Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

CURRENT NEWS
SPECIAL EDITION

THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS AND BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING AND IMPACT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES HERE, OF COURSE, DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TO THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

21 NOVEMBER 1979 No. 492

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW

Vol. 4 Summer 1979 No. 2

Page 160

Verification and the SALT II Treaty

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Like the SALT I Accords, the SALT II Treaty provides (Article XV) for verification by "national technical means" and stipulates that neither signatory will "interfere with the national technical means of verification" undertaken by the other. Moreover, the Treaty states that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union shall make use of "deliberate concealment measures" in an effort to impede the other side's ability to engage in verification in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Like the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, the SALT II Treaty provides for use of the Standing Consultative Commission established in December 1972. Among the functions of the Commission (Article XVII of the Treaty) is consideration of "questions concerning compliance" with the Treaty.

Verification by "national technical means" relates to the intelligence capabilities of the state undertaking verification of the activities of another state, and specifically to the technologies available for this purpose. In SALT, the objects of verification have been principally inventories, including production rates, of strategic nuclear systems, although arms control verification encompasses weapons from the R&D to the deployment phase. To assert that the United States can, or cannot, verify the SALT II Treaty is to pass judgment upon the quality of the American intelligence community both to monitor Soviet compliance and to analyze information collected in timely fashion to ascertain the existence of a violation. But intelligence is not synonymous with verification. The needs of the United States to collect and evaluate intelligence about the Soviet Union exist with or without the SALT Treaty, as Secretary of Defense Brown has pointed out. The SALT Treaty sets requirements within itself for verification by virtue of

JAMES KILLINGBECK, CHIEF, CURRENT NEWS BRANCH, OX 78768 HELEN YOUNG, ASSISTANT CHIEF
FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH SERVICES OR DISTRIBUTION CALL HARRY ZUBKOFF, CHIEF, EXECUTIVE AGENCY SERVICE, OX 52884

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

the provisions that must be verified by the "national technical means" available to the American intelligence community. Hence the issue is not that the United States faces similar intelligence problems with or without SALT, but rather whether the Soviet Union is more likely than the United States to cheat clandestinely within the SALT Treaty and, in so doing, to gain a potentially important strategic advantage. Because of the ceilings and other limitations that it imposes on strategic systems, the SALT Treaty creates intelligence, or verification, problems that would not exist without the Treaty. However, the intelligence needs of the United States with respect to Soviet strategic nuclear forces extend far beyond the verification of SALT II. Thus, in effect, the question that has been asked, both by Treaty supporters and by opponents, is whether the Treaty provides a framework within which the United States can learn more about existing and projected Soviet force programs than it could without the Treaty. Of even greater consequence is the question of whether verification should be the central issue with respect to an evaluation of the Treaty, and how its verifiability relates to other U.S. national security interests.

In SALT context, verification is said to constitute the process which assesses compliance with the provisions of a treaty or an agreement, or the ability of the United States to ditect violations by the Soviet Union of provisions contained in the Treaty, with the assumption that we should not enter into agreements in which the Soviet Union could cheat in ways that we could not detect. Herein lies the logical limitation of verification for, as Amrom Katz has cogently stated: "We have never found anything that the Soviets have successfully hidden."[1] It follows that our verification capabilities are not only inextricably linked to the quality of our intelligence, but also to the level of knowledge available to the Soviet Union about our intelligence community. The greater the quality of our intelligence capabilities and the less the Soviet Union knows about them, then the more likely the United States is to detect Soviet violations. Thus the theft of information about one of our most advanced surveillance satellites, the KH-11, and its sale to the Soviet Union by a CIA employee constitutes a potentially serious verification problem for the United States. Knowledge by the Soviet Union of the limit of U.S. intelligence capabilities would enhance Moscow's prospects in circumventing them in ways that would not necessarily be detectable by "national technical means."

