The Terrorist Underground in the United States

By Samuel T. Francis

The Nathan Hale Institute
"I wish to be useful, and every kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious."

—Capt. Nathan Hale
1755–1776

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By Samuel T. Francis

The Nathan Hale Institute
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A nationwide terrorist underground network is operating in the United States. The remnants of the Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and other terrorist groups of the 1960s and 1970s have linked up in a “movement of independent but cooperating groups that believes in and practices the use of violence for political purposes.” This movement was involved in the 1981 Brinks robbery, in which three murders were committed, and is responsible for a series of bombings since 1982, including the bombing of the U.S. Capitol in November 1983.

This terrorist underground may also be connected to foreign terrorist organizations. “There is an increasing body of facts to suggest at least a continuing liaison between the underground terrorist movement...and various foreign based movements.”

Although the United States has experienced the violence of terrorist groups in the past, most Americans until recently probably have perceived terrorism to be a problem for foreign countries and their citizens rather than as a threat to themselves. In late 1983, however, a series of events combined to stimulate public interest in the possibility and likelihood of major terrorism in the United States or directed at American targets abroad. These events included the mass murder of 241 American military personnel of the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force in Beirut on October 23, 1983 by local terrorists; the bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building on November 7, 1983 by domestic terrorists; the deployment of special security measures at the White House and other federal buildings in December 1983 following a report of a possible terrorist attack; and increased security measures for the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the World’s Fair in New Orleans, and the National Conventions of the Democratic and Republican Parties against terrorist attacks.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the principal agency for the investigation of terrorism in the United States, reports a decline of domestic terrorist incidents in the last year. According to the FBI count, there were 31 terrorist incidents in the United States in 1983, compared to 51 in 1982. In previous years, the FBI counted 52 incidents in 1979, 29 in 1980, and 42 in 1981. On December 18, 1983 Judge William H. Webster, Director of the FBI, stated publicly that two-thirds of the terrorist incidents in the United States were related to Latin American or Caribbean political issues, and in testimony before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 14, 1984, Judge Webster stated that “it is important that the public not come to the conclusion that we are being overrun with people who support the overthrow of the United States. This country is very infertile ground for terrorism to thrive and succeed in its purpose.”

Judge Webster’s remarks and the recent FBI statistics may be taken as a commendable effort to avoid alarmist exaggeration of the terrorist threat in America. Nevertheless, some
law enforcement authorities have questioned either the accuracy or the significance of the FBI's statistics on terrorism. Under the FBI definition of terrorism — "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" — some criminal acts that are terrorist in nature may not be counted as such. In order to show "political or social objectives" as motivations, it is ordinarily necessary to have a communiqué or statement from the terrorist group acknowledging its responsibility and motivations for a violent act. Although such statements are common, they are not obligatory, and some terrorists do not acknowledge responsibility for all of the violent acts for which they are responsible. In many cases, moreover, terrorists will rely on comparatively minor crimes, such as assaults or threats, to intimidate or coerce a group, and in some cases even to specify a particular act as terrorist is difficult or impossible.

Nor does the apparent decline in terrorist incidents necessarily mean that terrorism is declining in importance in the United States. This decline may be due to recent disruptions of terrorist groups by law enforcement or it may be due to conscious decisions on the part of the terrorists to restrict their violence or to use violence more selectively. In general, terrorism becomes "important" in a society when the population or government feels that terrorism is a threat —— when they experience intimidation or terror. The subjective nature of this feeling makes it very difficult to measure, and the number of terrorist incidents by itself does not necessarily reflect this subjective state. In the United States today, there is increased concern about terrorism due to the Beirut and U.S. Capitol bombings and similar incidents and perhaps a growing sense that the United States is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. This increased concern is due to the significance of the targets and the results of the attacks on them and not to the number of incidents or the size and skills of the terrorist groups involved.

These events and concerns therefore raise the problem of the extent and nature of terrorism in the United States —— the degree to which there are terrorist groups extant in the United States at the present time; their goals, methods, and interconnections; and the likely targets and future prospects of such groups or of new groups or coalitions of terrorists. While there is no large terrorist movement in the United States today such as existed in Italy, Turkey or Uruguay in the recent past or such as exists in El Salvador or Lebanon today, there is a movement of independent but cooperating groups that believes in and practices the use of violence for political ends. This movement or its component groups has been responsible for a series of violent incidents in the last several years —— incidents that have cost several lives and resulted in considerable property damage. The terrorist movement in the United States expresses support for a number of foreign ter-
rorist groups and may have received support from them. The American terrorist movement appears to have undergone extensive reorganization in recent years and, although disrupted by the arrest of some of its key members and the disruption of some of its “safehouses” and organizations, may be escalating its level of violence (both in terms of the frequency of its attacks and of the nature of its targets), and it may become a much more serious threat to the internal security of the United States in the near future.

THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND NUCLEUS:

The Weather Underground Organization (WUO), formed in 1969-70 from members of the “Weatherman faction” of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), is the parent group and probably the principal component of the most important underground terrorist network in the United States today. This network consists of three main components: (1) the WUO and its aboveground support apparatuses; (2) black terrorist groups (the Black Liberation Army or BLA and the Republic of New Afrika or RNA) to some extent descended from the violent “Cleaver faction” of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and similar groups of the 1960s; and (3) the Puerto Rican terrorist organization FALN and associated groups.

The most notable act of terrorism perpetrated by this network to date has been the so-called “Brinks robbery” of October 20, 1981 — the armed robbery of a Brinks armored car of $1,589,000 in Clarkstown, N.Y., and the murders of two Nyack, N.Y., police officers and one Brinks Company guard. This incident is significant not because it was a success (in fact, it was a failure) but because the apprehension, trial, and conviction of its perpetrators and the subsequent investigation revealed for the first time a highly organized, clandestine, and nationwide terrorist network.

The Weatherman faction of SDS took its name from a line of singer Bob Dylan’s song “Subterranean Homesick Blues” —— “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows” —— which served as the motto for a 16,000 word manifesto of the faction. The Weatherman took control of SDS in the summer of 1969 and a number of its members traveled to Cuba in August, where they met with Cuban and North Vietnamese officials who encouraged them to make use of violence to oppose U.S. participation in the Vietnam war. Thereafter, the Weatherman planned and led its first violent action, the “Days of Rage” rioting in Chicago on October 8-9, 1969, and carried out its first bombing (of the Haymarket police memorial statue in Chicago) on October 7, 1969. In December 1969, the Weatherman held a “national war council” in Flint, Michigan, at which an ideological line and tactical plans for terrorism were formulated. Thereafter, in February 1970, the Weatherman faction closed the national office of SDS and went underground. At this time the WUO was believed to consist of some 400 members.
From October 1969 to September 1975, the WUO claimed responsibility for approximately 40 bombings, including the bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building on March 1, 1971, of the Pentagon Building on May 19, 1972, and of the U.S. Department of State on January 28, 1975. From the mid 1970s, however, the WUO appeared to become less active as a terrorist organization. In 1977 several members and associates of the WUO were arrested in connection with a conspiracy to bomb the offices of California State Senator John Briggs, and this action was the last known terrorist effort of the WUO. Several of its better known members surfaced in the late 1970s: Mark Rudd in 1977, Bernardine Dohrn, William Ayers, and Cathlyn P. Wilkerson in 1980. In 1979 the FBI closed its investigation of the WUO, and on December 29, 1981, Judge Webster stated publicly that “The Weather Underground Organization is not a viable organization. There is no evidence that such an organization is functioning.”

In fact, since the early 1970s the WUO had undergone an extensive internal schism over its organization, ideology, and tactics. In 1974, a new tactical line emerged in a manifesto of the WUO entitled Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism. The new line consisted principally of an effort to build a mass party using all means of revolutionary struggle rather than to operate exclusively as a terrorist group. This change, which was called the “weather inversion” or “strategy of inversion,” corresponded to a move closer to orthodox Leninist tactics and away from the “New Left” or “revisionist” tactic of Che Guevara and Regis Debray of reliance on a revolutionary “foco” that engages exclusively in “armed struggle” or terrorism. The latter tactic had originally been the basis of WUO strategy.

