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# **The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Building Bases of Support**

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**A Research Paper**

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*NESA 86-10025  
May 1986*

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# **The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Building Bases of Support**

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**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by   
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,  
with a contribution by  Office of  
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the  
Directorate of Operations.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
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## The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Building Bases of Support

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### Summary

*Information available  
as of 21 April 1986  
was used in this report.*

The Muslim Brotherhood will be a powerful Islamic force in Egypt into the next decade, but it is not an immediate threat to President Mubarak's rule. The Brotherhood retains its goal of establishing a conservative Islamic state in Egypt, to be achieved by reducing Western influence and implementing Islamic law. After years of unsuccessful militancy, the Brotherhood over the past decade has been following a gradualist strategy to achieve its goal. Although the nominee to replace the Brotherhood's aging leader favors more confrontation with the government, the Brotherhood is unlikely to radically change its moderate tactics. The aims of the Brotherhood are best served by stability of the Egyptian Government.

Although illegal, the Brotherhood is cooperating with the government to wrest leadership of the Muslim fundamentalist movement from more radical groups. The government is unlikely to crack down on the Brotherhood unless it becomes more confrontational or gains too much power. The government will probably withhold granting legal status to the Brotherhood to preserve its leverage against the organization.

The chief strength of the Brotherhood is its financial resources, which will probably allow it to weather the current popularity of more radical Islamic groups in Egypt. The organization is funded primarily through its local business interests, including finance, construction, manufacturing, trade, and services. Other income is derived from sympathizers in the Arab Gulf states, Western Europe, and North America.

Increased factionalism is the Brotherhood's most serious potential problem. The moderate tactics of the current leadership have produced strains in the organization that could grow as the Brothers begin the process of choosing a new Supreme Guide.

The Brotherhood has been successful in building a fundamentalist network in Egypt through the recruitment of educators, students, journalists, other professionals, and businessmen. It has had little success in recruiting among the lower classes or in the armed forces.

Egypt's growing economic problems will heighten the appeal of the Brotherhood's vision of a just Islamic society. Declining revenues from oil, tourism, and remittances are depressing the already low standard of living. Returning overseas workers are swelling the ranks of educated Egyptians becoming frustrated by the lack of employment opportunities.


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Despite cooperation with the government, the stand of the Brotherhood against the Camp David accords, the Agency for International Development, and Western cultural penetration of Egypt makes it a potential anti-US force. Increased strength of the Brotherhood, combined with Egypt's growing religious conservatism, will tend to make Egypt less sympathetic to US goals in the Middle East. A weakened Brotherhood, however, is likely to strengthen Islamic extremists who are even less accommodating to the United States. 

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**The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:  
Building Bases of Support**



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The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's long-term goal is to build a fundamentalist Muslim society by sweeping out Western influence and implementing Islamic law.<sup>1</sup> The Brotherhood's more immediate objectives are to assert preeminence among Islamic fundamentalist groups, to gain governmental recognition as a legal organization, and to create a fundamentalist Islamic network in the country. To achieve these goals, the Brotherhood is cooperating with the government against Islamic radicals and seeks both to strengthen its diverse—and profitable—business interests and to infiltrate the education system, labor unions, professional associations, and the military.

Over the last decade the Brotherhood in Egypt—which has as many as 500,000 members and sympathizers—has been using more moderate tactics, apparently because previous confrontational policies brought only repression, torture, and imprisonment. In a series of meetings over the last three years, Brotherhood leaders from Egypt and other Muslim countries formally decided to pursue a policy of accommodation with the Mubarak government. They believe a period of good relations with the government would allow the building of a strong grassroots organization capable of meeting the challenge from emerging radical Islamic groups (see appendix A, "Historical Sketch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood").

<sup>1</sup> We define fundamentalism as a religiously motivated political movement that attempts to rebuild society according to a divine plan. Typically, fundamentalism is dogmatic: scripture, mythology, and traditions are accepted as literal truth without consideration of their historic or symbolic context. Adherents hunger for authority and are committed to a world view in which all events have religious significance. This definition encompasses a wide range of Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and radicals such as al-Jihad, who have similar goals but use different tactics to achieve them.

<sup>2</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood also operates in Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the West Bank and Gaza. Most of these groups were founded by Egyptians who left Egypt to avoid government persecution. These leaders meet occasionally in Europe to plan Brotherhood activities.

