Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Organization and Capabilities

An Intelligence Assessment
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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by the Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and reviewed by the US Embassy in Manila. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI.
Key Judgments

Information available as of 30 May 1985 was used in this report.

The Communist insurgency in the Philippines now presents a formidable challenge to the Marcos government and US strategic and political interests in Asia. Moreover, the insurgency is capable of growing more rapidly in the next two years than at any time in the past. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA), have seized the initiative in the countryside and are preparing to bring their revolution to Manila. The insurgents have not, however, been seriously contested militarily or politically by the government. This absence of sustained counterinsurgent pressure has allowed the Communists a free hand in many areas of the country and has left their potential vulnerabilities unexploited.

Party leaders are pursuing a dual military and political strategy aimed at achieving a stalemate on the battlefield while forming a broad political alliance with the anti-Marcos opposition. The party is in a strong position to gain politically from the malaise now prevalent throughout Philippine society and the government’s unwillingness to undertake political and economic reforms. Party leaders hope to seize power by joining with the moderate opposition in a post-Marcos coalition government they intend to dominate. To this end, they plan to participate in the 1986 nationwide elections and support candidates whom they can co-opt.

The Communists have assembled an extensive and sophisticated clandestine political/military organization over the last 16 years that is waging protracted guerrilla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively controlling villages inhabited by at least 5 million people, and contesting control of villages inhabited by another 5.5 million:

- The CPP—nearly 30,000 to 45,000 strong—is a tightly knit organization with a coherent ideology, centralized and cohesive leadership, an effective propaganda apparatus, and the discipline and patience required for a protracted struggle.

- The National Democratic Front (NDF), through its organizing and propaganda activities, has been in the forefront of the Communists’ legal effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to the Marcos government. The government estimates that there are almost a million members in party-controlled and NDF-initiated village associations and that the Communists have infiltrated more than 500 legitimate organizations.
- The NPA—with 15,000 to 16,500 regulars and 15,000 to 20,000 irregulars—has become a credible military force that is rapidly gaining experience and confidence and is capable of fielding guerrilla battalions in many parts of the country. NPA attacks against the government are characterized by effective command and control, secure communications, good intelligence, sound guerrilla tactics, and effective adaptation to the Philippine environment.

The Communists are sensitive to the misgivings of many Filipinos about uniting with Marxist revolutionaries. Consequently, their propaganda—a clever mixture of Marxism, Catholic liberation theology, and traditional Philippine values—is careful to emphasize the nationalist aspects of their struggle. They frequently cite Nicaragua as an example of a revolution in which Marxist-Leninists combined with a moderate opposition to successfully overthrow a dictator. Popular support for the Marcos government is at an alltime low, and party propagandists are exploiting this to their advantage.

Despite its formidable organization and successful performance, the CPP/NPA has weaknesses. A charismatic leader capable of galvanizing popular support for the revolution has yet to appear, its anti-American rhetoric rings hollow with many Filipinos, and the party’s emphasis on nationalism over Communism has drawn to its banner many individuals lacking in ideological commitment. However, the most serious CPP/NPA liability is the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to provide arms, ammunition, and other war materiel to the guerrillas. Although a small number of weapons are now being smuggled into the Philippines by the NPA, we believe the guerrillas lack the equipment to sustain an offensive of even a week’s duration and the combined-arms capability required to attack well-defended military targets. The Communists have so far eschewed foreign support, and the isolated character of the Philippines severely complicates establishing a reliable logistic network or foreign sanctuary. The CPP has established contacts with the Soviets probably to obtain their assistance. Although extensive cooperation between the Communists and the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) could help ease this problem, we believe there is little prospect for more than token cooperation between them.
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This assessment is intended to serve as a model for analyzing the organization and capabilities of a politically organized insurgency. In this case, we examine a well-developed insurgent organization, the Communist Party of the Philippines; its military arm, the New People’s Army; and united front activities that attempt to mask the radical nature of the movement and broaden its appeal. The paper does not systematically compare the performance of the insurgents against the Philippine military, nor does it examine the Muslim insurgency of the Moro National Liberation Front.
Figure 1
CPP/NPA Communist Administrative Areas, 1985

First-order administrative boundary
Second-order administrative boundary

Northern Luzon Commission
1. Zambales PPC
2. Tarlac PPC
3. Nueva Ecija PPC
4. Pampanga
5. Bulacan PPC
6. Bataan PPC

Central Luzon Commission

South China Sea

Philippines

Visayas Commission

Mindanao Commission

Malaysia

Indonesia

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Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organization
and Capabilities

Introduction

Since its founding in 1968, the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its military element, the
New People's Army (NPA), have consistently demon-
strated slow but steady growth. During the past two
years, they have taken advantage of increasing popu-
lar discontent with the Marcos government to swell
their ranks. The NPA now aggressively attacks the
government’s Armed Forces, increasing both the
number and sophistication of tactical operations,
while the party maneuvers to seize political power in a
post-Marcos government. This paper reviews the par-
ty’s political and military strategy and examines
current insurgent organization, capabilities, and per-
formance.

The Overall Strategy of the Insurgency

The CPP/NPA has most closely followed the political
and guerrilla strategy of protracted revolutionary
warfare developed by Mao Zedong and articulated by
party founder Jose Maria Sison in documents still
used in teaching all party members. As in Mao’s
revolution, the Communist insurgency in the Philip-
pines emphasizes the importance of building a base of
support in the countryside among the peasant popula-
tion. It also has an urban component, however, that is
increasing in size and importance. All NPA military
activity is controlled by the Communist Party’s politi-
cal leadership, which has generally stressed organiza-
tion and recruitment over direct military action. The
Communists’ military strategy is complemented by a
political program in which party members and frontline
organizations work to undermine the Marcos govern-
ment and legitimize their own organization.

Party documents and actions reveal that the Com-
munist leaders have also demonstrated an ability to adapt
Maoist strategy to the geography and politics of the
Philippines. Following setbacks in 1972 in the Caga-
yan Valley, the leadership decided not to establish
permanently liberated zones in imitation of Mao in

Yenan; they believed to do so was only to invite
government offensives that the CPP/NPA could not
hope to repel. Instead, guerrilla fronts were initiated throughout the Philippines—especially on the larger
islands that would provide easy escape and conceal-
ment (appendix A).

In 1981 party leaders decided that with the lifting of
martial law the time was ripe to reactivate the urban
underground that had been decimated by government
security forces. Urban guerrilla units, dormant since
1972, were reactivated in Mindanao to assassinate
government supporters and demonstrate the perva-
siveness of the CPP/NPA. Urban united front activi-
ties, whose purpose is to broaden the base of support
for the revolution, have since mushroomed in an
attempt to win over the Philippine middle class,
largely alienated from the government following the
Aquino assassination.

The party’s Central Committee recently claimed at a
meeting for cadres to be testing a “new and higher
form of struggle” by fomenting “people’s strikes” in
major urban centers to cripple industries, transport,
education, commerce, and the government bureau-
cracy. Such strikes, in theory, are intended to contribute
to the development of a revolutionary situation in the
cities to prepare them for popular uprisings that
would occur before the seizure of power during a final
Communist offensive. These uprisings would be coor-
dinated with the intensification of guerrilla warfare in
the countryside. The success of people’s strikes in
Mindanao last fall—several cities were paralyzed for
several days at a time—probably presages more wide-
spread use of this tactic in the future.

Another of the Communists’ strategies is to achieve
political power by presenting themselves as national-
ists and joining with the moderate opposition in a
post-Marcos coalition government. This is now evi-
dent from Embassy reporting and the public state-
ments of party-controlled front organizations that

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now actively promote this concept. To broaden its
popular appeal, the party frequently cites Nicaragua
as an example of a revolution in which both Marxist-
Leninists and a moderate opposition successfully
united to overthrow a dictator. The Sandinista regime
is portrayed as a state where the Christian plea for
social justice has been realized. In our judgment, this
analogy particularly appeals to many Filipino Catholi-
cs who oppose the Marcos regime but have misgiv-
ings about uniting with Communist revolutionaries.
The newly formed organization, Bayan (the Nation),
is the Communists' latest attempt to portray party
willfulness to join forces with moderates in a
coalition.