To implement the new strategy an aboveground support group, the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC), was founded. Internal disputes over the new strategy continued, however, and in 1978 the New York chapter of the PFOC became the May 19th Communist Organization, while the West Coast PFOC retained its old name. Despite the internal disagreements among the factions and personalities of the WUO, public demonstrations in recent years suggest that all elements of the organization continue to cooperate.

It is the May 19th Communist Organization that serves as the principal support group and propaganda arm of the terrorist network that was responsible for the Brinks robbery and murders as well as for the bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building on November 7, 1983 and for other bombings in the New York City and Washington, D.C., areas. The May 19th Communist Organization (MCO) takes its name from the common birthdates of Ho Chi Minh (May 19, 1890) and of Malcom X (or Malcolm Little, May 19, 1925). Its principal manifesto, written early in 1979, is Principles of Unity of the May 19th Communist Organization. This manifesto defines the MCO as essentially a support apparatus for “national
liberation movements” engaged in “armed struggle” against “imperialism.”

We have seen the collective strength of national liberation forever alter the balance of forces against imperialism. Revolution is the main trend in the world, and revolution is being led, ideologically and on the battlefield, by the national liberation struggles for proletarian power.

We have changed our name to the May 19th Communist Organization out of a commitment to follow that leadership.

While acknowledging that “the highest point of world revolutionary struggle has shifted to Southern Africa,” the MCO declares itself to be committed to the principle of Third World leadership and it expresses support for a wide range of Marxist national liberation movements. In addition to its support for foreign terrorism, the MCO specifically endorses the use of terrorism within the United States:

Armed struggle is the fundamental tool of oppressed people to win their liberation. We fully support, both politically and materially, the waging of national liberation war against imperialism. Around the world and in the U.S., vanguard forces will emerge and have done so through the building of armed clandestine movements and the waging of people’s war. A central aspect of our support is the active defense of all political prisoners and prisoners of war captured by the imperialist state.

The MCO manifesto also expresses support for a number of far-left causes and groups within American society: women’s liberation (defined principally as “the struggle against lesbian oppression”), the “struggle against white supremacy,” and solidarity with Puerto Rican, black, Chicano, and American Indian terrorists and violent activists in the United States. The themes expressed in the manifesto are of central importance in understanding recent American terrorist activity and its likely direction in the future.

THE BRINKS ROBBERY AND ITS CONNECTIONS:

On October 20, 1981, a Brinks Company armored car was robbed of $1,589,000 in cash that it was preparing to transfer from the Nanuet National Bank in Clarkstown, N.Y. One of the guards of the Brinks truck was killed in the robbery attempt and two other guards were severely wounded when the perpetrators opened fire with shotguns. In an attempted escape from the scene of the robbery and murder, one of the vehicles bearing the perpetrators was stopped in a collision, and a second was stopped at a police roadblock. A third was successful in escaping. The occupants of the first vehicle were
arrested. The occupants of the second vehicle opened fire on Nyack, N.Y., police at the roadblock and killed two policemen. The suspects then fled, although one occupant was arrested. The stolen funds were recovered by police the same day from the vehicles.

Those arrested on the day of the Brinks robbery were:
(1) Katherine Boudin, a member of the WUO and a fugitive since 1970;
(2) Samuel Brown, with no known political background but a record of arrests in New York City dating to 1958;
(3) Judith Alice Clark, a former member of the WUO and a current member of the MCO; and
(4) David Joseph Gilbert, also a member of the WUO and a fugitive.

In addition to these arrests, a number of suspects were apprehended in the following days. One of the vehicles used in the escape attempt was found to be registered to Eve S. Rosahn, a member of the MCO as well as of the “Springbok Five”, involved in violent demonstrations at Kennedy Airport in September, 1981. Rosahn was charged with criminal facilitation, but this charge was dropped on January 28, 1982 since her ownership of the vehicle by itself was not sufficient to sustain an indictment. Upon her release Rosahn made a public statement expressing “strongest greetings of solidarity to the captured combatants.”

Tracing the license plates and descriptions involved in robbery, murders, and escape attempts led police to a series of apartments evidently used as “safehouses” by the gang. Two of these safehouses had been used by Marilyn Jean Buck, described as “quartermaster” of the BLA. These apartments were found to contain weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, false documents and disguises, lists of police officers and floor plans of area police stations, and radical political literature. The safehouses had been abandoned shortly before the police search, but evidence contained in them contributed to subsequent arrests.

On October 27, 1981, Cynthia Boston (aka Fulani Sunni-Ali), “minister of information” of the RNA, was arrested at RNA headquarters in Gallman, Mississippi. Boston and her common law husband, William Johnson (aka Bilal Sunni-Ali) had been identified from photographs by witnesses as having visited the safehouses, and a vehicle found at the RNA headquarters had been identified as having been present at one of the safehouses shortly after the Brinks robbery. Despite this evidence, charges against Boston were dropped when a witness in New Orleans, Louisiana, affirmed that she had been in that city on the day after the robbery. Her husband, William Johnson, was arrested in the Central American country of Belize in November, 1982; he was extradited to the United States and indicted for his alleged role in the Brinks crimes. Two former members of the WUO, Jeffrey C. Jones and Eleanor Stein Raskin, were also arrested on suspicion since their names had been found in one of the safehouses,
but these charges were also later dropped. Jones pled guilty
to a charge of bomb construction and received a light sentence
on December 16, 1981.

In the course of 1982 and 1983 a total of eleven suspects
were arrested and indicted on federal or state charges growing
out of the Brinks robbery and triple murders. After lengthy
and expensive trials in the spring and summer of 1983, several
convictions were obtained.

On September 3, 1983, Sekou Odinga (t/n Nathaniel
Burns), a member of the Black Panther Party and the Black
Liberation Army, and Silvia Baraldini, “national treasurer”
of the MCO, were convicted on federal charges of conspiracy
and racketeering that included the Brinks robbery and
murders, a robbery and murder in the Bronx in 1981, and
the escape of BLA leader Joanne Chesimard from prison in
1979. Two other defendants, Cecil Ferguson and Edward L.
Joseph (a former member of the Black Panther Party and the
BLA), were convicted on the same day as accessories, and
defendants Ilana Robinson and Bilal Sunni-Ali (t/n William
R. Johnson), were acquitted. On February 15, 1984, Odinga
and Baraldini received sentences of 40 years imprisonment
and a fine of $50,000; Ferguson and Joseph were sentenced
to twelve and a half years.

On September 14, 1983, Judith A. Clark, David J. Gilbert,
and Kuwasi Balagoon (t/n Donald Weems, a former member
of the Black Panther Party and the BLA) were convicted on
state charges of two counts of first degree armed robbery and
three counts of second degree murder. On October 6, 1983,
the three convicted defendants were each sentenced to three
consecutive terms of 25 years imprisonment and concurrent
terms of twelve and a half to 25 years imprisonment for armed
robbery. Two other defendants, Katherine Boudin and Samuel
Brown, were scheduled to be tried separately on state charges
of murder and armed robbery. On April 26, 1984, Boudin
entered a plea of guilty to the charges and on May 3 was
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. On June 14, 1984, Brown
was convicted of state charges of murder and armed robbery
and on June 26 was sentenced to three consecutive prison
terms of 25 years to life. Another suspect in the Brinks rob-
bery, Samuel Smith (aka Mtayari Shabaka Sundiata, a
member of the BLA) was killed by police in New York City
on October 23, 1981 after he had fired on police officers seek-
ing to arrest him. A .38 caliber bullet found in Smith’s pocket
after his death was later shown to have come from the gun
of one of the police officers killed in the Brinks escape
attempt.

