

FILE

[Redacted]

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DATE 12/17/86 FILE

DOC NO EA M 86-20178

OIR 3

P & PD 1

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

12 December 1986

North Korea-South Korea: The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games [Redacted]

25X1

Summary

After a major push for cohosting of the 1988 Olympics, North Korea has won only an offer from the International Olympic Committee of the right to hold two Olympic competitions and parts of two others. Some South Korean officials are willing to go further, but Seoul and IOC President Samaranch insist that the North must accept the Committee's offer unconditionally before continuing negotiations on more events and other important symbolic issues, including the title of the Games and the handling of Olympic ceremonies. Moscow and its East European allies so far have ignored North Korea's call for an Olympic boycott. China, which sent a team to the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, probably will take part in the Olympics. Cuba, until now the North's strongest supporter, has been awarded the 1991 Pan American Games, which is likely to diminish its incentive to oppose the Seoul Olympics. Nevertheless, we are uncertain how many Communist countries will attend the Games. [Redacted]

25X1

This memorandum was prepared by [Redacted], Office of East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 12 December 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia Division, OEA, [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

EA M 86-20178

25X1

25X1

25X1

Status of the IOC Offer

Samaranch has given North Korea until 17 September 1987, exactly one year before the Olympic opening ceremony, to accept a modest share in the Olympics. According to the US Embassy in Seoul, Samaranch and South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan have agreed that no further concessions will be considered until the North agrees in writing to settle for the archery and table tennis competitions, along with some soccer and cycling events. Moreover, Samaranch has publicly scrapped plans to hold a fourth round of North-South sport talks until the North accepts. [redacted]

25X1

P'yongyang so far has reacted ambiguously, agreeing to the proposal in private conversations with Samaranch while publicly demanding more events and a greater share of Olympic ceremonies. P'yongyang has called for another round of talks without preconditions. We believe North Korea's willingness to spend scarce resources on athletic facilities indicates it is serious about cohosting the Olympic Games. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the North Koreans are building arenas for badminton, swimming, weightlifting, and archery competitions. North Korean and Western press reports also indicate the North is building at least one stadium with a capacity for 150,000 spectators for track and field and Olympic ceremonies. North Korean spokesmen have invited Olympic officials to inspect their facilities and have pledged repeatedly to allow Olympic participants and spectators free movement within North Korea. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Seoul's Strong Position

South Korea's credentials as Olympic host have benefited from Seoul's successful staging of the Asian Games this fall. The international praise for the athletic facilities, which are the venues for the 1988 Olympics, overshadowed the unsolved bombing at Kimpo Airport a week before the Asiad--which the South blames on the North. Even the North Korean media, which conducted an anti-Asian Games blitz during the summer, have implicitly admitted the Asian Games went well. [redacted]

25X1

Domestic political movements and most student leaders who oppose President Chun also did not disrupt the Asian Games. Opposition leaders, in public statements before the Games, put national pride ahead of partisan politics. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] student leaders acknowledged the Games were a success, and saw no point in pressing the anti-Asian Games slogans they had expounded in July and August. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

South Korean authorities remain concerned that North Korea will try to disrupt the 1988 Olympics. Some officials have told US diplomats they would be willing to permit the North to host one or two more events in order to ensure a peaceful Olympiad. Others [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

argue the North cannot be appeased. Lho has told US officials that he does not believe the North intends to cohost the Games, citing P'yongyang's alleged inability to construct adequate facilities and likely unwillingness to permit the free movement of athletes, officials, and tourists that Samaranch demands. Lho's pessimistic view considers the next two years a dangerous period, during which the North will have to choose between "assault and accommodation." [redacted]

