Terrorism Review

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This review is published biweekly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Other elements of the CIA as well as other agencies of the US Intelligence Community are encouraged to submit articles for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor.
Focus

North Korea Revives Terrorism Against the South

North Korean intelligence agents almost certainly were behind the disappearance of Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 858 over Southeast Asia on 29 November. The wreckage of the aircraft has not yet been found, but it is likely that the plane was brought down by a bomb. Information obtained as a result of the detention of two suspects in Bahrain on 1 December also points to P’yongyang. The attack may be part of a campaign aimed at disrupting the 1988 Olympics scheduled in Seoul during September.

Modus Operandi

The KAL flight originated in Baghdad on 29 November, landed briefly at Abu Dhabi to refuel, and was scheduled to go on to Bangkok and Seoul. The aircraft’s last communication was a routine request to enter Burmese airspace when the plane was 300 kilometers west of Tavoy, Burma, above the Andaman Sea. The fact that no other communication was received from the plane indicates it was the victim of a sudden disaster, probably a bomb blast. Since no new passengers boarded in Abu Dhabi, attention has focused on passengers who traveled from Baghdad.

Two of those passengers—using the names Shinichi Hachiya and Mayumi Hachiya and traveling as father and daughter on Japanese passports—departed the plane in Abu Dhabi early the morning of the 29th. They flew to Bahrain later in the morning where they stayed for two nights. The Japanese Embassy in Abu Dhabi determined that the pair had been aboard the downed aircraft and asked Bahraini assistance in detaining the two. The woman’s passport was discovered to have been forged, and the pair was prevented from boarding a flight to Amman and Rome on 1 December. During their interrogation by airport security personnel, the detainees bit cyanide capsules; the man died, but his female companion recovered. She was extradited to South Korea, along with his body and their personal effects, on 14 December.

Investigators determined the pair bought their tickets in Vienna on 19 November, traveled to Belgrade on 23 November, then to Baghdad on the 28th. They had tickets on KAL Flight 858 as far as Abu Dhabi and deplaned as scheduled; we do not know if they checked bags onto that flight in Baghdad or had only carry-on luggage. They exchanged tickets in Abu Dhabi for an earlier flight to Bahrain, then in Bahrain bought tickets for the 1 December flight.

1 The man’s passport was later determined to be also a forgery.
No explosive-related materials were found in the suspects’ luggage. If they had checked bags aboard the Korean airliner, those should have been removed in Abu Dhabi. None have turned up. If they brought a bomb aboard in their carry-on luggage, it would have to have been relatively compact and well disguised to have survived at least one preboarding inspection. Among the possible timing devices they could have used are a straight timer, a barometric switch that counts landings and takeoffs, or some combination of the two.

Links to P’yongyang—and Beyond?
Initial suspicion of North Korean involvement stemmed from the choice of a South Korean target and the typically North Korean attempt to avoid capture or interrogation. Cyanide capsules have been used by North Korean agents in past incidents. Although the two travelers have not yet been positively identified, their passports tend to link them to P’yongyang. A Korean living in Japan—who bore the same name as that on the deceased suspect’s passport—said on 2 December that he had loaned his passport and other personal papers to a business associate in 1983 and that these papers would have allowed the associate to forge a passport. The associate, Akira Miyamoto, is wanted in Japan as a member of a North Korean spy ring.

North Korea’s bitter criticism of Bahrain’s decision to extradite the woman to South Korea is a further indication of P’yongyang’s complicity. The North probably was behind a threat against a Bahraini extradition decision issued by “The Friends of Mayumi Hachiya” in the Middle East.

Other terrorist connections may come to light. The suspects spent five days in Belgrade—the longest single pause in their journey—suggesting that they may have received some operational or logistic support there. Belgrade hosts a North Korean Embassy and is the site of frequent visits by members of the Japanese Red Army (JRA). [25X1]

Assessing North Korea’s Motivation
North Korea presumably intended to embarrass Seoul and cast doubt on its ability to protect potential visitors. We do not believe that North Korean agents would carry out such an operation without authorization from the highest levels. If this bombing was the opening round in a campaign to disrupt plans for the Olympics,
however, we cannot explain why P'yongyang acted so far in advance. The timing might indicate an attempt to influence the 16 December presidential election in South Korea, but any indication of North Korean involvement would seem to favor ruling party nominee Roh Tae Woo, whom P'yongyang would least like to see in power.

We believe that North Korea intended to bring down the airliner over water, where its fate might never be known. After its agents had disappeared, P'yongyang could have let speculation about unknown terrorists take its course or arrange for a bogus group to claim credit and link the attack to the Olympics. As long as no clear evidence linked the North to the disappearance, it could launch other actions to disrupt the Olympics or embarrass the South.

**Results of the Attack**

The most immediate effect of the attack was to inject the North Korean threat into the South's presidential election campaign. Both President Chun and then candidate No Tae-u condemned P'yongyang for causing the crash, but the other candidates were more restrained. The raising of the North Korean threat may have helped ruling party candidate No, who won the race on 16 December with 36 percent of the vote; polls taken just before the airliner incident showed him even with his rivals or trailing with as much as 20 percent of the electorate undecided. At the margin, the incident probably gave new life to the frequently overused ruling camp theme of national security and undermined opposition candidates' efforts to use the theme of North-South reconciliation to their advantage. As the South Koreans now manage the investigation, emerging evidence confirming P'yongyang's role will keep the issue on the political front burner while the new regime copes with demonstrations and charges of fraud. Since Seoul is mindful of the need for stability and calm between now and the Olympics in September, it is unlikely to react violently when the North's role is fully exposed.