Despite these convictions, the failure of the Brinks rob-
bery, and the disruption of the network that the arrests and
investigations caused, the Brinks incident was not an isolated
crime, and some of its principal alleged perpetrators remain
at large. Law enforcement authorities pointed to at least five
earlier successful or attempted armed robberies in the same
area as the one in Clarkstown with a modus operandi similar
to that of the Brinks robbery. These robberies included: (1) an attempted robbery of an armored truck in Scarsdale, N.Y., on February 20, 1980; (2) an armed robbery of $52,000 from an armored car in the Bronx on February 25, 1980 and the murder of a guard during the robbery; (3) the armed robbery of $529,000 from an armored truck in Inwood, Long Island, on April 22, 1980; (4) an attempted robbery of an armored truck in Danbury, Connecticut, and the wounding of its driver on March 23, 1981; and (5) the armed robbery of $292,000 from a Brinks truck in the Bronx, the killing of one guard, and the wounding of another on June 2, 1981.

In each of these robberies, as in the Clarkstown case, escape vehicles had been rented by a white male or female using the identification of a legitimate citizen. The actual robbery or robbery attempt was perpetrated by black males using shotguns, automatic rifles, and (in some cases) 9 mm handguns. A total of $873,000 was stolen in these robberies; to date none of these funds has been recovered. At least three major suspects in the Brinks-related cases remain at large: Joanne Chesimard (aka Assata Shakur, a leader of the BLA); Jeral Wayne Williams (aka Mutulu Shakur, also a member of the BLA and RNA); and Marilyn Jean Buck of the BLA.

The terrorist, as opposed to the criminal or mercenary, nature of the Brinks robbery and related crimes became apparent from the political affiliations and associations of several of the leading suspects as well as from the materials discovered in the safehouses. Aside from linkages among the WUO, the BLA, and the RNA, an additional connection to West coast terrorist activity was also revealed. One of the safehouses contained a picture of Betty Jean Abramson, a member of a group in California known as "Tribal Thumb" and its affiliate, the Wells Spring Communion (WSC); and a radio transmitter found in one of the abandoned safehouses in New Jersey was traced to this group through the Federal Communications Commission. The WSC and Tribal Thumb have been associated with the Symbionese Liberation Army and with the Charles Manson Family. Abramson and another member of the WSC, Wendy Sue Heaton, were wanted in the murder of Roseanne Goustin, a member of the Communion who tried to defect from it. Abramson was arrested in New York on December 19, 1981, and Heaton was arrested in New Orleans on June 4, 1982.

Tribal Thumb was founded by Earl Satcher, a former convict and member of the Black Panther Party who was killed in a gunfight on the group's property in 1977. Another founder, Benjamin Sargis, is the former husband of Heaton and worked as an organizer for "People In Need," a food distribution program organized by the Hearst family as a part of the ransom demanded by the SLA for the release of Patricia Hearst in 1974. Another individual who worked in this program at that time was Sara Jane Moore, who used the Tribal Thumb commune in California for target practice in August 1975, one month before she was arrested for an assassination attempt.
on President Gerald R. Ford. In the summer of 1982, the FBI was investigating the possible connections between Tribal Thumb and the Brinks robbery, including the possibility that Marilyn Jean Buck and other accomplices were hidden by the group after the robbery.

Despite these terrorist characteristics, the FBI was reluctant to categorize the Brinks robbery as a terrorist incident. There had been no communiqué from a group claiming the robbery or similar crimes for a political cause and as late as March 1982 the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center of the FBI included the Brinks robbery as only a "suspected terrorist incident." By early 1983, however, the FBI acknowledged that the Brinks robbery was indeed "a terrorist incident" "because of the politically motivated statements made by the subjects and because they have been linked to known terrorist groups dedicated to the overthrow of the United States Government."

The organizational support for the Brinks robbery as well as its political and terrorist character became clear on November 2, 1981 when the MCO and the RNA held a press conference "to extend our full solidarity to the captured combatants, the Black Liberation movement and in particular the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika" (in the words of the MCO statement). The RNA expressed its solidarity with and support for the BLA and for "armed struggle," although it denied any connection between the Brinks robbery and the RNA. On November 5, 1981, the BLA itself issued a communiqué that began:

On October 20th 1981, under the leadership of the Black Liberation Army, Black Freedom Fighters, and North American Anti-Imperialists, all members of the Revolutionary Armed Task Force, attempted an act of expropriation of 1.6 million dollars from an armored Brinks truck.

The John Brown Anti-Klan Committee (JBAKC), a WUO aboveground support group founded in 1977, issued a special edition of its newsletter, Death to the Klan!, in which it also expressed support for the perpetrators of the Brinks robbery, which it termed an "attempted expropriation" and noted that "We made an error...by referring to the attempted expropriation as the Brinks 'robbery'. We know that the use of this term contributes to the state's strategy of criminalizing a revolutionary act." (It may be noted that the term "expropriation" was used by both Lenin and the Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella to describe armed robberies committed to obtain funds for the financing of terrorist and underground activities).

Details of the background, organization, and purposes of the "Revolutionary Armed Task Force" were revealed during the trial of the Brinks defendants in the testimony of Tyrone Rison, a 36 year old convict currently serving a 12 year prison term for bank robbery in Georgia. Rison agreed to testify after pleading guilty to the armed robbery of an armored car.
in the Bronx on June 2, 1981 and to cooperate with federal authorities in the Brinks case.

Rison testified on May 2, 1983 that he had been recruited into a group called "The Family" at meetings of the RNA by Mutulu Shakur in 1976. Rison identified defendants Nathaniel Burns, Silvia Baraldini, William R. Johnson, Cecil Ferguson, and Edward L. Joseph as members of The Family. In later statements Rison described the leadership of this group as "The Action Five," consisting of himself, Shakur, Burns, Donald Weems, and Samuel Smith. This group had supervised or participated in armed robberies or attempted robberies as early as 1976 in Pittsburgh as well as robberies of a credit union in Arlington, Virginia, the Brinks robbery, and others. Rison also provided a detailed account of the escape of Joanne Chesimard from the Clinton, N.J., Correctional Facility on November 2, 1979. Rison, Burns, and Shakur, as well as Baraldini, assisted Chesimard's escape from prison, where she was serving a life term for the murder of a state trooper in 1973. On November 2, 1979, Burns, using false identification, was able to smuggle a revolver to Chesimard inside the prison. Following her escape, she was taken to a safehouse in New Jersey that was raided by police after the Brinks robbery two years later, given money from earlier robberies, and provided a plane ticket to the Bahamas.

Rison also described in his testimony an organization established in 1979 by Shakur as a front for the robberies and for illegal narcotics traffic. This organization, known as the Black Acupuncture Advisory Association of North America (BAAANA) was located in Harlem, and according to the FBI it served as a planning center for the robberies as well as a distribution center for cocaine and other drugs. According to Rison, the funds from the robberies were turned over to Shakur. As much as $100,000 from stolen funds may have been used for drugs and for living expenses by the group. It was from BAAANA that the perpetrators of the Brinks robbery itself allegedly left before carrying out the robbery and murders. It was also Shakur who served as the principal link between the blacks and the white radicals in the network, according to Rison.

Rison also was specific on the political motivations of the crimes. Shakur had originally recruited him, he testified, by asking him, "will I be willing to commit robberies to give money to the black people?" Although the Brinks robbery itself was originally intended to benefit the members of the group, according to Rison, Nathaniel Burns objected to this, saying, "We're not just going out robbing to put money in our pocket. Our purpose is to rob for black people, as a mass of people, to channel the money back into the neighborhoods." As a result of Burns's argument, it was decided by the group that the money from the Brinks robbery would "go to the political struggle, just like any other robbery."

Additional evidence of a link between the series of armed robberies in the New York area and the Weather Underground
and its remnants was derived from false identifications used to rent vehicles that were involved in these robberies. It was discovered, for example, that the identifications of two legitimate citizens were used to obtain driver’s licenses by persons who later rented vans used in two of these robberies (an attempted robbery in Greenburgh, N.Y., on February 20, 1980, and a successful robbery of $500,000 in Inwood, Long Island, on March 22, 1980). The legitimate citizens whose identifications were used had, in December 1979, purchased items at a boutique in Manhattan known as “Broadway Baby.” Their identifications were used shortly after shopping at the boutique by other unknown persons to obtain false driver’s licenses, and these licenses were used later to rent vehicles involved in the robberies. From September 1979 until February 1980 the manager of Broadway Baby was Bernardine Dohrn, a founding member and leader of the Weather Underground until her surfacing on December 3, 1980 in Illinois.