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**Goals of the Muslim Brotherhood**

*The long-term goal of establishing an Islamic state in Egypt is derived from Hasan al-Banna's proscription against the "vices" of the modern world: imperialism, usury, imitation of the West, laws promulgated by man rather than God, atheism and ideological chaos, weak leadership, secular scientific methods, and corruption. The Brotherhood's objectives include:*

- *A government that will implement and defend the Islamic system as revealed by God. In this government, legislators will be chosen from the ranks of the ulema (religious scholars), will pass laws in accordance with sharia (Islamic law), and will serve as a check on the executive and judiciary. The judiciary will interpret law to conform with sharia.*
- *An economic system based on a profit-sharing arrangement that accommodates the Koranic prohibitions on usury. The zakat (alms tax) will replace income taxes and will supply funds to operate necessary government functions.*
- *A social system that strictly separates men and women in educational institutions and at all public gatherings. Once in power the Brotherhood would ban birth control and laws and regulations that promote women's liberation because these are considered part of a Western conspiracy to destroy Muslim society.*

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**Cooperation With the Government**

an informal alliance was formed last summer between the Brotherhood and the government when the organization apparently convinced senior government officials that only the

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**Egypt's Islamic Radicals**

*Islamic radicals, inspired by the Iranian model, believe that an Islamic revolution is necessary to solve Egypt's social, spiritual, and economic problems. [redacted] the radicals number 20,000 to 30,000 distributed among two dozen groups. The groups are split by personal rivalries and ideological disputes. Some such as Takfir wa Hijra, al-Jihad, and the Islamic Liberation Army have been involved in terrorist activities including the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. [redacted]*

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*These groups arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of spiritual, cultural, and political crises that followed the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel and Sadat's "Open Door" economic policies that increased the Western presence in Egypt. The radicals' violent and utopian ideology stems from the writings of Sayyid Qutb, a Muslim Brother executed in 1966 for plotting against Nasir. Varying interpretations of Qutb's ideology—ranging from a return to 6th century Islamic practices to a more pragmatic accommodation with modernity—have prevented a unified radical front from taking shape. [redacted]*

Brotherhood could prevent the spread of Islamic radicalism and purge the Islamic movement of misguided youth who are harming Islam and dividing Muslims. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Brotherhood dealt a setback to the radicals in December 1985 when candidates it favored won a majority of student government seats in elections at Cairo University. [redacted]

[redacted] the Brotherhood financially backed the winning party, the moderate "Islamic Association." Although the group did not acknowledge the Brotherhood's sponsorship, it would have been difficult for it to mount and finance such a major campaign, which included hundreds of candidates and workers and

thousands of costly leaflets and posters, without the Brotherhood's backing. The fliers handed out by the winning party carried typical Brotherhood messages. [redacted]

The Brotherhood and the government cooperated in Alexandria in August 1985 to counter Islamic radicals who were attempting to politicize the traditional festival of sacrifice (Id al-Adha), [redacted]

[redacted] Following discussions between the government and Brotherhood leader Umar Tal-massani, the government allowed the Brotherhood to lead the holiday services in return for a special effort by the Brotherhood to numerically overwhelm the radicals at the celebration. No disturbances were reported during the services, which [redacted] estimated were attended by 100,000 persons. [redacted]

In our view, the cooperation between the Brotherhood and the government is a marriage of convenience. [redacted]

[redacted] the Brotherhood hopes to use the alliance to recoup some of its waning popularity among younger fundamentalists by demonstrating that its access to the Egyptian establishment gives it more influence than the Islamic extremists. Brotherhood leaders also believe cooperation will help the organization to achieve legal status. We believe Mubarak sees the alliance as an opportunity to undermine the radicals without requiring the government to play a leading role in doing so. He may also believe that better relations with the Brotherhood improve the ability of the security forces to keep an eye on the organization's activities. [redacted]

The Brothers remain concerned that stepped-up militancy by radical fundamentalists will spark a crack-down on them, despite their alliance with the government. During the police riots last February, senior Brotherhood leaders, responding to rumors of fundamentalist involvement, fled their homes in fear that they would be arrested. [redacted]

[redacted] no Brotherhood leaders

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were arrested, [redacted]  
[redacted]

publications. The US Embassy in Cairo reports that *Al-Itisam* and *Al-Mukhtar al-Islami* resumed publishing in late 1985, and in April 1986 the government approved publication of the more widely read Brotherhood magazine *Al-Dawa*. [redacted]