The bombing is likely to undermine North Korea's quest to share Olympic events with the South and perhaps end prospects for the North's participation in the games. The head of the South Korean Olympic Committee has said that, if the North is proved responsible, the South will end all talks on event sharing. In addition, the South's Unification Minister has warned that the incident could affect all aspects of negotiations with the North. We have no evidence that the South is considering armed retaliation against the North, as it deems stability essential for the elections and the Olympics.

If world opinion can be convinced that North Korea was behind the KAL incident, this act will rekindle images of P'yongyang's role in the October 1983 attempted assassination of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon. That bombing left 18 South Korean officials dead, caused Burma to break relations with P'yongyang, and brought the North unprecedented world condemnation and political isolation. The latest action will automatically link P'yongyang to acts of terrorism directed against Seoul before or during the Olympics and maintain the North's isolation internationally. It has already complicated any such plans P'yongyang may have made by prompting Seoul to increase security measures and to ask for more foreign security assistance.
Highlights

Significant Developments

Western Europe

Belgium

Suspected CCC Member Arrested
On 3 November Belgian police arrested a suspected member of the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), Christophe Vercauteran, as he was returning from Great Britain to Oostende. He was charged only with association with criminal elements and will be detained at least 30 days. Vercauteran was an active member of the pro-CCC Ligne Rouge in the early 1980s. Belgian authorities arrested most members of the group in 1985, and there have been no CCC terrorist incidents in Belgium since December 1985.

Vercauteran's arrest could lead to the development of new information about the CCC, possibly affecting upcoming trials of other members. Although there is only limited circumstantial evidence against Vercauteran, police may claim that information developed from his arrest could affect evidence presented in the trials of other CCC members scheduled for January 1988. If police request these trials be delayed, it may be because they hope to receive further information on ties between the French group Action Directe and the CCC.

France

Action Directe Explosives Expert Captured
On 27 November, police in Lyon arrested Action Directe (AD) terrorist Max Frerot, the last known AD operative to be at large. He was arrested after a shootout with police—one of whom was injured—when they discovered him in a hotel parking lot during a routine identity check. Frerot was known as AD's explosives expert. He has been implicated in nearly 80 terrorist incidents since 1979, including several bank robberies and shootings, in which at least three persons were murdered. Frerot carried detailed lists of targets he surveilled, including French political figures of the right and left. French police believe Frerot planned to attack some of these individuals when members of AD's internationalist wing stand trial in January 1988.

French counterterrorist officials believe that Frerot's arrest signals the end of AD as an active terrorist organization. After the arrest of his mentor, Andre Olivier, in March 1986, Frerot reportedly lived on the run, sleeping in parking lots and empty garages, indicating that probably no support group is left. Because Frerot was in the "nationalist" wing of AD, he lacked contacts with foreign groups such as West Germany's Red Army Faction that could have provided refuge. Frerot traveled between Paris and Lyon and never left France. They were impressed, nonetheless, by the detailed targeting information he had amassed and noted that, even alone, he posed a serious threat.
Hizballah Cell Leader Charged With Bombings
Additional charges have been levied against the leader of a Hizballah-backed network that conducted the series of bombings that swept Paris in 1986. French officials have been investigating the cell, composed of North African expatriates and led by Tunisian national Fuad Ali Salah, since the first members were arrested in March 1987. A French magistrate on 3 December charged Salah with conducting four more bombings, including one at a cafeteria in the La Defense commercial center on 12 September 1986 that injured 41 persons. Salah previously had been charged with involvement in attacks at the Paris townhall post office and the Tati department store in September 1986; the latter bombing killed seven persons and injured 51 others.

A group calling itself the Committee of Solidarity with Arab Political Prisoners (CSPPA)—believed at the time to be a covername for the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction—took credit for all the attacks. French officials have gathered evidence, however, that several Hizballah members brought the explosives into France, stored them with Salah’s help, and planted some of the bombs. We cannot confirm ties between the Salah group and the CSPPA, the composition of which remains unknown. French officials recently have begun to play down the role of Iran as the instigator of the bombings, probably because of the deal to release two French hostages but also because of the lack of legal evidence to tie Iranian officials to the bombings.

France Cuts Deal for Release of French Hostages
The release on 27 November of Jean-Louis Normandin and Roger Auque, two French journalists held captive in Lebanon, almost certainly was part of a deal between France and Iran, which also involved French concessions to Tehran on bilateral issues. The day before their release, the Revolutionary Justice Organization (RJO)—believed to be a covername for a Hizballah faction—claimed it would release two French hostages because it had received “assurances” that France would change its Middle East policy. Normandin, kidnapped on 8 March 1986, says he shared a room with US hostages Joseph Cicippo and Edward Tracy; Auque, abducted on 13 January 1987, was held briefly with a South Korean hostage who was released on 31 October. The RJO claimed responsibility for the abductions of Normandin, Cicippo, and Tracy; no claim was issued for Auque.

We believe that the two Frenchmen were freed as the result of an agreement between France and Iran. On 29 November, a French magistrate briefly questioned Iranian Embassy employee Vahid Gorji about his ties to a pro-Iranian terrorist cell arrested in March 1987. At the same time, French Consul Paul Torri appeared before an Iranian court to answer trumped-up espionage charges. No legal charges were issued against Gorji, who was immediately taken to a French Government chartered aircraft. Gorji and Torri were exchanged in Karachi, Pakistan, on 30 November. The same day, police barricades in front of the Iranian and French Embassies were removed, and the diplomats were allowed to return home. In another gesture toward Tehran, French officials on 7 December arrested 20 Iranian dissidents in Paris and on the following day announced that 14 of them would be expelled to Gabon.
Other details are not known, but France probably also agreed to repay monies owed Iran. Statements by French Prime Minister Chirac and Foreign Minister Raimond strongly imply that Paris made promises to Tehran concerning repaying the remaining $600-700 million of a $1 billion Eurodif loan dating from the time of the Shah. Chirac has tied normalization of relations between the two countries to release of the three remaining French hostages, and we believe the two countries will continue negotiations to obtain their freedom.

