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CONFIDENTIAL

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, CSWG

SUBJECT: DIA Computer Security Problem Areas

Enumerated below are the problem areas affecting DIA in the ADP environment:

a. User authentication/identification: An authentication system is currently being developed which is intended to insure against inadvertent release of classified information to unauthorized persons. Each DIA user of the system is to be identified to the system by a specifically assigned "user's authentication number." This number will be the passage whereby a user is allowed "need-to-know" retrieval access to an information data base, and whereby he is allowed or denied the privilege to access and modify a data base. Responsibilities and procedures for assigning and administering this number is yet to be established.

b. Over classification of information: Under the present mode of operation, SI clearance is required of all personnel involved in the system. This includes operators, maintenance personnel, technicians, and users. All information processed through the system is considered SI. This poses a problem in that it restricts the use of information to the few who have the appropriate clearance and denies proper maintenance and efficient functioning of the system.

c. Physical security: The problem of physical security will be made greater because of the eventual wealth of information stored in one place. Needless to say, a more determined effort will possibly be made by hostile intelligence services. It will be necessary that intrusion devices and other approved methods of controlling access be the best available. Testing of the various methods of security will require additional manpower due to the necessity for closer intervals in conducting these tests.

d. Communications security: Adequate safeguards must be established to insure that the system is provided an operational environment which presents no hinderance to efficient and effective performance. Telephones, radios or any "foreign" transmitting devices must be given more than normal concern. Consideration should be given to prohibiting such instruments in areas where ADP equipment is located. Every effort must be made to prevent machine error, human error, and cross talk. Equipment, such as model 33 TTY, should not be located in the same area as the ADP equipment.

LOSTON HARRIS
Major, USA
Member

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DIA review completed.

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