The party's consolidation plan is another aspect of
CPP strategy, which though not well publicized is
taught to all cadres. According to Sison’s writings,
to the Communists come to power they plan a
subsequent “socialist revolution” to consolidate Com-
munism in Philippine society. Although united front
tactics and coalition government proposals are expedi-
ent now in forging a broad alliance, once the People's
Democratic Republic of the Philippines has been
established the party alone will be responsible for
transforming the society into a “proletarian dictator-
ship.” Presumably, at this time the “blood debt to the
people” owed by the landlord class will be avenged.

Party strategists maintain that theirs is an “unfin-
ished revolution.” The Communists insist that the
Philippine people were never really liberated—not in
February 1945 or July 1946 nor, for that matter, in
1898. They were simply transferred from Spanish, to
American, to Japanese, and then, following the grant-
ing of nominal independence, to neocolonial domina-
tion. The United States is now identified as the
principal enemy of the Philippine people, and Presi-
dent Marcos is depicted as a puppet carrying out the
mandates of Washington. We believe the anti-Ameri-
can rhetoric may ring hollow with many Filipinos, but
the appeal to nationalism and independence from
foreign dictates does not.

**Communist Short-Term Intentions**

We believe the Communists recognize that they lack
the capability to defeat the government militarily and
would settle for a stalemate on the battlefield. A
guerrilla commander recently told a Manila journalist
that the NPA expects a standoff with the military in
three years. A high-ranking CPP cadre echoed this
theme when he announced at a recent party meeting
that the CPP expects to reach a strategic stalemate
with government forces in several regions in 1986.

It is in the political sphere that we believe the
Communists now see their most advantageous pros-
tspects. Our analysis of Embassy reporting leads us to
believe that, to exploit the vulnerabilities of the
Marcos regime, the CPP is skillfully maneuvering for
a role in any government that might be formed should
the President die in office and is actively promoting
the concept of a coalition government in which it
would legally participate. In a switch from its previous
position advocating a boycott of elections, the
CPP/NPA also intends to actively participate in the
1986 nationwide local elections.

areas where the party is strong the new People's
Democratic Coalition will field candidates. Where the
party is weak but allies are present, the CPP/NPA
will campaign for the ally and harass competitors. In
other areas, the party will attempt to disrupt the
elections through military actions.

**The Insurgent Organization and Capabilities**

To implement their strategy, the Philippine Commun-
ists have assembled an effective, clandestine politi-
cal-military organization that wages protracted guer-
lla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively
controls villages inhabited by at least 5 million people,
and contests control of villages inhabited by another
5.5 million. For the purpose of this paper, we use the
term Communist-controlled village to mean areas
where:

- A Communist “shadow government” has been
  established.
- Communist peasant, women, and youth associations
  are functioning.
- Most of the population is sympathetic and gives
  material support to the insurgents.
- At least 50 percent of the population can be mobil-
  ized for protest actions.
- NPA militia units may be present.
Figure 2. This poster publicizing the new CPP-dominated united front, "Bayan" (The Nation), is now plastered on walls throughout Manila.
The CPP—about 30,000 to 45,000 strong—is a tightly knit organization led by professionals who are well trained and highly disciplined. The National Democratic Front (NDF), the party’s main united front organ, is in the forefront of the Communists’ legal effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to the Marcos government. The party has already infiltrated almost 500 organizations. The New People’s Army—with 15,000 to 16,500 regulars and 15,000 to 20,000 irregulars—has become a credible military force capable of fielding guerrilla battalions in many parts of the country.

The Communists’ organizational model—with its parallel party, united front, and military echelons—is very similar to other Communist insurgent organizations we have seen during the last 50 years. Neither the party organization itself, the distinctive organizational practices it follows, the subsidiary organizations it has set up, nor the conceptual framework it has pursued in evolving its forces and in contending with the government is unique. Rather, the Communist organization in the Philippines is a synthesis of organizational principles and operational procedures evolved in China, Vietnam, and elsewhere.

The Party
As with all Communist parties, the CPP/NPA is under the firm control of a small number of highly dedicated leaders, or cadres, who make all important decisions regarding ideology, strategy, and management of the party. These cadres form the Central Committee, the Executive Committee, and the Politburo. We base this judgment on the analysis of more than a decade of party decisionmaking and leadership behavior as documented in Embassy reporting. This committee structure is duplicated from the national level down to the village, called a barangay or barrio, and is illustrated in figure 4. Central Committee directives are interpreted and implemented by barrio committees, the NPA at each level is under the command of both the local party...
Estimating Party Membership

Membership in the CPP is restricted to a select group of dedicated individuals who have been tested and trained for six months to two years before being admitted to the party. Under the direction of the Central Committee, party members carry out the party's program in the villages, the NPA, the underground and the various united front organizations. Last fall, a senior party cadre announced that there were nearly 60,000 party members nationwide. We believe this estimate is high, the actual number of CPP full members being closer to 30,000 to 45,000.

Our estimate is based on the number of party members we believe serve on village committees, in the New People's Army, and in the urban underground. Barrio Party Committees are functioning in at least 3,500 villages. The party mandates at least five but no more than 10 members for these village committees. Assuming an average of five party members in each yields 27,700 members scattered in CPP/NPA-controlled villages nationwide. If 20 percent of NPA regulars are party members—those equivalent to officers and noncommissioned officers—there are at least 3,300 members now leading the guerrillas.

The party now has 5,800 members working in the urban mass movement sector nationwide including those working in labor organizing in Metro Manila. These figures may be overstated. Nevertheless, they probably constitute the majority of party members in the urban underground and legal united front organizations.

Committee and higher level NPA commands, and united front activities are directed by a similar interlocking command structure. Such a system of command and control provides local flexibility in implementing orders from above.

The CPP is organized along both territorial and functional lines and, since 1984, by rural and urban responsibilities as well. Six Regional Commissions, each headed by a Central Committee member, were created in the 1980s to cope with the geographic spread of the party and to ensure that all subordinate committees operate in accordance with the party line set by the Central Committee. Five functional commissions oversee party activities in the areas of propaganda, military affairs, united front activities, and "mass movement" organizations. In 1984 the Central Committee split responsibility for rural and urban activities between two leaders, Rodolfo Salas and Rafael Baylosis, giving Salas command of the NPA and rural operations and Baylosis supervisory responsibility for party activities in Metro Manila and other urban centers throughout the Philippines under the newly created National Urban Center Commission (NUCC).

Since its founding, the CPP has stressed organizational efforts and recruitment in rural areas rather than military activities. We know that the Communists use well-established tactics. After preparing a thorough investigation of social conditions in a village or barrio, cadres establish a Barrio Liaison Group, made up of three to seven members who may be of any social class. This group is then tasked to recruit new members, solicit food supplies for the guerrillas, do intelligence work, prepare in-depth social investigations, and conduct limited propaganda.

New recruits form the Organizing Groups, whose membership is strictly limited to lower-middle peasants, poor peasants, and farmworkers. Basic party doctrine and principles are studied, and potential leaders are assessed for party membership. The most promising recruits—but not more than 10—eventually form a Barrio Revolutionary Committee. This committee—the highest political unit in the village—constitutes the "shadow government" that directs and controls party activities in the barrio.

The party has strict criteria for membership. A person becomes a candidate member upon the recommendation of at least two party members with three years of continuous good standing in the party. The party member who makes the recommendation must prepare an appraisal of the ideological, political, and personal history of the candidate. Advancement to
Figure 4
Structure and Channels of Command for the Philippine Insurgency
full membership varies, depending on the candidate's class background: six months for those from peasant/labor and urban sectors; one year for those from the middle class; and two years for everyone else. Those who make it through the selection process undergo rigorous training, as revealed by captured training materials. We believe nearly all party members are highly motivated and dedicated to the revolution; few cadres have defected.

