


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

State Dept. review completed


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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Jewish Emigration

Jewish emigration from the USSR totaled 1,038 last month, matching the January rate, but well below the pace set last year. Through February, 2,246 emigrants had received exit permission for Israel, compared with approximately 4,000 in the first two months of 1974 and 5,100 in 1973.

The Netherlands embassy, which represents Israeli interests in Moscow, attributes the decline in the emigration rate this year to uncertainty (promoted by the Soviets) about conditions in Israel, the expense of application, and the usual pattern of harassment of applicants. The rate of outright refusal reportedly has not increased.

Despite the overall decline in Jewish emigration, the number of Moscow Jews leaving the Soviet Union was up slightly in January and February. Soviet authorities may calculate that by easing emigration restrictions on well-educated and articulate Muscovites they will reduce activist agitation in the capital, and negative publicity in the West.

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
Romanian Chief of Staff Begins US Visit

Romanian Colonel General Ion Coman, who arrives in the US today for an eight-day visit, is the first chief of staff of a Warsaw Pact army to visit this country.

According to the US embassy in Bucharest, Coman sees his trip as the beginning of a series of visits. He mentioned the possibility of an exchange of visits between the Romanian military academy and the National War College, and also an exchange of visits by naval training ships. While Coman may shy away from substantive matters, others in his entourage have suggested an interest in US army training practices and equipment.

Coman is a trusted member of party boss Ceausescu's inner circle of advisers. His career has closely paralleled Ceausescu's, and their friendship dates back to at least the late 1940s, when they served together in the army's higher political directorate. Soon after Ceausescu became party first secretary in 1965, Coman was appointed to head the army's political directorate. Later he served as head of the military and security affairs section of the party Central Committee.

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Yugoslavs Try To Drag Moscow
into Macedonian Dispute

Belgrade is apparently trying to implicate Moscow in its polemic with Sofia over the Macedonian issue.

Over the past week or so, Yugoslav propaganda has stepped up attacks on Bulgaria for harboring Yugoslav Cominformist exiles. In fact, large numbers of Yugoslav citizens did take refuge in Bulgaria after Tito broke with Stalin in 1948. A few are now prominent in the Bulgarian cultural world, and they support Sofia's position that the Macedonian people are Bulgarians. One such Cominformist--Venko Markovski--recently received a high Bulgarian award, and the Yugoslav press immediately seized on the incident to hit hard at Bulgaria's "hostile intentions" toward Yugoslavia.


Sofia may regret the Markovski award, especially if it took the step without full approval from Moscow. The Soviets have been trying to live down the embarrassment of last year's Cominformist affair and the current polemic can only complicate its always fragile relationship with Belgrade.

In making a major issue of the connection between Bulgaria and Cominformists, Belgrade is implicitly placing the Soviets on notice that their assurances of good faith are in question. Rumors to this effect are already circulating in Belgrade's diplomatic and journalistic circles. One well-informed commentator--Milika Sundic of Zagreb Radio--last Friday claimed that Bulgaria's hostile attitude extends to the European security talks and preparations for the European Communist Conference. Sundic thus questions the motives of both Sofia and Moscow.

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In sending this message to Moscow, Tito may hope that the Soviets will feel constrained to urge Bulgaria to make some concessions on the Macedonian matter in the interest of improving relations with Belgrade. Moscow may get Sofia to cool the issue for awhile, but the Soviets are not likely to urge major concessions that might complicate the domestic situation in Bulgaria.

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Academy of Sciences Celebration On Again

Politburo member Kirilenko has announced that the Academy of Sciences will celebrate its 250th anniversary with a jubilee session in Moscow this year. In listing the participants--"party, state, and public organizations and...representatives of the working people"--he did not mention foreign scientists.

A Central Committee decree had sanctioned a ceremonial session in 1974, and scientists around the world had received invitations for May 14-20. The meeting was postponed in late April with an artificial excuse citing preparations for holding elections to the Supreme Soviet. The celebrations of republic academies, also mentioned in the Central Committee decree, were held.

Kirilenko, speaking on February 28 at an award ceremony for the Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House, did not set a date for the academy session. Jewish scientists in Moscow have heard it will be in May. Although the Academy of Sciences was founded in early 1724, it did not open until late 1725; observance this year will thus not do great violence to history.