A fingerprint found on the application for a duplicate driver’s license used to rent a van involved in a June 2, 1981 armed robbery and murder in the Bronx was established as being that of David Gilbert, and the handwriting on this application is identical to that on another application for rental of a van used in the escape of Joanne Chesimard. A copy of a rental agreement in the false name of “Judith Schneider,” an alias used to rent a vehicle involved in the Brinks robbery of October 20, was found in the apartment of Katharine Boudin after her arrest.

**Washington—New York Bombing Campaign:**

Between December 16, 1982 and April 20, 1984 a series of 14 bomb explosions in the New York City and Washington, D.C., areas has been claimed by three previously unknown terrorist groups. Analysis of the bombing techniques, rhetoric, and modus operandi of these bombings indicates that they were all committed by the same terrorist organization and that those responsible for the bombings are closely connected to groups involved in the Brinks and related “expropriations” discussed above. The three groups that have acknowledged responsibility for these bombings call themselves the Armed Resistance Unit (ARU), which claims most of the bombings in the Washington area; the United Freedom Front (UFF), which claims most of the bombings in the New York area; and a group that is probably part of the same terrorist complex, the Revolutionary Fighting Group (RFG), which has acknowledged responsibility for one bombing in the New York area. To date, there have been no casualties or injuries in these bombings, although considerable property damage has been sustained by the governmental and corporate institutions attacked. No one has to date been arrested or charged in connection with these bombings; and there is no reason to believe that this series of attacks has ceased or that it will not continue in the future. The chronology, place, targets,
and claimants of each of these bombings is given in the table below:

**Bombing Series, 1982-84**
(Source: FBI, Risks International, News Sources)

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<th>Place</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Claimant</th>
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<td>South African Purchasing Company</td>
<td>UFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>UFF</td>
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<td>RFG</td>
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<td>04/20/84</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Officers Club, Fort McNair</td>
<td>ARU (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) — FMLN: Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front.
* — two bombs were detonated.
** — attempted bombing.
*** — The Puerto Rican terrorist group FALN allegedly claimed the bombing, but it is probable that the same persons composing the ARU were actually responsible.

The modus operandi of these bombings has tended to be the same in almost all of them. The M.O. consists of timing the explosive device to detonate at a late hour of the night (often 11:00 P.M.—12:00 Midnight) and of placing a warning call, usually to a news media outlet, shortly prior to the explosion. This call is often accompanied by a tape-recorded message that warns of the impending explosion, claims it for the particular group, and gives a reason for the bombing (usually on behalf of a South African, Central American, or Puerto Rican terrorist group and in opposition to U.S. policy in these countries). A typed communiqué is distributed by the group or its above-ground support units after the bombing.
The construction of the bombs in this series has also tended to be similar — sticks of dynamite with similar caps and often placed in attache cases. In the Washington area at least, the bombs have had dual firing mechanisms to avert a possible failure of a single mechanism. The bombing material of the more recent UFF bombings in the New York area has been dynamite stolen from the New England Explosives Company in New Hampshire in November 1983.

In an oversight hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on March 14, 1984, Judge Webster testified,

We do know that the Armed Resistance Unit and the United Freedom Front...tend to supply the same rhetoric with respect to U.S. policies, the same kind of words that we experienced among some of the other dissident groups that became dormant and which have, in a way, metamorphosed through other organizations that we have been watching closely, particularly as a result of the Nanuet robbery, the Brinks robbery which I referred to earlier in my testimony....The inferences we are drawing result not only from the rhetoric of the claims, but also from the nature of the explosives that were used in all of these cases and the manner in which they were put together.

Further indications of a connection between the UFF/ARU bombings and the Brinks case arise from a publication of the MCO entitled Armed Propaganda Against the U.S. War Machine: Communiques from the Armed Resistance Unit and the United Freedom Front 1982-1983, Compiled with an introduction by the May 19th Communist Organization, published in the spring of 1984. This compilation consists of ten communiques from the UFF and ARU expressing their responsibility for the various explosions in the bombing series, and it also includes a communiqué from the Puerto Rican terrorist group FALN expressing responsibility for bombings in New York City on December 31, 1982. The whole compilation and especially the introduction by the MCO may be taken as an expression of solidarity of the MCO with both FALN and the UFF and ARU.

The terrorist strategy of the bombings is explained in the "Introduction"; the bombings

expose the vulnerability of a system in extreme contradiction with the people it rules — it has to beef up its security because it doesn't know when it will be attacked. "Democratic rights" in a "free and open" system clearly become expendable, and the real nature of the system as an empire thriving on colonial oppression is exposed.

Thus, the purpose of the terrorist activity is to intensify the security and counter-terrorist measures of the government and
the established authorities so that its truly "repressive" nature will become clear and resistance to it will be increased. This concept is closely related to the idea of Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian terrorist of the 1960s, who wrote in his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla* (published in Havana in 1970).

The government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police networks, house searches, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city unbearable. The military dictatorship embarks on massive political persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine.

In spite of all this, the police systematically fail...The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.

It is unlikely, however, that this strategy ever works very well. It did not work in Brazil, nor in Uruguay, where the Tupamaros followed a similar plan. Two reasons why it does not work are that (a) governments do not necessarily meet increased terrorism with genuine repression and (b) even if they do resort to repression, this may be effective in suppressing the terrorists (e.g., Uruguay).

The "Introduction" continues:

These actions [bombings] have begun to provide revolutionary leadership for those American people also who are truly disturbed by the u.s. [sic] invasion of Grenada, and for the growing solidarity movements with the peoples of Central America....For revolutionaries in the oppressor nation, solidarity with national liberation struggles provides the political basis upon which we will polarize the white proletariat to organize significant sectors of it to fight for socialist revolution. Recognizing the leadership the oppressed nations struggling for independence and socialism offer in the dismemberment of the imperialist system calls for a strategy in the oppressor nation that makes war on the warmakers.

Among the forces that the MCO recognizes as fighting imperialism and engaging in "revolutionary resistance inside the u.s. — to fight the world’s enemy on its own turf" are the Black Liberation Army, FALN, and "captured freedom fighters inside u.s. prisons." The MCO therefore sees itself and its terrorist allies in the United States as complementing the terrorism and guerrilla warfare of the "national liberations movements" in the "imperial system" (e.g., southern Africa, Central America, and the Middle East) as well as
leading terrorists and urban guerilla campaigns within the United States.

FALN:

The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN or “Armed Forces of National Liberation”) is an underground terrorist organization that has operated in the continental United States (principally in the New York and Chicago areas) since late 1973. Between 1973 and 1983 FALN has been responsible for some 100 terrorist bombings and the deaths of five persons (four of whom were killed January 24, 1975 in the FALN-claimed bombing of Fraunces Tavern in New York City). FALN has also been involved in armed robberies and has planned at least one kidnapping. The organization collaborates with and often coordinates its terrorist activities with terrorist groups that operate on the island of Puerto Rico. The ostensible goal of FALN and its sister terrorist organizations is national independence for Puerto Rico from the United States.

In 1982 FALN claimed 11 bombings in which three persons were injured. In 1981 and 1983 FALN claimed no bombings, but a related group, the Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (PRAR), claimed responsibility for five bombings in 1981 in which one person was killed. Most authorities believe that the PRAR was either a faction of FALN or FALN itself operating under another name.

FALN and the Puerto Rican terrorist groups with which it collaborates are Marxist-Leninist in ideology, and FALN is closely related to the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which is in fact the Communist Party of Puerto Rico and maintains close links to Havana. FALN is also traditionally close to the WUO and currently may be considered a branch of the underground terrorist movement in the United States responsible for the Brinks and other armed robberies and the bombing series discussed above.