Parallel to the party structure for full members, but separate and distinct from it, is the party youth organization, the Kabataang Makabayan (KM). In a developing nation like the Philippines, where a majority of the population is under 18, captured documents reveal that party leaders believe it is essential to allow for the participation of youth in the revolution even though they may not yet be mature enough for full party membership. The KM serves as a training school for future party members and allows the party access to the enthusiasm and dedication of young radicals. Some as young as 13 are admitted to the KM after a careful assessment and become eligible for party membership at age 18.

**The United Front**

In our view, united front organizing has heretofore been the weak link in this Communist insurgence. The party’s efforts to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to the Marcos government have suffered setbacks repeatedly. In addition to an ideological bias favoring rural organization and a reluctance of many Filipinos to join a Communist movement, the long period of martial law (1972-81) made all overt opposition activities very difficult. Since 1979, government security forces have captured or killed many key cadres connected with these efforts: Sixto Carlos, Horacio Morales, Isagani Serrano, Edgar Jopson, and Mila Aguilar Roque.

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1 The KM is distinct from the League of Filipino Students, the CPP's legal mass organization for youth, which appeals, with little discrimination, to all youth.
Figure 6
CPP/NPA Flags

Flag of the hoped-for People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines.

The same flag is used by the Maoist Sendero Luminoso insurgents in Peru.

*CPP—Communist Party of the Philippines.
NPA—New People's Army.

Party leaders realize this weakness and are now concentrating their attention on united front activities to ensure a role for the party in any successor government. The CPP/NPA has begun to scatter party cells, infiltrating the leadership of some organizations, forming new ones seemingly independent of the party when necessary, and establishing alliances throughout Philippine society in support of the party's revolutionary objectives.

In the student sector, there are 25 identified CPP front groups and 114 infiltrated organizations; in the labor field, there are 10 front organizations and 251 infiltrated. Embassy reporting from a well-informed source indicates that the party now has about 5,800 members working in urban united front activities nationwide, with 2,800 active in Manila. The same source asserted that there are now 38,600 urban activists in the National Democratic Front—a claim that the Embassy believes may be exaggerated.

The party's control over the activities of the NDF is accomplished by clandestine cells of three to five persons who work together to broaden the base of support for the CPP/NPA revolution. Cadres use as a guide the 12-point program contained in the NDF manifesto of 1 January 1973. In urban areas, the cadres are to forge links with labor federations and unions, teachers associations, student organizations, and professional and civic organizations. In rural areas, the cell is to conduct social investigations among peasants and farmworkers and eventually help
recruit NPA guerrillas. A captured internal party guide to building NDF cells also directs them to:
- Disseminate propaganda among friends, relatives, and sympathizers by distributing underground publications, writing chain letters, and holding discussions.
- Give direct support to the NPA and the underground by providing material support and services.
- Form additional cells from among trusted associates, friends, and relatives.
- Actively participate in legal institutions with the aim of making them support the CPP/NPA directly or indirectly.
- Foster close relations with sympathetic groups and individuals.

In villages controlled by the party, united front activities take the form of mass organizations run by village cadres with members drawn from the village population—farmers, women, youth. Membership in these associations is voluntary, but the Village Party Committee makes every effort to involve every family; fear undoubtedly contributes to association ranks. However constituted, this is the “mass base” that grows food for the NPA and, at times, can be mobilized to support protests. This base now exceeds 1 million persons. We believe their numbers are seriously underestimated because, most of the estimated 5 million persons in CPP/NPA-controlled areas actively support the guerrillas. the CPP/NPA directly initiated 40 to 60 percent of all major protests in 1984, and, when party-controlled front organizations are included, the party was probably responsible for the majority of all major protests throughout the Philippines. As illustrated in figures 7 and 8, the party has steadily increased the number of Communist-initiated marches, strikes, and boycotts. However, the party’s efforts have failed to keep pace with the general rise in activities protesting against the Marcos government.
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The New People's Army
The NPA is a military organization characterized by effective leadership and operational security, sound command and control, and strict discipline. The NPA is made up of both full-time regulars and part-time irregulars. We estimate that there are now probably about 15,000 to 16,500 regulars organized in infantry battalions and urban guerrilla units. Local guerrilla units and village militia make up the irregulars, which estimate at between 15,000 and 20,000.

Regular Units—Regular Mobile Forces. The Regular Mobile Forces are the best trained, equipped, and organized guerrillas. These uniformed forces are responsible for most of the newsworthy raids and ambushes. NPA regulars operate at three levels—district, guerrilla front, and regional—under the direction of the respective party committees.

Main Regional Guerrilla Units (MRGUs) and Secondary Regional Guerrilla Units (SRGUs) are each equivalent to a regular company of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and normally confine operations to the 56 to 60 guerrilla fronts now active throughout the country. According to Embassy reporting, the MRGU is a mobile force that can link up anytime with an SRGU, forming a combined force to conduct guerrilla operations in the latter’s area. Within the past two years, the NPA has frequently combined such forces to successfully attack poorly defended government targets. MRGUs in Mindanao can now field 200 to 300 men (and in Northeast Mindanao, an additional squad armed with four M60 machineguns), but units of this size are still in their formative stages in most regions. Operations involving 100 to 200 guerrillas are the norm throughout the rest of the country.

Regular Units—Armed City Partisans. The NPA uses classic urban guerrilla tactics to bring the war to the cities. Four-to-seven-member guerrilla teams specialize in killing police, other government employees, and informers whom the party identifies as responsible for abuses of the people. Commonly called sparrow units, these assassins attack like sparrows, diving in pairs for food one after the other, so that if one misses, the second does not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Size in Mindanao</th>
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<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Main Regional Guerrilla Unit (MRGU)</td>
<td>5 per Regional Committee; undersize to regular size company (100 to 300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Front</td>
<td>Secondary Regional Guerrilla Unit (SRGU)</td>
<td>21 per Front; regular size platoon to undersize company (50 to 150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Armed City Partisan Unit (ACPU)</td>
<td>10 to 15 teams in various cities, with 4 to 7 persons in each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>District Local Guerrilla Unit (DLGU)</td>
<td>15 combatants (9 militia + 6 NPA regulars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Section Local Guerrilla Unit (SLGU)</td>
<td>15 combatants (9 militia + 6 NPA regulars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>Squad- to platoon-size units; 15 to 20 combatants</td>
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Figure 12
The Communist Urban Underground: Example of the Butuan City White Area Committee

- Political
- Military

White Area Committee
- Secretary
- Deputy Secretary
- Finance Officer
- Liaison

Armed City Partisans
- Base-1
- Base-2
- Base-3

Operational Cell
Organizing Cell

Youth-Students
- Education Committee

Unity Partisans
- Peasants
- Semiproletariat
- Jeepney drivers
- Out-of-school youth

Unification Party
- Labor

Cops
- Paramilitary
- Professionals
- Private employees
- Government employees

Peasants
- Patriotic Peasants' Association
- Out-of-school youth
- Semiproletariat
- Sectoral mass movement
- Destination force

* Three committees exist in these sectors.
The Urban Underground

The party is now making a concerted effort to establish a covert urban infrastructure in cities throughout the Philippines, including Manila. During 1984 urban-based CPP Central Committee members focused their efforts on building a clandestine network in the cities to garner support for the party among various sectors of society, to provide logistic support to NPA activities in the countryside, and to initiate urban terror.

Cadres assigned to work in urban "White Areas" controlled by the government are tasked to form covert political and military cells. Political cadres working in urban areas do not, however, normally interact with the NPA urban guerrillas, except on political and financial matters. The NPA maintains its own safehouses and acquires its own firearms and other support services. White Area Committees modeled on the success of Davao—where whole areas of the city are now governed by the CPP/NPA and where hundreds were assassinated in 1984—are now known to be functioning in most cities throughout Mindanao and in Manila.