Although this most recent hostage release demonstrates Iran's direct influence over the fate of some of the hostages, we doubt that Tehran could force Hizballah to free all its hostages in Lebanon. Hizballah is likely to become more reluctant to free hostages unless it can achieve its goals, some of which may not coincide with those of Tehran.

Greek Terrorists Intensify Campaign

A recent attack by a terrorist group probably affiliated with the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA) has escalated the terrorist campaign against the Greek Government. A bomb blast ripped through a cafeteria in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Athens on 10 December, injuring five persons—one critically—and causing a fire. Four minutes before the explosion, an anonymous caller warned of the attack and claimed a second bomb would explode. A group calling itself the Anti-Authority Struggle took credit for the attack, claiming the Chamber reflected the economic policies of the government and its two-year austerity program.

The Anti-Authority Struggle made its first appearance last May when it claimed responsibility for a bomb attack against a Greek-owned bank. The type of attack, target, and rhetoric in the claim for the May attack echoed those of ELA subgroups, suggesting that the Anti-Authority Struggle is a subgroup of ELA. Previously, ELA and its affiliates tried to avoid casualties by attacking late at night and after telephone warnings. The Chamber of Commerce attack, however, clearly was intended to cause casualties among Greek officials: it took place while some Chamber members were at lunch and others were voting.

Red Brigades Plans To Surveil US Facilities

Italian security services have arrested 11 suspected Red Brigades–Communist Combatant Party (BR-PCC) members since May in Florence and Rome. One member, Giancarlo Seghetti, was arrested on 20 November and charged with participation in the postal-van robbery in Rome in February 1987, during which two policemen were killed. He is the brother of hardcore BR member Bruno Seghetti. The suspects claimed that in the fall of 1985 they were tasked with collecting information on a senior US Army officer of the 8th Support Group at Camp Darby in northern Italy. They reportedly considered the task too difficult and never carried it out. Later these instructions were canceled.
This is the second known incident of the BR targeting the US Army facility at Camp Darby. Documents discovered in a 1982 raid of a BR hideout reportedly included a list of CIA agents in Italy and information from US Aviano Airbase and Camp Darby. The Camp Darby notes also contained details on local facilities frequented by military personnel.

Spain

ETA Violence Increases
Members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) group claimed responsibility for a car bomb on 11 December that destroyed a building housing Spanish military families in Zaragoza, killing 12 persons and injuring more than 40 others. Two terrorists reportedly parked the car bomb at 0600 hours near the barracks, which housed 50 families, then sped off in another vehicle. The 50-kilogram explosive detonated almost immediately, bringing down the entire building and killing women and children as well as guardsmen, according to press reports. In a communique, ETA congratulated itself on the attack. Later that day a policeman in Basauri was seriously maimed when a letter bomb blew up in his face, and before midnight, ETA shot to death a policeman walking home with his wife in Placencia de las Armas. On 13 December, a crowd of roughly 400,000 persons held impromptu demonstrations against terrorism in Zaragoza, some demanding the death penalty for terrorists.

Hardcore ETA members probably staged the attacks to signal a rejection of Madrid's current dialogue with more moderate members, marking the end of a six-month lull in major ETA attacks. Although Madrid reportedly was near a breakthrough in establishing a truce with ETA, the attacks highlight the fact that not all of ETA is represented at the negotiating table and that police arrests have not destroyed the group's ability to stage operations. The attack in Zaragoza is the fifth this year against Spanish military personnel. The city, which is home to a US airbase, hosts hundreds of Basque students, some of whom could provide ETA with support.

West Germany

Trial Date Set for Abbas Hammadi
The trial of Abbas Hammadi, brother of TWA Flight 847 hijacker Muhammad Hammadi, is set to begin on 5 January 1988 in Dusseldorf. Abbas, a Lebanese who holds German citizenship, was arrested on 26 January at the Frankfurt airport, two weeks after his brother was captured trying to smuggle liquid explosives into West Germany. Abbas is charged with participating in the kidnapings of two West Germans in Beirut in January, for which he could receive a three-to-15-year prison sentence. In connection with the kidnapings, he has also been charged with attempting to coerce the West German Government into releasing Muhammad, a charge which carries an additional one-to-10-year penalty.

No trial date has been set for Muhammad Hammadi, who, in addition to his role in the TWA hijacking in June, has been closely linked to the Hizballah cell in Lebanon responsible for the kidnapping and detention of US hostages. Abbas Hammadi's trial is the less sensitive of the two. We believe negotiations between Iran and West Germany have centered on Muhammad, who is more important in the Hizballah movement than his brother.
Latin America

Peru

SL Attempt To Regain Media Limelight
By staging simultaneous operations in Lima on 19 November, the Sendero Luminoso (SL) apparently attempted to capture a share of the publicity recently given to Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) actions in San Martin Department. Following an operation that blacked out Lima and most of Peru’s central coast region, 30 SL members attacked a Nissan factory, setting fires in the installation after entering the plant on a company bus. Police responding to the attack killed four terrorists and captured a few others. On the same night, SL assailants threw small explosives at several buildings in the capital, including the US Embassy where a policeman was injured. Other explosions at the Health and Justice Ministries, as well as at a bank and hotel, caused damage but no injuries. The attacks and the absence of a claim of responsibility are consistent with SL’s modus operandi.