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**Seeking Legitimacy**

We believe that over the last year the Brotherhood has been attempting to negotiate a deal with Mubarak's government to achieve legal status. The Brothers' eagerness for a deal was shown in May 1985 by the mildness of their protest against the National Assembly's limitation of debate on *sharia* to two hours. The Brotherhood continues to tolerate the slow pace of the government's review of existing Egyptian laws to ensure they are in accordance with *sharia*,<sup>3</sup> according to the US Embassy in Cairo. [redacted]

The government also has let Egyptian courts examine the constitutionality of the statute that was used to outlaw the Brotherhood in 1954, according to the US Embassy in Cairo. In mid-1985 a lower court questioned the law's prohibitions on any political party based on race, religion, or creed. Despite the lack of a definitive court ruling, [redacted] the Brotherhood leadership was encouraged that the measures are at least under review. The Embassy believes, however, that the High Constitutional Court eventually will prevent the Brotherhood from gaining status as a legal political party. [redacted]

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To show its good faith in its quest for legal status, the Brotherhood claimed it would disband its secret militia beginning in August 1984, [redacted]

[redacted]

**Aligning With the New Wafd Party**

The US Embassy in Cairo reports the Brotherhood formed an alliance with the opposition New Wafd Party in 1984 to increase its political strength through parliamentary representation, augment its influence over the major opposition group, and gain the appearance of greater legitimacy. A Brotherhood member of parliament told the US Embassy that the New Wafd agreed to the alliance to expand its constituency by tapping the Brotherhood's popular support. In return, the alliance enabled the Brotherhood to demonstrate that it can successfully compete in elections. The Embassy reported that eight of the 58 seats captured by the New Wafd Party in the parliamentary election in May 1984 were won by Muslim Brothers. [redacted]

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[redacted] We believe that Brothers who advocate more confrontation with the government have defied the leadership's instructions and have maintained a covert military capability. [redacted]

The government has presented the Brotherhood's leaders with four conditions they must meet to gain legal status, [redacted]

The Brotherhood must:

- Stay out of Egyptian politics.
- Reconsider its alliance with the opposition New Wafd Party.
- Stop protesting the Camp David accords.
- Refrain from recruiting in the military. [redacted]

The Brotherhood has been an unreliable political partner from the beginning. Its members in parliament have ignored New Wafd leaders, discussed political issues only at Brotherhood headquarters, and voted exclusively in the Brotherhood's own interest regardless of the views of the Wafd. [redacted]

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We believe the Brotherhood will reject these conditions, which will give the government sufficient justification to continue denying it legal status. The government is encouraging continued cooperation by allowing the Brotherhood to resume some of its

[redacted]

<sup>3</sup> *Sharia* is Islamic canon law developed from the Koran and the Hadith (acts of the Prophet). It codifies all facets of a Muslim's life, including family relationships, economic transactions, and criminal punishments. Egyptian civil law is largely based on European legal systems. [redacted]

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the 1950s and 1960s were given, upon release in the 1970s, 1,000 Egyptian pounds for each year of confinement as compensation for wrongful imprisonment. This money was pooled and invested in small businesses. Several of these businesses have prospered, due in part to the boost Sadat's Open Door economic policies gave to private entrepreneurs. [redacted]

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To avoid governmental interference or takeover of their enterprises, the Brotherhood usually forms partnerships with sympathetic businessmen who are not members of their organization. Part of the companies' profits—including money from overstated expenses—is donated to the Brotherhood. Most of the firms hire Brotherhood members. [redacted]

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These companies enable the Brotherhood to finance hospitals, clinics, and publications and to proselytize abroad. [redacted] major businesses owned or operated by the Brotherhood include:

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- **Arab Contractors.** Now nationalized, it is Egypt's largest construction company. Through its manager and former owner, Uthman Ahmad Uthman, the company maintains ties to the Brotherhood. Uthman was Sadat's confidant and former Minister of Construction. The company employs many Brothers and has controlling interest in about 40 other companies in Egypt and abroad that also support the Brotherhood.

- **Faisal Islamic Bank of Cairo.** The bank is owned by a Saudi citizen but is managed by an Egyptian, Ahmad Ali Kamal, who is an active Brotherhood member [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] many sympathetic investors donate their share of the bank's profits to the Brotherhood.