The recent capture of an important guerrilla organizer in Manila, however, demonstrated what could prove to be a key organizational weakness, the failure to maintain strict compartmentation. To carry out their mission in cities where the government's intelligence and security assets are strongest, urban guerrillas must operate in small independent cells. If a guerrilla unit is compromised, this compartmentation impedes government efforts to neutralize the entire organization.

Urban guerrillas were active in Manila setting time bombs and killing opponents before the declaration of martial law in 1972. They resumed these acts of terrorism in 1981 in small cities and in Mindanao but were hardly noticed. The recent effectiveness of urban guerrillas in Davao—where in 1984 nearly 700 people were assassinated—has convinced most party leaders that the time is ripe to intensify urban guerrilla operations and to initiate them in Manila, Cebu, and other cities.

The NPA has been organizing for combat in Manila since 1980 and now has about 300 to 600 people involved in these activities in the capital. To date, however, these urban guerrillas have been largely inactive. In addition, there are now 10 to 15 sparrow units operating in cities throughout Mindanao, and captured documents reveal that in Manila the NPA has organized an extensive logistic network involving several hundred people to support urban guerrilla operations.

For example, we believe the creation of the National Urban Center Commission (NUCC) in 1984 presages an attempt to bring the revolution to Manila as the Marcos era draws to a close.
Irregular Units—People’s Guerrillas. In municipalities and barangays where the party is contesting control or is already firmly entrenched, local guerrilla squads of 10 to 20 irregulars are formed by the NPA, both to support regular insurgent military forces and to operate independently. These local guerrilla squads operate in or close to their home villages, sometimes in conjunction with much larger guerrilla units. They are usually poorly armed and may play only a supporting, rather than a combat, role in large NPA operations. By day, a guerrilla in such a unit works at his normal job; at night, or in emergencies, he is available for assignment by his party superiors.

Irregular Units—People’s Militia. The formation of a militia unit is the final stage of party organization at the village level. These units of about 20 persons operate directly under the village committee rather than the NPA. The militia members are villagers, male and female, who are covertly recruited and given the critical responsibility for defense of villagers in CPP-controlled areas against government reprisals and protection of resident or visiting cadres. A secret unit within each village militia is responsible for enforcement of party discipline, including assassinations.

Although they have few firearms and receive only limited military training, members of the village militia are the eyes and ears of the insurgent movement within the village, providing tactical intelligence on all aspects of the local scene, according to Embassy reports. Training for the militia emphasizes political indoctrination. The village militia also supports NPA operations by playing a part in the flexible insurgent logistic system. The militia members provide a labor force for the transport and storage of food and equipment, serve as guides for guerrillas traveling through the area, and are a source of recruits for regular NPA units.

Arms and Ammunition. Embassy reporting indicates that nearly all firearms used by the NPA have been purchased, stolen, or captured from the Philippine Armed Forces. We believe that the insurgents now have about 10,000 high-power rifles and an unknown but limited quantity of grenade launchers and machineguns.

Although we know very little about their logistic system, the insurgents seem to be able to transfer their weapons between units scattered throughout the Philippines. In Mindanao, for example, nearly all guerrillas in large units now use M16 rifles. In regions where guerrilla warfare is less advanced, guerrilla units may have as many as 10 or 15 different firearms that use different caliber ammunition. It is assumed that the NPA uses every means possible to supply its guerrillas, including reloading spent shell casings. A safehouse containing a weapons repair facility and several ammunition reloaders was discovered recently in Cagayan de Oro, a city in Northern Mindanao.

Apparently, ammunition shortages are not a major problem for the NPA at this time. In an increasing number of encounters, Philippine military officers report that NPA firepower outweighed that of the military. However, should military action increase, maintaining weapons and supplying adequate ammunition would become an important problem for the NPA.
• Anti-American rhetoric. Party propaganda portrays the United States as an imperialist nation and the sole prop supporting the Marcos government. But we believe America and Americans are favorably regarded by most Filipinos, and this propaganda rings hollow. The CPP now downplays the anti-US rhetoric in rural areas to avoid alienating people and uses it only with students and intellectuals.

• Non-Communist elements in the NPA. In the attempt to stress nationalism over Communism, the party appears to have accepted under its banner many individuals who have a grudge against the government but lack ideological commitment to Communism. In Kalinga Apayao, several hundred guerrillas belonging to an ethnic minority recently defected from the NPA but continue to war against the government. Similarly, in Palawan the CPP/NPA has not been able to establish a front because of the activities of a renegade NPA band, according to Embassy reports.

• No combined-arms capability. The NPA has demonstrated an ability to use small-unit guerrilla tactics effectively but to date has not used combined arms—the coordination of different types of military units—in its operations. Should the Communists decide to attack well-defended military installations, they will find it necessary to use direct and indirect fire from machineguns and mortars to support their assault force.

NPA units nationwide now regularly attack military targets, and, in our judgment, the guerrillas have gradually gained the combat experience and confidence necessary to sustain the revolution's momentum. In 1984 NPA raids and ambushes involving 100 to 200 guerrillas became more common in most regions of the Philippines, especially in Mindanao and other areas where the NPA is strong. Raids, which net the guerrillas favorable publicity and firearms, increased by 53 percent in the past year—216 were carried out in 1984. For such operations, NPA commanders now combine part-time local guerrilla units with district, front, or main regional guerrilla units.

By attacking weakly defended targets in such numbers, the NPA is virtually assured a tactical and propaganda victory. Mapping the distribution of these raids and ambushes reveals that most CPP/NPA front commands schedule at least one per month; in Mindanao, two per month (figure 22).

Most guerrilla-initiated military activity is focused on assassinations and assaults upon individuals to acquire weapons. Such incidents now occur nationwide. In 1984, government and civilian casualties as a result of these incidents totaled 2,600 killed and 1,400 wounded. The insurgents' casualties totaled 1,321 killed and 266 captured. Insurgent losses are increasing but at a much smaller rate than might be expected given their more aggressive posture.

The Performance Record

NPA Military Performance
Analysis of CPP/NPA-initiated actions from 1973 through January 1985 reveals that the level of insurgent activity has increased steadily over the last decade with a significant upsurge in 1984—80 percent of the more than 5,000 violent incidents were initiated by the NPA in 1984. Last year there were 12 times more violent incidents than 10 years earlier and 107 percent more than in 1983. Much of this sudden increase last year occurred during two months—in January, when there was a national plebiscite, and in May, when parliamentary elections were held.

Secret

28
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as a middleman. NDF cadres were reportedly dispatched to Europe for this purpose.

With the help of MNLF leader Nur Misuari, these cadres may have succeeded in purchasing arms, ammunition, and communications equipment from Libya or Syria and in arranging for covert shipments to MNLF bases in Sabah, Malaysia, for transshipment via coastal freighters to various parts of the Philippines.

The formation of NPA units trained in clandestine arms infiltration techniques using small boats. These units were reportedly being used in 1983 to transfer war materiel from freighters off the coast of Mindanao. At this point, however, we have no corroborating evidence.

The CPP/NPA is looking for new sources of foreign assistance and has established contacts—through NDF offices and European Communist Parties—with Soviet officials in Stockholm, Rome, and the Netherlands. Claimed further that a “reconciliation” between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPP/NPA is now being tested in joint efforts in the labor sector between World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)-affiliated unions and the CPP/NPA’s labor front, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU).

Beyond the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to support a guerrilla war, other CPP/NPA weaknesses include:

- **No foreign sanctuary.** The Philippines is geographically isolated—a situation unique in the world—and neither Malaysia nor Indonesia, the nearest countries, will permit Communist insurgent bases on their soil. The CPP has so far used the island’s environment to their advantage by forcing the government to confront them on several fronts and by establishing bases in remote mountainous terrain found throughout the Philippines. However, should the government’s counterinsurgent effort intensify, the Communists—like the Huks of 30 years ago—could find their lack of sanctuary a serious liability.

- **Penchant for paperwork.** The Communists keep detailed records and files that are regularly discovered when cadres are captured at their homes or safehouses. When compromised, such information provides government security forces with a better understanding of the insurgent organization, membership, and plans.

