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TIME MAGAZINE

INTERVIEW OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
AND
DR. ROBERT BOWIE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

June 2, 1977

QUESTION: We will assume that what is on tape is quotable unless otherwise mentioned.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Very good.

QUESTION: At the same time, Admiral, if you would like to at any point put something on background, or if that Kissingerian term "deep background" is still around, or there is something that you feel would be helpful to us --

QUESTION: If you feel a wave of indiscretion sweeping over you we can turn the machine off.

QUESTION: Or take care of in the transcript later.

QUESTION: Well, Admiral, following up on that dinner you said at that time that some things were not clear enough in your mind yet to give real appraisals.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, oh.

QUESTION: No, it is just a general --

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I am just joking. There was a period when I could use the excuse I was too new, now I am getting past that.

QUESTION: Well, that is fair enough, but now the 100 days and so on -- we have got that syndrome. I thought

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maybe you would be willing to give some of your impressions now that you have been over here for a while about the level of morale and the feeling of health of the organization after its trials and tribulations and how you see the organization functioning.

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think that I am pleasantly pleased with the morale because one would expect after all the problems that have been raised in the press and in the television over the past 2-1/2 years that there would be a lot of questioning out here as to how they were being received by the country.

I think in spite of this and obviously it has disturbed people as it would anyone that is criticized that much publicly, that the willingness to continue working just as hard -- the people here schedule conferences at 6:00 and 7:00 at night, internal conferences -- it pleasures me tremendously.

I think there is a real professionalism here in that sense that we can all be very pleased and proud of. I don't want to fail to say that there has been a problem in terms of how this publicity affects people and a problem of uncertainty as to where they are going to be five years from now because of this expression of lack of public confidence on their jobs. So I look on one of my tasks to be to help restore confidence of the public in the Agency.

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I think that can be done because I think what they are doing is good, not abusing the law or morals and worthy of commendation. We have got to bring it out and that is why I asked you to be here today with us.

QUESTION: My follow-up would be then how you see the currents of a new wind of another kind of publicity or public relations. What are you hoping to achieve with this new openness? Is it just a restoration of confidence in the public minds or is it something more basic than that?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Much deeper than that in my view. I think it goes back to the fundamental tenets of our society. We operate well when the public is well informed, and I have an abiding confidence that through the Congress, the public expresses sound opinions over a period of time and the better informed the public is the better those expressions will be.

The public spends a lot of money to operate the intelligence community. The information we have which need not be classified it seems to me should be in the public domain. The public has paid to get it.

Now there are a lot of legitimate limitations on what we can release. But I have made an effort, encouraged people around here to ask, "Does it need to be classified? Can the public share it?" So that is one basis.

The second is that we have a serious problem in our country and our government today with the leaking of

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unauthorized information, the leaking of information that is not authorized to be released. I think one way to curb that is to limit the amount of classified information, i.e., you treat with disrespect classified information if you sense or know that it really isn't classified information but it has the label on it. So the less we classify the better off we are in protecting what we have to protect. That is the serious problem today, protecting the necessary secrets, and I don't believe any understanding and right-headed American would question the fact we need some secrets.

So there are both of those aspects that I would add to the reason for the increased desire on our part to share with the public what we are doing.

DR. BOWIE: Could I just add something? I think the openness also is in the other direction. I think there is a strong feeling of a need to draw more on the available sources of expertise, data, information, research, that is unclassified and is out in the rest of society simply because so much of the topics are ones on which you have more data, knowledge, information than you have in any particular organization which in fact is really quite small in terms of the task. If you see it in those terms --

QUESTION: Sure.

QUESTION: Is one thing that you are saying, Dr. Bowie, is that you had hoped the openness would work two

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ways and the people, the career intelligence analysts, would have more access to what the outside world is doing in their areas.

DR. BOWIE: Frankly, I had hoped that it would work several ways. I would hope very much that we would be able to draw into the organization for periods of service people from the academic world or other experts who would serve maybe for a period of leave from their regular work and serve here for a couple of years.

I would hope similarly, as you say, that the analysts here would reach out more, capitalize on, draw on information, expertise, knowledge, that is available on the outside. Yes?

QUESTION: Not to derail the conversation, but it seems very pertinent at this point and since it is your area, I gather, are you hoping to make systematic use of outsiders, that is people outside the intelligence community? The national estimates process --

DR. BOWIE: We were going to hope to use them in terms of expert review and drawing on them more for either research under contract or use of people as consultants.

QUESTION: Would this differ -- the public experience with this sort of idea has been from all the news and stories about Team B -- would this be very different from that kind of venture? It seems to have some negative aspects.

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DR. BOWIE: I think the negative aspects of Team B arose from the way in which it was polarized in which you had essentially outsiders --

QUESTION: A versus (?) ?

DR. BOWIE: A versus (?). I would certainly hope that what we would get would be balanced contributions from outside including people with one view and the other view but nevertheless an effort to get a balance so that what you would have would be not a polarized kind of thing but a contribution to the process which might very well be critical of what we are doing but it would nevertheless not be critical from a particular preconceived view which, I think was the real weakness of the Team B that got publicity.