The question of what constitutes "adequacy" in verification has emerged as an issue of central concern in the SALT context, for the United States has premised its arms control policies upon the assumption that any agreement must be adequately verifiable. In the absence of direct access to the objects of the limitations contained in the Treaty, it has been deemed essential that the United States maintain a capability for monitoring Soviet compliance from outside the territory of the Soviet Union. As a political concept, verification encompasses a judgment as to what is of significance in measuring the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, and what would be the costs and benefits, respectively, to the Soviet Union in cheating, weighed against the costs and benefits to the United States in not including a given provision in the Treaty, even though it may not be verifiable. In addition to the detection of violations of the provisions of a treaty or agreement, verification has as its purpose the deterrence of such violations by posing to the other party unacceptable risks of detection. Presumably, the Soviet Union would weigh the prospective advantages to be derived from cheating against the problems resulting from cheating that had been discovered by the United States. What would it be worth to the Soviet Union to gain a specified advantage in strategic nuclear capabilities, set against risks that would be incurred?

For the United States as well, a gain-risk calculus exists. Is the risk to American security greater with a SALT Treaty that is not fully verifiable than could exist in the absence of any Treaty? What is the risk incurred by the United States if the Soviet Union does cheat? If it is deemed to be of marginal importance, verification deficiencies within the Treaty may be considered to be acceptable. Those who hold that the strategic-nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union is inherently stable and therefore not subject to dramatic transformation by increments in capabilities by one side or the other are likely to place relatively little emphasis on verification. Cheating by the Soviet Union at the margins of an agreement, would have little effect upon U.S. security. Hence, the verification capabilities of the United States are considered to be adequate within the timeframe

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

of the Treaty. But even if they are not sufficient fully to determine the existence or the extent of Soviet cheating, the aggregate benefits allegedly accruing from the Treaty to the United States are said to outweigh deficiencies in SALT verification. Specifically, these are held to comprise the knowledge that the United States gains about Soviet strategic nuclear forces from the SALT process, and specifically from the Treaty itself. Thus the information that the Soviet Union has provided about its strategic forces in SALT II supposedly furnished evidence of the quality of U.S. intelligence because it accords with data obtained by the United States about the Soviet Union by means of "national technical means" of verification. But another interpretation may have even greater plausibility. The Soviet Union is capable of providing information about its strategic-nuclear forces similar to that made available by the United States with respect to Soviet forces.

Among the critics of the Treaty, however, there are at least two views of the verification issue: the first is that the Treaty is so asymmetrical in its provisions in favor of the Soviet Union that the Soviets would have little incentive to seek to circumvent its provisions, and thus verification does not provide an issue of transcendant importance to the United States. Whatever the deficiencies in verification, they are held to be of lesser consequence than other problems such as the legitimization, or codification, of a Soviet strategic capability that, during the timeframe of the Treaty, will pose a threat to the fixed- and land-based portions of our strategic force. A second view holds that the SALT II Treaty is fraught with verification problems and that, contrary to the assumption inherent in the proposition stated above, the ability of the Soviet Union to cheat could have a profoundly destabilizing effect upon the U.S.-Soviet strategic-military relationship in the 1980's — within the timeframe of the Treaty. Therefore, the inability of the United States to verify its provisions may constitute a serious security problem that will confront the United States.

All arms control treaties contain asymmetries, some of which favor one side more than the other, for the security interests and needs of each state are unique. Nowhere are the fundamental security issues that separate the United States and the Soviet Union more fully exemplified than in the ongoing SALT process of the past decade. These differences have been rooted not only in the perceived security interests and needs of each side, but also in their distinctive societal structures and value systems. For the United States, the problem of verification differs dramatically from that of the Soviet Union. The capacity of the United States to verify Soviet compliance with an arms control agreement is diminished by the secrecy that is characteristic of the Soviet Union as a "closed society," and which has its origins in Tsarist Russia. In contrast, the Soviet Union has ready access to information about the United States as a result of the ongoing debates about national security policy in an "open society," even to the point of deliberations about budgetary appropriations, alternative weapons design, production schedules, deployment modes, and the actual location of weapons systems, including ICBMs. For the United States to engage in clandestine development and deployment of a new generation weapons system, except under extreme conditions of wartime secrecy such as occurred in the Manhattan Project in World War II, would be difficult and perhaps impossible in the late twentieth century. In short, a distinction of fundamental importance must be drawn between a society such as the Soviet Union, which is able to control tightly the sources of information about its military structure and weapons budgets, and the United States, with its diverse perspectives on defense and national arms control agreements. In addition to its Constitutional structure, the United States as a pluralistic society contains numerous informal checks and balances, including a press and electronic media capable of exercising scrutiny over defense issues. In large part for this reason, the United States has had verification as a central concern in arms control negotiations and agreements with the Soviet Union, and for Moscow verification has been deemed to be of lesser importance than other Soviet objectives in SALT.