- **No charismatic leader.** The CPP/NPA has no one of the stature of Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, or Fidel Castro. The Central Committee and senior cadres in prison are virtually unknown to the public. Were a popular non-Communist leader—with the charisma of Magsaysay—to emerge in the post-Marcos era, he might attract considerable popular support away from the Communists.
Key Insurgent Vulnerabilities

Despite their extensive organization and the strengths their performance has shown, the CPP/NPA has a number of current and potential vulnerabilities. In combination, these shortcomings have hindered insurgent expansion and provided the government with several key targets for exploitation.

The lack of foreign support is the key weakness of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of all available evidence, we do not believe the Communists now receive any sizable foreign assistance. In the past, Beijing provided arms, training, and money, but we believe Chinese assistance was terminated in 1975. Captured members of the Central Committee have admitted under interrogation that the party’s most significant foreign financial support has come from unnamed US organizations. Additionally, Libya—through the Palestine Liberation Organization—is known to have provided 150 AK-47 rifles, which were smuggled into Manila harbor in 1981.

In November 1984, the CPP leadership was reassessing the military struggle and had concluded that foreign arms purchases were necessary if the Communists were to take advantage of the deteriorating domestic situation and rapidly escalate guerrilla warfare; however, that the CPP wanted to maintain an independent foreign policy—following Mao’s concept of self-reliance—and would, therefore, probably not turn to the Soviet Union. Instead, it would attempt to purchase arms from Middle Eastern countries using the
• Good intelligence: the NPA usually is better informed on government operations than the government is on the insurgents. The NPA in Bataan is now forewarned of all military operations by informants within every military unit in the province.

• Sound guerrilla tactics. The NPA effectively uses classic guerrilla tactics and demonstrates a good military combat capability. Over the last several years, the NPA has cautiously escalated the number of operations to provide combat experience for guerrillas with minimal risks.

• Effective use of environment. The CPP/NPA has focused guerrilla activity in areas where the terrain provides cover and escape. As early as 1974, Sison saw the insular nature of the Philippines as a potential asset for the insurgents. He realized that the growth of guerrilla fronts on all the larger islands would stretch thin the capabilities of the Armed Forces while making it almost impossible to defeat the CPP/NPA in any one campaign.

• Popular support. Both the party and the NPA have demonstrated an ability to recruit and to mobilize the population in support of their cause. While coercion is sometimes used, many people voluntarily cooperate with the insurgents at considerable risk of government retribution.

• Effective propaganda. The CPP has infiltrated many opposition organizations—including Catholic human rights groups and the media—to secure favorable coverage for its cause and discredit the Marcos government and the Armed Forces. This covert propaganda campaign has been effective both in the Philippines and abroad.

• Momentum. The CPP/NPA has gradually built a momentum—a combination of its own initiative and government inaction—that could take years to reverse.

Is This Really a Communist Revolution?

Analysts are divided over the degree of commitment to Communism of NPA guerrillas, party sympathizers, the rural population living in areas now controlled by the CPP/NPA, and the population at large. Some analysts believe that many, if not most, of these people may be cooperating with the insurgents because of human rights abuses by the military, grievances against the Marcos government, or the lack of improvement in rural standards of living. The issue is central to US concerns because, like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the commitment to Marxist–Leninist–Mao Zedong ideology will largely determine whether the Philippines would become a Communist state should the revolution succeed. It also affects the effort required to dissipate support for revolution and defeat the insurgency.

All available evidence indicates that hardcore CPP/NPA members are ideologically committed Communists who are determined to bring a Marxist government to power—even if they have to impose it from the top. Moreover, in areas controlled by the party, there are indications that some people cooperate voluntarily, not just out of fear. Although we cannot gauge the attitudes of most rural dwellers, we believe that the longer an area is under Communist control—and we estimate that at least 5 million people now live in CPP/NPA-controlled areas—the stronger the popular commitment to the party and the revolution is likely to become. However, the party is sensitive to the lack of strong commitments to any ideology on the part of most Filipinos and the peasants’ almost exclusive concerns with local issues. Thus, the party stresses anti-Marcos themes, nationalism, land reform, and abuses by the military while downplaying Communist rhetoric (appendix C).
Embassy reporting of CPP/NPA activities and our analysis reveal strengths in a number of key areas that combine to make these insurgents a formidable opponent:

- **Coherent ideology.** The party has a coherent, well-articulated ideology that emphasizes nationalism and anti-imperialism. First articulated by Jose Maria Sison, the CPP through its publications and courses presents a program that combines Marxism-Leninism and Catholic liberation theology, all in the guise of traditional Philippine nationalism.

- **Effective political leadership.** Through the Politburo, the Executive Committee, and the Central Committee, the CPP provides strong direction to subordinate cadres nationwide. Effectiveness can be judged by the absence of factionalism and—with one exception—high-level defections, and the minimal effects on operations caused by the capture of senior cadres.

- **Patience.** Aware of the Huk’s premature switch to conventional warfare, party literature repeatedly stresses the protracted nature of this revolution to prepare followers for an indeterminate period of guerrilla warfare. We believe the party is quick to learn from mistakes and has been content to work slowly but steadily at establishing a popular base of support in the countryside.

- **Strong command and control.** The CPP/NPA follows the standard Marxist-Leninist policy of “Democratic Centralism.” This policy provides considerable autonomy to local leadership as long as they adhere to Central Committee directives. Senior cadres are frequently reassigned, and there has not been even a hint that either they or their subordinates question command decisions. Party discipline is strict and very effective.

- **Secure and effective communications.** The party and the NPA rely on a courier system for most communications.

**Key Insurgent Strengths**

The CPP/NPA organizational infrastructure is now firmly in place and growing. Moreover, its performance over the past several years has been impressive.
Training. Two recently acquired NPA training manuals—one published in 1978 in Mindanao and the other in 1982 in the Visayas—show that the guerrillas are taught tactical operations from the US Army's Ranger Handbook, the Malaysian Jungle Operations Manual, and the writings of Mao Zedong. The documents describe tactics applicable to team, squad, and platoon operations and emphasize the political aspects of guerrilla warfare. They do not, however, mention fire and movement, rally points, and security for night field positions—all tactical essentials in combat.

Some former Armed Forces noncommissioned officers have joined the NPA and serve as training instructors, according to press reports. Training generally takes place at base camps located in remote areas and, in several cases, includes an obstacle course that meets US Army specifications. If the NPA follows classic guerrilla procedures, new recruits will be quickly included in combat operations—albeit in minor, less dangerous capacities—to acquire on-the-job training and boost their confidence.

Figure 15. A captured NPA training/propaganda manual explains in detail proper ambush tactics. Note the variety of weapons being used.
Figure 19
Philippines: Violent Incidents Involving the New People's Army, 1973-84

Number of incidents
5,500
5,000
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

0  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84
Other
Encounters
Assassinations/kidnapings
Ambushes
Raids

The Rural Control Situation

For more than 15 years, the party and the NPA have concentrated their efforts on organizing the Philippine village population in support of the revolution. Beginning with a clandestine investigation of the class structure and grievances of the village population, the Communists spend a year or more gradually establishing a shadow government and weaning the people away from support for the Marcos government. We believe these long-term efforts are now yielding dividends, and villages are being won over to the Communists' side at an increasing rate.

In mid-1984 the Philippine Constabulary surveyed each of the 12 Regional Unified Commands on the extent of CPP/NPA village control. Although we believe its report significantly underestimated the

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*CPP = Communist Party of the Philippines. NPA = New People's Army.