QUESTION: Maybe it is oversimplifying it but does that mean outsiders and insiders working together on the same team rather than the outsiders looking over the shoulder of the team of insiders?

DR. BOWIE: I think the way I see it would be a variety of methods according to the need and according to the situation. In some cases I can perfectly well imagine a combined group attempting to work on a problem together, but I can also see the possiblity that the outsider would come in more as consultants and critics of the work going on. But as I say, not from the point of view of preconceived counter position, but rather hopefully mobilizing a variety

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1 views which would be the best expertise you could find.

2 ADM. TURNER: The thought of having one set of data

3 given to two groups in total isolation, one in California

4 and one in Washington to see how they come out from basically

5 the same information is not a bad idea from time to time but

6 when you stack the one group and they almost had an avowed

7 intent to come out in a certain way beforehand, you knew

8 that before you started.

9 QUESTION: Has this already started, by the way?

10 ADMIRAL TURNER. Only in a modest way. I have

11 really only been here a couple of months.

12 Well, let me tell you an example, because we have

13 both only been here a few months and we haven't tried to make

14 more changes yet. We both want to get our feet on the ground

15 and make sure we want to understand the good of what is being

16 done because it is very good. We published the energy reports

17 publicly and we read in the newspaper that the Stanford Research

18 Institute disagreed with them and Professor Goldman of the

19 Harvard University disagreed with them, and some other people.

20 QUESTION: Including the chief economics correspon-

21 dent of TIME, as I recall.

22 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I must admit with some

23 chagrin that I didn't notice that.

24 QUESTION: He would be chagrined; we are not.

25 ADMIRAL TURNER: But I wrote to all the others whom

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I did notice and said, "Here is a copy of the actual unclassified study. Will you give me your detailed critique on this because I don't profess that we are right and I am concerned for the public good that if we are not right we learn about it. But more than that because I expect no one can be proven right or wrong at this time, I would like to know the areas of differences of real substance because then I will start my intelligence effort on those points and in the next six months to 12 months track and see if it is going the way we predicted or the way somebody else predicts so that if we are wrong we can turn the thing around and say, mea culpa, but here is where we think the problem is going."

I have received very constructive responses from those people I just mentioned and others and we are having a luncheon meeting next week with a number of them to explore it more, but I want that yeast in our system.

QUESTION: On this issue.

ADMIRAL TURNER: On this issue on that one report, because that is not finished business. We have got to track that prediction which went into the early 1980s and find out if it is -- it won't come out the way we predicted; we know that. Either we will conserve more or the Soviets will conserve more. Because the price goes up a little bit people will stop driving -- but we have to make certain assumptions in our study and now what we have to trace as it proceeds is where

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the assumptions are faulty and the conclusions are faulty or is it deviating from our predictions because of reactions to the study itself and reactions to the events it said were going to happen.

QUESTION: That gets in the way of something I wanted to ask. That is how you see your own job personally. Your predecessors of course have worn two hats. But I gather you are going to have actually two hat racks to hang them on. Have previous directors had offices in town, and if so, they haven't spent too much time there. You apparently take that quite seriously. What is the significance of that, that you are going to be physically removed from this building for part of the week?

ADMIRAL TURNER: There are two points of significance. One which is overlooked generally is that I am down there to support the CIA as well as the other significance which is to play the role as Director of Central Intelligence. I happen to believe that one of the needs of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community today is to do a better job of salesmanship. We have a product which like anybody else you want your product used. I think we need to sell our product to our customers more and I think we need to expand our customers. So I am downtown to be sure that I am in touch with the White House, the National Security Council, State Department, Defense Department and the Congress, and find out

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if they have needs that we haven't discerned, to find out if the product we are giving them is being well received or if it is missing the mark. That takes time and it is economical of my time when I have a series of activities of that nature to work from a base downtown so I don't have an hour on my hands and try to come back here in twenty minutes and turn around and go back in twenty minutes.

QUESTION: About how much time have you been spending downtown as opposed to out here?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Twenty-five to 30 percent.

QUESTION: Versus 70 percent out of this office?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.

QUESTION: What about your third hat, the one with the anchor on it? There has been some criticism both in house and in the press even though there is very good precedent for Directors of Central Intelligence to --

ADMIRAL TURNER: Three admirals; two generals.

QUESTION: There has been, as you know, your favorite columnists had an item about it over the weekend --

ADMIRAL TURNER: I didn't notice that.

QUESTION: How do you respond to the criticism that you may have "Navy-ized" both your job and the CIA by keeping your commission and bringing so many naval people in?

ADMIRAL TURNER. They are two separable issues. Keeping my commission --

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QUESTION: Why did you do that?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Because it would have been dishonest in my view to do it any other way. I have 30 years of naval service and I basically have that background. Now how can I erase that by suddenly retiring, and the accusation would be that if I retire I am less likely to kowtow to the Defense Department because I want a favor from them in the future, but there is nothing to prevent one retiring today and returning to active service two, three, four, five years from now.

So it would have been a charade to have retired and it would have in my opinion have impuned the military profession for an active duty military man here. The first three directors were active duty military men, two of whom returned to extensive active duty in the military after being here. General Vanderberg was seven years in the military after he left CIA. So I don't see that there was anything to have been achieved except agreeing with an implication that you cannot be impartial as a military man in this job even though the law provides that you can.