The problem of arms control verification in gereral, and SALT II in particular, is related to another important consideration, that is, the extent to which there is a correspondence between criteria of significance and criteria of verifiability.[2] It is a truism to assert that arms control agreements should limit weapons systems that are of significance in relations between the signatories of the

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

agreements. Yet what is "significant" may not necessarily be verifiable. In the United States there has been a prevailing assumption that a "good" arms control agreement must be verifiable. A "bad" arms control agreement that was nevertheless verifiable would remain a "bad" agreement — barely better than a "bad" agreement that was unverifiable. This dilemma posed by criteria of significance and verifiability has confronted the United States in its arms control policies in the 1970's. And it poses far greater problems in SALT II than it did at the time of SALT I. It can be expected to produce even more formidable difficulties for arms control in the 1980's because newer strategic weapons systems are more easily concealable than were those of the past. Illustrative of this problem is the failure of SALT II to address the question of numbers of missiles, as contrasted with launchers, upon which both the Interim Agreement of 1972 and the SALT II Treaty have been focused.

Thus the means of verification developed in the 1960's for the strategic weapons of that era will not be adequate for the strategic weapons of the 1980's. In the absence of new means, the United States standard of what constitutes "adequacy" will have to be lowered accordingly, or the gap between what is significant and what is verifiable will be widened. As a consequence, arms control agreements will fail even to a greater extent than they have in the SALT process to address the real problems of U.S. national security — strategic stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Among the many criticisms that have been leveled against the SALT I Accords in retrospect is the contention that the SALT process has ignored another important dimension of arms control. The emphasis upon limiting numbers of launchers, begun in SALT I and codified now in the SALT II Treaty, has left uncontrolled the numbers of land-based missiles that could be launched by the Soviet Union from launchers with a retrofire capability. (On both sides, SLBM fleets might be reloaded if they could be returned to, or fired from port after SLBM launch.) There is a major asymmetry resulting from the land-based silo retrofire capability possessed by the Soviet Union, but not by the United States. Conceivably, the Soviet Union could produce and store clandestinely a large number of missiles for reloading its land-based launchers. The Soviet Union is now estimated to have at least 1,000 missiles in excess of launchers.[3] Here once again, we confront the dilemma inherent in the criteria of verification and significance: to insist that missiles, as well as launchers, be included in the SALT II Treaty would add to the Treaty another provision that cannot be verified by national technical means. To limit such systems in SALT would not necessarily increase, or diminish, the Soviet capacity to produce them clandestinely. Their inclusion might, or might not, provide constraints that would assist the United States in ascertaining Soviet missile production levels and thus increase the quality of our intelligence about this important aspect of Soviet strategic forces. Short of on-site inspection of Soviet factories and storage sites, the United States cannot determine precisely how many missiles the Soviet Union has built and stored for rapid deployment as a "breakout" capability either in a potential crisis or for use in a protracted nuclear exchange with the United States. Thus this issue confronts the United States with two formidable verification problems: the potential for clandestine production and storage of strategic missiles, and for their covert deployment in a mobile mode — in addition to their use in fixed launchers with a retrofire capability. With or without the Treaty, the United States faces an intelligence problem of formidable dimensions. The Treaty simply provides that the Soviet Union will not store missiles at the site of launchers, although it is unlikely that such "ammunition" would be placed near Soviet silos that would constitute high value targets for the United States Strategic Air Command.

