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15 OCT 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
DCI Security Committee

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FROM: [redacted]
CIA Member, DCI Security Committee

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/11 (U)

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Chairman, SECOM, dated 9 August 1979, same subject (SECOM-D-604)

In accordance with your request, as set forth in reference, the proposed draft of DCID 1/11 has been coordinated and the following represents the CIA position regarding recommendations for change:

a. Change 1.c. on page 2 to read as follows: "c. Reviewing and formulating security policies and procedures for the secure transmittal, use, storage and destruction of intelligence released to foreign governments and international organizations and for the implementation of laws and executive orders pertaining to the declassification and public release of intelligence information." Rationale: It is felt this change will more accurately set forth SECOM's security role in setting security policy relative to the foreign release of intelligence information. The overall policy responsibility of the Intelligence Community regarding the foreign release of intelligence information is best placed with the senior officials of the National Analysis and Tasking Centers, advised by control officers and source exploitation experts. (U)

(Accepted in part)

b. Clarify the policy intent of page 4, paragraph 2.b. Rationale: Since any intelligence information released to the public has

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by the very nature of its release been removed from security protection, it is felt that this paragraph requires clarification. However, before any rewrite, the intent of such a policy statement must be defined. The obvious drawback of any such policy statement is the potential involvement of the Community in every public release by the member agencies' public information personnel which might entail specific or implied release of intelligence. In any rewrite, it is suggested that the word "security" (NO) be inserted between "Director of Central Intelligence" and "policies" as currently shown in paragraph 2.b., page 4. It is felt that this change would more clearly define and restrict SECOM's functions to those of a security nature. (U)

(Partially Accepted)

NFMC

c. Change page 5, paragraph 2.c., lines 2 and 3, to read ". . . procedures to guard against improper classification of intelligence information . . ." Rationale: This change will ensure accommodation with Section 5-404(d) of Executive Order 12065 which encourages challenges of classification decisions believed to be improper, not restricting challenges to overclassification only. (U)

NO

d. Change paragraph 1.i. of Attachment 1 to read as follows: "To evaluate foreign technical surveillance measures believed to be employed or capable of employment against U. S. installations, personnel or equipment." Rationale: This will more accurately cover the use to which foreign technical surveillance countermeasures are put. (U)

NO (accepted "equipment")

e. Either remove the word "communicated" from the last sentence of paragraph 1 of Attachment 2 or change paragraph 1 of Attachment 2 to read as follows: "Review, formulate, and recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence policies, standards, and procedures to protect intelligence data stored, processed, or communicated by computer. Communications functions performed by the special purpose computer system that make up the telecommunications segment of ADP networks are excluded from the meaning of

YES (accepted deletion of "communicated")

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this directive." Rationale: This change is proposed to avoid conflict and confusion between DCID 1/11 and DCID 1/16 which, in paragraph III.1.a., Chapter III, exempts computers performing certain communications functions. The CIA considers the above change to be essential. (U)

f. Change the following portions of the proposed Attachment 3 of DCID 1/11 to reflect the wording of the current Attachment 3, DCID 1/11:

NFAC

(1) Insert the word "technical" on page 1, paragraph 1, line 3, of Attachment 3 of DCID 1/11 between the words "Board" and "guidance," and, on page 2, paragraph 2, lines 1 and 2, between the words "maintain" and "guidance."

NO

NFAC

(2) Reinstate the following paragraph which is present in the current Attachment 3 to DCID 1/11 but has been stricken from the proposed Attachment 3 to DCID 1/11: "To furnish technical guidance and assistance to the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, to the SIGINT Committee and to the Executive Agents of other compartmented information in connection with their sanitization, downgrading, declassification and decontrol responsibilities." Rationale: The above changes should make it clear that SECOM's primary responsibility in the area of compartmentation, as in foreign disclosure, is to develop and monitor specific security policies and procedures, not to provide policy on what is to be compartmented (or released). (C)

NO (SECOM won't accept)

g. Clarify the intent and rewrite page 3, paragraph 5 of Attachment 3. Rationale: As written, the paragraph advocates the recommendation of security policies which would govern "the release or disclosure of compartmented intelligence information to the public." It is felt that the probable intent of this paragraph was to establish security policies governing the decompartmentation and declassification of intelligence information for public release. Additionally, it is recommended that

(partially accepted)

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any rewrite of paragraph 5 retain the phrase ", in coordination with appropriate DCI committees," which is present in the current version of Attachment 3 to DCID 1/11. It is felt that the retention of this phrase will highlight the necessity for coordination between SECOM and any affected DCI committee. (U)

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