The reason for the postponement last year remains unknown. Speculation at the time centered on the poor health of Academy President Keldysh and on the possibility that Soviet and foreign scientists would create embarrassing incidents. Jewish scientists are trying to revive support for a conference of their own to coincide with the official observance. They would like to attract visiting foreign scientists to some of the sessions and to advertise the plight of the Soviet scientists. The organizers are among those scientists who have

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lost their jobs and access to technical information
after applying to emigrate. About 40 of them now
gather for a scientific seminar every Sunday at the
Moscow apartment of physicist Mark Azbel.

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Shelepin's Prospects Dimmed
by British Furor

Aleksandr Shelepin, Politburo member, former head of the KGB and a long-time aspirant for the top job of general secretary, received another damaging blow to his career as a result of the public uproar in the UK resulting from his planned trip there in April. Shelepin, in his capacity as chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, was invited by the British Trades Union Council, but strong British press, parliamentary, and public reaction, may yet force him to cancel the trip.

One reason for the British reaction is Shelepin's past service as head of the KGB. Although he held this post for only three years from 1958-1961, many British have neither forgotten nor forgiven. Stories about the unsavory nature of the KGB and about some of Shelepin's own activities while heading it are being featured in the British press.

The protests in Britain, coming as they do in the aftermath of the successful visit to Moscow of Prime Minister Wilson, occur at a particularly bad time for Shelepin. The primary purpose of Wilson's visit was to heal the breach between the two countries caused by London's ouster of 105 Soviets for espionage in 1971. This was the most massive expulsion in history and the KGB's worst public relations disaster ever.

Shelepin's Politburo rivals, already alarmed by his aggressive ambitions in 1964 and 1965, may view this affair as yet another argument against his achieving a top post requiring international activities in an era of detente. Indeed, they might even raise questions about his effectiveness in his current position.

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The British reaction comes in the wake of similar problems created by Shelepin's visit to West Germany. Shelepin had repeatedly tried to visit West Germany in his capacity as trade union leader, but on each occasion he was thwarted by unfavorable public reaction in Germany, stemming from the KGB murder on German soil of a Ukrainian nationalist leader. He finally made the visit in January, but only by keeping it brief and publicity to a minimum.

Yury Andropov, Politburo member and current chairman of the KGB, is probably viewing these events with considerable concern. Although not a front-runner in the general secretary sweepstakes, he is by dint of personal qualities and connections in the small circle of Politburo members who could aspire to move up. Andropov probably had assumed--logically enough--that he would first have to shift from the chairmanship of the KGB to another job, perhaps a senior party post, before ascending to the position of general secretary. Shelepin's difficulties, however, would apply to him as well, perhaps with even greater force, and he must see in them an upper limit to his ambitions.

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Moscow Carefully Cultivates Lisbon

Remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko indicate that the Soviets are continuing to play it cool regarding Portugal. In a conversation on March 5, Gromyko went so far as to assure the Portuguese ambassador that Moscow "will do nothing to interfere with the internal affairs of Portugal." Gromyko noted several times that detente was the key element in current international affairs; in effect he was telling the ambassador that the Soviets place more value on good relations with the major Western nations than on quick gains in Portugal.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are continuing to expand their official contacts with Portugal, which were established only last year. On March 7, Portuguese Secretary of State for Fisheries Ruivo completed a three-day visit to the USSR. Talks with his Soviet counterpart Ishkov resulted in an agreement on joint research and training in fisheries. The agreement says nothing about possible visits of Soviet fishing ships to Portuguese ports--the subject of considerable speculation in January. As in the case of previous diplomatic exchanges, the Soviets reported Ruivo's visit without fanfare. This week also witnessed the inauguration of Aeroflot service to Lisbon via Frankfurt.

The Ruivo visit and Gromyko's statements illustrate Moscow's desire to demonstrate its sympathy with the changes in Portugal and position itself to take some credit for favorable developments there. On the other hand, the Soviets hope to avoid the kind of blatant involvement that could rally domestic and foreign opposition.

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The Fringe of Soviet Dissidence:
Hating Jews and Loving Russia

The authoritarian, Russian-nationalist wing of Soviet dissident thought is becoming more pervasive.