Arms control agreements have usually confronted another problem in verification: it has usually been easier to gather information about a weapons system at the stage of its testing and deployment than during the developmental phase, even though the United States is said to obtain data about rockets under development in Soviet design bureaus before they are tested. For example, the Soviet Union is alleged to have as many as four such systems presently under development that have not reached the testing stage.[4] Thus in the SALT II Treaty there is principal emphasis upon limitations in the deployment of strategic systems based upon data that presumably can be gathered during the testing phase. The United States possesses technical means for gathering information about the testing of Soviet systems. For

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

example, the United States has monitored the telemetry from Soviet ICBMs launched during tests to ascertain the MIRVed warhead potential and other characteristics of the system. For this purpose the U.S. monitoring facilities located in Turkey and Iran have been important, and the loss especially of the Iranian facility represents a major deficiency in the U.S. verification capability. The debate on this issue focuses on whether compensatory technical means — satellites in space with sensors — can be developed for use during the timeframe of the Treaty or whether the United States could utilize other means such as U-2 aircraft flying over Turkey to gather data from Soviet missile telemetry. The United States can be faulted for not having pushed the development of technical means that would have removed the need for facilities in countries whose future is politically uncertain.

Although the SALT II Treaty, like the earlier SALT Accords, prohibits the deliberate concealment of such data and the United States has protested from time to time since 1972 Soviet efforts to encode the telemetry, transmitted from missiles to ground personnel during tests, the Treaty contains an "agreed statement" that "neither party should engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetric encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with provisions of the Treaty." But who is to determine whether the Soviet encryption of telemetry is deemed necessary by the United States for verification purposes? If the United States is denied access to such telemetry, it cannot ascertain whether or not it was necessary for American verification of Soviet compliance. Clearly, the Soviet Union is not prepared to allow the United States access to telemetry that could constitute evidence of Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty. On this issue, therefore, the Soviet Union stands as both the judge and the jury with the United States forced presumably to accept Soviet judgment as to whether the telemetry encoded was, or was not, essential to U.S. verification of Soviet compliance. Thus even at the testing phase, the United States faces uncertainties in verifying Soviet compliance with the SALT II Treaty.

The problem of verification has been compounded by the deployment of MIRVed warheads since the SALT I period. Although it is possible to ascertain the number of warheads with which an ICBM has been tested, it is conceivable that the same ICBM could be deployed with a larger number of warheads. Thus, the SALT II Treaty stipulates that the Soviet Union cannot deploy an ICBM with more than ten warheads, the number of warheads with which the largest Soviet ICBM, the SS-18, was known to have been tested, although in the months before the signing of the SALT II Treaty this Soviet "heavy missile" was considered to have a larger warhead capability. In fact, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, the SS-18 with its throwweight of 16,000-19,000 pounds has been tested with twelve warhead "stops," and is probably capable of carring many more warheads.[5] Since it is not possible to verify, by national technical means, the number of warheads a missile is carrying — contrasted with the number of warheads with which it has been tested — it follows that the ability of the Soviet Union to equip clandestinely its ICBM force with a substantial number of warheads in excess of those permitted in the SALT II Treaty would constitute an advantage of potentially destabilizing dimensions in the U.S.-Soviet strategic-nuclear relationship. In short, there is no adequate means of ascertaining whether a MIRV-capable system is deployed with a single warhead or with several warheads, or to determine when the number of warheads has been increased or decreased. The increased warhead fractionation potential that will exist in the 1980's will create a more complex set of problems for arms control negotiations and, specifically, for their verification.

Similarly, the controversy that has arisen with respect to the Soviet SS-20/16 is fraught with considerable importance for the superpower strategic-nuclear relationship. Let us assume that the Soviet Union deploys, by 1985, several hundred SS-20 systems, all of which fall legally outside of the SALT Treaty because they are configured principally for targets in Western Europe, China, or Japan. Such systems could be converted to launch vehicles with intercontinental range either by removing warhead ballast or by adding the third stage to become the SS-16. The availability of several hundred of these systems, whose conversion process could be completed within only a few hours notice, would provide a potential strategic advantage of major proportions to the Soviet Union in the event of a protracted nuclear crisis with the United States. To assert, as the SALT II Treaty does, that the Soviet

Special Edition--21 November 1979
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Union will not undertake the conversion of such systems is not only unverifiable but also meaningless in the context in which their conversion is likely to take place. Such systems would constitute a rapidly deployable strategic reserve force. Even if it did not possess accuracy levels comparable to the Soviet SS-17, 18, and 19, the Soviet Union could augment its strategic capabilities within a short time. No countervailing capability exists, or is likely to come into existence, in the United States within the timeframe of the Treaty. Because such a system would be assembled from components that could be brought together quickly, provisions limiting such systems — either the further production of the SS-16 or the upgrading of the SS-20 to the SS-16 — are meaningless unless the SS-20 itself were to be limited.