On February 28, 1982, FALN claimed responsibility in a typed communiqué for the bombing of four American financial institutions in New York City. The communiqué expressed solidarity with

the three north-americans captured in the Brinks expprpiation [sic]. By linking up with your Black comrades and making their struggle your own you have put into practice the Leninist principle which states that the duty of the working class and the advanced sectors in the imperialist countries is to actively assist and fight for the liberation of the colonies.

The May 19th Communist Organization distributed the FALN communiqué for five bombings in New York City on December 31, 1982 and stated that “Terms for this period of armed activity were defined when the…FALN bombed”
these targets in New York on that date. The above-ground support groups of both FALN and the terrorists in the Brinks case often express support for each other.

The communiqué for the bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building on November 7, 1983, also distributed by the MCO, stated in its last paragraph:

33 years ago almost to the day, Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola, two Puerto Rican Nationalists fighting for Independence for Puerto Rico, attacked another part of imperialist power — the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the U.S. Their action was one of the first in which the oppressed brought the war back to the doorsteps of the oppressor. We salute them and all those Puerto Rican, Mexican, New Afrikan, Native American and North American freedom fighters who have been killed or captured in the struggle. To them also, our action carries a message — our commitment to carry on the struggle.

The action to which the ARU refers in this communiqué is the assassination attempt against President Harry Truman on November 1, 1950 by Collazo and Torresola, two members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party which in many respects was a predecessor to the PSP. Although President Truman was not harmed in the assassination attempt, Torresola and a White House police officer were killed. Collazo was sentenced to death; this sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by President Truman, and Collazo was released from prison by a further commutation of his sentence by President Jimmy Carter in September 1979.

One reason for the recent comparatively inactive state of FALN terrorism is that since 1980 some of its principal members have been apprehended. On April 4, 1980 police arrested eleven members of FALN in a raid on a safehouse in Evanston, Illinois. One of those arrested at that time was Carlos Alberto Torres, at that time the top-ranking name on the FBI’s “most wanted” list. Torres and seven other FALN members were subsequently sentenced to eight years in prison for possession of a sawed-off shotgun and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Two others received 30 year sentences, and Torres’s wife, Maria Haydee Torres, was extradited to New York, where she had earlier been sentenced to a life term for a bombing on August 3, 1977 that took the life of one person.

On May 26, 1983 Mexican federal police arrested another FALN member, William Morales, in Puebla, Mexico. Morales, reportedly the principal bombmaker for FALN, escaped from a Bellevue Hospital prison ward in 1979 after being sentenced to a ten year term for conviction of federal weapons and explosive charges. Morales lost most of both his hands in the explosion of a bomb he was constructing.
at the time of his arrest in 1978. Documents found in Morales's possession at the time of his arrest in Mexico as well as his own subsequent confession revealed that he was planning an attack on a meeting of Mexican and United States Congressmen scheduled for May 26.

A subsequent blow to FALN occurred on June 29, 1983 when four of its members were arrested and two of its safehouses were raided in Chicago. According to the U.S. Attorney in Chicago, FALN planned several bombings for the July 4 holiday in the area as well as attacks on Illinois jails where FALN members were being held.

**Black Liberation Army and Republic of New Afrika:**

The third component of the underground terrorist movement in the United States consists of the remnants of revolutionary or nationalist black groups that originated in the 1960s. The two groups that are most prominent in this connection are the Black Liberation Army and the Republic of New Afrika.

The BLA developed from the violent “Cleaver faction” of the Black Panther Party in 1971. Supporters of Cleaver organized an “urban guerrilla” organization that was called the “Afro-American Liberation Army” (AALA) or the “Black Liberation Army.” The former name was used by Cleaver’s adherent, Elmer “Geronimo” Pratt, who had reportedly written a pamphlet in 1972 that explained and justified the AALA. Pratt stated in an interview in 1971 that he preferred the name AALA over BLA “because it recognizes our connectedness to Africa.” At about that time the FBI reported that the Cleaver faction numbered approximately 150 members.

The first act of terrorism carried out under the name BLA occurred on May 19, 1971 when two New York City policemen were wounded by machinegun fire from a car traveling the wrong way on a one way street which they had attempted to stop. On May 21, two other NYPD police officers were shot in the back and killed after being called to a site in Harlem. A communiqué from the BLA to the *New York Times* delivered on May 21 claimed responsibility for the first attack. The latent fingerprints of Richard “Dharuba” Moore, a member of the “Panther 21” (a group of Black Panther Party members indicted in 1969 for planning to bomb public buildings) and an adherent of Eldridge Cleaver, were found on the envelope. Moore and others linked to the Black Panthers were later arrested during an attempted robbery on June 2, 1971 and a .45 caliber machinegun used in the robbery attempt as well as in the attack of May 19 was found on them. Moore was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1973.

The *New York Times* on February 19, 1972 reported that members of the BLA were wanted in connection with the murder of four NYPD policemen and for assaults on policemen in Atlanta, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Raleigh. On
August 1, 1972 a group of five persons with three young
children hijacked a Delta Airlines jet to Algiers, receiving
$1 million in ransom for the release of the 87 passengers. The
hijackers were met in Algiers by the Cleaver group (which
was then residing in Algiers) and identified as members of
the BLA. On February 15, 1973 an arms cache of the BLA
was seized in Brooklyn. Two .45 caliber machineguns, one
antitank 3.5 inch bazooka, six rifles, five shotguns, two .9
mm. pistols, and 200 rounds of ammunition were impounded.
On May 2, 1973 Joanne Chesimard, Clark Squire (aka Sun-
diata Acoli) and James Costan (aka Zayd Malik Shakur), a
former official of the New York Black Panther Party, were
involved in a gunfire with police on the New Jersey turn-
pike. Costan and a New Jersey state trooper were killed and
another trooper and Chesimard wounded. Chesimard and
Squire were later captured and sentenced to prison, from
which Chesimard escaped on November 2, 1979 with the aid
of the BLA and a member of the May 19th Communist
Organization. Squire attempted but failed to escape from
prison in 1976.

On November 14, 1973 BLA leader Twyman Meyers was
killed in New York, and the New York Police Commissioner stated that his death “broke the back” of the BLA, noting
that five of its leaders had been killed and 18 were in custody.
However, the BLA robbed banks in Berkeley, California, and
New Haven, Connecticut, in the spring of 1974, critically
wounding a police officer in the latter city. In April 1974 and
in May 1975 the BLA was discovered to be involved in efforts
to free its leaders from New York City jails. On April 16,
1981, New York City policemen John G. Scarangella was kill-
ed and his partner Richard Rainey was wounded after they
had stopped a van for a routine check in Queens. Anthony
LaBorde and James Dixon York, both former members of
the Black Panther Party and the BLA were sought in this
shooting, and they were arrested in January 1982 in
Philadelphia and in August 1981 in South Carolina respec-
tively. On August 9, 1982 a New York jury convicted LaBorde
and York of attempted second degree murder in the shooting
of Officer Rainey but was unable to reach a verdict in the
death of Officer Scarangella. LaBorde and York were sentenc-
et to terms of 8-25 and 12.5-25 years respectively. The in-
ability of the jury to reach a verdict on the murder charge
was due, according to some jurors, to racial feelings on the
part of the largely non-white jury. A second trial of LaBorde
and York on the murder charge also ended in a deadlock,
and a mistrial was declared in October 1983.

Although LaBorde had been identified by witnesses to the
Brinks robbery as having been involved in that crime, some
witnesses were unable to identify him in a line-up after his
arrest. Charges against LaBorde in the Brinks robbery were
dropped in September 1982.

During the tour of the United States by the Springboks,
the South African rugby team, in the summer of 1981, the
offices of the Eastern Rugby Union in Schenectady, N.Y. were bombed on September 22, 1981. The BLA took responsibility for this bombing in a communiqué and telephone call to a local radio station. Although the FBI later stated that “information obtained through investigation suggests that members of the CWP [Communist Workers Party] were probably responsible for this bombing,” the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee, a group close to the BLA and MCO infrastructure, praised the bombing and acknowledged BLA responsibility. In the October-November 1981 issue of its Newsletter, *Death to the Klan!*, the JBAKC noted:

This act of proletarian internationalism showed the unity and leadership of Afrikan and New Afrikan liberation struggles and set the terms for white anti-imperialists in the fight against white supremacy [sic]. In a separate action the “All Whites” Rugby League of Indiana was bombed.