The second part which is total canard is that I have decided to run this establishment with only naval officers and I have surrounded myself with a clique that won't let anybody through. Let me give you the hard numerical facts. I had a personal staff of three officers in my last job. I asked them

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all to come with me because it is awful nice to have people with whom you are familiar for doing the detailed personal work. One of them runs my schedule. One of them writes speeches. Those are very personal sorts of things and they don't really get involved in running this organization in a substantive way.

The third is an executive assistant who shovels all the papers that come in and out to me. I asked those three to come and they did. Now to be totally accurate with you, it happens that one of those positions was in the process of changing when I left and I brought both the predecessor and successor with me so I brought four officers with me for three jobs, and the fourth one is going on his way to his new assignment in a few days.

So really I have three such officers with me. I have supplemented them with another scheduling professional employee from the agency. I supplemented them with another executive assistant from the Navy. So I have three Navy and two Agency in my front office at this time. They are my front with the rest of the world.

Now the accusations that I brought lots more Navy in. What I did was look at how many naval officers who are on duty here from the Navy on loan were rotating this summer. And I went to the Navy and said, "Instead of replacing those with Joe, Bill and Pete, I would like you to replace them with

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1 Strobe, Bruce and Bob, because I knew Strobe, Bruce and Bob,
2 and I knew they were the kind of people who were needed here.
3 I have done that and four of them have arrived and two more
4 are coming. They would have been replaced by other naval
5 officers. Those people don't work for me; two work for Bob,
6 one works for Sayer Stevens whom you will meet with today, and
7 one works for the community intelligence staff downtown and the
8 other two I don't know where they are going to go when they
9 get here. But they have nothing to do with me or my running
10 of this place other than they are just like somebody else who
11 works on the team. They don't see me any more than anybody
12 else does.

13 QUESTION: Well, those who have chosen to make an
14 issue out of this have found some ammunition in the fact that
15 your son is on this floor, too. But am I correct that that
16 is a temporary thing?

17 ADMIRAL TURNER: He is here for four months
18 between assignments. He is going either for professional
19 intelligence officer in the Navy, unrelated to my being in
20 intelligence -- he was in it before I was and he was here in
21 Washington on duty. He had four months before his next
22 assignment in Monterey, California, at the Intelligence
23 School for the Navy, and he is here just to understand how
24 the intelligence community operates and to have a little fun
25 with a father and son having something in common to talk about

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and share because it is his profession and now it has become my profession. He has not cost the government a nickel. He just drives to a different place to work every morning. He has not been added to the Agency payroll because he is a professional naval officer on the government payroll in any event. He has not displaced anybody. He is in a Navy opening here which will be filled by one of those two officers I mentioned who won't get here until later in the summer.

QUESTION: Moving right along --

ADMIRAL TURNER: It is hard to move along when you cannot get a crisp answer out of me.

QUESTION: We feel it important to raise that because it has been an issue on the Hill during your confirmation although not a serious one and in the press, and being part of that we feel we should ask you.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, there is another factor that I would like to answer, too, and that is the story in the press on Monday morning. I think I came as close to William Tecumseh Sherman, "I will not run if nominated; I will not serve if elected," in my confirmation hearings as you can without being in that category. I disavowed that I would seek the office of Chief of Naval Operations or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they come open next summer for the normal rotation. And I say with some sense of indignation that stories that have circulated, that I feel I have served

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1 my country for 30-31 years in the way that the constituted
2 authorities have asked me. The last authority that asked me
3 was the highest authority in the land and I said, "Aye, aye,"
4 and I came here because he thought that is where I could
5 best serve the country. A year from now, two years from now,
6 five years from now, I will do exactly the same thing again
7 and I am not going to seek out anything else.
8 Among other things, I personally believe that I
9 can do as much here for the good of the country to which I
10 dedicated 31 years of my life as I can in any military
11 assignment and that this is as important as any military assign-
12 ment. I mean no derogation on General Brown or Admiral
13 Holloway in their spots. They are extremely important but I
14 don't think they are any more important than this one.
15 QUESTION: I never thought the DCI as being a kind
16 of holding pattern that one would go into waiting for a better
17 job to come along.
18 ADMIRAL TURNER: I think it is ridiculous and
19 it is a slight on my intelligence and perception of balance
20 of something when one would say I am going to moved upstairs
21 to one of those jobs. I think they would be sliding horizontally
22 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I have no
23 particular ambition to do that. I am very happy to do this.
24 I watched for 30 years as military officers came
25 to the point of retirement and I seldom saw one who didn't

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1 have a sense of trauma and a sense of a little bit of disappoint-
2 ment. Very few of them ever get to the very, very top. I
3 have left the military. I left it on an hour and 45 minutes'
4 notice when I came to Washington to do this. I haven't any
5 tears or farewell speeches and when I walk out of this
6 place I am not really feeling like I am walking out of the
7 military should I then retire and go on to either full retire-
8 ment or civilian life, whatever it may be.

9 So I feel I have made a transition here that is
10 one of the more difficult for a man in the military profes-
11 sion and I am happy with it. I have never been as stimulated
12 and as challenged by any other assignment as I have this one
13 so I am enjoying it. I am happy, and I am not sitting here
14 worrying about some different assignment tomorrow.