Outside the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet Union is permitted to continue to build the controversial Backfire bomber. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss, in detail, the operational characteristics of this new generation supersonic Soviet aircraft. Whatever its alleged importance as a theater warfare capability against Western Europe, China and Japan, the Backfire, under certain conditions, could reach the United States. It may be possible for the United States to verify Soviet production rates of the Backfire bomber during the SALT II Treaty period, with Brezhnev having "confirmed," in a written statement to President Carter, that the Soviet Backfire production rate will not exceed 30 per year. Strategic aircraft are produced in a few well-known facilities in the Soviet Union, and may be observed during flight testing. Soviet airfields for the deployment of such strategic aircraft are identifiable, and such planes are usually parked in open areas. However, the Soviet Union could produce aircraft components clandestinely in underground facilities. Because of the emphasis placed on a capacity for war survival and post attack recovery, it follows that the Soviet Union would seek to build facilities for the production of certain categories of military capabilities, including aircraft. Such facilities, and their production, would not necessarily be ascertainable by U.S. verification capabilities.

In general, weapons that are large and that can be built at only a few sites in facilities that are unique constitute objects that can be verified in arms control agreements. Clearly in this category are SSBNs, which offer additional opportunities for observation when they undergo sea trials before deployment. Hence, the United States has been able to verify Soviet SSBN production rates by virtue not only of the monitoring through national technical means of construction sites, but also the intelligence knowledge available about Soviet submarine development and construction. Once deployed, submarines must depart from, and return to, ports whose identity and location can be determined for observation by national technical means.

We are drawn to the conclusion that verification faces formidable problems both during the testing at the deployment phase, and that the technical means of verification available to the United States have not kept pace with the concealment opportunities afforded by new generation strategic weapons systems, with certain important exceptions noted above. It is in the developmental stage, however, that verification becomes ever more difficult, although not totally impossible. Herein lies another flaw in the SALT process and in arms control itself. In arms control, ideally, weapons should be limited at the earliest possible phase in the acquisition process, that is, at the point at which they are under development. Otherwise they are likely to pose major problems for arms control negotiations as we have seen in the SALT II process during the 1970's. But it is most difficult, and perhaps impossible, to ascertain Soviet weapons development, as illustrated in the ongoing controversy about the nature and level of Soviet R&D in such exotic weaponry as high-energy lasers and charged particle beams, as well as in antisubmarine warfare — in all of which Soviet breakthroughs could have a profound effect upon the superpower strategic-military relationship to the detriment of the United States in the years ahead. Arms control agreements that purport to place qualitative limitations upon weapons systems confront this intractable problem. Inherent in the nature of R&D is the development of qualitatively superior capabilities to replace existing generation systems. Arms control agreements normally address only those systems of the present. Thus we are led once again to the paradox of significance and verifiability. In all likelihood, the most important strategic-military systems of the next generation have not yet left the drawing board or the research laboratory. Usually only when they

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

enter the testing phase are they likely to be considered as possible objects of arms control. An arms control agreement that limits R&D cannot be verifiable by "national technical means." Indeed such an agreement might even provide an incentive to a state seeking strategic advantage over an adversary to engage in the clandestine development of a system that might be tested for "rapid breakout" deployment. There has been apprehension that the Soviet Union seeks such a quick deployment option with respect to ballistic missile defense either by upgrading existing technologies or by the development of new generation capabilities.[6] Such systems could be deployed after the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, without their existence necessarily having been detected by the "national technical means" permitted under the terms of the Treaty.

The SALT II Treaty has been lauded for its qualitative limitations on the deployment of "new type" ICBMs. Under its terms, each signatory is restricted to the deployment of one light "new type" ICBM before December 31, 1985. A "new" strategic missile is defined by throwweight, length, launch weight, and diameter. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union could probably develop and deploy one or more systems based upon new components within the shell of an existing missile within the constraints set forth in the Treaty. What, then, really constitutes a "new" missile? Moreover, the Soviet Union having completed the development and deployment phase of at least six new strategic systems since the early 1970's could use the timeframe of the SALT II Treaty to engage in the developmental phase of large numbers of advanced generation systems that would reach possible deployment after the formal expiration of the Treaty. While the United States might have obtained evidence that the Soviet Union was engaged in such activity in its design bureaus, as we have in the past, at what point would we be prepared to argue conclusively that this constituted a violation of the Treaty?