In a separate article in the same issue, the JBAKC noted:

On August 20, 1981, the BLA launched an offensive against the police. They attacked a New York City policeman, stealing his gun and walkie-talkie, and leaving him in bad shape. The Red Unit of the Black Liberation Army took credit for the attack, which they said was in retaliation for the capture of James York, who had been the target of a vicious manhunt for months.

The Republic of New Afrika, a violent group advocating the independence under black control of five southern states, has been closely related to the Black Panthers and the BLA. The RNA was founded in Detroit, Michigan, in 1968 by Milton and Richard (aka Imari Abubakari Aobadele) Henry, and its first president was Robert F. Williams, who, after fleeing a kidnapping charge, lived in exile in Cuba, Tanzania, and the Peoples Republic of China. Williams resigned the presidency of the RNA after his return to the United States in 1969, and Richard Henry assumed control of it.

RNA headquarters near Jackson, Mississippi was raided on August 18, 1971; one police officer was killed and another officer and an FBI agent were wounded in the raid by gunfire from RNA members. Richard Henry and six others were convicted for their participation in a separate gun battle, and four persons were convicted of murder for their involvement in the fight at the Jackson headquarters.

In October 1971 a publication of the Cleaver faction of the Black Panther Party, *Voice of the Lumpen*, contained a communiqué from the BLA expressing its support for the RNA in its gun battle with the police in Mississippi. Another article on the same page praised the BLA shooting of two NYPD officers on May 19, 1971 and stated, “what could have been more fitting than to kick it off on Malcolm’s birthday [May 19].” Although Cynthia Boston and her husband,
William Johnson, were not convicted for their alleged role in the Brinks robbery, the RNA has expressed support for terrorism, and several members of the RNA were convicted for their involvement in the Brinks robbery. In 1981 Chokwe Lumumba, a member of the RNA and its "minister of justice," claimed that as of 1977 the RNA had rebuilt its structure and was active in twenty states.

**Prison Organizing:**

One of the most likely sources for new recruits to the BLA and other components of the terrorist underground in the United States is the prison population, especially those of black or Hispanic background. A number of BLA members have been convicts, and some have been recruited while in prison and have escaped from prison due to efforts by the BLA. Since at least the early 1970s radical and extremist groups have consciously sought to politicize and recruit convicts under the guise of "prisoners' aid" or "prison reform."

The National Lawyers Guild (NLG) is an organization of leftist orientation that was described in 1950 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party." Today, it remains the principal U.S. affiliate of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), described by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1978 as "one of the most useful Communist front organizations at the service of the Soviet Communist Party." In 1971 components of the NLG began publication of a prisoners' newsletter entitled *Midnight Special.* The editor of this newsletter was Russell Neufeld, indicted or arrested several times for violent activities in association with the Weathermen in 1969-70; another editor of the *Midnight Special* was Judith A. Clark, later convicted of murder and bank robbery for her role in the Brinks robbery. Susan Tipograph, a member of the NLG and a lawyer who defended Silvia Baraldini of the May 19th Communist Organization during her trial for complicity in the Brinks robbery, visited both Marilyn Jean Buck of the BLA and William Morales (also her client) shortly before their escape from prison. It will be recalled that Baraldini was convicted for her alleged role in the escape of Joanne Chesimard from prison. Baraldini had been legal assistant to Tipograph prior to her arrest. In a number of cases, NLG members have been indicted or subpoenaed for alleged roles in the escape or attempted escape of terrorists from police custody or prison.

Prison gangs, increasingly considered a serious problem by penal authorities, offer an organizational base by which convicts can be politicized or ideologized. One of the four largest such gangs is the Black Guerrilla Family, described by Detective Arleigh McCree of the Los Angeles Police Department in testimony before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on August 12, 1982 as "essentially the inprison component of the Black Liberation Army," and he added,
I know many of them and have known many of them for years. They are a revolutionary group inside the prison walls. Their philosophy is entirely compatible, if not identical, as I say, to the Black Liberation Army's. They seek revolution, and they are a very violent group. Many of them are very proficient with weapons and explosives, and Mr. Pratt [Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt, a founder of the BLA and leader of the Black Guerrilla Family, now in prison], of course, being supreme in that category, I might add.

Arm the Spirit, a "revolutionary prisoners newspaper" published in Berkeley, California, has published communiques from the BLA and MCO in support of the Brinks robbery as well as communiques from the RNA and other violent or extremist groups from prison chapters in Iowa, Washington state, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and other states. It has also published a statement of the "Coalition to Support Black August," a group associated with the Black August Organizing Committee, which defines itself as

comprised of prisoners who define themselves as Afrikan revolutionaries dedicated to the national liberation of Afrikan people in this country and to the ongoing struggle against racism, exploitation and police brutality in prison and in the Afrikan community.... It has...built significant unity and solidarity between the prison movement and the struggles in El Salvador, Iran, the Native American struggle and other Third World and progressive movement.

Given the similarities between this "anti-imperialist" theme and the ideology of groups such as the MCO, RNA, BLA, ARU, UFF, JBAKC, etc., it is not surprising that, as the Information Digest noted, the Coalition to Support Black August "has been seeking national support from organizations associated with violence-oriented and terrorist groups including the Weather Underground Organization and the Communist Workers Party."

Foreign Connections of U.S. Terrorism:

The rise of transnational terrorism in the 1970s, with support from regimes such as those of Libya, Iraq, and Syria, as well as the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East European satellite countries, has led to speculation on the extent of foreign support for terrorist activity in the United States. The position of the FBI on this question has varied somewhat over the past few years. In a speech of July 6, 1978 Judge Webster expressed doubt that Cuba supported American terrorists, although he did suggest that "many of the propaganda manuals" of Puerto Rican terrorist groups had been printed in Cuba. On April 26, 1981, speaking on "Meet the Press," Judge Webster stated
that “there is no real evidence of Soviet-sponsored terrorism within the United States.” More recently, in the aftermath of the bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building, Judge Webster told reporters on November 10, 1983 that support from the Soviet Union and Cuba to American terrorists “cannot be ruled out,” but reiterated that he did not have evidence of direct involvement.

It must be noted, however, that there is an increasing body of facts to suggest at least a continuing liaison between the underground terrorist movement described above and various foreign based movements — especially the so-called “national liberation movements” of the Third World which are themselves often closely connected to and supported by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the WUO, the Venceremos Brigade, and similar “New Left” groups in the United States had extensive contacts with and support from the governments and intelligence services of the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Vietnam, Communist China, and some East European Soviet satellites. Much of this support was documented in a 98-page summary of evidence presented by the defense in the 1980 trial of FBI officials Mark Felt and Edward Miller. To cite only one instance from this document —— prepared with the assistance of the FBI —— “the FBI learned from a reliable source that Weatherman Howard Machtinger was in Canada being instructed by a Russian advisor on how to make bombs.” In 1973 the Annual Report of the FBI stated

A current tabulation shows that approximately 135 leaders of subversive Puerto Rican independence groups have traveled to communist Cuba for indoctrination and/or training. Many of them received extensive instructions in guerrilla warfare tactics, preparation of explosive devices and sophisticated sabotage methods.

A large majority of persons so trained have instructed others upon their return to Puerto Rico and have carried out acts of sabotage there. Dozens of these individuals are presently awaiting trial for violations of Puerto Rico’s Explosives Law or are being sought as fugitives for such violations. It is commonly thought that vigorous police action against these terrorists is primarily responsible for the decline in the number of bombings during the past year.