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- **Al-Sharif Group.** The group is a holding company [redacted]

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[redacted] It has five factories in Egypt, including a major pipe and plastics producer.

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
- **Al-Salam Group.** This company, owned by a long-time Brotherhood member, runs a major hotel in Cairo and is planning to build another.

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• **Hilal Group.** This group owns 14 diversified companies in Egypt. [redacted]



Umar Talmassani, acting Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood [redacted]

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The Brotherhood has systematically collected money from members for foreign investments, [redacted]. Each member of the organization contributes 10 percent of his income to the Brotherhood. These funds, in addition to donations from wealthy sympathizers, are sent to Islamic Charities, a Brotherhood front organization in Kuwait. Islamic Charities manages an investment portfolio whose profits are returned to the Brotherhood. [redacted]

The Brotherhood also raises money by selling US dollars on the Egyptian black market. [redacted]

al-Jihad and Takfir wa Hijra—involvement in antigovernment conspiracies and the assassination of Sadat—were founded by disgruntled Brotherhood members. [redacted]

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**Moderates.** The largest faction, led by Supreme Guide Umar Talmassani and composed of generally older intellectuals, businessmen, and lawyers, continues to seek accommodation with the government (see appendix B for profiles of Brotherhood leaders). They fear that violent confrontation with Mubarak would turn Egyptians from the Brotherhood and usher in a new period of repression. They favor continuation of the political alliance with the New Wafd Party until the Brotherhood can legally form its own political party. The moderates are concerned that they are losing ground to the militants because the government has procrastinated in legalizing the Brotherhood and attempted to increase control over its financial activities, such as by reorganizing their Islamic International Bank for Investment. [redacted]

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Money that eventually is funneled to the Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere is first deposited in the bank accounts of Islamic cultural and religious centers [redacted]

Funds come from individual benefactors in Saudi Arabia, expatriate Egyptian Brothers, and from sympathetic Muslims living in Europe and North America. [redacted]

**Factionalism**

We believe the moderate tactics of the Brotherhood and its lack of a clear plan to organize and run an Islamic state have led to the formation of factions that reflect different philosophies about how to attain its goals. The Brotherhood's tendency to break into factions is, in our view, its most serious problem. [redacted]

[redacted] there are substantial divisions between older and younger members. The older generation is disturbed that younger members favor radical revolutionary doctrines. We believe a defection by younger members would sap the Brotherhood of its most dynamic, albeit sometimes more extreme, members. For instance, the radical groups

The moderate faction also includes a less politically active group, led by Ma'amun al-Hudaybi, the son of a former Supreme Guide. This group opposes the alliance with the New Wafd Party and favors religious education programs to gradually change Egypt into an Islamic society. It is made up of aging Brotherhood pioneers and pious students, teachers, university graduates, and recently retired military

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officers. They adhere to the teachings of the Brotherhood's founder, Hasan al-Banna. This group is trying to win support of the lower middle class in the countryside, especially among those workers who have returned from the Gulf states. [redacted]

**Militants.** Led by Mustafa Mashur and Abbas Hassan al-Sissi, [redacted] who live in Kuwait and West Germany, respectively, the militants advocate more confrontation with the government. This group argues that only through confrontation will Mubarak see the power and pervasiveness of the Brotherhood in Egyptian society, forcing him to make concessions to the organization. There is no indication of the forms of confrontation this group advocates, but, as members of a secret militia, they may want to resort to an old Brotherhood tactic of organizing nonviolent demonstrations that evolve into more violent action. [redacted]

The militants regard Mubarak's delay in legalizing the organization as well as Jordan's recent move against fundamentalist influence in government as signs of an impending crackdown against the Brotherhood, [redacted] They want to reinvigorate the organization's clandestine militia. The militants have proposed that, until the Brotherhood holds a general assembly to elect a new leader and fill other vacancies, the organization should be managed by an emergency council to emphasize what they call the near wartime conditions it faces. [redacted]

**Brotherhood Power Struggle**

The nomination in late March of Mashur to succeed the aged and ailing Talmassani will increase tensions between the factions, [redacted]

The militants secured the nomination with support from Talmassani, who—frustrated by the lack of concessions from the government—had been harshly critical of President Mubarak in the weeks preceding the nomination. They are also trying to fill other vacancies in the organization. [redacted]

The moderates claim Mashur lacks sufficient religious education as well as political and diplomatic skills and vigorously oppose his nomination. They contend that Mashur and many of his followers, who