"National technical means" of verification were deemed to be adequate when it was possible to observe weapons systems deployed on fixed platforms and having ranges that were clearly identifiable and measurable. The systems that have been developed in the 1970's have added to the complexity of verification by virtue of their mobility of deployment as well as uncertainty about their range and warhead characteristics as well. In addition to mobile launchers for ICBMs, the emergence of the cruise missile is illustrative of each of these problems. The cruise missile can be deployed from a fixed or mobile platform, from land, from air, and from a submarine or surface ship. Thus it may be difficult to locate its point of launch. For the cruise missile, and especially for the new generation systems under development in the United States and perhaps also by the Soviet Union, range is a function of such variables as payload: the lighter the warhead, the greater the range. A cruise missile has variable range so that it could strike targets that are less or more distant. A cruise missile can be equipped with a conventional or nuclear warhead. Although the SALT II Treaty specifies that aircraft carrying cruise missiles are to be included on a one-to-one basis in the 1,320 MIRV category, aircraft, or other launch platforms, could be equipped with cruise missiles quickly and easily. Thus the United States would not necessarily know whether a Backfire bomber, to be included in the 1,320 total only if it carries cruise missiles, in fact carried such systems until it approached its target. Clearly, the cruise missile has opened a large number of verification issues for the SALT process.[7]

The United States has evinced not only great interest in verifying Soviet compliance with SALT, but has been anxious to ensure that the Soviet Union could verify U.S. compliance — notwithstanding the asymmetries that favor the Soviet Union in verifying U.S. compliance and the lesser interest manifested by the Soviet Union in arms control verification. To be sure, the Soviet Union has appeared to be only too willing to oblige those in the United States concerned with arms control verification by pointing to the verification problems posed by the MX. In its preoccupation with verification, the United States has been engaged in a vast effort to devise modern ways of deploying the MX that could be verifiable by the Soviet Union. In one of its deployment modes, the MX canister, the size of a Boeing 707 fuselage, would be carried slowly on a unique, easily identifiable railroad vehicle to the assembly point and then transported to the deployment area. Among the critics of MX have been those concerned with the implications of its deployment for arms control verification — that such a deployment mode would create

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

insurmountable verification problems for arms control because of the possibility of concealing more than the specified number of missiles permitted in the shell game. But this kind of problem already confronts the United States — as a result of the Soviet retrofire capability.

Verification encompasses not only the monitoring for the Soviet strategic systems in accordance with limitations contained in an arms control treaty or agreement, but also the actual use of such capabilities. Central to strategic stability, viewed from an American perspective, has been the capacity of the United States to maintain space-based systems to obtain verification data. Therefore the development by the Soviet Union of an anti-satellite system constitutes a destabilizing element in the superpower strategic-nuclear relationship. In the 1980's, the Soviet Union will probably have available an antisatellite system that could deny the United States verification data from U.S. space-based systems.[8] Such a weapon would be used against U.S. verification or early warning systems in a crisis — at the time when they would be most fully needed by the American intelligence community. The development of such capabilities by the Soviet Union, as contrasted with their use, does not itself constitute a violation of the Treaty provisions against interference with the national technical means of verification of the United States. However, the interest manifested by the Soviet Union in the development of an ASAT capability points up the sharp contrast between the Soviet and American conceptions of strategic stability, and of verification both as a centrally important part of arms control and as an essential element in minimizing the likelihood of nuclear war.