As late as 1976 a California based terrorist group, the Emiliano Zapata Unit, had an adviser named Andres Gomez who was identified by American intelligence sources as an officer of the DGI, the Cuban intelligence service. Gomez disappeared after the group was apprehended by police. Extensive information on Cuban involvement in terrorist incidents in the United States was presented in hearings before the Subcom-
In September 1981 Judith Clark, arrested one month later for her role in the Brinks robbery, represented the May 19th Communist Organization at a conference in Lebanon sponsored by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese National Movement. According to the newsletter of the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee of October–November 1981 “500 delegates attended, primarily from Western and Eastern Europe, and the socialist countries and National Liberation movements.” According to Clark herself, “The conference was an international conference in solidarity with the Lebanese and Palestinian struggles.”

As noted above, the MCO, UFF, and ARU have frequently expressed their solidarity with and support for the liberation movements of the Third World. Their solidarity with such movements in southern Africa is especially significant. Several of the bombing targets of the UFF have been facilities associated with the Republic of South Africa or trade with South Africa. The bombings by the UFF of the South African Purchasing Office and an IBM office in Elmont and Harrison, N.Y., on December 16, 1982 were carried out “in the spirit of resistance with the African National Congress and Nelson Mandela and all African peoples on the motherland,” according to the UFF communique. It is perhaps significant that the date December 16 is a special one for the African National Congress (ANC), a Communist Party-dominated terrorist group in South Africa. As Sechaba, the official organ of the ANC (printed in East Germany), expressed it in December 1981:

On December 16, 1961, organised acts of sabotage against government installations took place, marking the emergence of Umkhonto We Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation) which was later to become the armed wing of the ANC. The date, December 16, which was chosen for the initial sabotage acts, was of historical significance. . . .

To the Africans this day symbolises resistance and the indomitable quest for freedom. . . .

The date December 16 is celebrated in South Africa as the anniversary of the Battle of Blood River on December 16, 1838 in which the Afrikaners defeated the Zulu warriors; to the ANC and its adherents, however, the date “is thus symbolic for the ascendancy of white power over the Blacks.” Two days after the UFF bombings in New York, the ANC itself carried out a bombing of the Koeberg nuclear power station under construction near Cape Town. Four bombs were exploded and claimed by the ANC on December 20. The ANC stated that “the explosions served as a warning to foreign investors in South Africa of what would become of their investments.” The Koeberg plant was being constructed
with the aid of a French consortium. The UFF in its
communique on the bombing of IBM also emphasized that foreign
investors have been significant in developing South African
industry and (allegedly) apartheid and racism, quoting the
ANC to this effect, and rationalized its bombing as a warn-
ing to other foreign contractors and investors in South Africa.

The relationship between the Brinks robbery-murders and
the ANC and other southern African terrorist movements is
suggested by reports of visits to radical states in that region
and of guerilla training by these states or associated terrorist
movements. According to a report of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police,

...component elements of RATF [Revolutionary
Armed Task Force, the nom de guerre applied
to the Brinks gang] have raised funds and main-
tained political connections with the ZANU
Popular Front that is currently ruling the African
country [Zimbabwe] undergoing revolutionary
 upheavals.

Silvia Baraldini of the MCO has visited Zimbabwe under its
present government and has stated

May 19th Communist Organization in 1977 began
actively to work with the Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Union (ZANU). We supported the party
in their struggle to lead the Zimbabwean people
to independence, to overthrow the white settler
regimes and to end the presence of British im-
perialism in their country.

Nathaniel Burns, also convicted for his role in the Brinks rob-
bbery and murders, has been reported to have received guer-
illa training in Angola from Cuban advisers to the Marxist
MPLA, which now rules Angola, and to have fought with
the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO). After
her escape from prison in 1979, Joanne Chesimard reported-
ly expressed interest in seeking refuge in Libya, Angola,
Cuba, or China according to witness Tyrone Rison. On
March 8, 1982, an FBI listening device recorded a conversa-
tion between Mutulu Shakur, one of the leaders of the RATF
and still at large, and Edward Joseph, later indicted and con-
victed as an accessory in the Brinks case, during a meeting
in Greenwich Village. Joseph is reported to have stated, “We
should be concentrating on lining up bankroll, making a flam-
boyant move, leave here for Zimbabwe.”

Although no definite conclusions can be drawn at this time
regarding material assistance from foreign states or terrorist
groups to those involved in the Brinks crime and similar ter-
rorist incidents, it is clear that the American terrorists feel
and express strong sympathy for a number of Marxist ter-
rorist movements and states in the Middle East, southern
Africa, and Central America; that there is reliable informa-
tion of some cooperation between these American terrorists
and their foreign counterparts; and that the possibility of more extensive foreign support for American terrorist activities not only cannot be excluded but also should be aggressively investigated.

Conclusion:

The core of the underground terrorist movement in the United States consists of elements that grew out of the Weather Underground Organization of the 1970s operating in alliance with violent organizations of black nationalists (the BLA and RNA) and with FALN. It is unlikely that this core is numerically large, although its periphery, the above-ground support groups, is larger. The Brinks robbery and the subsequent investigations and trials appear to have disrupted its organization and strategy. Nevertheless, this movement remains the most dangerous terrorist group in the United States. It has shown itself capable of operating clandestinely for some years prior to its accidental failure and exposure in the Brinks incident. It was able to accumulate at least several hundred thousand dollars through “expropriations,” to free incarcerated members and sympathizers from prisons and provide them security, to establish a network of safehouses, to create virtually a nationwide (and perhaps an international) network of supporters and sympathizers, and to maintain communications with and discipline over this network. Most of the $873,000 stolen in armed robberies prior to the Brinks incident remains unaccounted for, and a number of the principal suspects in these robberies remain at large— including the command nucleus of the Black Liberation Army, Joanne Chesimard, Mutulu Shakur, and Marilyn Jean Buck. As long as these three remain at large and as long as convict recruiting and organizing continues, it is likely that the BLA or similar groups will continue their terrorism.

Since the Brinks robbery the terrorist underground has shown itself capable of constructing, placing, and detonating over a dozen bombs, and not one of these bombings has yet been solved by law enforcement authorities. One of these bombings (of the U.S. Capitol Building in 1983) attracted international attention and has been a principal factor in increasing public awareness of and governmental concern about terrorism. Although most of these bombings were probably not intended to kill, it is a fair assumption that those responsible for them do not seriously object to killing. Certainly this is suggested by both their public rhetoric as well as their continuing defense of the murders in the Brinks robbery and escape. Had the United States Senate been in session on the evening of the Capitol bombing, a number of Senators and staff members could easily have been killed or seriously injured. The terrorist movement therefore has the capacity and the will to take life and use violence for its ideological purposes, and it may be merely a matter of time before it embarks on an intentionally murderous course to make its point.
The terrorist underground, however, is only one of a series of terrorist groups believed to be operating in the United States, although there is little evidence as yet of firm linkages among most of these other groups. In mid 1984, the FBI was reported to be actively investigating 19 U.S.-based groups suspected of terrorism and to be cooperating with foreign authorities in the investigation of 15 to 20 other groups believed to be involved in international terrorism. Oliver B. Revell, Assistant Director of the FBI, noted that 40% of all terrorist activities (including international terrorism) target U.S. individuals or assets. The widespread nature of the terrorist threat has led some authorities to warn of increased terrorism in the United States, despite the apparent decline in terrorist incidents as counted by the FBI. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, for example, stated in late 1983 that that year "is going to be probably the bloodiest year for which we have any statistics" and "in looking at incidents with 10 or more fatalities, we have had already this year than in 1980-82 combined." The Department of State in November 1983 counted 300 deaths due to international terrorism in Beirut alone, as compared to 150 deaths from all international terrorism in 1982, and Jenkins estimated that the death toll from all international terrorism in 1983 would be about 500 and from "local terrorism" worldwide about 2000 to 5000. In December 1983 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, stated, "I think the prospect of 1984 being the year the [terrorists] bring the war to our shores is real. We should assume it and not be surprised by it." W. Raymond Wannall, a former Assistant Director of the FBI and a well-known expert on terrorism and internal security matters, has also suggested that 1984 could be the "Year of the Terrorist" in a recent publication of the Nathan Hale Institute.