15 Besides that, if I worried about that I wouldn't
16 be able to do this job well and if I don't do this job well,
17 I am not going to keep this job let alone get any other one.

18 QUESTION: A structural question. Maybe both of
19 you could address youselves to this. What would be an ideal
20 reorganization of the intelligence community as a whole? And
21 I ask that fully aware that there is Presidential review of
22 just this subject in which you certainly are playing a part,
23 and keeping in mind that our story is not going to come out
24 until a week from Monday, when is the PRIM going to come to
25 a head, by the end of next week?

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ADMIRAL TURNER. I have been on the phone three times today about when the next meeting on the PRIM will be and I honestly don't know. It won't get resolved over night.

QUESTION: Can you speak a little bit on the record on how you would like to see the community as a whole reorganized?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I have at this point a view that the community can be and is being operated with a reasonable efficiency in its present form. There is no bureaucratic organization that cannot be improved so we are looking for those ways of improvement. But there have also come times when you look at any organization in industry, government, or academia, and you decide that what you have organized on a vertical basis may be better done on a diagonal or a horitzonal basis. We are looking at that in some sense right now.

We are looking as the Senate Select Committee has indicated of ways to strengthen the Director of Central Intelligence. You don't strengthen somebody without it being at the expense of somebody else. You have now taken a vertical line and turned it a little bit horitzonal. When you do that you lose something. That is what the study is all about. Is it worth losing something that now exists in the present structure in order to strengthen the Director of Central Intelligence?

I believe the organization can be operated satisfactorily in its present form. I believe that we must look at

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whether we could improve it by some restructuring. We are in the midst of that right now and I don't think if I were willing to be utterly forthright with you that I could predict with 90 percent certainty how I will vote when I get into the tank for the final meeting on this with the President.

QUESTION: It depends on what you are voting on, of course, what the form of the final package is.

ADMIRAL TURNER: One of the things we will be voting on is my own proposal. Surely I am entitled to tell the President how I think the community will best be organized and what I am telling you is I haven't made up my mind on that in every detail at this point.

QUESTION: What about on a matter which is not really a detail but is crucial and that is whether the DCI perhaps under another name should be strengthened, the community should be centralized around a Cabinet-level czar, to use that word I have never understood.

ADMIRAL TURNER: That is the problem, you see. What is the definition of a czar? What is the definition of strengthening, and what I haven't made up my mind on is how much strengthening can be accepted without undue loss to existing authorities that are quite legitimate.

QUESTION: So that would relate primarily to the military services. Certainly they are the most sensitive, I think, to the question of centralization and what kind of centralization would be, because they are the biggest producers

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and consumers themselves. Do you share some of that apprehension that they have over at the Pentagon that centralization, that efficiency can be the wrong priority, to put it one way, that if you go too far in the direction of efficiency you will stifle some of the opposing views that are healthy?

DR. BOWIE: May I suggest that you divide the question because it seems to me that there is a real danger here talking past one another. It seems to me the question of production, estimates, for example, is not the same question as the question with respect to control of the collection. It seems to me there is nobody suggesting that there be a czar for production in the sense that you would take over the INR from State or that you would try to take over and control DIA.

At the same time responsibility of the Director for Analysis and for estimates is very clear. He is supposed to produce estimates and other components have the opportunity to make contributions, to criticize, to dissent. I don't believe anybody is thinking of any significant change in that part of the equation. There might be some organizational changes within this organization or otherwise to make it perhaps more efficient, but that will not eliminate or shouldn't eliminate the competing centers of analysis which are there and will continue. Not only those but others.

So really, talking about a czar is talking about

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what relation to the collection much more than it is talking about about the collection.

QUESTION: I understood the proposal would be the czar would have the responsibility for so-called resources or budget and a certain amount of line authority for picking who is going to be in charge of these various agencies, but there would be a high degree of creative competition still wtihin the community as a whole.

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think that is an important clarification.

Perhaps if you want to stress that point because the picture may be that you are going to have a single source of intelligence in the sense of wiping out competing analyses in the State Department or the Defense Department and nobody has any such idea in mind.

QUESTION: But some people are worried about it. You have encountered some, haven't you?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think, too, that they often use the word "economy" rather than "efficiency." There is some accusation that what we are trying to achieve in any reorganization is a reduction of expenditures for the same product. You cannot be against that. It is like being against motherhood unless of course the only way to achieve economy is to sacrifice some substantive point. I would say that while I am very anxious to economize in any way I can, economy is not the

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overriding factor. Efficiency is, in the sense that we must be efficient with our collection resources in particular because they are the very expensive ones. The analytic estimating resources you want competition, you want overlap, you cannot afford not to have it and it is not that expensive in actual dollar terms, but you do want efficiency both because you must dovetail both the technical and the human sources for collecting intelligence to get the maximum product and because they are very expensive and you cannot afford to scare them.

QUESTION: That is another concern. Just to carry it to the end, the military is sensitive to what I heard called over at the Pentagon "management culture" in the sense that if there is one boss, loyalties can develop to the boss and the result could be a tendency toward making that boss happy rather than being independent in your work.