25X1

Little International Support for the North

China's decision to send a team to the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, in our judgment, makes Beijing's Olympic participation likely, but we are uncertain whether other Communist countries will attend. Moscow and its East European allies have ignored North Korea's call for a boycott, and their Olympic officials continue to discuss openly team preparations. A Hungarian journalist implied in an interview with a North Korean sport official that P'yongyang should not count on support from Socialist states. According to press reports, Samaranch emerged from a late October meeting with Soviet officials "convinced" the Soviet Union and its allies will attend the Olympics. [redacted]

25X1

Nonetheless, the Soviets have begun to adjust their rhetorical position to reflect improving ties with North Korea. Moscow responded positively last summer to the IOC event-sharing formula, interpreting it as a sign the IOC was paying attention to North Korea's demands. More recently, however, Soviet spokesmen have echoed the North's criticism of Samaranch's proposal, have stressed they have not yet decided to attend the Olympics, and have called on the IOC to increase P'yongyang's share of Olympic events. [redacted]

25X1

A potentially telling blow to North Korea's hopes for support on the Olympic issue was the award to Havana--heretofore P'yongyang's staunchest international supporter--of the 1991 Pan American Games. According to press reports, Cuba won these Games on condition it participates in the 1988 Olympics. One report even says that Mar Del Plata, Argentina, has been selected as Pan-American Games alternate site. President Castro, who has loudly attacked the IOC and the Seoul award since 1982, when Indianapolis edged out Havana for the 1987 Pan American Games, had declared Cuba would boycott the 1988 Olympics if North Korea's demands were ignored. The 1991 award could appease him and reduce Cuba's rhetorical support for P'yongyang's position. [redacted]

25X1

Looking Ahead

Samaranch's skillful diplomacy has given all parties at least until next fall to find a solution to the Olympic imbroglio. Behavior by both Koreas suggests a compromise is

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

possible. Even so, we think the North faces a difficult choice between accepting a decidedly junior role in Seoul's Olympic triumph or rejecting the Games and perhaps further tarring its reputation in an attempt to disrupt them. At the same time, Chun must continue to control a volatile domestic situation if South Korea is to maintain its negotiating advantage. Olympic participants might rethink Seoul's merits as Olympic host if clashes between police and the opposition escalate as the country moves toward a political transition in early 1988. [REDACTED]

25X1

We believe the Soviet Union and its allies hope to avoid another Olympic boycott in 1988 but, with an eye to North Korea's position, are likely to push for further South Korean and IOC concessions. Warsaw Pact states are unlikely to finalize their Olympic decisions until shortly before the Games themselves. They can choose from at least four options:

- Participate fully;
- Boycott the Games in support of North Korea;
- Withdraw from the Seoul Olympics, citing security problems, while denying they are boycotting the Games (Moscow's position in 1984); or
- Keep their athletes home, but send officials to Seoul to attend Olympic organizational meetings (Vietnam's policy toward the 1986 Asian Games). [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

SUBJECT: North Korea-South Korea: The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games [redacted]

25X1

Distribution:

Original - Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense
Room 4E830, Dept. of Defense

- 1 - Director, DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (7E-12)
- 1 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
- 1 - NIO/Economics (7E 48)
- 1 - C/PPS/DO (3D 01)
- 1 - C/EA/[redacted] (5E 18)
- 1 - OGI/FSIC/PI (2G 18)
- 1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
- 1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
- 1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
- 1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
- 1 - OEA/China Division (4G 32)
- 1 - OEA/SEA Division (4F 24)
- 1 - D/OEA (4F 18)
- 1 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
- 1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
- 1 - DDI (7E 47)
- 1 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
- 1 - Office of Legislative Liaison (7B 14)
- 1 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
- 5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G 07)
- 1 - CPAS/ILS (7G 50)
- 1 - C/PES (7F 24)
- 1 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
- 1 - DDO/EA Division (5D 00)
- 1 - DDO/EA/[redacted] (5C 45)
- 1 - DDO/EA/[redacted] (5C 19)
- 1 - DDO/EA/[redacted] (5C 19)
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

DDI/OEA/NEA/K/[redacted]

12 Dec. 86

25X1