Technical Trends

Western Europe

Cyprus

Scanning Device Installed at Larnaca Airport
Airport officials reportedly have installed a scanning device to monitor baggage from all incoming Arab airlines for illegal weapons and ammunition. If suspicious items are detected, the baggage will be inspected after it has been claimed. Cyprus has been used as a key transit point for Middle Eastern terrorists. Airport officials now appear concerned about reducing such use of Larnaca. The US Embassy in Nicosia reported in September that the airport met or exceeded most international airport security guidelines and that its security equipment appears to be modern and well maintained.
West Germany

Remotely Controlled Robots Purchased for Bomb Disposal
German state security officials in Bavaria reportedly have purchased three robots for use in bomb disposal and counterterrorism operations. The US-made robots can be outfitted with water cannons, shotguns, explosive detectors, and other equipment that can be tailored to various situations. The radio-controlled, battery-operated vehicles have a range of 5 kilometers and can operate on sloping surfaces. An operator can use two color video cameras to monitor the area around the robots. Weighing only 50 kilograms each, the robots are small enough to fit in the trunk of an average-size automobile. The compact size and versatility of the robots indicate they can be used for surveillance or disposing of a wide variety of explosive devices while security personnel remain at a distance.

Middle East

New Methods To Disguise Explosives
Israeli and Spanish authorities have discovered explosives disguised as oil paintings. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) intend to use such explosives in attacks outside the Middle East. In this method of disguising explosives, canvas is saturated with the explosive and oil paints are applied to the surface. After the paint dries, a small hole is made in the picture, a triggering device and detonator are attached, and the picture is wrapped. When the package is opened, the device explodes.

As security forces have developed better methods for detecting explosives, terrorists have become more innovative in their deception techniques. In the last 18 months, explosives disguised as olives, chocolate eggs, and ceramic butterflies have been confiscated from Middle Eastern terrorists. Attentive security personnel were responsible for detecting flaws in the disguises. Some types of explosives, such as TNT and plastic explosives, can be cast into almost any form and their consistency can be altered without significantly degrading their explosive characteristics.
Lebanon: Hizbullah

Spreading the Word

We, the son of Hizbullah's nation, consider ourselves a part of the Islamic nation in the world, which is facing the most tyrannical arrogant assault from both the East and West.

Excerpt from a 1985 Hizbullah press statement

Since its emergence in 1982-83, the group of Lebanese Shia radicals, collectively known as Hizbullah, has rapidly become the most dynamic Islamic fundamentalist movement outside Iran. Inspired, nurtured, and trained by Iran, Hizbullah now appears to be developing its own program to assist other fledgling fundamentalist Shia movements and to export its brand of Islamic radicalism.

Hizbullah's radical Shia leadership, driven by a fundamentalist ideology inspired by the Iranian revolution, aims to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Like their Iranian brethren, Hizbullah maintains that the Islamic Revolution must be a worldwide phenomenon and cannot be confined within the boundaries of a single country. We believe Hizbullah, with Iran's support, is now encouraging fundamentalism throughout the Arab world and may be assuming the same mentor role that Iran did in Lebanon.

Iran has played an integral role in the development and training of radical Shia in Lebanon. Several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guard members are presently in Lebanon to provide both military training and logistic support to Hizbullah. The Revolutionary Guard provides Hizbullah with training in weapons, explosives, military tactics, and communications. We do not believe that the contacts of Hizbullah with other fundamentalist groups has reached the dimensions of Iran's links to it, but rather that it is in the initial stage of testing the waters.

Hizbullah has begun to pass its knowledge of military tactics and recruitment techniques to other fundamentalist groups through contacts and training provided both inside and outside of Lebanon. Although we see evidence of significant contacts in the Maghreb and Gulf States.

Although most Muslims worldwide are Sunni, in Lebanon and Iran the Shia predominate. Longstanding ideological differences will hinder Hizbullah's activities in Sunni-dominated countries (as it has Iran's), but growing fundamentalist tendencies in both Shia and Sunni communities worldwide are at least superficially helping bridge the obstacles to cooperation. Fundamentalist groups are able to identify with each other as oppositionist political groups who advocate nonsecular alternatives.

Hizbullah Ties to North Africa

The fundamentalist movements in predominantly Sunni North Africa, while distinct from those in Lebanon, appear to have loose affiliations with the Lebanese group. Tunisian fundamentalists in particular appear linked to Lebanon's radical Shia. Last September, a Tunisian court sentenced the leader of the largest Islamic fundamentalist group in Tunisia—the Islamic Tendency Movement—to a life sentence for terrorist activities. Almost immediately, Lebanon's Hizbullah responded with a communique, authenticated with a photograph of US hostage Terry Anderson, threatening retaliation against government leaders if the death sentences of other group members were carried out.

In addition, French police arrested several Tunisian and Moroccan immigrants in March 1987 who acted as a support cell for Hizbullah terrorist attacks in France.

Hizbullah members—probably with guidance from Tehran—brought explosives into France, stored them at cell members' homes, and assisted the North Africans in placing bombs that shook Paris in 1986. The Tunisian ringleader of the group had
studied in Iran, but most members of his group were Sunni Muslims. Several Hizbollah cells have also been discovered in Algeria. The cells reportedly consist of Algerians trained in both Iran and Lebanon.