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't want collection people who are independent in their work and we have not talked about one boss for the analysis people. There is no point or place for an independent head of a collection agency. He must subordinate to somebody who is giving central direction and seeing to it that his collection effort dovetails with the next fellow's, with the next fellow's, with the next fellow's.

As a military man, I can tell you in my opinion that is a specious argument because there was never a military

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1 man who didn't want firm control of things and one director
2 and nobody wants two masters. It may be that in this case,
3 which is not a purely military matter, two masters may be
4 perfectly satisfactory, it is working satisfactorily now with
5 two masters. The question is would we lose enough in not
6 the way they are suggesting but in other ways if we had one
7 master?

8 QUESTION: Relations with Congress have been a
9 major preoccupation for certainly your last two predecessors.
10 But Directors Bush and Colby seemed to spend -- you say you
11 spend 30 percent of your time down in the (unclear), they spent
12 30 percent of their time on Capital Hill shuttling back and
13 forth.

14 A two-part question: First of all, how much time
15 have you had to spend so far or have you had the honor to
16 spend so far with Congressional leaders in this whole area,
17 and how much do you plan to spend?

18 ADMIRAL TURNER: I think we would like some tea
19 or coffee or coke or cold water or something.

20 I am sorry to interrupt you.

21 QUESTION: How much time have you spent, how much
22 time do you plan to spend, and the second part of the question
23 is, what from your standpoint would be an ideal Congressional
24 oversight arrangement?

25 ADMIRAL TURNER: The first question. I am not

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sure I can quantify it without going into the files. I keep pretty close track of my time but I spend three or four hours a week on the Hill. I don't think that is undue. It varies, of course, whether there are a lot of hearings going on in a particular week, but I also have to spend time going up and talking with Congressmen. Now that is in part because I am new in town and I haven't been in the Washington arena for four and a half years prior to coming to this job, so there are a lot of Congressmen I have never met who have important roles to play in the intelligence community, so part of my time is simply meeting people and that may change the proportion of time I spend up there after those initial visits are completed, though I still feel it will always be very important that I continue to go back to the people that are working on intelligence matters and also to people who are not but who need our product.

I want to encourage chairmen of committees not involved in defense or foreign affairs whom we service very liberally --

QUESTION: Economic and technical matters.

ADMIRAL TURNER: The law of the sea, maritime matters, agricultural matters. We predict grain crops. It is just unbelievable the number of committees up there I think we can give some service to because there are various functions of the United States Government today that don't have some

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interface with foreign affairs, economic, political or military.

The second part of your question?

QUESTION: What would an ideal oversight arrangement be?

ADMIRAL TURNER: The ideal arrangement would be one joint committee on intelligence between the two Houses of Congress so that when I bare my soul and tread the fine line between maximum disclosure, maximum openness, which we all want in our society, and retaining those secrets that is my statutory responsibility to protect the sources of collecting intelligence, the people whose lives will be at stake or the technology that we have spent billions on and which can be squandered by an unauthorized disclosure of how it operates, we have to draw a line as to how much we can risk disclosing in these areas, so the fewer people to whom we have to disclose the better the oversight will be, the more frank we can be in our reports. It does not appear that it will be satisfactory to the Congress to have a single joint committee at this time. I am hopeful that the House will create a select committee on intelligence for the House as the Senate has and is operating.

I would like to add here that there are some people that have said to me, "You are nuts to have seven committees that you work with now and you are just asking for an eighth -- Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and the select committees. You already have seven and you are just asking

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1 for more time consumed up there," and I am saying, "No, I welcome
2 the oversight committees." I welcome the opportunity to have
3 someone I can turn to for advice. I welcome the opportunity
4 to bounce off of them, have them drag out of me through their
5 interrogations what my concept is of how we should be conducting
6 intelligence for several aspects. One, the ethics of it, because
7 they reflect the ethics of the country and the intelligence
8 community must reflect those ethics and rather than just
9 interpreting it myself as a citizen, it is helpful for me to
10 have that interpretation from them.

11 But secondly, when you get as close to any organiza-
12 tion as I am to intelligence, you may start to lose sight of
13 the forest for the trees so it is good to have a body like
14 that that is intimately involved in the affairs of our govern-
15 ment in its foreign relations and have them say, "Why aren't
16 you looking at the food problems 10 years from now more than
17 you are," or something.

18 QUESTION: But when you say you want a new committee,
19 wouldn't that supercede these other seven, or would it be
20 an addition to?

21 ADMIRAL TURNER: That is the way it works in the
22 Senate. We had three committees and now we have four. Now
23 gradually those other committees may decide it is not as
24 necessary for them to become as involved and the Senate
25 Select Committee has primary jurisdiction over most of our

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activities other than appropriations, but the others have concurrent or secondary -- I forget the precise term that they use on the Hill -- jurisdiction. So I still report to the other committees also, but it will take time to see how much the balance is between them.

QUESTION: They have no precise terms, at least that has been my experience.

How many times a week or can you give us any idea of your contact with Senator Inouye? Do you stay in close and regular touch with him?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I would say we talk with each other on the average of once a week. That is a guess. Sometimes it is several times.