**Muslim Brotherhood Organization and Leadership**

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**Supreme Guide**

Umar Talmassani (acting since 1974) <sup>a</sup>

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**Supreme Guidance Council <sup>b</sup>**

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12 seats (six living members)

Umar Talmassani

Hamid Abu Nasir

Abd al-Mu'az Abd al-Sattar


Muhammad Farid Abd al-Khaliq

Fahmi Abu Ghadir

Sahah Abu Ruqayq

**Consultative Assembly <sup>c</sup>**

150 seats (about 100 members still living)



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
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live abroad, are out of step with Egyptian political realities. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

We expect Egypt's growing economic problems to enhance the appeal of the Brotherhood's vision of a just and equitable Islamic society. Dropping oil prices,

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a fall in remittances from Egyptian workers abroad, the declining tourist trade—aggravated by the police riots in February 1986—and contradictory exchange rate policies have contributed to a marked deterioration in the country's financial situation. Programs aimed at alleviating the financial difficulties—such as import restrictions, reduction of food subsidies, and removal of price supports—will depress already low standards of living. We believe the Brotherhood will try to take advantage of popular frustrations by claiming that worsening conditions stem from imitation of bankrupt Western economic systems. [redacted]

In the short term, we believe that radical Islamic groups will have more appeal for Egypt's youth—who see the Brotherhood as a tired organization run by old men—than the Brotherhood. Even with tacit government support, the Brotherhood's attempts to defeat campus radicals will probably have only modest success. The radicals will be more likely to use civil unrest, such as the police riots, to their advantage. Although the riots by conscripts of the Central Security Forces appeared to have broken out without fundamentalist direction, the selective attacks on tourist hotels and nightclubs suggest that Muslim radicals were well prepared to exploit the riot and explain its causes in Islamic terms. We believe this demonstration of the unreliability of a major element of the Egyptian police may embolden extremists to foment new disturbances. In the unlikely event that Islamic radicals were about to seize the government, the Brotherhood would side with the government to suppress the radicals and to gain control of the fundamentalist movement. [redacted]

Despite the radicals' apparent short-term advantages, we believe the Muslim Brotherhood has the patience, financial resources, and organization to remain a more powerful Islamic force over the long term. These assets will enable the organization to weather leadership changes and factionalism as well as the challenge of radical fundamentalists. We also believe that time favors the Brotherhood. Egypt is steadily becoming a more religiously conservative society, which, in the long run, will help defuse some of the issues exploited by the radicals: consumption of alcohol, wearing of "immodest" Western dress by women, and mingling of the sexes in public places. [redacted]

Brotherhood moderates appear to have been caught off guard by the sudden move to nominate Mashur, but they may still be able to keep him from taking over the leadership. They will have their work cut out for them, however; the nomination and other personnel changes have strengthened the militants, who were in any case better organized than the moderates, [redacted] Should Mashur become leader, he would reiterate demands that the government immediately enact *sharia* and abrogate the Camp David accords. He would also end the Brotherhood's alliance with the New Wafd Party. [redacted]

If Mashur becomes Supreme Guide, we believe he will be forced in time to return to the more conciliatory tactics adopted by the Brotherhood over the last decade. Mashur, who has lived in Kuwait since 1981, will face political realities in Egypt that only pragmatic leadership can successfully address:

- Differences between the militants and the moderate majority of the Brotherhood force the leadership to find common ground that will prevent the organization from breaking into small, weak factions.
- Most Egyptians are conservative and do not favor revolutionary change. A sharp turn from the moderate tactics of the Brotherhood would defeat its goal of gradually converting Egypt into a fundamentalist society.
- The government will almost certainly crack down on the Brotherhood if it strays from its current tactics. Mashur, who was in prison for nearly 15 years during the 1950s and 1960s, probably will avoid actions that would send him and his lieutenants to jail. [redacted]

We believe a crackdown by the government will be an ever-present threat to the Brotherhood. Any groundswell of support for the Brotherhood's goals, particularly the implementation of *sharia*, will alarm the government, which apparently intends to drag out the

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***Egypt's Drift Toward Conservative Islam***

*A Cairo shop specializing in veiling fashions* [redacted]

*In recent years Egyptian society has become more outwardly Islamic:*

- *Many young women—even at the American University in Cairo—are wearing veils, and young men have grown beards and are wearing the traditional*