Last but not least, there remains the question of what constitutes a treaty violation. The United States and the Soviet Union have approached this aspect of arms control treaties from quite different perspectives. In marked contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States has often emphasized the "spirit of the agreement," while the Soviet Union has adhered to a far more rigid legalistic interpretation. For the Soviets, anything that is not strictly prohibited is permitted. For its part, the United States has sought unsuccessfully to restrain Soviet strategic programs by the inclusion of unilateral interpretations which have had no apparent effect upon the Soviet Union. The controversy surrounding the Soviet deployment of its fourth generation heavy systems, begun within a year after the signing of the SALT I Interim Agreement, is illustrative of this problem. The Soviet Union was unwilling to include a definition of a "heavy missile" in the Interim Agreement that would have precluded the deployment of a system such as the SS-18. In the absence of superpower agreement on this issue, the United States inserted its own unilateral statement. In retrospect the United States should not have been surprised that the Soviet Union pressed forward with new ICBM systems which have constituted, from the American perspective, a highly destabilizing element in the strategic nuclear relationship in the late 1970's. Some critics of SALT have suggested that such Soviet deployments are in violation of the "spirit," if not the letter, of the Interim Agreement. While such Soviet deployments have provided good cause for American apprehension, it is difficult to conclude that they are in violation of the Interim Agreement, which contained no definition of a heavy missile to which the Soviet Union had assented. Instead, the inability of either SALT I or the present Treaty to place effective controls on such systems represents perhaps its most fundamental deficiency. If the United States, as numerous analysts of the SALT process have suggested, was unable at the time of SALT I to anticipate the rapidity with which the Soviet Union would deploy such strategic systems, there is little reason to anticipate that SALT II will enable us successfully to grapple with emerging asymmetries in the strategic-military environment of the 1980's.

How much evidence is necessary to convince the intelligence analyst and the policymaker that the other party to an agreement has sought to circumvent its provisions? Intelligence estimates about the same phenomenon are sometimes at variance with each other, and on occasion they have been politicized to accord with the conventional policy wisdom of the day. Those who have supported a particular arms control agreement may be loathe to find evidence that the other party to the agreement has, in fact, violated it. This problem confronted the United States in its monitoring of Soviet compliance after the SALT I Accords. Rightly or wrongly, the Administrations in power were accused of suppressing evidence of alleged Soviet violations.[9] Having

Special Edition 21 November 1979

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

committed so much of its time, substance, and prestige to the SALT II Treaty, it is doubtful that any Administration will seek eagerly to bring to public attention evidence of Soviet violations. The U.S. interest in minimizing verification problems will be enhanced by President Carter's assertion, backed by other Administration officials, but excluding the Director of Central Intelligence, to the effect that the SALT II Treaty will be adequately verifiable from the day of its signing. Members of the intelligence community may find no more welcome a hearing for alleged violations than has the Director of Central Intelligence in his expressions of reservations about the capacity of the United States to develop the means for adequate verification during the timeframe of the present Treaty.

Instead, the tendency, once noted by Winston Churchill, "to tell a chief in a great position things he most likes to hear" may well take precedence over objectivity in the intelligence process. Such problems have, in fact, beset the gathering and analysis of intelligence in the United States in recent years. They may well be, as Churchill once noted, "the commonest explanation of mistaken policy" producing a situation in which "the outlook of the leader on whose decisions fateful events depend, is usually far more sanguine than the brutal facts admit."[10]

Thus we are drawn to the conclusion that verification is not possible for a large number of the major issues with which the SALT II Treaty deals, and that it is more likely that the Soviet Union could verify U.S. compliance than that the United States could verify Soviet compliance. But the Soviet Union can rely upon the United States to monitor its own compliance with the SALT II Treaty, while the United States has no similar Soviet monitoring capability within the Soviet Union. Of even greater importance in an analysis of verification is the asymmetry between U.S. and Soviet strategic-nuclear doctrines — the U.S. emphasis upon mutual assured destruction and war deterrence of avoidance, contrasted with the Soviet conception of strategic forces that could fight, win and survive a nuclear war. The Soviet Union seeks strategic superiority, while the United States has opted for strategic parity as the basis for strategic stability. For these reasons alone, verification is indispensable to the United States to ensure that the Soviet Union will not use arms control agreements to achieve strategic superiority. If the SALT Treaty is not adequately verifiable, do the advantages inherent in the Treaty, whatever they may be, outweigh its deficiencies in verifiability? Although an analysis of the Treaty as such is beyond the scope of this article, the fact remains that the Treaty represents a codification of strategic military trends that are detrimental to the United States as we enter the 1980's. Therefore, the remedy for the United States lies outside the arms control process upon which so much attention has been focused in the American strategic military affairs community during the last decade.