QUESTION: Do you beep him on his beeper that he is so proud of?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I just call him on the telephone or ask to go up to see him in his office, but I am always available to him. I tend to want to leave the initiative to him unless of course I have some new information or am about to take a new initiative or something like that where I think it is either proper to ask his advice or notify him in advance, and I get a number of letters from him every week and respond to him, not because we are formal with each other, but because some of these things are better answered in written form that he can then share with the rest of the committee.

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If he sees something in the newspaper, for instance, that says we did so and so, he will write me a letter and say, "What is the background on this," and we will dig it out for him and send it up.

QUESTION: Admiral, I think probably now more than for a long time what we have is really a national security team in Washington. Could you describe in some detail how it works, how does this relationship operate -- the President, Vice President, Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, yourself. Is there some complicated waltz that goes on or is it pretty much ad hoc?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, it is pretty much ad hoc, but it is -- maybe smooth is the right word -- it is a harmonious waltz that is going on but the pace changes and the pattern changes. You don't know next week exactly how it is going to operate compared with this week. I don't mean to create a sense that there is confusion. What I am saying is that we are all, I believe, compatible, flexible people, and we don't stand on a lot of ceremony.

So today, for instance, within 10 minutes I had phone calls from both Secretary Brown and Secretary Vance. I had two conversations with Mr. Brzezinski this morning on my initiative and that is the way we do business. We, I think, are quite scrupulous among other things in seeing that we don't cross each other up or in any way undermine each other.

Mr. Brown called me this morning specifically to say,

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"I am going to raise something with the President this afternoon and I think you ought to know I am going to raise it."

We work a great deal through the NSC mechanisms, that is, we meet in what is either known as the PRC or the SCC and I cannot even tell you the difference, particularly, but they are subcommittees of the NSC. We meet fairly regularly. I was over there for one meeting. That is the only one this week. I think there are two scheduled next week.

QUESTION: With agendas?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. That is only with a specific topic for which generally there have been papers prepared and circulated already. I think only once in my four months have we met without some form of preparatory paperwork. We met one Saturday for three hours in the morning just to talk SALT. We did not have a specific agenda but we said it was just a good time to let our hair down and really philosophize about SALT, and we let nobody else in the room but the ones you have mentioned and I think Mr. Warnke and maybe one other, and that was very valuable and is reflective of the type of spirit of teamwork that exists where you can just sit down and hash things out.

QUESTION: We would love to have the transcript of that one for another story we are working on.

QUESTION: The staff, NSC staff, do you perceive

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this as a tool of assistance to you in some way or is it a problem?

ADMIRAL TURNER. No, they are a big help to us and I think we have got very good relations with them and they are a very capable crowd, incidentally.

DR. BOWIE: You see, these special committees, the two committees of the NSC that the Director referred to are typically meeting on papers which have been prepared by working parties and the working parties typically include people from the key substantive departments like Defense --

(Tape changes.)

Sometimes we think it more suitable to prepare a separate intelligence estimate which is in parallel to the paper. It depends on how important it is. But it may be a separate estimate which is prepared by the community and goes with the paper which is for consideration by the committees or by the NSC or we make a contribution to an integrated paper under some circumstances.

That is only if the problem lends itself to that and doesn't really need a separate input. But the staff of the NSC essentially works with this process in very large part. I don't mean Brzezinski, himself. He chairs, I think, a couple of meetings, but there are 20 people or so working on the various topics and they sometimes simply participate in these working parties and on occasion they may chair them.

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ADMIRAL TURNER: Excuse me, Bob.

I talked with Brzezinski about this yesterday and I think you ought to know the kind of thing that he said because it is indicative of why the system is a team. He pointed out that on a few occasions people from his staff have come into him and said, "Look at that screwed up paper that so-and-so department or agency produced." And he told me when they do that, he says, "Now, first of all, that isn't the department or the agency. It was some individual there who did that. And secondly, that is not the right attitude. Let's get the thing straightened out if you think it is wrong but let's not sit around here making critical comments about other people because that is going to tear down the cooperation." They are very dependent upon all the rest of us. If we didn't cooperate with them their sources of information are dried up. If we don't cooperate with them our product, our opinions, don't get funneled into the system. So it is a mutually dependent operation and I think from my own observations of it in the past, it is working much more smoothly under this team and particularly with Brzezinski's handling of it from the White House than before.

QUESTION: Speaking of Brzezinski, those same columnists that we referred to earlier, did have something nice to say about you Sunday. They said you completely eclipsed with (? unclear) Brzezinski as the leading influence

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on the President's world views.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I don't have to try to --

QUESTION: I wasn't asking you to respond to that but by all means do.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Let me respond to it in this way. Over and above opinions of who is important and so on, which I don't even pretend to be important, I do not give the President policy advice. I give him information and opinions and assessments of what the other side, the foreigners -- I only deal with foreign intelligence, I don't deal in what is going to be the impact on the United States of a given course of policy and so on, that is out of my sphere, or whether it is a good thing for the United States to do, or bad. I will tell him what I think the foreign reaction to a course of action will be and I don't sit here and think up policy actions that we should take. That is Brzezinki's field, that is Vance's field, that is Brown's field.

So to say I am eclipsing anybody in advice is to misunderstand my role which is not to be competitive with them but to be complementary.