Relations between Hizbollah and Egyptian Sunni fundamentalists also appear to be developing. growing sympathy among Egyptian fundamentalists for the radical Shia agenda—a sharp departure from the past. Early this year a series of articles and interviews by Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, a militant Egyptian cleric linked to the assassins of former President Anwar Sadat, appeared in the Hizbollah press. Ideologically close to Hizbollah, Abd al-Rahman advocates an Islamic nation and opposition to the moderate Egyptian Government, Israel, and the West. While Abd al-Rahman’s Sunni affiliation and his belief that Egypt, not Iran, should lead the future Islamic nation almost certainly will hinder cooperation, such public ties between radical Sunni and Shia groups provide valuable propaganda and underscore Hizbollah’s commitment to Islamic unity.

Tutor to the Gulf States
Hizbollah’s affiliation with Muslim extremists in the Gulf Arab states appears to focus on training and may predate ties to similar elements in the Maghreb because of longstanding Iranian interest in the Gulf. In late 1985 a large training camp was discovered in northern Lebanon near the village of Janta, in the vicinity of Bala‘bakk, part of which is controlled by Hizbollah. More than 2,000 Shia were reported to be training there, including about 60 from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. After their training, these Shia were to perform operations in the Gulf states.

Hizbollah military trainers have begun to organize and train Shia activists in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.

Taking the Show to Syria
An increasingly important target for Hizbollah activity may be neighboring Syria. Hizbollah-Syrian relations are a barometer of sorts for the larger Iranian-Syrian relationship. In recent months, the relationship has been tense as Syria tries to contain Iranian influence in Lebanon and impose its security plan on large sectors of Lebanon. The kidnapping of American journalist Charles Glass demonstrated the fragile equilibrium of the relationship. Embarrassed by the breach of security, Syrian troops cracked down on Hizbollah movements and supply shipments while Glass was incarcerated but were careful not to push restrictions to the point of open hostility.

Hizbollah has longstanding ties to the anti-Syrian Sunni fundamentalist group, the Islamic Unification Movement (IUM), in northern Lebanon. The Islamic Unification Movement in turn has ties to Syrian oppositionist groups such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Many Syrian fundamentalists found a haven with the IUM in Tripoli, Lebanon, after the Syrian Government’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982. Iran may attempt to promote these relationships more strongly to obtain access through Syria’s borders in the event that Iranian-Syrian relations sour and Iran decides to embark on a campaign of subversion.

Hizbollah officials are trying to establish a covert presence in Syria to protect their interests in view of the perceived improvement in US-Syrian ties. A team of Hizbollah members was to be sent to Syria to study the issue. The fluctuating Syrian-imposed travel restrictions concerning Lebanon and the desire to develop covert ties to Syrian fundamentalists could hasten the development of bases and terrorist acts within Syria.

Hizbollah has a contingency plan to attack the US Embassy in Damascus. Such an attack would demonstrate the group’s ability to strike within Syria if Syrian-Iranian ties were broken.

Outlook
Hizbollah will seek to expand its fledgling ties to fundamentalist groups in an attempt to protect its growing revolutionary reputation. The group will work closely with Iran. It may step up joint training with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers in the Bekaa and try to send arms clandestinely to its...
new friends. In time, Hizballah's ties to other fundamentalists may be sufficiently developed to enlist their aid in terrorist operations against mutual enemies.

Much of Hizballah's success in expanding ties to other fundamentalist groups will depend on its relations with Syria. A Syrian crackdown on Hizballah's freedom of movement or supplies could destroy its capabilities to train other fundamentalists. Syrian tolerance, or even a continuance of the present occasional Syrian harassment, will give Hizballah the room to maneuver and develop its aspirations to become a sponsor of worldwide Islamic fundamentalism.
The M-19: Down But Not Out

Colombia's 19th of April Movement (M-19) had little success in 1987 in overcoming its serious financial and organizational problems, despite joining a grand alliance of insurgent factions. Still not fully recovered from the disastrous Palace of Justice takeover attempt in late 1985 and the death of former M-19 leader Alvaro Fayad in March of 1986, the group began 1987 with low funds and a lack of strong leadership. A number of important operations were canceled by the group in 1987 because of a lack of money. The leadership appears to be making attempts to reverse the group's failure of command, lack of direction, and depleted financial resources. We believe its future activities probably will be directed toward obtaining money for the group and improving its tarnished image.

Money Problems

Foreign support for M-19 this year appears to have been minimal. During the first half of 1987, Cuba apparently provided little in the way of financing, although in May it sent a shipment of small arms. Speculation regarding the reason for Cuba's lack of financial support has ranged from poor economic conditions in Cuba to Fidel Castro's displeasure with M-19's ineffectiveness and lack of leadership. Although M-19 commander Carlos Pizarro Leongomez claimed in December 1986 that Libya would provide assistance, such support also appears to have been limited. Attempts to raise funds from Ecuadoran and Peruvian insurgent groups and from the Panamanian Government this November also were unsuccessful.

We believe lack of international backing is the major factor in the crippling of M-19 operations this year. A major joint guerrilla offensive in Cauca Province—scheduled for June—had to be indefinitely postponed when M-19 reportedly was unable to provide food, ammunition, boots, and uniforms. The operation had been planned by the National Guerrilla Coordinator (CNG), an alliance of several Colombian guerrilla groups. When M-19 was unable to carry out its part in the operation, it appears to have lowered its prestige within the CNG and to have depressed morale among M-19's rank and file.

M-19 urban guerrillas also were low on funds, standards of full-time M-19 members in urban areas had fallen to such an extent that some middle-ranking leaders considered leaving the organization. Training reportedly had to be canceled, and risky and ill-planned operations were launched to gain funds. The degree to which M-19 urban units were able to remain viable depended greatly on local conditions, with M-19 guerrillas in Bogota gaining some assistance through cooperation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia's (FARC) newly formed urban unit.