*sharia* debate for years. The organization will have to exert enough power to achieve its religious objectives, to meet the fundamentalist challenge, and to contain internal divisions, and at the same time appear to be no threat to the government. [redacted]

The popularity of the Brotherhood—and other Islamic groups—will ultimately depend on the government's ability to reduce the perception of Western cultural penetration and influence and to halt economic deterioration. Signs of further disintegration of Egyptian society—a perceived decline in the standard of living, higher unemployment or underemployment, and military impotence—will heighten the appeal of groups advocating Islamic solutions to Egypt's problems. [redacted]

*galabiya (loose robe) as symbols of their piety. Dress has become more conservative among elements of the once flamboyant upper middle classes. Many university classes are sexually segregated.*

- *More schools, businesses, and offices are pausing to observe the daily calls to prayer. Social drinking in public has declined.*
- *The government has canceled some US-made television programs (particularly "Dallas") during the holy month of Ramadan because these shows, though popular, are regarded as offensive to Islam.*
- *Egyptian courts have ruled that some of the personal status laws, often called the Jihan Sadat laws after their chief advocate, are unconstitutional. The laws had given women the right to file for divorce if the husband married another wife without the first wife's agreement. The provisions also gave divorced women the right to hold property until the husband provides the divorced wife with an equivalent residence.* [redacted]

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**Implications for the United States**

We believe the Brotherhood has a stake in the stability of the Egyptian Government and acts as a counterweight to more revolutionary Islamic groups. The organization's staunch anti-Western, anti-Camp David views, however, make it a potential anti-US force in Egypt. Many Egyptian Muslims regard the United States as the most powerful cultural threat to an Islamic way of life. Furthermore, the US Agency for International Development has become associated in the minds of many Egyptians with the "Open Door" economic policy launched by President Sadat.

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The Brotherhood opposes that policy in the belief that it has caused the growth of the new Westernized entrepreneurial class, widened the gap between rich and poor, and greatly increased corruption.

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We believe a stronger Brotherhood, coupled with Egypt's evolving religious conservatism, will be an influence to make Egypt less sympathetic to US goals, policies, and diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. Although Mubarak is unlikely to bow to fundamentalist pressure in the near term, he may reject new diplomatic overtures for a Middle Eastern peace settlement or military cooperation that might be construed by the Brotherhood as a further alignment with US interests in the region.

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A weaker Brotherhood would not benefit US interests in Egypt. Political power lost by the Brotherhood would probably be gained by Islamic extremists, who are even less accommodating to the United States, Western culture, Egyptian-Israeli ties, and US peace initiatives in the Middle East than the Brotherhood.

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## Appendix A

### Historical Sketch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Since its founding in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, a visionary Egyptian school teacher, the Muslim Brotherhood has fought to reduce the impact of Western culture and to restore conservative Islamic values in government and the daily lives of Muslims. Although the Brotherhood began as a religious reform movement, governmental opposition to its goals turned the group into a militant organization from the mid-1930s to the early 1970s. The Brotherhood has gone through several distinct phases. [redacted]

**1928-36.** The Brotherhood focused on religious, social, and proselytizing activities. It founded schools, organized religion courses, taught illiterates to read, undertook enterprises to raise the standard of living in villages, set up hospitals, built mosques, and began businesses to help finance the organization. [redacted]

**1936-52.** This was a period of increasing political activity and troubled relations with the government. After Egypt became independent in 1936, al-Banna supported the cause of the Palestinians—a course that helped spread the movement to Syria and other countries in the Middle East and brought him into increasing conflict with the government. Al-Banna organized a paramilitary group. He sent cadres to fight with the Arab armies in the first Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. Fearing that the organization was gaining strength, the government banned the Brotherhood in December 1948. In retaliation, a Muslim Brother assassinated the Egyptian Prime Minister in January 1949. Al-Banna himself was killed in February 1949. Evidence in trials conducted after the 1952 revolution implicated government officials in his death. [redacted]

In 1951 the Brotherhood was again allowed to operate, provided it eschewed clandestine or military activities. The Brotherhood easily evaded the prohibitions and harassed the British in the Suez Canal zone and participated in the burning of British-owned buildings in Cairo in 1952. [redacted]

