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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

13 March 1975

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Bill:

Following up on our brief discussion Tuesday on the clearances of Committee Staff, I thought it might be helpful to outline a procedure which you may consider reasonable to use.

As I understand your current ground rules, you are submitting your staff applicants to the FBI for full field security investigation and on report from the Bureau, under the authority of Senate Resolution 21, the Chairman and/or the Committee will take action to grant or deny clearance.

The next step requires a notification to the Director of Central Intelligence of the Chairman's decision and certification of the clearances granted. I've attached a suggested format for this which you could use. On receipt of the certification we will advise the USIB security elements of the people so certified.

I also promised to go over with you the range of compartmented clearances that exist and I am prepared to do that when we next get together. You will recall these are the clearances for which you will want to determine the "need-to-know" for selected members of your staff. We need to establish agreed procedures here as well. Access to this information requires that an individual meet security standards set forth in DCID 1/14, a copy of which is attached.

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I would like to suggest that you appoint a member of your staff - say, Ben Marshall - as a focal point for handling compartmented information access approvals and assign him the responsibility of insuring that these security standards are met by persons selected to participate in this sensitive area.

The CIA operates a Compartmented Information Branch as a service of common concern to the intelligence community which records the names of all individuals in the Government with access to compartmented information. Your personnel would be similarly recorded which would considerably ease the access certifications to all organizations for the duration of your inquiry.

As indicated, I am prepared to discuss this with you at any time.

Sincerely,

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Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachments:
1 - DCID 1/14
2 - Suggested Format

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The following Staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/14

UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES GOVERNING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION[1]

(Effective 1 July 1968*)

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1 (New Series, revised 4 March 1964), paragraph 2, subparagraph a. (5) and in order to ensure uniform protection of sensitive compartmented information, the following personnel security standards and practices are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, Government consultants, and employees of Government contractors who require access to sensitive compartmented information or to information which reveals the manner, methods and operational details by which sensitive compartmented information is collected. The standards and practices established herein are to be considered minimal and the departments and agencies may establish internally such additional security steps as may be considered necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained. Access to sensitive compartmented information shall be under the strictest application of the "need-to-know" principle and in full accordance with the existing authorities and regulations which govern access thereto.

Purpose

1. The continued protection of sensitive compartmented information within any one participating agency or among Government contractors affects and is a matter of serious security concern to all participating agencies. The provisions of this Directive shall apply to all persons under the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Executive Branch, without regard to civilian or military status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service. The establishment of uniform personnel security standards and practices as well as continuing security programs should enhance the security protection of such information and at the same time facilitate the security certification process among

[1] The term "Sensitive compartmented information" as used in this Directive is intended to include all information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section 11, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

* This directive supersedes DCID 1/14, approved 23 June 1967.

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Government departments and agencies when access to sensitive compartmented information is required.

2. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to sensitive compartmented information shall not, solely for this reason, be considered ineligible for access to other classified information. However, individuals whose access to sensitive compartmented information has been authorized as an exception granted in accordance with paragraph 5, shall not solely for that reason be considered eligible for access to other classified information.

Personnel Security Approval Criteria

3. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for access to sensitive compartmented information are as follows:

a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.

b. Except where there is a compelling need and a determination has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph 5 below that every reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the security risk is negligible.

(1) Both the individual and the members of his immediate family shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes, "immediate family" is defined as including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters and children.

(2) The members of the individual's family and those persons to whom he is bound by affection or obligation should neither be subject to physical, mental and other forms of duress by a foreign power nor advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States nor the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

4. When there is compelling need to grant access to sensitive compartmented information prior to completion of the full prescribed investigation, such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall be made at once, and shall include a personal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel whenever feasible. Access in such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the full prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment.

Exceptions

5. The exceptions to paragraph 3.b. (1) (2) above may be granted only by the Senior Intelligence Officer of the parent organization represented on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), including military departments, or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically

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delegated to the head of an office or organization as set forth in interdepartmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be a common sense determination based on all available information, and shall be recorded by the agency making the exception. In those cases in which the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period of his life, a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements, and a judicious review of the information therein must be made before an exception is considered.

Investigative Requirements

6. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access to sensitive compartmented information shall be thorough and shall be designed to develop information as to whether the individual clearly meets the above Personnel Security Approval Criteria.

