a step which drew criticism from the Razak government despite the relative mildness of the Chinese message. The CCP's last such publicized message, on the Malayan party's 40th anniversary, had extended "warmest fraternal greetings" to the Malayan communists, attacked the Kuala Lumpur leaders by name, and cited Peking's "internationalist duty" to support the insurgents. By contrast, the 1975 message extended only "warm fraternal greetings," avoided reference to Malaysian Government leaders, and noted only that the CCP and MCP have always supported and encouraged each other; it did not mention any Chinese "duty" to support the MCP.

Peking also continues on occasion to refer to the "Communist Party of North Kalimantan," operating at the head of a small insurgency in Eastern Malaysia. It last mentioned the party in an NCNA report of a condolence message the party sent on the April 1975 death of PRC Politburo Standing Committee Member Tung Pi-wu.

VOMR broadcasts moderated their invective against Razak prior to his China visit, but resumed it soon after his return. VOMR has argued, for instance, that Razak undertook the establishment of relations with Peking with ulterior motives, in a vain attempt to

* While the Burmese visit preceded the Malaysian visit, Burma and Peking had already established relations in the early 1950's, and had generally enjoyed friendly relations until the Chinese cultural revolution.
ease pressing problems at home and abroad—a notable departure from Chinese leaders' public praise of Razak for coming to China. The clandestine radio has continued to focus on news of guerrilla battle successes and to stress the primacy of Maoist armed struggle, but over the past two years it has given increased attention to urban mass movements in order to capitalize on recent signs of increasing unrest in Malaysian cities. The broadcasts have also stressed the maintenance of MCP unity and orthodoxy and have denounced vaguely defined "splittist tendencies" following a public break from the party by a group of Marxist insurgents in the fall of 1974.

The VOMR broadcasts daily to both Malay- and Mandarin-speaking audiences in Malaysia and Singapore and originates new programs every two or three days. The station augmented its Chinese-language programming on 20 April 1975 by adding broadcasts in southern Chinese dialects. VOMR has continued its longstanding role as a clearinghouse for broadcasting material intended for both Indonesian and Philippine listeners by occasionally replaying statements by the pro-Peking Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Philippine CP. VOMR broadcasts also include material originally transmitted by the other two PRC-based clandestine stations, as well as international news following the general PRC line.

PHILIPPINES  Peking's warm reception for President Marcos, leading to the signing of a joint communique establishing Sino-Philippine diplomatic relations on 9 June 1975, was preceded by an unusually cordial and high-level welcome in September 1974 for Mrs. Marcos, who was received by Mao and personally escorted by Mao's wife, Politburo member Chiang Ching. Such high-level leadership attention has been accompanied by unusual moderation of Chinese propaganda on Philippine policies. For instance, NCNA has carried no criticism of Philippine affairs since 26 September 1972 report mildly rebuking "Marcos authorities" over the declaration of martial law in the Philippines. Peking has also not criticized the presence of large U.S. bases in the Philippines, in contrast to its continued complaints about U.S. bases in Thailand. Recent Chinese reportage has centered on reports of "friendly" contacts between visiting Philippine delegates and PRC leaders, with NCNA reporting taking special pains to note that Chinese leaders have asked the visitors to convey the PRC leaders' personal regards to President Marcos and other Philippine dignitaries.

Chinese media continue to refer to the anti-Marcos Philippine CP on ceremonial occasions, though the party has traditionally received less Chinese propaganda attention than the other Southeast Asian parties. For example, the Peking media marked the Philippine CP's 5th anniversary on 26 December 1973 with a lengthy,
belated NCNA replay of the party's anniversary statement, but Peking
did not report the usual Chinese party greetings on such a quinquen-
nnial date. In another instance, Peking recently deleted NCNA replays
of Philippine CP statements from its broadcasts in Tagalog beamed to
the Philippines. Thus, NCNA's last reference to the Philippine CP,
a 2 February 1975 report on a Philippine CP message on the PRC's
January 1975 National People's Congress, was excluded from Peking's
Tagalog broadcasts. There is no PRC-based clandestine station that
beams to the Philippines in the name of the insurgents, but the
Philippine party's pronouncements calling for a strategy of armed
struggle to overthrow the Marcos authorities have been carried
periodically by the VOMR.