Organizational Chaos

Lack of national-level leadership was another serious problem for the group this year. In March, the absence of M-19 leader Pizarro as a leadership crisis. Pizarro apparently was out of Colombia from December 1986 to May 1987. Two other top M-19 leaders reportedly were also out of the country in January and February 1987. Because Pizarro allegedly failed to issue guidance in his absence, many midlevel leaders followed their own agendas. Criticism of Pizarro has been widespread even when the leader has been in the country. In late November regional leaders agreed that Pizarro had made no significant proposals and was not a charismatic leader.

The regional officers also acknowledged, however, that, despite Pizarro's shortcomings, no one else was qualified to lead the M-19.

In July and August the group hit its lowest point. Many M-19 members were hungry and homeless, Discipline was rapidly eroding and increasing numbers of M-19 members

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Secret

DI TR 87-025
21 December 1987
had announced their plans to return home or to join
other guerrilla organizations. Most of those considering joining other guerrilla
groups favored the National Liberation Army (ELN). An ELN official reportedly observed in mid-August, however, that M-19 members were slowly dividing into two factions—one pro-ELN and one pro-FARC. This fragmentation may have been halted by M-19’s decision to join the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator, an alliance of six Colombian guerrilla organizations, which includes both FARC and the ELN.

M-19’s leadership appears now to be working vigorously to overcome its failure of command, lack of direction, and absence of financial resources. Recent planning appears focused on moneymaking operations and on terrorist actions that could raise the national—and international—image of the M-19. The group’s participation in the Simon Bolivar alliance, while opposed by some M-19 members, probably will result in logistic and materiel support to the group.

M-19 may be cooperating with criminals and drug traffickers in carrying out hired killings and kidnappings. Colombian officials have learned M-19 also plans to attack multinational corporations and large estate owners, and US Embassy officials believe the group may soon launch a major terrorist action.

M-19 guerrillas planned to take over an embassy or kidnap a foreign diplomat in December 1987 to gain ransom money and international attention. Upon successful completion of this terrorist operation, M-19 members will travel to Libya. We believe that Libya has promised additional financial and training assistance to the group in return for positive terrorist results.

**Outlook**
The coming months will be critical to the future of the M-19. Financial backing is vital if the group is to regain its strength. To regain its prestige, the group will have to either increase its overall terrorist activity or carry out one major terrorist attack. US officials and businessmen undoubtedly will be high on M-19’s list of potential targets.
The Terrorism Diary for February

Below is a compendium of February dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.

1-11 February 1979

**Iran.** Return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran from exile in Paris. The 10 following days are celebrated as the “Ten Days of Dawn,” marking the victory over the old regime.

1 February 1984

**India.** Kashmir separatist leader Maqbool Butt executed.

1 February 1985

**India.** Kashmir Liberation Front sets off two bombs to commemorate Butt’s execution.

4 February 1948

**Sri Lanka.** Independence Day.

4 February 1961

**Angola.** Beginning of armed struggle against Portugal.

4 February 1986

**Israel-Libya-Syria.** Israeli interception of Libyan aircraft carrying Syrian officials.

5 February 1960

**Burma.** Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Revolution Day.

6 February 1840

**New Zealand.** Waitangi Day (national day).

6 February 1981

**Pakistan.** Founding of Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

6 February 1984

**Lebanon.** Fall of West Beirut to Muslim militias.

7 February 1974

**Grenada.** Independence Day.

7 February 1986

**Philippines.** Ferdinand Marcos reelected president; widespread fraud charges and demonstrations led to his fleeing to United States.

11 February

**Japan.** National Foundation Day.

11 February 1929

**Italy, Vatican City.** Lateran Treaty signed (governs relationship between Italy and Vatican City).

12 February 1947

**Burma.** Union Day.

13 February 1961

**Zaire.** Death of Patrice Lumumba.

13 February 1975

**Cyprus.** Declaration of establishment of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.
15 February 1966  Colombia. Death of National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla leader and priest Camilo Torres.

16 February 1918  Lithuanian SSR. Independence Day.

17 February 1979  Vietnam. Invasion by Chinese troops.


19 February 1947  Poland. People's Republic established.

19 February 1952  Nepal. King Tribhuvan Memorial Day.


22 February 1948  Romania. Founding of Romanian Workers' Party.

22 February 1972  Qatar. Coup d'etat that brought Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani to power.

22 February 1979  St. Lucia. Independence Day.


24 February 1948  Czechoslovakia. First Communist government.


27 February 1844  Dominican Republic. Independence Day.


28 February 1977  El Salvador. Leftists demonstrating against alleged election fraud in San Salvador killed by security forces; Popular League of 28 February (LP-28) takes its name from this event.

28 February 1986  Sweden. Unidentified gunman kills Prime Minister Olaf Palme.
Chronology of Terrorism—1987

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

23 September
Lebanon: A group calling itself the Revolutionary Crescent Organization claims responsibility in Beirut for several recent attacks in Egypt. The targets included US diplomats, two former Egyptian ministers, and a Coptic library that was burned in Asyut.

26 September
Lebanon: Boobytrapped car explodes at Tall Square in Tripoli, injuring four persons. The explosion caused several fires and property damage in the area. No group has claimed responsibility.

Early October
Tanzania: Dar Es Salaam police arrest three armed Palestinians suspected of plotting to kill visiting Pakistani Shia religious leader. Heavy security was placed around the visiting leader, who is known for his fundamentalist Shia and anti-Sunni views.