In preparation for anticipated terrorist attacks, several government institutions established new security precautions and procedures. Three days after the bombing of the U.S. Capitol Building, the Congress established special identification badges for staff members and mandatory use of metal detectors and searches for visitors to Congressional buildings, and access to certain parts of the Capitol Building was restricted for tourists and visitors. Other special precautions were implemented by the White House, the Pentagon, and other government buildings in November and December 1983, after reports or threats of bombing attacks were received.

Further plans for offensive as well as defensive measures against terrorism were drafted or implemented in early 1984. The most impressive (in theory and actuality) were those for the Summer Olympics, although there were jurisdictional disputes between the FBI and the LAPD. Security provisions for the Summer Olympics cost more than $100 million (about 1/5 of the total budget for the Games), and the Congress appropriated an additional $50 million in the event of a major incident requiring military intervention. Military helicopters
and special communications and surveillance equipment were also purchased with federal funds. Because of the diversity of jurisdictions involved in the Olympics, no single agency had comprehensive control of security procedures, although interagency agreements for cooperation were evolved. Over 16,000 personnel were employed for security purposes at the Games, and according to Edgar Best, in charge of security for the Olympics, "This Olympics will be the first in which we take full advantage of high technology in security." In addition, the FBI developed and sent to the Olympics a hostage rescue team of 50 FBI agents that was specially trained in sharpshooting and offered an alternative to the use of military force.

In addition to precautionary measures, the Department of Defense also developed anti-terrorist plans, training, and procedures in the aftermath of the Beirut bombing, and in early 1984 the White House issued a National Security Council Directive (NSDD-138) reportedly implementing more aggressive measures for combating terrorism. This new policy toward terrorism was reflected in Secretary Shultz's public comments on the concept of regarding terrorism as a form of warfare, although it is still not clear if the full dimensions of this concept have been grasped. Finally, the Administration as well as members of Congress introduced new legislation intended to address international terrorist threats.

The most effective means of combating terrorism does not consist in more legislation, executive orders, interdepartmental conferences, additional concrete barriers, or pamphlets such as this one. The most effective means of combating terrorism consists of a domestic security and intelligence capacity adequate to investigate groups and individuals who are ideologically prone to violence and to anticipate and prevent their violence. Since at least the early or mid 1970s, the United States at the federal level (and increasingly at the state and local levels) has not possessed such a capacity, a defect examined in detail in W. Raymond Wannall's *Who is Tracking the Terrorists*, published by the Nathan Hale Institute. The imposition of the Attorney General's Guidelines for domestic security investigations (the "Levi Guidelines") in 1976 and the resultant erosion of domestic security investigations played an important role in allowing the formation of the underground terrorist movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although groups such as the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee and the May 19th Communist Organization were formed in 1977 and 1978, due to the Levi Guidelines they could not be investigated by the FBI. The lack of investigation coupled with the evolution of a new identity and strategy of the Weather Underground Organization led the FBI to the erroneous conclusion that the WUO had ceased to function and to the termination of its investigation of the WUO and Prairie Fire Organizing Committee in 1979. Only in the wake of the Brinks robbery and its ramifications were similar or derivative groups placed under FBI investiga-
tion. The apprehension of FALN members in April, 1980 in Illinois and the subsequent apprehension and prosecution of other members of this terrorist group were due purely to an accident (the fortuitous suspicion by a neighbor of activities near what was a safehouse for the FALN) and not in the least to law enforcement intelligence efforts.

That intelligence investigation of extremist groups can be effective in preventing terrorism is shown by the example (to take one of many) of informants in the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (emplaced prior to the Levi Guidelines) who in 1977 alerted police to the planned bombing of the office of a California state senator. Because of this information, the bombing was prevented and several key members of the PFOC and WUO were arrested. The value of anticipative (or "pro-active") intelligence in preventing terrorism and the lack of such intelligence in the U.S. intelligence community in recent years has been acknowledged by several authorities. In the wake of the attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30, 1981, the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, in a review of the performance of the Department in connection with the attempt, noted,

From the protection-oriented perspective of the [Secret] Service, therefore, the decline in FBI domestic intelligence activities has caused a critical overall decline in the useful information the Service receives from the FBI. In November 1979, Secret Service Director Stuart Knight testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Service was, at that time, receiving only about 40 percent of what it had previously received from the FBI, and that this reduced intelligence product had deteriorated in quality. Explaining what he meant by quality, he referred to the loss of information concerning motives and plans.

Knight repeated these statement in the aftermath of the March 30 assassination attempt, in testimony before other committees of the House and Senate, specifically attributing this loss of useful intelligence to the Attorney General’s Domestic Security Guidelines.

More recently, a similar conclusion on the role of intelligence (albeit foreign, not domestic security, intelligence) was noted by the Department of Defense Commission (the "Long Commission") on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act:

The Commission concludes that although the USMNF commander received a large volume of intelligence warnings concerning potential terrorist threats prior to 23 October 1983, he was not provided with the timely intelligence, tailored to his specific operational needs, that was
necessary to defend against the broad spectrum of threats he faced.

The Commission further concludes that the HUMINT [human intelligence] support to the USMNF commander was ineffective, being neither precise nor tailored to his needs. The Commission believes that the paucity of U.S. controlled HUMINT provided to the USMNF commander is in large part due to policy decisions which have resulted in a U.S. HUMINT capability commensurate with the resources and time that have been spent to acquire it.

In March 1983 the Department of Justice issued new guidelines for domestic security investigations to replace those issued by Attorney General Levi. These “Smith Guidelines” have been in effect for a little more than a year, and to date it is too early to make an informed judgment on their effectiveness. There is some reason to believe, however, that many of the same problems persist.

The underground terrorist network in the United States offers several opportunities for effective intelligence that, until recently, have been missed and may still be missed. The terrorist groups in this network have generated a nation-wide series of above-ground support groups that regularly publicize their activities, ideology, membership, strategy, and interconnections as well as their self-proclaimed enemies and potential targets. Under the Levi Guidelines, the FBI was not permitted to read such publications (let alone to employ informants in or utilize more intrusive techniques on such groups), and not until after the Brinks robbery was the FBI able to investigate these support groups or analyze their publicly available documents. The importance of investigating terrorist support groups has been emphasized by General Shlomo Gazit, former Director of Israeli Military Intelligence, and Michael Handel at a symposium in 1980:

Very few organizations can operate in complete or full compartmentalization and do not depend on networks of local supporters. Such supporters help the terrorist organization, either because of ideological motivation or through fear and blackmail, without being directly involved in terrorist operations. The importance of penetrating the sympathizers’ or supporters’ system lies in the fact that it is easier to penetrate it than the more highly closed terrorist organization. By penetrating this supportive system it may be possible to penetrate the organization itself or obtain indirect information about it. Also, it is much easier to deter such supporters from continuing their assistance than to deter the members of the organization itself. By reducing or eliminating
this supportive system, we can undermine the
capacity for action of the terrorist organization.

The very need of terrorist organizations to propagandize, gain
legitimacy, and support themselves logistically therefore
represents a vulnerability of terrorist activity that can be (but
has not yet been) exploited by law enforcement to anticipate
and prevent terrorist violence.

The occurrence of several nationally or internationally con-
spicuous events in the summer of 1984 suggested the possibili-
ty of terrorist attacks on them, and attempts by terrorists on
future mass public events should not be ruled out. Both the
indigenous terrorist movement described in this report as well
as other, largely foreign terrorist groups (consisting of Libyan,
Iranian, Palestinian, Armenian, Cuban, or Central American
terrorists or their American adherents) have reason to
embarrass, disrupt, or destroy what national or international
events represent and to gain the publicity that such attacks
generate. Nevertheless, the Olympics and similar highly visi-
table public events are not the main issue in thinking about and
dealing with terrorism, and protective, organizational, and
legislative measures are not the principal means by which
terrorism can be prevented or deterred. After these events
pass, the terrorist underground in the United States will per-
sist, and it is this network that at the present time represents
the most serious threat of terrorist violence in the United
States for the future.
Other Studies in the Nathan Hale Institute's Terrorist Series:

1984 — Year of the Terrorist?
By W. Raymond Wannall

Who is Tracking the Terrorists?
By W. Raymond Wannall

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