THAILAND  China's reception for visiting Thai Prime Minister
Khurkit Pramut in late June and early July this year
was on a par with its treatment accorded the Malaysian and Philippine
leaders. Following the major thaw in bilateral relations during the
visit of a Thai sports delegation to China in September 1972, Peking
stopped criticizing Bangkok authorities by name and reduced coverage
of Thai CP activity. For instance, the December 1972 CCP message on
the Thai party's 30th anniversary was--most unusually--not even
reported in Chinese media. The text of the greetings, carried by
the VOPT, was also notably milder than the CCP message of the last
Thai quinquennial date. However, the October 1973 collapse of the
military regime in Bangkok and the succession to power of a series
of weak civilian cabinets prompted a revival of Chinese criticism
designed to pressure Bangkok to speed the normalization of relations.
During that period, Peking stepped up replays of VOPT reports on the
insurgents' battle successes and it began to publicize antigovernment
strikes and mass demonstrations in urban areas. Following Khurkit's
moves to normalize relations in early 1975, Peking sharply reduced
anti-Bangkok regime coverage and now refers to the VOPT and the Thai
party generally only on ceremonial dates. NCNA's last known replay
of a VOPT battle report was on 13 May 1975.

NCNA continues on occasion to replay reports of Thai popular
demonstrations against U.S. military bases, intelligence activities,
and business enterprises in Thailand, most recently taking note of
the popular Thai outcry against the use of the bases during the
April 1975 Mayaguez incident. However, the Chinese in recent months
have given more attention to encouraging Thai resistance to Soviet
strategic and economic penetration. For instance, a 15 May 1975
NCNA report applauded Thai Foreign Minister Chatthai Chunhawan's
rejection of Moscow's Asian collective security system during a
12 May meeting with PRAVDA editor Ivan Schedrov. In July, a series
of NCNA reports on Thai press reaction to the establishment of
relations with Peking were also unusually blunt in warning of Soviet
ambitions.
VOPT originates new programs daily and has continued to produce a considerable volume of extremely harsh invective against the Bangkok authorities. Though emphasizing the Thai CP's strategy giving primacy to rural armed struggle, the broadcasts have acknowledged the success of student demonstrations and urban strikes in bringing down recent Thai administrations by giving more attention to encouraging such mass movements as an auxiliary to the Thai CP-led armed struggle. VC2T has claimed to see little difference between the recent civilian administrations and past military governments, viewing them as representatives of the same exploitative social classes and determined to crush the armed insurgency.

BURMA Peking media attention to Burma since the August 1971 visit of Ne Win to China has consisted primarily of periodic reports on a variety of diplomatic, economic and other bilateral contacts, characterized by Peking as taking place in "warm" and "friendly" surroundings. As with its treatment of Thai internal affairs, Peking has reported on recent mass demonstrations in Burma, though avoiding any direct criticism of the government. (Peking has not reported antigovernment demonstrations elsewhere in Southeast Asia in recent years.) Peking has never referred to the clandestine VOPB, but Chinese media do periodically mention the Burmese CP. NCNA on 20 May 1975 reported a CCP condolence message on the killing of two Burmese CP leaders by the Burmese army in March, and it also replayed the text of a 16 May Burmese BCP statement on the deaths which contained references to the "Ne Win-San Yu military clique" normally deleted by Peking. Peking continues to note the presence of Burmese CP leaders resident in Peking every May Day and PRC National Day, and the CCP message on the Burmese party's last quinquennial anniversary in August 1974 was duly reported by NCNA.

SINGAPORE, INDONESIA The latest developments in Peking's relations with Singapore came during the 13-21 March visit to Peking of Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam. The foreign minister was feted by PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and received on 16 March by Chou En-lai. A 14 March Peking broadcast in Malay pegged to the visit noted that Chinese relations with Singapore had "improved in the last few years." Peking media have continued to avoid critical references to Singapore's internal affairs and have reported favorably its stand on the Malacca Strait. Singapore remains the target of daily VOMR broadcasts, which continue harsh attacks on the "Lee Kuan-yew clique" and criticism on a variety of social and economic issues.

Peking's gradualist approach to Indonesia has been designed to allay the strong residual Indonesian fears and suspicions stemming from the abortive 1965 coup. Reports on Indonesian internal affairs are