**1952-70.** The Brotherhood adapted to the political environment created by the 1952 revolution. The Free Officers movement, which toppled the government, and the Brotherhood enjoyed friendly relations. Many of the Free Officers were members of the Brotherhood or sympathetic to its aims. Although not a Brother himself, Anwar Sadat was the link between the Brotherhood and the Free Officers. [redacted]

The relationship deteriorated because the revolutionary government was moving toward a secular state and culminated in a Muslim Brother's attempt to kill President Nasir in 1954. In retaliation the government arrested thousands of Brotherhood members and executed several. Forced underground, the organization was re-formed under the well-known writer and Islamic theorist, Sayyid Qutb. In 1965 the government uncovered another Brotherhood conspiracy to assassinate Nasir. Once again the government reacted with mass arrests and executions. [redacted]

**1970-85.** Sadat—elevated to the presidency after Nasir's death in 1970—used the group to counter a growing leftist threat. Sadat allowed the Brotherhood to engage in social, educational, and religious activities, but he refused to legalize the organization or allow it to form a political party. On the surface, the Brotherhood honored the restrictions and in the process was perceived by younger Islamic activists as a spent force. Despite this perception, the Brotherhood expanded its membership during the 1970s and 1980s. Under the Mubarak regime, the Brotherhood's trend toward moderation has continued. [redacted]

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**Appendix B****Leaders of the  
Muslim Brotherhood****Umar Talmassani**

Talmassani has been Supreme Guide since 1974. He was the architect of the Brotherhood's alliance with the New Wafd Party and policy of working within the existing political system. He rejects the use of violence, which led in the past to government repression, [redacted] Since he is 82 and in poor health, he cannot provide dynamic leadership. [redacted]

**Mustafa Mashur**

Mashur was nominated in March of this year to replace Talmassani, [redacted] he has been in exile since 1981. He was formerly a top official in the secret militia and favors maintaining the organization's paramilitary capabilities. He is highly respected within the Brotherhood for his lengthy and exemplary membership; during nearly 15 years of imprisonment (1955-70), he did not cooperate with his captors despite intensive interrogations and torture. He is in his middle sixties. [redacted]

**Muhammad Farid Abd al-Khaliq**

As head of the Brotherhood's youth program, Abd al-Khaliq is responsible for recruiting new members. A moderate, he desires to improve relations with the government. [redacted] he wants the Brotherhood to form a political party and establish open contacts with the government and other political parties. He denounces violence and favors dismantling the organization's secret militia. He is reputed to possess good organizational skills. [redacted]

**Salah Shadi**

Shadi is a close associate of Supreme Guide Umar Talmassani. He has been criticized by moderates because of his staunch support for the Brotherhood's paramilitary wing, his lack of formal religious training, and his perceived faulty political judgment, [redacted] [redacted] As a police officer and a leader of the paramilitary wing, he was the group's point of contact with the leaders of the 1952 revolution and a key figure in the failed policy of cooperating with the Nasir regime. He was jailed during the period 1954-74. He is in his late sixties. [redacted]

**Abbas Hassan al-Sissi**

Al-Sissi is senior Brotherhood official with strong ties to the group's paramilitary organization. [redacted] [redacted] he advocates a confrontational strategy toward the Mubarak regime as the most effective means to gain concessions. He is a supporter of Salah Shadi. He lives in exile in Saudi Arabia and West Germany. A former Army officer, he is 67. [redacted]

**Ahmad Muhammad al-Malt**

A physician who has been involved in establishing free medical clinics in Cairo slums, al-Malt is highly regarded by Brotherhood members for his honesty and courage, [redacted] While imprisoned during the late 1960s, he boasted to his captors that he had given funds to the Brotherhood and would continue to do so until his death. He is about 63. [redacted]

**Muhammad Abd al-Qaddus**

Al-Qaddus is an energetic and skilled journalist, whose articles appear in the New Wafd Party's weekly newspaper. He was formerly the managing editor of *Al-Dawa*, the popular Brotherhood magazine. He represents a new generation of Egyptian writers who reject Nasir's secularist tradition. [redacted]

**Yusif al-Quradawi**

Al-Quradawi is a senior Brotherhood official living in Qatar, where he serves as director of the local Islamic Institute. He is opposed to a secret militia and to Muslim extremism. He serves as an adviser to the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt. He delivered an Id al-Adha sermon before a large Alexandrian audience when the government stepped in to help the Brotherhood overcome radicals in August 1985, [redacted] He is about 55. [redacted]

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