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See appendix G for elaboration of rural control indicators and terminology.
The Communist Land Reform Program

There are few immediate rewards the Communists can offer poor, indifferent farmers to gain their active support. In China and Vietnam, the Communists enacted land reform in areas they controlled during the revolution. This is occurring in the Philippines, but details rarely surface. In 1982, however, a party propagandist claimed that the CPP land reform program had already directly benefited 44,000 people in the Cagayan Valley of Northeastern Luzon. Although such claims cannot be accepted at face value—the numbers are undoubtedly exaggerated—they provide valuable insights into the variety of tangible rewards the party claims to have provided to some rural poor:

- 6,754 farmers had stopped paying land rent to landlords or amortization to the government.
- 2,526 tenants had had their land rents lowered substantially—in many cases the new rent was only a tenth of the crop.
- 434 tenants understated yields and secretly lowered the rent they pay to recalcitrant landlords.
- 536 landless laborers had their wages raised.
- 505 landless families had been allotted farms taken from the excess lands of rich or middle peasants.
- 225 farmers had rental prices on farm machinery reduced.
- 295 families had interest on their debts lowered.
- 73 farmers were given farm animals confiscated from landlords.

...actual ground situation—Embassy trip reports usually reflect a much bleaker picture—it provides the only nationwide statistics on the success of the Communist efforts. The Constabulary statistics indicate that the party already controlled 11 percent of the villages and was contesting government control in an additional 12 percent. In November an Armed Forces reassessment of the CPP/NPA situation concluded that 14 percent of villages were Communist controlled and another 13 percent contested... confirms a rapidly deteriorating situation in parts of the country.

believe the Communists have consolidated their control of 24 more villages in Bataan and Zambales Provinces and the 16 municipalities in the mountains of Abra, and that the military is on the verge of ceding the mountainous interior of the island of Negros and Samar to the CPP/NPA. The Embassy recently interviewed a local official of Molave in Zamboanga del Sur who indicated that he believes the Communists control all 22 barangays in that municipality; six months earlier the Constabulary had reported that the party controlled only three of the barangays.

Projecting Near-Term Capabilities

In assessing insurgent capabilities and prospects over the next two years, four variables will be critical: the performance of the Philippine Armed Forces and government, popular support, the role of the Catholic Church, and foreign arms supplies:

- The guerrillas' prospects are largely dependent on whether the Philippine Government and the Armed Forces can initiate meaningful political, economic, and military reforms to regain the initiative and reverse a rapidly deteriorating situation.
- Popular support will be critical because it directly affects CPP/NPA ability to recruit and retain combatants, maintain momentum, and convince skeptical middle-class urban dwellers that the future of the country lies with them.
- The increasing alienation of Catholic priests and nuns from the government and their support for radical change is providing increased credibility and legitimacy to the Communist Party's appeal.
• Foreign arms supplies will determine whether the guerrillas will have enough arms and ammunition to sustain offensive actions, defend base areas, and mount conventional attacks against the Armed Forces.

We believe the Communist insurgency has the potential to grow more rapidly during the next two years than at any time in the past. The Communist Party is now in a strong position to benefit from the malaise prevalent throughout Philippine society: popular support for the Marcos government is at an alltime low; the record of the last few years leads us to conclude that the prospects for meaningful political reforms under this regime are slight; the military’s response to urban terror by the NPA is to step up extrajudicial killings, which further damages its reputation; and the economic crisis is expected to erode standards of living further in the next two years. Given the Armed Forces’ lack of logistics, their poor leadership, and the politicized nature of the officer corps, it is unlikely that the military’s performance will improve enough to stem increased NPA activity. The elections planned for 1986 and 1987 are likely to be the most contentious and violent in Philippine history—probably driving more people into the ranks of the Communist Party.

The NPA probably will grow in numbers, gradually escalate military actions, and improve its military tactics to include assaults against well-defended targets and night operations. If present trends continue unchecked, government forces may soon be forced to cede de facto control of the rural highlands to the Communists in many regions of the country. But the Communists cannot hope to defeat the Armed Forces in the near future and will be unable to sustain an offensive of even a few weeks’ duration without substantially more arms and ammunition than they now possess.

If party leaders have been able to arrange for weapons purchases abroad, as now seems likely, they must also arrange for numerous clandestine arms deliveries to various islands in the archipelago. We believe it will be difficult, but not impossible, to sustain such a logistic pipeline over time; as the deliveries increase, interdiction could become easier.

Party efforts to join ranks with the MNLF insurgents have not, and probably will not, succeed. The MNLF is beset with defections, financial problems, and factionalism along ethnolinguistic lines. Nur Misuari, leader of the largest and most radical group, the Tausug Muslims, has advocated cooperation with the CPP/NPA for some time, but he commands little allegiance among Muslim guerrillas outside of Sulu. Communist propaganda aimed at the Muslim community has not been able to overcome longstanding Christian-Muslim hatreds. Although Misuari may help arrange arms purchases for the NPA, we believe there will be little cooperation between the two insurgent groups in the next two years. Moreover, as the NPA increases activity in MNLF areas of operations in Mindanao and presents a threat to established MNLF extortion activities, there will be even more friction and enmity between the rival insurgent groups. We base this judgment on recent incidents in Davao del Norte and Lanao del Norte.

Support for the party by Catholic clergy and nuns is growing, largely because of human rights abuses by the Constabulary, police, and Civilian Home Defense Forces. If alienated, nuns and priests would provide a highly dedicated and professional work force for party and united front activities. Father Balweg, a rebel priest and NPA commander, is now a popular folk hero. Analogies between the Philippines and Nicaragua—where the revolution succeeded in toppling the Somoza dictatorship with the assistance of religious radicals—are becoming more common in the Philippines. We believe government attempts to isolate religious radicals and regain the support of priests and nuns will be futile without military reforms to curtail abuses of the population.

The Communists are now preparing to bring their revolution to the streets of Manila. This will command international media attention and further undermine the Marcos government’s legitimacy and stability. Armed City Partisan Units have been organized in Manila, and the units soon will initiate terrorist activity similar to that now common in Davao. They reportedly will begin by assassinating intelligence operatives,
abusive police, and corrupt local officials and bombing government buildings. We believe these killings will be very selective, will escalate in frequency slowly, and, as in Davao, will not be viewed unfavorably by the general population. They are, moreover, likely to produce an overreaction by the Constabulary and police—who in Davao have resorted to summary public executions of individuals identified by hooded informants during cordon and search operations.

Confronting the government in the streets of Manila, while offering the potential of seriously destabilizing the government, also entails considerable risks for the party.

The government would in all likelihood respond with greater force and effectiveness. In particular, party front groups are highly exposed and vulnerable.

**Threat to US Military Facilities**

We do not consider the principal threat to US bases in the Philippines to be military. Rather, party propaganda opposing American use of the Clark and Subic bases aims to make continued US use of the bases politically untenable for any future government. Party propaganda decries “US imperialism” and cites the presence of US military facilities on Philippine soil as the most visible manifestation of America’s imperialist intentions and an affront to Philippine sovereignty. Repeated use of this propaganda theme over the last decade has helped polarize most opposition politicians. Today, those who do not oppose the bases are accused of being unpatriotic and “tools of the CIA.” To avoid such charges, any successor government may have to demand either renegotiation of the bases agreement on terms more favorable to the Philippines or the abrogation of the agreement.

A direct military attack on one of the bases is possible—and threats of military or terrorist action have been received—but the NPA is much more likely to selectively target US personnel or attempt to place bombs in US installations. Direct assaults against the bases by guerrilla units in the near future would be counterproductive and costly. The NPA leadership is aware of their limited firepower, lack of fire support, and the difficulty of secretly massing.

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**Suspected CPP/NPA Attacks Against US Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Page</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 July</td>
<td>Two airmen wounded near main gate of Clark Air Base by automatic weapons fired from a moving vehicle.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>Four airmen injured by a grenade thrown from a moving vehicle in Angeles City.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 August</td>
<td>Six airmen wounded by an explosive device thrown from a moving vehicle in Angeles City.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 January</td>
<td>Car bomb exploded outside the Joint US Military Advisory Group Headquarters in Quezon City.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January</td>
<td>US Navy seaman attending a fiesta with his wife and children shot and killed in Bamban.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 March</td>
<td>USAF officer wounded by gunfire while driving near Clark Air Base.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Two US airmen tied up, beaten, and shot to death in a remote section of Clark Air Base.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Bomb exploded in an Angeles City nightclub frequented by Americans. Antenna of a US Navy communications site adjoining Camp O'Donnell bombed.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April</td>
<td>Three US Navy officers shot and killed while traveling by jeep through an unimproved area at Subic Bay Naval Base.</td>
<td>25X1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
troops for a surprise attack in Central Luzon. Party leaders also realize that such actions would justify increased US military actions.