QUESTION: That wasn't so much our misunderstanding although I am sure we have plenty which we will work out. But I was wondering just what an intellectual relationship with the President was like, what kind of brief does he like and take best. What is it like dealing with him, particularly

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on a one-to-one basis?

ADMIRAL TURNER: It is fun but it is challenging because you never know when you start into what you think is a complex topic that you don't find the President six steps ahead of you and it is rewarding because you also find over time that whatever you gave him that was of value has been retained.

I gave him some figures one time on SALT-type matters and two weeks later I was in a National Security Council meeting and I heard them coming back at me, and I was checking my memory because I couldn't remember for sure about them.

QUESTION:: Does he take notes? Does he like to --

ADMIRAL TURNER: Never; never seen him take a note.

QUESTION: Does he like to have a precis of what you are going to brief him on in writing in advance?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I have never asked him if he wanted that. I did send him a few. I got no remarks and I discontinued sending them in part because I always scramble until the last five minutes before I go there as to what I am going to take up that day, so it is always hard to get an agenda produced.

No, he leaves it almost entirely to me as to what I am going to take up with him on my meetings with him. Occasionally he does write a note on a written piece of material

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we send him and like an amplification or something else. The last time I was there he told me, "You once before sent me a report of this nature. I liked it. We now are in an analogous situation so many weeks down the track. Please send me another one in effect updating that because I found the other one useful." I think he likes hard-hitting, factual presentations.

DR. BOWIE: One other comment. I can always be one removed by dealing with the President but all I can say is I am sure like other Presidents he wants things brief. But I am very much impressed with what he will read, having worked under various Presidents, all of whom I respected, but this man seems to me is a reader. If you give him something worth reading, I am impressed with the fact that he reads it and obviously asks for more.

QUESTION: He took an Evelyn Wood Course, did you see that?

DR. BOWIE: I don't know about that.

I think editing ought to get somewhere into your story. (?) is also a reader. I have seldom dealt with anybody that you could hoist material onto him and if it is worth reading he reads it, and he reads and awful lot that isn't worth reading.

QUESTION: What have you got on your bedside table, or whatever, right now that is not classified? What are you reading at the moment?

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ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I honestly have to admit that I haven't done much --

QUESTION: The Doctor really set you up for this.

DR. BOWIE: I didn't mean extraneous reading, I mean serious reading.

QUESTION: No, I mean serious reading.

ADMIRAL TURNER: The only thing I am reading at the moment other than business matters is a biography of Harry Hopkins whose son works for us out here and was good enough to give me this biography, and I found it so far very interesting.

But I have stacked up on my own unclassified reading file potpourri -- I am trying to think of what they specifically are right now. They are either unclassified documents that come out of here or things that people send me, a couple of articles on what the intelligence function ought to be.

QUESTION: Well maybe we will have a chance to come back there. We don't want to overstay our hospitality. We did have one other question match which is operations. Herb was kind enough to set up a number of very good interviews and appointments for us. We are not seeing the DDO as far as I know.

ADMIRAL TURNER: That would break the tradition more than the system will take.

QUESTION: Can you tell us in a nutshell what your --

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give us sort of a status report on that side of the Agency. We are aware of interesting structural changes within the DDI, the merging of OPR and OCI into ORPA -- it sounds like somebody burping.

ADMIRAL TURNER: You know more initials around here than I do.

QUESTION: I don't know very many initials on the other side except for DDO. What have you done since you have come into office that you could tell us about that would reassure people that covert operations are not going to be an embarrassment in the future?

ADMIRAL TURNER: A number of things. First, I have brought into the organization a civilian special assistant who has my utter confidence with respect to things like ethics and morality, and I have charged him to do nothing for the first whatever months it takes. He has been at it for three months to go through the DDO from stem to stern and report back to me anything he feels I would not approve of being done and in addition he educates me on the whole process.

Secondly, I picked topics that I know the DDO is involved in and probe into them myself by the various techniques one does -- have somebody come up and talk to you about it, ask for a paper on it, and so on. So I am generally familiarizing myself with the operation personally.

Thirdly, I have encouraged employees of the Agency

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to communicate with me directly on any activity they feel is not proper.

Fourth, I have reinforced the standing instruction in the agency for people not to be encouraged but required -- and there is a definite regulation -- requiring them to report any errors or misuse of authority to the Inspector General or to the Director. I mean I have emphasized that that is a responsibility and an opportunity. Next, I have dismissed two people here for what I considered was improper but not illegal action to try to set the tone of how I expect the operations to be conducted.

Finally, I feel that there is a great safeguard today against abuse in the DDO or any other elements and they transcend the CIA where you can make mistakes. In the oversight procedures that were set up in February of '76 by the new Executive Order both the select committee process on the Hill -- which really isn't related to the Executive Order; I sort of confused the picture but anyway there is that oversight procedure -- but then the oversight procedure established of course in the Executive Order is the Intelligence Oversight Board, and the ability of people to go around me, to go around the system, to that Board if they have a problem I think is very important.

You might even say that the reason you are here today and that CBS was here last week is that I am not adverse

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to more public oversight of this whole operation.