4 October
Lebanon: Nepalese UNIFIL soldier is killed by South Lebanese Army (SLA) gunfire, after terrorists detonate two roadside bombs near an SLA force. The UNIFIL soldier was hit when SLA soldiers fired toward the perpetrators as they fled the scene of the incident.

8 October
Lebanon: Lebanese Liberation Organization claims responsibility for the bombing of Syrian Intelligence Headquarters in Tripoli. Three Syrian soldiers were killed, and a number of others were injured in the incident. The group also claimed responsibility for the shooting and death of a Syrian intelligence member and the wounding of his companion on the previous night.

9 October
Lebanon: Masked gunmen abduct Iranian national George Asfahani as he drives down a main street in Beirut. Asfahani was abducted earlier this year and, after he was released, stopped payment on a ransom check. Police believe the same group, annoyed at being deceived, may have seized him again.

Lebanon: A group, calling itself the Liberation Battalion, claims responsibility for two explosions targeted against Syrian forces. The explosions occurred outside the Soviet Embassy on Tallat Al-Khayyat and in front of the Hili Barracks in West Beirut.
Peru: Police arrest five members of Sendero Luminoso (SL) at a hideout in Huancabamba Province. Authorities recovered a large amount of stolen explosive materials and captured several firearms in the raid.

10 October

Lebanon: Car bomb intended for the deputy to Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', Dr. Hashim Al-Husayni, explodes prematurely near a hospital in Tripoli. The three passengers in the car were killed. Reportedly the victims had been assigned the task of assassinating Husayni by another Ja'Ja' aide.

Philippines: Suspected New People's Army rebels assassinate local anti-Communist newspaperman in Cebu City. The victim had been the target of numerous death threats.

Sri Lanka: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members attack Sinhalese villagers in the northeast, killing nine persons and injuring seven others. As many as 150 persons have been killed in recent LTTE attacks against Sinhalese civilians.

24 October

Thailand: Small explosive device explodes under Sungai Golok-Bangkok train as it traveled between the Yupoh and Taseart stations in Yala Province. There were no casualties, and the train failed to derail. Muslim separatists are believed responsible.

27 October


29 October

Colombia: The National Liberation Army (ELN) claims responsibility for the kidnapping of noted sculptor Rodrigo Arenas Betancur several days earlier.

Colombia: People's Liberation Army (EPL) terrorists release kidnapped physician for $120,000 ransom. The victim had been held since 24 August.

2 November

Colombia: ELN assailants bomb police vehicle in Arauca. The explosion killed four policemen and wounded two others.

6 November

Portugal: Portuguese police detain Guinea-Bissau diplomat. Luis Queba Sambu, who had been responsible for security at the Guinea-Bissau Embassy in Lisbon, turned over explosive devices to Portuguese authorities and asked for political asylum. Sambu claims the explosives were to be used against dissidents opposed to
Bissau. However, Portuguese police found other explosive devices at the Embassy and at the diplomat’s residence, which they believe were for use in terrorist operations outside Guinea-Bissau. Police suspect that Sambu may have links to the Portuguese Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) and the French group Action Directe.

9 November

Sri Lanka: Car bomb explodes outside police station in Colombo, killing at least 30 persons and injuring 100 others, including children who were leaving a nearby school. The blast damaged several buildings and destroyed at least 20 vehicles. No group has claimed responsibility, but police suspect the LTTE.

West Germany: Government releases two Red Army Faction (RAF) members, placing them on probation after they served 10 years of a 15-year sentence for attempted murder and membership in the RAF. Both were captured in 1977 after a gunfight with Dutch police. The two terrorists were in a work-release program after renouncing their support for the RAF.

10 November

Colombia: ELN terrorists attack two buses near Cano Tigre, killing a noncommissioned officer who was a passenger on one of the buses. The assailants did not harm other passengers or cause any damage.

Colombia: Members of the ELN attack police station and Cattleman’s Bank in Pailitas. The perpetrators, wearing military uniforms, killed a policeman and wounded three other police officers and three soldiers.

Turkey: Police capture 18 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) terrorists in raids in Hakkari Province. The captured members had also served in support roles as couriers, intelligence agents, and suppliers of provisions for the group.

13 November

Turkey: Security forces arrest 18 more PKK members during raid in Istanbul. The police also seized ammunition and documents. A captured militant later led them to large caches of winter clothing and medical supplies stored in several caves in eastern Turkey.

Sri Lanka: Unidentified assailants murder United National Party (UNP) organizer in his home in Madurankuliy near Puttalam. Members of the Sinhalese leftist group Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) are believed responsible.

14 November

Sri Lanka: Unknown rebels kill UNP village council chairmen in Ellawela and Kahtagalagiriya, respectively. Members of the JVP are suspected in the incidents.
Mid-November  
Zimbabwe: Guerrillas from the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) kill five students and kidnap 20 others at school near border.  

16 November  
Ethiopia: Terrorists kidnap two Italian civilians and at least one Ethiopian national in Baghir Dar. The assailants were driving to work at the Tana Belles development project when the assailants burned their car and took them hostage. Although no one has claimed responsibility, a similar incident occurred last year, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party kidnapped two Italian construction workers, whom it later released, at Tana Belles.  

17 November  
Colombia: Approximately 100 guerrillas of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator attack and dynamite cement plant in Puerto Triunfo. After the raid, the assailants briefly held three executives prisoner. The Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator also claimed responsibility for the recent assassination of Pablo Guarin Vera, an anti-Communist congressman.  

18 November  
Pakistan: Bomb explodes on bus at Nasir Bagh, a main refugee camp near Peshawar. One person was killed and at least 19 others—both Pakistanis and Afghans—were injured. Authorities blame the bombing on the Soviet-backed Afghan Government.  