**Threat to US Personnel**

Assassination of US personnel, on the other hand, could easily be accomplished by trained NPA sparrow units and has, in the past, been sanctioned by the party leaders—the same leaders who now control the party.

Rodolfo Salas and Juanito Rivera both participated in the killing of US servicemen in the early 1970s. Party plans to attack the US Embassy in 1975-76 never materialized, primarily because Philippine security forces broke up the NPA’s Armed City Partisan teams in Manila. In 1979 party leaders’ plans to assassinate the US Ambassador and the two US military base commanders at the ceremony to turnover control of the bases to the Philippines were thwarted when security was tightened.

CPP leaders have recently discussed plans to target US officials if the United States becomes more actively involved in the government’s counterinsurgency effort. It would be impossible to protect all possible victims of such attacks.
Appendix A

Operation of a Guerrilla Front

The CPP/NPA concentrates most military action in rural areas along 56 to 60 guerrilla fronts on the larger islands throughout the country. As described recently in a Central Committee publication, Ang Bayan, these fronts are areas where the NPA has established secure guerrilla bases and where the village population is under Communist control and can be trusted to provide advance warning of any government actions.

Beyond this core is a “pink zone,” the area within the front where most political and military activities to contest the government’s control are concentrated. Urbanized areas within this zone are usually classified as “white areas” because they are controlled by the government and its forces. The party is now stepping up efforts to penetrate these cities and towns, organizing white area committees and urban guerrilla units in most fronts. Areas that lie outside the guerrilla fronts are also labeled white areas, but as the fronts expand party strategists expect these white areas to disappear.

The guerrilla front, typically located in mountainous terrain adjacent to a populated lowland, consists of a series of zones or areas. A “red zone” contains the guerrilla base and surrounding base area. Guerrilla bases, although extensive in size, are not fortified military encampments. Rather, the NPA forces live in several established contiguous barrios—usually 10 or more—which differ little from other barrios. In some instances, these barrios are surrounded by a defensive perimeter of trenches and foxholes, but in most cases the NPA has abandoned these bases without serious losses as government forces prepared to assault them.

NPA Regular Mobile Forces are housed and trained in the guerrilla base area, which provides a reliable operational center, secure sanctuary, and rear area for the party’s local political and military organizations. NPA regulars operate throughout the guerrilla front from these bases; large units attacking government forces and small armed propaganda teams increasing party influence in villages are scattered throughout the front.
Figure 23
A Typical Communist (CPP/NPA) Front

Front area
- Guerilla base
- Base area
- Guerilla zone
- Guerilla front

Village (barangay)
- CPP/NPA controlled
- Contested
- Uncontested

Road

White Zone
(government controlled)
Figure 24
Philippine Estimate of Village Control, Mid-1984

- CPP/NPA controlled
- CPP/NPA contested
- MNLF/BMA controlled
- MNLF/BMA contested

Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army
More National Liberation Front/Bangsa Motor Army
Appendix C

Communist Analysis of Philippine Society

In 1970 Jose Maria Sison published an analysis of social classes in the Philippines in *Philippine Society and Revolution*. Today, his ideas are still taught to all CPP members and form the basis for deciding a person’s eligibility for party membership. Table C-1 summarizes the essence of this class analysis. The terminology frequently appears in party propaganda and opposition publications, but the meanings are not clearly understood by most analysts. Modeled after Mao’s analysis of China’s prerevolutionary society, this analysis shows the enemies and targets of the Communist revolution and makes the point that landlords “owe a blood debt to the people” that must be satisfied at some future date—a fact that rarely surfaces when Communists describe their “nationalistic” revolution.

To win the support of a broad spectrum of Philippine society, the party tailors its propaganda to appeal to specific audiences. Figure 26 summarizes the main themes recurring in publications controlled and influenced by the party.
## Communist Class Analysis of Philippine Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Economic Status</th>
<th>Political Attitude</th>
<th>Role in the Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landlords</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big, middle, small</td>
<td>Landowners; leaseholders/concessionaires; managers and promoters of farm cooperatives; those who assist in collecting rent or managing estates; squatters</td>
<td>Own vast tract of land; exact onerous land rent; lend money at usurious rates; increase land rents arbitrarily</td>
<td>Most backward and reactionary; main obstacle to change; main social base of imperialism; resist the revolution violently</td>
<td>Target of the revolution; owe a blood debt to the people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bourgeoisie</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprador big bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Fifty big families (Soriano, Ayala, Zobel, etc); principal trading and financial agents of US imperialism; bureaucrats capitalists; managers, lawyers, big accountants, highly paid reactionary publicists, and intellectuals in service of big bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Ties to big landlords wealth derived from export of local raw materials and import of finished products</td>
<td>Control the present political system; violently opposed to the revolution</td>
<td>Target of the revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle bourgeoisie (national bourgeoisie)</td>
<td>Businesses interested in “nationalist industrialization”; manufacturers</td>
<td>Fettered by feudalism but many belong to landlord class</td>
<td>Inconsistent attitude toward revolution (leftists support revolution, rightists oppose it)</td>
<td>Limited participation in revolution possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Teachers, student youth, low-income professionals, office clerks and lower government officials, small businessmen, skilled workers</td>
<td>Possess small amount of property; limited and fixed income</td>
<td>Susceptible to counterrevolutionary ideas</td>
<td>Motive force of the revolution and reliable ally of working class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Have some savings</td>
<td>Rightwing</td>
<td>Abusive of imperialists; tendency to stay neutral; doubt effectiveness of revolution</td>
<td>Must be won over to the revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leftwing; welcome the revolution</td>
<td>Intelligentsia are the spearhead of the revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Role in Revolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich peasants (rural bourgeoisie)</td>
<td>5 percent of rural population; own their land and rent to others</td>
<td>Income exceeds needs; some are minor landlords; often side with reactionaries</td>
<td>Should not be prematurely targeted; encourage grain or cash contribution from them; must be removed from political leadership of barrios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle peasants (rural petty bourgeoisie)</td>
<td>15 to 20 percent of rural population</td>
<td>Self-sufficient; live austere; willing to join, welcome agricultural cooperation and socialism; reliable ally; important motive force of the revolution</td>
<td>Follow opinions of upper-middle and rich peasants in good times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper level</td>
<td>Slight surplus</td>
<td>Aspire to be rich peasants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level</td>
<td>Just self-sufficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower level</td>
<td>In debt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor peasants and farm workers</td>
<td>75 to 80 percent of rural population; tenants</td>
<td>Own no land; often obliged to sell their labor; often in debt; most reliable ally of proletariat; can be arroused and mobilized to smash landlords, imperialists, comprador big bourgeoisie, bureaucrat capitalists</td>
<td>Biggest motive force of revolution; because the land problem is their essential problem, it is main problem of the revolution; main source for NPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>15 percent of total manpower in Philippines; industrial workers; farm workers</td>
<td>Own no means of production; extremely oppressed by US imperialism, local capitalism, and feudalism</td>
<td>Always willing to exercise their clan leadership and strike down oppressors and exploiters</td>
<td>Leading force of the revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-proletariat</td>
<td>Unemployed and underemployed; dock workers, market carappers, pedicab drivers, jeepney drivers, and restaurant helpers</td>
<td>Irregular and insufficient income; eager to fight in revolution; A motive force of the revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumpen proletariat</td>
<td>Drug society—theft, robber, prostitutes, vagrants (often found in slums)</td>
<td>Resort to antisocial acts to make a living; easily bought off by the enemy; some can be remolded</td>
<td>They can become source of spring rebel bands and anarchist ideology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 25
CPF/NPA Perception of Current Political Spectrum in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revolutionary Force</th>
<th>&quot;Reformists&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Liberal Democrats&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Radical Allies&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Secorridale Exempts&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Villagers Insane&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core refugees</td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>US Insubordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>US Insubordination</td>
<td>NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democrats</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>US Insubordination</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>US Insubordination</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>US Insubordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Core Elements**
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination

**Groups**
- Anti-imperialists
- Anti-imperialists
- Anti-imperialists
- Anti-imperialists
- Anti-imperialists

**Reasons**
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination

**Conclusion**
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
- US Insubordination
Appendix H

Chronology of Key Events

1872
Three Franciscan priests—Fathers Burgos, Gomez, and Tamora—executed by the Spanish colonial government for inciting the Cavite Mutiny. Catholics in the CPP refer to the historical precedent of these “martyrs” in justifying the involvement of religious in the Communist revolution.