7. The investigation shall be accomplished through personal interviews by trained investigative personnel and shall establish affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include birth, residences, education, emloyments and military service. Where the circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility have in their possession all the relevant facts available.

8. During the course of the investigation the individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement and a certificate of non-affiliation with those organizations designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450. Fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be obtained. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of identity is required.

9. The individual under investigation shall be given a personal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel whenever feasible.

10. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:

a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship of the individual.

b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and other national agencies as appropriate. An additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be made if members of the individual's immediate family are other than United States citizens by birth.

c. Local checks in all areas of the United States where the individual has resided for at least six (6) months during the past fifteen years

For Committee guidance in this determination on clearances for compartmented access.

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or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Such period of coverage shall include the following:

(1) Check of police and credit records. where feasible?

(2) Interviews with neighbors at present residence regardless of duration and, to the extent considered to be productive and practical, any other address at which the individual has resided.

d. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen years or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Personal interviews with supervisors and co-workers who had personal contact with the individual shall be accomplished to the extent possible and practical.

e. Attendance at institutes of higher learning or at the most recently attended secondary school shall be verified in all instances. During these inquiries collateral verification of prior educational records shall be made and personal interviews with faculty members who had personal contact with the individual shall be accomplished to the extent possible and practical.

f. Review of appropriate military records.

g. Interviews with a sufficient number of personal references given by the individual and with a minimum of two other persons who can furnish information on the basis of personal knowledge concerning the individual's character, discretion and loyalty.

h. When employment, education or residence, except U.S. Government service, has occurred overseas during the past fifteen years, or since age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the Passport Office/Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop informants who knew the individual overseas in order to cover employment, education or residence during this period.

i. The spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family shall be investigated to the extent necessary and appropriate to permit affirmative determination by the adjudicating agency that the provisions of paragraph 3, Personnel Security Approval Criteria, above, are met. In all cases, the spouse shall be checked through the subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national agencies, as appropriate.

Previous Investigation

11. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five years which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided a review of the personnel and security files does not reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility. If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than five years

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old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file up to date in accordance with the investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 4, above. Should new information be developed during the current investigation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this new information.

Evaluation

12. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an individual's loyalty and suitability shall be performed by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in security and counterintelligence. When all other information developed on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has not been met will not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to sensitive compartmented information shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security shall be an over-all common sense determination based on all available information.

Security Programs

13. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigative requirements established by this Directive, member departments and agencies shall institute continuing Security Programs for all individuals having access to compartmented information. In addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive compartmented work requiring access to sensitive compartmented information and operations, the department, agency or Government program to which he is assigned shall assume a continuing security and counterintelligence responsibility for that individual throughout the period of his assignment.

14. The Security Programs shall include the following:

a. Security Education Programs to ensure that individuals who are granted access to sensitive compartmented information are initially and periodically thereafter indoctrinated as to its unique sensitivity and that they understand their personal responsibility for its protection. These indoctrinations should be conducted by individuals having

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extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information involved.

b. Security Supervisory Programs to ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility for maintaining the security of sensitive information. Such programs shall provide practical guidance as to indicators which may signal matters of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide all necessary help to the individual concerned to neutralize his vulnerability.

c. Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate security authorities invariably receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information bearing on the security posture of persons having access to sensitive information. Personnel history information shall be kept current. Security and related files shall be kept under continuing review. Departments and agencies shall develop security programs under which at intervals no greater than 5 years, checks are made with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as all relevant police and credit sources and, where feasible, each individual is given a personal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel.

15. Whenever indicated during the course of these Security Programs, appropriate investigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. In the absence of such indication the tempo of additional investigation shall be tailored by the adjudicating agency to the circumstances surrounding the individual under consideration as well as the breadth of knowledge and degree of sensitivity involved in his access. The investigation shall be sufficient in scope to ensure that continued utilization of the individual in activities requiring sensitive compartmented information is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

Effective Date

16. This Directive declares the policy of USIB concerning Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Practices for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. This policy shall become effective as soon as practicable after approval of this Directive but in no case later than 1 July 1968. Existing directives,[2] regulations, agreements, and such other references governing access to sensitive compartmented information as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

[2] These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investigation and Evaluation sections of DCID 6/3.