On the one hand I want to lift the mystique so that the people of the country can judge our operation in a more intelligible way. But secondly, it is a form of oversight. There is a limit to how we can take you into the fold obviously because of the problem of secrecy, but I think taking you in more rather than less as it was before, is a check and balance that will help here.

So we are doing all of these and I guess finally I would say that you have to recognize that the clandestine, covert type of operation that is necessary we retain, very necessary, is nonetheless not the major activity of the intelligence operation of your country.

QUESTION: Is the DDO still the same man that was in charge of that operation --

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. I would like to end with a final plea which is parochial and that is to keep the whole thing in the proper proportion of perspective. It really takes off from this last. I mean, the inevitable tendency I think of the press is to pay attention and certainly of the investigation is to pay attention to the particular type of activity. But the role of intelligence today has enormously increased today compared to whatever it has been in the past if you are talking about the information necessary for sensible policy making. And that is our business. We are

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trying to provide the intellectual and informational informational underpinning of understanding the environment in which foreign policy is being made. Foreign policy today -- half of it is domestic policy in every country. When you get interdependence into the picture it simply means that the knowledge or understanding necessary in order to conduct an intelligent policy whether you are talking about nuclear proliferation or economic policy or environmental policy or security policy, the range of information which is necessary is staggering, and it is really a very large-scale research activity in which you have to have special forms of information collection.

Ultimately they are feeding this effort to understand the world we are in. And I don't want to minimize the importance of looking at the clandestine or the other, but it really is when you look at the enterprise in its whole scope, it is really just a small bump on the entire organ. It is only a part. It is only a segment, and yet it tends to be what people still think of as intelligence because they read spy stories and that seems to be what intelligence is all about.

QUESTION: They read the newspapers too.

ADMIRAL TURNER: And they read the newspapers. But actually if we would make a plea -- and this is absolutely ad hoc pleading -- but try to see if you cannot present the

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picture of what the intelligence operation is about in what I would consider to be its true form, that it is a very serious effort to mobilize data information, expertise, in order to understand the whole range of things which you have to understand if you are going to conduct an intelligent foreign policy today.

QUESTION: Well, the emphasis of our original inquiry to Herb was very much on intelligence gathering and analysis. We asked specifically to see you, Dr. Bowie, and the DDI. We didn't even request to see Mr. --

ADMIRAL TURNER: I didn't mean to lecture at you but the conversation really had only developed this aspect and I --

QUESTION: Of course, but I don't think the onus is enitrely on the press for the preoccupation of the public with operations. It is because some operations have gone awry and became the cause celebre that it was.

ADMIRAL TURNER: It is the most vulnerable part of our operation but it is not either the most important or the most resource consuming.

QUESTION: How about your reserves, how much of your time -- I asked the wrong question. Again, an approximate thing. How much of your time do you spend on DDO matters?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I really don't know how to break that out because I don't consciously divide it into DDO when

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it comes across my desk, but I would -- I really don't know how to guess it, to be very honest with you. Pick a number.

I would like to wrap up by suggesting that it would be important for people to understand what I think is the increased role that intelligence can play for our country today over 30 years when this agency was founded and we tried to regularize the intelligence function for our country in the DCI. Thirty years ago we were hands down the predominant military power above everybody else. Today we are not predominant to that degree or anything like it. That isn't necessarily bad and it is not likely to change or even go back to the other mode.

But you have got to be more intelligent. You have got to use your resources better. You have got to have more ultra secrets if you are going to be able to parlay a more parity type position into successful --

QUESTION: You mean ultra secrets in the winner bottom (?) sense?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, the code break.

Secondly, 30 years ago we were a totally independent economic power. We didn't have to worry too much about anybody else. Today we are interdependent. It comes back to Bob's -- the domestic activities, the grain crop in the Soviet union, which wouldn't have meant a tinker's damn to us 30 years ago, is important to us today and we will lose our

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shirt if we don't keep abreast of that kind of economic thing. We lost our shirt in '72 in the grain deal, right? And that is why we now predict grain for the Soviet Union. Finally, the same thing prevails in the political sphere. We were the dominant political power 30 years ago. There weren't too many people that would stand up and buck us if we took a position on something and now you go to the United Nations and 100 people will stand up and vote against a major position of the United States.

It may not all be bad. I am not condemning it. But as a reality though, if we don't understand the political process in all those countries and keep abreast of what is going on, we will lose our shirt in that arena, too. And it doesn't mean we go all spook to get the information we need. Bob is pointing out a lot of it comes off of your sources, the same sources you use. It can be obtained by us just as easily or through you, but it does mean we have to have it and I think the function where we may provide a greater significance than any other in the decade ahead will be the collation of all this because you can bring a lot of it together, but you have got other objectives, meeting deadlines and selling papers or magazines -- you don't have some of the information we have, I hope -- and so our being able to collate all of the unclassified information with those kernels of classified that are important, now maybe having a more extensive network than

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you to get even the unclassified information, I think means that the intelligence function can be of tremendous value to the country on all three of these spheres -- economic, political and military.

QUESTION: Well, thank you very much for your time and for the access in general, and we think it is great and we would just as soon you close down the access now for a couple of weeks, at least as far as other weekly news magazines are concerned.

END

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