1880-1890s
“Propaganda Movement” initiated by a small group of intelligentsia to introduce ideas of European liberalism, including national self-determination into the Philippines. This movement set the stage for the revolution of 1896 and a precedent for a “second propaganda movement” to revise Communist ideology (that is, Sison’s attempt to introduce Maoist principles into the PKP) in the 1960s.

1896
Insurgency against the Spanish colonial government begins following the execution of the novelist, physician, and political thinker Jose Rizal by the Spanish. The insurgency is started by Andres Bonifacio—regarded as a “proletarian hero” by the Communists—who had organized workers in the slums of Manila.

1899-1902
Following the surrender of the Spanish in the Spanish-American War, the United States wages massive counterinsurgency effort against the guerrilla forces of Emilio Aguinaldo. 150,000 US soldiers fought the guerrillas; more than 4,000 were killed. The Communists today portray themselves as the standard bearers of the 1896 “unfinished” revolution.

7 November 1930
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) established by Crisanto Evangelista.

1942-45
Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon—Hukbalahap (Anti-Japanese People’s Army), the armed wing of the PKP, wages guerrilla war against the Japanese in Central Luzon.

1950-54
PKP wages armed insurgency in Central Luzon against the Philippine Government. The guerrilla organization crumbles with the surrender of leader Luis Taruc in May 1954.

30 November 1964
Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) (KM) founded by Jose Maria Sison and other young PKP radicals to lead the movement to revitalize the PKP known now as the “Second Propaganda Movement.” By 1966 the KM claimed 10,000 members throughout the Philippines.

11 September 1967
League of Filipino Students, a front organization for the KM, founded ostensibly to protest rising school tuition fees.

1967
First major theoretical document of the CPP revolution published, Jose Maria Sison’s Struggle for National Democracy. Reprinted in 1972 by Amado Hernandez Memorial Foundation, Quezon City.

65
Secret
1968 Young radicals in the PKP compile a document, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party," enumerating the political, ideological, and organizational mistakes of the PKP in an attempt to wrest leadership from the party's old guard.

26 December 1968 A new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) founded by dissident young radical cadres in the PKP who desire armed struggle based on the strategy and tactics of Mao Zedong.

1969 Young radical Muslims led by Nurullahi Misur—A colleague of Jose Maria Sison at the University of the Philippines and in the KM—split from the Moro Independence Movement and form the Moro National Liberation Front.

29 March 1969 The New People's Army (NPA) founded as the military arm of the CPP. Under the leadership of Bernabe Buscayno, "Commander Dante," the NPA begins with 60 men and women and 35 old firearms in Tarlac, Central Luzon.

1970 Lt. Victor Corpus, instructor at the Philippine Military Academy, defects to the NPA after raiding the academy armory.

The CPP/NPA expands into Isabela Province (Cagayan Valley).

30 July 1970 CPP leader Jose Maria Sison's Philippine Society and Revolution published in both English and Filipino editions and immediately becomes the ideological primer for the CPP. (Reprinted by the Chinese Communist newspaper Ta Kung Pao in Hong Kong in 1971 and by International Association of Filipino Patriots, Oakland, California, in 1979.)

1971 CPP/NPA expands into Southern Luzon—the Bicol and Southern Tagalog regions.

February 1972 Catholics for National Liberation (CNL) founded by CPP member and admirer of Mao Zedong, Father Edicio de la Torre, as an organization of Christians in support of the NDF and Communist insurgency.

22 April 1972 Sison's Pomeroy's Portrait: Revisionist Renegade published by Revolutionary School of Mao Tsetung Thought.

July 1972 "Karagatan" arms shipment intercepted.

22 September 1972 Marcos government declares martial law following large, violent student demonstrations in Manila.

Fall 1972 MNLF initiates insurgency in Western Mindanao.

1973 CPP/NPA expands into Samar, Panay, Negros, and Mindanao.

April 1973 CPP creates the Preparatory Commission for the National Democratic Front (NDF) and issues a manifesto endorsing armed struggle and a 10-point program.
1974

CPP/NPA claims to be operating in 34 provinces.

PKP leadership surrenders formally to Marcos.

High point of the MNLF insurgency.

27 November 1974

More than 1,000 residents of Tondo, the Philippines' largest slum, march to Malacañang Palace to protest a government plan to raze their homes. Led by ZOTO (Zone One Tondo Association), a CPP-infiltrated group.

1 December 1974

Sison publishes Specific Characteristics of Our People's War, which outlines the strategy for waging Maoist people's war in the Philippine archipelago. Reprinted in 1979 by International Association of Filipino Patriots, Oakland, California.

1975

CPP/NPA expands into Quezon and Aurora Provinces.

May 1975

"Nine independent unions and a number of small workers' groups" unite to form the Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (Alliance of Filipino Workers) (BMP), a CPP-infiltrated labor organization. A Catholic "workers' mass" is held to mark the occasion.

June 1975

Marcos government reestablishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Chinese support for the CPP/NPA wanes.

October 1975

The CPP-infiltrated labor group, BMP, leads a workers' strike at La Tondena Corp. distillery to test a government proclamation forbidding strikes in essential industries. Workers seize the factory, 400 are arrested, and three days later the government allows management to grant the workers' demands. Before the year ended, workers in 26 major firms went on strike. The BMP had reportedly grown to 130 unions with some 80,000 members.

1975

CPP claims that this year its urban underground was responsible for more than 400 strikes, with the support of students, religious, and the urban poor.

1976

NPA leader Bernabe Buscayno, Commander Dante, captured.

CPP/NPA expands into Ilocos-Cordillera-Pangasinan areas of Northern Luzon. The party claims to be operating in all 12 regions of the Philippines with 20 guerrilla fronts.

December 1976

The Marcos government signs an agreement with the MNLF in Tripoli providing for Moro autonomy. A nine-month cease-fire with the MNLF follows.

Early 1977

Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the CPP organization for party youth banned at the imposition of martial law, revived.

1977

April 1977  
ZOTO leader Trinidad Herrera arrested. A year later she runs for parliament in national elections and subsequently goes underground.

July/August 1977  
Student protests and boycotts erupt at 25 major colleges and universities.

10 November 1977  
CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison captured.

12 November 1977  
NDF Preparatory Commission reissued its 10-point program with more detailed analysis of conditions, more precise statement of goals, and more specific tasks to be accomplished.

1977  
Horacio “Boy” Morales defects to the CPP/NPA. (He was captured in 1982.)

October/November 1980  
Permanent People’s Tribunal—sponsored by European radicals and the CPP/NPA and MNLF—meets at the University of Antwerp, Belgium, and condemns the Philippine Government. Proceedings are published in London in 1981.

Early 1981  
Marcos ends martial law just before visit of Pope John Paul II.

1981  
Government initiates KKK Program to aid the rural population economically. The program yields few results.

1982  
Government initiates Oplan Katatagan, an integrated counterinsurgency program that produces few results.

21 August 1983  
Aquino assassination leads to first major protests in more than a decade.