FOOTNOTES

1. Amrom H. Katz, *Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation), 1979, p 11.

2. For an extended discussion of this issue, see Amrom H. Katz, *Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation), 1979.

3. Henry A. Bradsher, "New U.S. Study Finds More Soviet Missiles," *Washington Star*, April 12, 1979.

4. Robert G. Kaiser, "Verification of SALT II: Art and Science," the *Washington Post*, June 15, 1979, p A12.

5. Walter Pincus, "U.S. Downgrades Soviet ICBM Yield," *Washington Post*, May 31, 1979. See also Jacquelyn K. Davis, Patrick J. Friel, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *SALT II and U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces* Special Report, Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1979.

6. See, for example, Testimony of John B. Walsh, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering (now assigned to NATO Headquarters) before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate; Reprinted in "Russian ABM Work Boosts U.S. Penetration Effort," *Aerospace Daily*, July 27, 1977, p 139. According to Secretary of Defense Brown: "The lead we enjoyed in BMD technology at the time of agreement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has substantially diminished. It is therefore important for us to pursue an aggressive R&D program to guard against a Soviet breakthrough in that field and to encourage their compliance with the treaty." Department of Defense, *Annual Report Fiscal Year*

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4

1980, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 25, 1979, pp 126-127.

7. For an extended examination of this issue, see Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Jacquelyn K. Davis, *The Cruise Missile: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain?* Special Report, Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977.

8. According to Secretary of Defense Brown, Department of Defense, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1980*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 25, 1979, p 129, "We see developing Soviet space capabilities that could directly threaten our terrestrail forces and some of our critical satellites. The Soviets are operating satellite systems that could perform targeting of U.S. naval and land-based forces and they have tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) system. In addition to their ASAT interceptor, they are working on other technology programs that appear to be ASAT related. These Soviet activities could threaten our access to space."

9. According to former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird: "The History of verification has, unfortunately, shown that the U.S. government has been reluctant to make public or press the Soviets on violations because of concern it would damage our relations or hinder progress at SALT II, a logic which escapes me." See Melvin R. Laird, "Arms Control: The Russians are Cheating!," *Reader's Digest*, December 1977, p 98. There is a substantial list of alleged Soviet violations of the SALT I accords. They include:

(a) Soviet tests of an air-defense radar in an ABM mode. U.S. monitoring revealed in 1973 and 1974 that the Soviet Union was testing a radar with the SA-5 surface-to-surface missile system to track ballistic missiles in flight. Such tests would be in violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union maintained that air-defense radar had not been tested in the ABM mode but they concealed the suspect activity. (They may now be able to renew such activity with impunity unless the United States is able to replace the lost Iranian monitoring facilities.)

(b) ABM radar on Kamchatka Peninsula. The United States observed that a new phased-array radar had been constructed at Kamchatka, an area which had not been designated as a Soviet ABM test range. This issue was subsequently resolved by the Standing Consultative Commission which included Kamchatka as one of the two test ranges allowed the Soviet Union by the SALT I ABM Agreement.

(c) Concealment measures. Since 1972, the United States has discovered a substantial number of Soviet efforts to conceal actions associated with strategic capabilities limited in the SALT accords. Such measures appear to be in violation of Article V of the Interim Agreement and Article XII of the ABM Treaty. Notable in this regard is the Soviet encoding of telemetry from ICBM tests to ground stations. This issue has become a topic of particular concern in the verification of a SALT II Treaty.

(d) The Soviet Union did not dismantle on schedule in 1976 fifty-one ICBM launchers as required by the Interim Agreement. The Soviet Union was permitted to increase its total number of SLBM launchers from 740 to 950 provided it dismantled one ICBM launcher for each SLBM launcher added. The Soviet Union agreed to the U.S. position that additional submarines with SLBM launchers could not be deployed before the required number of ICBM launchers were dismantled.

10. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1918*, Landsburg Publications, 1960 (abridged edition), pp 748-749.

CONTRIBUTOR TO THIS ISSUE

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and President of the United States Strategic Institute, Washington, D.C. Dr. Pfaltzgraff is the author and co-author of fifteen books on foreign policy, national security studies, and international relations theory.

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350018-4