[redacted] the nationalists are beginning to overshadow such democratic-leaning dissidents as Andrey Sakharov within the USSR if not on the pages of the Western press [redacted]

[redacted] Moreover, the nationalists' line of thought has developed a shrill, extremist fringe with its own "samizdat," underground literature. An example of this "ultra-Slavophile," nearly fascist writing has recently been made available to the US embassy in Moscow by a Soviet Jewish source. The Jewish community is particularly concerned over the highly inflammatory character of the articles, their attack on traditional Slavophiles for being, in effect, soft on Zionism, and the apparent intent of the extremists to use Russian nationalism to provide greater popular support for the regime.

The document given the embassy confirms this view and more. The tract's jingoistic agitation reaches the ridiculous in its claims that traditional Slavophiles have failed to warn the Russian people that Zionism is in control of the West, that it has a plan to take over the USSR, and that millions of Jews--presumably worldwide--are plotting to enslave non-Jews. Another theme that sets the document apart from traditional Slavophile literature is criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church, including the charge that the church has succumbed to "cosmopolitanism." This now generally dormant term harks to the Stalinist era, when it had strong anti-Semitic overtones.

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The tract also zeroes in on prominent dissidents in general, calling them "agents" of Zionism. It specifically labels such leading figures as Sakharov and even Solzhenitsyn (whom some traditional Slavophiles consider one of their own) as "cosmopolitan enemies" of the Russian people. Dissident writers Sinyavsky and Daniel are tarred with the same brush.

The document's programmatic portion centers on an appeal to all Slavophiles to address more forcefully "honest party, Soviet (local government), and military workers, patriotic cultural and artistic figures, and others, Communist and non-party, who have influence and a voice in administrative organs," in order to make clear to them the evils of Zionism. It calls for a broad program to curb the influence of Jews in the country, particularly by reducing their numbers in universities, institutes, and government agencies. The document ends with an orgiastic appeal for all true patriots to bring about the salvation of the Russian people by supporting "Communism and Soviet power."

The claim that true Russian values can flourish under a strong Soviet system and that Communism and Russian nationalism may indeed be complementary are the main characteristics of the extremist line. In contrast, traditional Slavophiles generally oppose the regime, particularly on questions of religion and freedom of expression--issues on which they converge with non-Slavophile dissident thought. The pro-regime line of the extremists inevitably fuels persistent speculation among other dissident circles that the "ultra-Slavophiles" have some support, active or passive, from segments of the Soviet establishment, particularly from the military and security organs.

This document and others like it may be plants circulated by the regime itself, possibly as part

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of the tactic of encouraging the fragmentation of Soviet dissidence, whatever its orientation. Even so, their circulation would be a measure of the regime's estimate of the strength of Russian nationalism and of the possibility of capitalizing on it to benefit the Soviet system.

Past reporting on the existence of an extremist fringe of Russian-nationalist dissidence suggests, however, that the document is genuine. Earlier, reporting supports the speculation that some elements of Russian nationalist thought, though not necessarily its extremist version, enjoy the sympathy of, and possibly a degree of protection from, responsible individuals in all echelons of the Soviet establishment, including the party leadership [redacted]

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
Maverick sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, a Jew now waiting to emigrate, recently echoed other Soviet sources when he told a US embassy officer of the existence of strong Russophile, anti-Semitic feelings among influential groups of society. Neizvestny, who has a wide range of acquaintances, also spoke of "secret societies" made up of various intellectuals, military, security, and party officials, who periodically meet to assess the strength of Russian "patriotism" and to discuss ways of combating Jewish influence in the country. Members of these "societies" appear to be fully in favor of Jewish emigration, because they see it as an effective way of riding the country of Jewish influence.

Neizvestny labeled these "secret societies" as "fascist," and said they are based on the *Rodina* (Fatherland) clubs around the country. In January 1971, the Western press reported the existence of one *Za Rodinu* (For the Fatherland) society, allegedly composed of xenophobic, anti-Semitic Stalinists; the press report did not indicate

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whether *Za Rodinu* was a clandestine organization, though this may be presumed.

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Naizvestny's current statements concerning *Rodina* suggest, however, that the society reported in 1971 does exist, that it has grown, and that it has given rise to more extremist offshoots with goals generally the same as those of the alleged, clandestine organizations within the CPSU.

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