Turkey: Military vehicle on routine patrol in Bitlis Province sets off landmine planted by PKK. One soldier was killed and six were wounded. A village headman riding in the vehicle was also injured.  

19 November  
Switzerland: Swiss authorities expel three Libyans suspected of plotting the murder of anti-Qadhafi dissidents and French nationals in Geneva.  

Turkey: Police arrest 37 PKK separatists in Diyarbakir. The militants had been involved in explosions, raids, and several killings in eastern and southeastern Turkey.  

United States: Lebanese terrorist Fawaz Yunis linked to second hijacking. Yunis was arrested in international waters on 13 September and charged in the United States with masterminding the June 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner in Beirut. US officials now allege that Yunis guarded some captive passengers of TWA Flight 847 in Beirut during the 17-day hijacking incident but state he probably will not face charges for his role in this operation.  

20 November  
West Germany: Police find automobile in Hochheim that they believe was used by RAF members since July 1987. The car was stolen and was made to look like another car legally registered in West Germany. Police found tools for stealing cars, drivers’ licenses, vehicle registrations, and other identification documents in the car.  

Secret
24 November

Philippines: Three unidentified persons assassinate university official in his car at busy intersection in Manila. Two other companions of the victim were unhurt. Although no one claimed responsibility for the attack, a sparrow unit of the New People's Army is suspected.

Lebanon: Syrian national Abbas Khashan is found shot to death inside his car in the Bizbina area in Akkar. The Liberation Battalion claimed responsibility for the assassination and warned that those collaborating with the Syrian forces would meet the same fate.

25 November

Turkey: Molotov cocktails explode at two Turkish banks in Istanbul, causing small fires and minor damage but no injuries. Police suspect the Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol).

Lebanon: Amal members dismantle three explosive devices found in different locations in Tyre. No one has claimed responsibility for planting the bombs.

Lebanon: Publishing house officials are seriously wounded in armed attack in the Al-Hursh area of West Beirut. The victims were the director of the Al-Farabi Printing and Publishing House and the chief of the company's distribution section. No group has claimed responsibility.

26 November

India: Sikh extremists ambush and kill security force soldier and wound two others near Gurdaspur; two Sikh brothers and a Hindu die of gunshot wounds in another attack. Police arrested 34 suspected members of the Khalistan Commando and Khalistan Liberation Forces.

Pakistan: Police recover and defuse powerful magnetic bomb in bazaar area near Peshawar. The target is believed to have been the government school. A suspect was apprehended before he could detonate the bomb.

West Germany: Police arrest two more persons believed to have been involved in the shooting of two policemen at a demonstration in Frankfurt on 2 November. Andreas Saemisch and Reiner Huebner are thought to have connections with the RAF. Police suspect that Saemisch stole the pistol used in the shootings.

27 November

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Lebanon: Bomb containing an estimated 15 kilograms of TNT explodes under a car in East Beirut, wounding three people and causing property damage. The car was parked near a restaurant in the Sin El Fil area, and the victims were passing the car when it exploded. No group has claimed responsibility.

28 November

Bolivia: Bomb explodes in La Paz at the Industrial Bank building, which houses USAID offices. No one was injured, but the blast caused extensive damage to a bank office. Bolivian banks have been bombed in the past, and it is not known if USAID was also a target in the attack. No one has claimed responsibility for the explosion.

France: Bomb explodes at state-owned radio and television headquarters in Paris, causing extensive damage to one of the entrances to the building. There were no reported casualties, and no group has claimed responsibility.

Pakistan: Bomb explodes in busy shopping area, killing at least 20 persons and damaging several shops, vehicles, and nearby homes. Another bomb exploded near Peshawar stadium but caused no damage or casualties. Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, agents of the Afghan intelligence service (WAD) are suspected.

28-29 November

West Germany: Unknown perpetrators sabotage Bremerhaven-Berlin military train in two separate attacks in Berlin. In one incident, a chain with a boat anchor at each end was dropped from an overpass on a train's overhead electrical wire. In another incident, an anchor was thrown on a locomotive causing a short circuit, which halted the train. There were no reported injuries, and no group has claimed responsibility.

29 November

Philippines: Bomb explodes near International Convention Center where ASEAN summit scheduled to meet in December. The blast caused minor damage to the building but no casualties. No group has claimed responsibility.

30 November

Lebanon: Bomb explodes in second-story apartment of a building in West Beirut, wounding one person and causing property damage. There has been no claim of responsibility.

Turkey: PKK militants raid four villages in Mardin and kidnap 26 residents. The attacks were successful despite heavy security measures throughout southeastern Turkey.
1 December  Lebanon: Letter bomb, delivered to residence of British Ambassador John Grey in East Beirut, is defused by bomb experts. The envelope, packed with 3 kilograms of TNT, contained a greeting card from the New Zealand Embassy and was delivered by someone in a car bearing diplomatic license plates. Ambassador Grey and his wife were out of the country at the time of the incident.

2 December  Pakistan: Car bomb explodes in law court complex in Peshawar, injuring 12 persons and damaging numerous parked vehicles. Although no group has claimed responsibility, authorities suspect WAD agents.

Lebanon: Bomb is discovered under a car belonging to a member of Parliament in the Al-Ashrafiyah area of East Beirut. The explosive device was placed in front of a tire. No one has claimed responsibility.

3 December  West Germany: Fake bomb is discovered across the street from Chancellor's office in Bonn. The device contained a small amount of black powder, an improvised detonator, and a battery. No one claimed responsibility for the device.